



**AUTOMOTIVE  
LINUX SUMMIT**

# **OpenGL Graphics Drivers in Safety Critical Environments: Fact, Fiction and Future**

**Rick Tewell  
July 2016**

# Joshua Brown



40 years old  
Navy SEAL for 11 years  
Owner of a wireless networking tech company  
Lived in Canton Ohio


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Avid lover of his Tesla Model S



# Tesla-S Autopilot Failure



*His Tesla Model S crashed after failing to activate its brakes because the auto pilot function didn't realize that the white side of a tractor-trailer in front of the vehicle was not the sky.*

*Died on May 7, 2016 in northern Florida when his Tesla-S "autopilot" failed to stop when a tractor-trailer made a legal turn in front of him. His Tesla-S struck the trailer at 65 mph (105 kph).*







# Apollo 1 Fire – January 27, 1967



- ✓ Pure oxygen environment
- ✓ Capsuled at high pressure - 16.7 psi - 14.7 psi (sea level)
- ✓ 34 square feet of super flammable Velcro - almost like carpeting
- ✓ Highly flammable nylon space suits
- ✓ Hatch design - couldn't be opened if pressure above sea level
- ✓ It was generally known that Apollo Block I had potential safety issues



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# Space Shuttle Challenger – January 28, 1986



- ✓ Solid rocket boosters O-rings become brittle at low temperatures (known at time of launch)
- ✓ Shuttle sat at extremely low temperatures for hours overnight prior to launch
- ✓ At launch temperature was “within range” but O-rings were still frozen solid and brittle

# Rare Occurrences?

- Shutdown of Atlanta Airport due to software not reporting that a security screening test was underway. Thought by security to be a “real” incident...
- Total loss of communication between Air Traffic Control and Aircraft at LA Airport for three hours - Microsoft Windows server 50-day “reboot” to prevent data overload...
- Crash of Air France Flight 447 – Airbus A330-200 - unreliable cockpit reporting of airspeed and other critical flight information –all 228 people on board perished...
- Crash of Korean Air Flight 801 – Boeing 747-300 – ATC disabled minimum safe altitude warning function in the radar system because it generated alerts that were considered annoying – flight crashed into a hill on approach to Guam airport - 228 died and 26 survived with major injuries.
- Crash of American Airlines Flight 965 – autopilot flew a Boeing 757 into a mountain near Bogota, Colombia – flight system was set for waypoint Rozo instead of Romeo because the co-pilot entered an “R” <enter> into the system and the FMS selected the wrong waypoint by default.





# Rare Occurrences?

- Loss of Mars Polar Lander – premature engine shutdown due to spurious signals that touchdown had occurred – total loss of spacecraft.
- Loss of Mars Climate Orbiter – imperial units programmed into flight system instead of metric units – total loss of spacecraft.
- Misplacement of Satellite by Launch Vehicle – RCS system ran out of fuel due to unexpectedly large number of initial launch stabilization corrections due to improper constants being compiled into the flight software causing the vehicle to roll during uphill flight – total loss of satellite.
- Emergency Shutdown of the Hatch Nuclear Power Plant – an update on the plant's business server affected the control system server by resetting it (somehow?!?) and The safety systems thought it detected a drop in water reservoirs thereby triggering an emergency shutdown.
- Miscalculated Radiation Doses at the National Oncology Institute in Panama – 56 patients were treated improperly – 28 “at risk” patients subsequently died. The software allowed radiation therapists to draw “shielding blocks” on a computer screen for radiation shielding. Through a series of complications – the shielding blocks did not draw as intended doubling the radiation dosing for certain patients with certain “drawn shielding blocks”.



# Rare Occurrences?

- Patriot Missile – Software Bug Led to System Failure at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia – the radar ranging incoming detection system would “drift” over time – requiring a periodic restart to keep the range detection system accurate. This particular Patriot system had been running for well over 100 hours without a restart and therefore was wildly inaccurate (restarts were recommended every eight hours) and looking in the wrong place for incoming missiles. An incoming missile went undetected and 28 US military personnel were killed and 98 more injured.



# *Reasons for Catastrophic Failures?*

- Failure of Imagination
- Irrational Exuberance - "Go Fever"
- Incorrect Assumptions



# Consequences

- 38,000 Automobile Crash Deaths in 2015 in the USA

This is the equivalent of a fully loaded Boeing 747 –and- a fully loaded Airbus A330 crashing every week killing everyone on board

- Will autonomous vehicles on the road improve the situation or make it worse?







**Bloomberg  
Technology**

Markets

Tech

Pursuits

Politics

Opinion

Businessweek

# Driverless-Car Global Market Seen Reaching \$42 Billion by 2025

by Jeff Green

January 8, 2015 – 2:03 PM CST



f



Vehicles that drive themselves on the freeway or take over in traffic jams may be on the road in large numbers by 2017 and autonomous cars might create a \$42 billion market for the technology by 2025, Boston Consulting Group said.

Self-driving cars, building on technology already available in many luxury vehicles, will be able to navigate crowded city streets by 2022 and may be a quarter of worldwide auto sales by 2035, the firm said today, citing interviews with industry executives and consumer surveys. Japan and western Europe will probably adopt the technology most quickly, its study found.

# *The Self Driving Car!*

**Are we ready?**

**Is the technology ready?**

**How can we help?**



# Benefits of Autonomous Car?



## Increase in fuel efficiency

Steering wheels, columns, pedals and gear sticks can be removed, saving weight and fuel.



## Removal of Driving Stipulations

Older, disabled, and intoxicated drivers can still have auto access.



## Reduced Vehicle Insurance

With fewer crashes, insurance will be heavily reduced.



## Increase in Productivity

Americans spend nearly 100 hours sitting in traffic every year.



## Reduction of Car Parking Spaces

Acting like a taxi, users can summon their car with a smartphone.



## Fewer Traffic Collisions

Humans are to blame for 93% of crashes.

## Google's Aspiration

## Potential Annual Benefits (US only)

### 90% reduction in ACCIDENTS

4.95 million fewer accidents  
30,000 fewer deaths  
2 million fewer injuries  
\$400 billion saving in cost

### 90% reduction WASTED COMMUTING

4.8 billion fewer commuting hours  
1.9 billion gallons in fuel savings  
\$101 billion saved in lost productivity and fuel cost

### 90% reduction in CARS

Reduce cost per trip-mile by 80%+  
Car utilization from 5-10% to 75%+  
Better land use.



# Self Driving Car Technologies

## LIDAR ■

Light Detection and Ranging system. The car uses lasers, spinning at upwards of 900 rpm, to generate a **point cloud** that gives the car a **360-degree view**.

## Video Cameras ■

Cameras recognise lane markings, road signs, objects, and pedestrians.

## GPS

Geo Positioning Service combined with tachometers, altimeters and gyroscopes to **pin-point the car better than any standard GPS**.

## Central Computer


Understanding formal and informal rules of the road, the computer analyses information and **controls steering, acceleration and braking**.

## Radar Sensors ■

Track nearby objects and vehicles, and **alert to possible collisions**.

## Ultrasonic Sensors

Wheel-mounted sensors measure **velocity and proximity to nearby objects** as the car manoeuvres through traffic.





# Self Driving Car Technologies

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# SAFETY CERTIFIED?

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
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
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# VeriSilicon Automotive Technologies





#1 Graphics IP supplier for Automotive LCD Clusters

#2 Graphics IP supplier for In-Vehicle Infotainment Systems

#3 Graphics IP supplier for Rear Seat Entertainment Systems

*Vivante Graphics IP is used by 7 of the top 10 automotive OEMs for IVI systems*

*...and 6 of the top 10 luxury brands for reconfigurable instrument cluster*

**\*\* Over 20 million cars on the road use Vivante GPUs \*\***

# VeriSilicon Automotive Deep Partnerships



android auto



Apple CarPlay





# VeriSilicon Automotive Deep Customer Experience

**DELPHI**

**DENSO**



**Pioneer**

**MAGNETI  
MARELLI**



HYUNDAI  
**MOBIS**

**Continental**

**TechniSat®**



**Autoliv**

**Valeo**

**ALPINE®**

**Panasonic**



**NIPPON SEIKI CO., LTD.**



# VeriSafe Technology


A combination of software and hardware technologies / features to bring TRUE safety critical GPU solutions to safety critical markets...



# Safety Critical Software?

IEEE

*“software whose use in a system can result in unacceptable risk.  
Safety-critical software includes software whose operation or  
Failure to operate can lead to a hazardous state, software intended  
to recover from hazardous states, and software intended to mitigate  
the severity of an accident”*




## Software Safety Standards

Avionics	➡	DO-178C / ARP 4754A
Medical	➡	IEC 60601 Edition 3
Nuclear Power	➡	IEC 60880-2
Automotive	➡	ISO26262
Industrial	➡	IEC 61508 Edition 2




# Khronos Safety Critical Working Group




K H R  N O S  
G R O U P



# Target Applications for OpenGL SC



# Goals of OpenGL SC



OpenGL SC is specifically designed to be able to be used in safety critical systems. The two primary requirements for any safety critical system are that the system is *deterministic* and *fully testable*.

It will always produce the *same output from a given initial state*, and it is fully testable in accordance with industry safety critical certifications. OpenGL SC is designed to meet FAA Mandated DO-178C Level A and EASA ED-12C Level A for avionics and ISO 262626 for automotive systems.

# Safety Critical Systems Require

- ⚠ Independent certification authority
- ⚠ Constant Monitoring and Failure Detection
- ⚠ True Determinism
- ⚠ Risk Assessments and Mitigation
- ⚠ Reliability (proven service hours)
- ⚠ Process and Traceability
- ⚠ Documentation (planning, development and verification phases)
- ⚠ Firewalling from non-safety centric processes



Ref: [http://vector.com/portal/medien/vector\\_consulting/publications/Webinar\\_Safety.pdf](http://vector.com/portal/medien/vector_consulting/publications/Webinar_Safety.pdf)

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
**FAR MORE THAN JUST  
SOURCE CODE!**




Ref: [http://vector.com/portal/medien/vector\\_consulting/publications/Webinar\\_Safety.pdf](http://vector.com/portal/medien/vector_consulting/publications/Webinar_Safety.pdf)




# Linux OpenGL Ecosystem




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


# Linux OpenGL Ecosystem + OpenGL SC






# AGL Built on Linux



# Wide Automotive Industry Support




# AGL + OpenGL SC



*The OpenGL ES software stack is commonly the largest and most complicated software in a cluster / IVI system...and the source of most software failures.*

*OpenGL SC will help...*



# OpenGL SC Implementations



## ArgusCore SC1™

CoreAVI's ArgusCore SC1 drivers are a superset of Khronos' OpenGL SC 1.0 API specification (OpenGL for safety critical applications). The OpenGL SC 1.0 graphics libraries are implemented to support a fixed function graphics rendering pipeline. Today, CoreAVI's ArgusCore SC1 libraries are used extensively in certified avionics display systems utilizing fixed function safety critical graphics applications.

## ArgusCore SC2™


CoreAVI completed and deployed the industry's very first OpenGL SC 2.0 graphics driver. CoreAVI's ArgusCore SC2 drivers are a superset of Khronos' OpenGL SC 2.0 API specification. The OpenGL SC 2.0 graphics libraries support a programmable graphics rendering pipeline. The drivers allows safety critical applications to take greater advantage of the performance gains by utilizing modern graphics processor shader engines while still maintaining the ability to achieve the highest levels of safety certification. ArgusCore SC2 enables users to deploy modern GPU shader programs in safety certifiable environments.

## CertCore178™

Available today, CoreAVI's complete FAA DO-178C and EASA ED-12C Level A certification data packages support the use of ArgusCore SC graphics drivers in any FAA DO-178C / EASA ED-12C avionics safety certification.

## Modular and Adaptable Architecture

Based on a highly modular architecture, CoreAVI can optimize their customer's specific applications and quickly adapt the OpenGL libraries to new hardware platforms, operating systems and even add customer specific features. Video capture enhancements, display controller settings, and deterministic memory management modules can be quickly modified to address unique device specific requirements.



ArgusCore SC Modular Architecture





# OpenGL SC Implementations



## GL Studio SC


### User Interfaces for Safety Critical Systems

GL Studio SC (Safety Critical) offers essential features for developing certifiable embedded safety critical user interfaces. The GL Studio SC editor enables the creation of 2D and 3D geometry in real-time through a WYSIWYG environment, alleviating the need to write cumbersome code by hand.

GL Studio SC generates Safety Critical Embedded C++ (SCEC++) code that conforms to the WP-AM-003 standard. This standard, published by the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) Special Interest Group on Programming Languages (SIGPLAN), specifies the subset of the C++ language for use in embedded and safety critical applications.

## Product Benefits

- ✓ 10x faster production time than traditional hand coding with SCEC++
- ✓ Runtime library with 4,000 lines of code reduces certification complexity and cost
- ✓ Development cost savings from building certified displays from the start
- ✓ Compact and OS Independent runtime library
- ✓ Seamless integration with previously developed OpenGL code




# Autonomous Vehicle Safety Critical Engineering



The University of Texas at Austin  
Electrical and Computer  
Engineering



## UT AutoSafe Lab



*Launching this Fall to tackle the issues surrounding safety critical engineering and autonomous vehicles...*



The University of Texas at Austin  
Electrical and Computer  
Engineering



## UT AutoSafe Lab

- ❗ Techniques and practices to make open source safe for use in Safety Critical systems – i.e. Automotive Grade Linux, Zephyr (RTOS for embedded systems – Linux Foundation Initiative), OpenGL SC, etc.
- ❗ Analysis of existing government regulations for safety critical solutions – FAA DO-178C, DO-330, etc. and its applicability to other safety critical applications such as automotive – this includes specific recommendations of changes that should be made to make the standards broader based instead of a specific application like aviation.
- ❗ Analysis / auditing of current autonomous vehicle solutions for potential points of failure and unexpected behaviors – The result of such audits would be concrete recommendations to improve such solutions from a safety critical standpoint.
- ❗ Recommendations and engineering solutions relative to COTS hardware and software systems to improve their role in safety critical systems – with a special focus on graphics and vision systems.




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Dr. Ahmed Tewfik - [tewfik@austin.utexas.edu](mailto:tewfik@austin.utexas.edu)  
Rick Tewell – [rick.tewell@verisilicon.com](mailto:rick.tewell@verisilicon.com)



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# Questions

