

A GRAPH-BASED METHOD FOR CROSS-ENTITY THREAT DETECTION

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Account Takeover

The image is a word cloud visualization of the English alphabet. Each letter is represented by a collection of words and numbers. The words are of various sizes and orientations, creating a dense, colorful collage. The numbers are also of various sizes and orientations, interspersed among the words. The overall effect is a dense, colorful collage of text that represents the entire alphabet.

Detection is Key

- Basic features
- Known signature
- Usage anomaly


Each with their weaknesses



CrossLinks

- Unexpected common features, across unrelated user accounts / environments
- Features:
 - IP, location, time zone,
 - user agent, browser fingerprint,
 - user action sequence, ...





Why Graph(X)?

- Why Graph?
 - Classical pair-wise entity relationship measurement solutions require $O(N^2)$ computations
 - Computation complexity dramatically reduced by localizing computations
 - Highly extensible solution with a multigraph
- Why GraphX?
 - Spark ecosystem
 - Scalability and performance
 - Advanced Graph algorithms



Graph-theoretical Techniques

- Graph analysis is of high interest in many social network contexts
 - Proximity-based approaches
 - Personalized pagerank: closeness of each node to the restart nodes
 - Simrank: similarity of contextual structures
- Bridge-Node anomaly [Akoglu, et al 2015]
 - Publication networks: authors from different research communities
 - Financial trading networks: cross-sector traders
 - Customer-product networks: cross-border products
 - Network intrusion detection: cut-vertices indicating nodes accessing multiple communities that they do not belong to




Bipartite Graph

Bipartite: Application access data directly makes a **bipartite graph** where an edge represents V_1 accessing V_2



Multigraph Formulation

We can also formulate the relationship of application access data as a ***multigraph*** where an edge between two entities represents some features that the two entities have in common.



Anomaly Detection by Graph Change Detection

- Our objective is to quickly discover changes in the access graph over time
- Unexpected new cross-entity connections are of particular interest in security detection problems
- A naïve detector and a community-based algorithm were proposed for access anomaly detection with a graph



Naïve Detector

REFERENCE GRAPH (TRAINING) – RG

DETECTION GRAPH (TESTING) – DG

MERGE OF RG & DG – RGDG

ANOMALY GRAPH (DEGREE INFO) – AG


CONNECTIVITY GRAPH (ENV-TO-ENV) – CG

Detection:


```
//outDegRG: count of neighbors in test nodes  
//outDegRGDG: count of neighbors of nodes in the combination of test  
data and reference data  
//We like to calculate the difference between the two degree  
//properties : outDegRGDG – outDegRG
```

Naïve Detector

Reference Graph




Detection Graph



Merge (RG, DG)



Anomaly Graph with Degree Info



Edges in **red**: edges in only the detection graph but not the reference graph.

Edges in **blue**: edges in both the detection graph and the reference graph.


```
case class DegreeCnt(feature: String, outDegRG: Int, outDegRGDG: Int)

val initDegreeInfo: Graph[DegreeCnt, Int] =
  RG.mapVertices{ case (id, feature) => DegreeCnt(feature, 0, 0) }

val DegreeGraph = initDegreeInfo.outerJoinVertices(RG.outDegrees) {
  case (id, u, outDegOpt) => DegreeCnt(u.feature, outDegOpt.getOrElse(0), u.outDegRGDG)
}.outerJoinVertices(RGDG.outDegrees) {
  case (id, u, outDegOpt) => DegreeCnt(u.feature, u.outDegRG, outDegOpt.getOrElse(0))
}
```

2nd-Order Connectivity


Bipartite graph




$X \cdot JOIN(X)$



Connectivity graph



2nd-Order Anomaly Graph



2nd-Order Anomaly Detector

Step 1: self join RG on the *feature-of-interest* (e.g., IP) to get the env-to-env connectivity graph.

Step 2: Build the Anomaly Graph as in the Naïve Detector algorithm (1st-order anomalies).

Step 3*: collapse the cluster of nodes into a single node on the Anomaly Graph.

Step 4: run the naive algorithm to get the updated node degrees to identify 2nd-order anomalies.

*: ConnectedComponent to approximate clusters




Experiments


- Reference Graph (RG) - Number of vertices: 2,222,613
- RG - Number of edges 2,156,104
- Connectivity Graph (CG) - Number of vertices: 4,682
- CG - Number of edges: 8,534
- CG - Number of ConnectedComponents: 1146

- Number of 1st-order anomalies: ~700
- Number of 2nd-order anomalies: ~200

- Computing time: ~ 5 minutes on a Mac Air (1.7 GHz Intel Core i7, 8G memory)




Toolkit for Interactive Analysis



Opportunities

- GraphDB for real-time indexing and query
- Probabilistic edges to support complex semantics
- Clustering on probabilistic graph for community detection



References

[Akoglu et al 2015] Akoglu, Leman, Hanghang Tong, and Danai Koutra. "Graph based anomaly detection and description: a survey." Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery 29.3 (2015): 626-688.

[Ding et al 2012] Ding, Qi, et al. "Intrusion as (anti) social communication: characterization and detection." Proceedings of the 18th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining. ACM, 2012.



THANK YOU.

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