



# Securing Application Data

Protecting user data




**John Wright**

Director, Platform Technology

# Agenda

- Data Protection and what it means for you
- Design of Data Protection in iOS 4
- How to enable Data Protection
- Adopting Data Protection in your application





# Current State

- On iPhone 3GS: All data is encrypted in place
  - No performance impact
  - Fast Remote Wipe
  - Protects “data at rest”
    - If device is stolen it is vulnerable to local attack
- Also in iPhone OS 3—encrypted backups
  - Data protected when “off device”

# Data Protection

- Goal: to keep data safe even if the device itself is compromised
- For iOS 4: the ability to tie the encrypted data to the passcode
  - Data is only available when the device is unlocked
  - Able to use choose data availability
  - Adopted by Mail, APIs available for adoption in your apps
  - No performance impact
- Still enables encrypted backups
  - Allows keychain migration between devices
  - No excuse to not use the keychain!

# Passcodes

- Reminder: Passcodes can be brute-forced
- Mitigations:
  - Backoff between failed attempts
    - Sixth failed attempt delays 10 minutes
  - Force complex passcodes
    - User-configurable in Settings
  - Force erase after number of attempts
    - User-configurable in Settings
- For iOS 4: Data protected with combination of passcode and device keys
  - Prevents attacks off device as device limits speed of attacks

## Technology

## Security Mitigation

Passcode	Prevents casual device access
Privilege Separation and Sandboxing	Limits access to system or other app data if local app compromised
Code Signing	Only code of known origins can execute
Remote Wipe	Erase all data if phone is lost
Encrypted Storage	Fast Remote Wipe
Encrypted Backups	Protects data off the device
Data Protection	Protects user's data when the device is locked



# Ultimate Goal

All apps adopt Data Protection

- We started with Mail
- We want you to choose how your data is protected
- Goal: Users know that their data is protected



# Mechanism

How and why it works

**Mitch Adler**

Architect, Embedded Security

# Protected When Locked



# Data Protection Classes

Availability	File System	Keychain
When unlocked	...ProtectionComplete	...WhenUnlocked
After first unlock		...AfterFirstUnlock
Always	...ProtectionNone	...Always


# Filesystem and Keychain

## Independent clients

- Intentionally similar semantics
- Separate class keys
- Isolates creation and accessing data


# Protection Hierarchy Example

## Protected file



# Protection Hierarchy

## File system



# Keybags

- System
- Backup
- Escrow



# System Keybag

- Holds class keys for all protected data on the device
- Contained class keys are protected with the device key
- Keybag protected with a disposable key on the file system
  - Wiped on every passcode change
    - Avoid former passcodes compromising class keys
- Lock and unlock using the users passphrase
  - Making class keys available and unavailable

# Backup Keybag

- Created for each backup (new keys)
- Holds the Class Keys for data in the backup
- Class Keys protected with backup password, if you have one
  - Uses PBKDF2 and backup password to derive key
  - If not, keychain keys are protected with device-key and cannot migrate

# Escrow Keybag

- Created for external systems
  - Improve user experience for syncing
  - Reduced device protection if synced systems are compromised
- Contains copies of system keybag class keys
- Class Keys protected with the device-key and generated key
  - Only useful with a particular device
  - Generated key can be forgotten to invalidate the keybag

# Filesystem Protection

- All Filesystem data is encrypted
- Metadata uses File System Key
  - Destroyed on remote wipe
- Files encrypted to file key
  - Stored in Metadata protected by Class Key
  - default is ...ProtectionNone
- No performance impact

# Keychain Protection

- Data protected by classes just for keychain
  - Keychain adds migratable and non-migratable classes
  - By default data is ...Always
    - Which is migratable

# Data Protection Classes

## With migration attributes

Availability	File System	Keychain
When unlocked	...ProtectionComplete	...WhenUnlocked ...WhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly
After first unlock		...AfterFirstUnlock ...AfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly
Always	...ProtectionNone	...Always ...AlwaysThisDeviceOnly

# User Passcode Handling

- Passcode transformed into key by mixing with hardware key
  - Strengthens passcode against brute force
  - Example: iPhone 4 uses 50,000 hardware operations to derive, ~50mS
- Passcode and User Passcode Key erased after unlock
  - Only exposed class keys are retained during unlock

# Data Protection Classes

## Device boot

Availability	File System	Keychain
When unlocked	<code>...ProtectionComplete</code>	<code>...WhenUnlocked</code> <code>...WhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly</code>
After first unlock		<code>...AfterFirstUnlock</code> <code>...AfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly</code>
Always	<code>...ProtectionNone</code>	<code>...Always</code> <code>...AlwaysThisDeviceOnly</code>



# Data Protection Classes

Passcode entered

Availability	File System	Keychain
When unlocked	<code>...ProtectionComplete</code>	<code>...WhenUnlocked</code> <code>...WhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly</code>
After first unlock		<code>...AfterFirstUnlock</code> <code>...AfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly</code>
Always	<code>...ProtectionNone</code>	<code>...Always</code> <code>...AlwaysThisDeviceOnly</code>

# Data Protection Classes

## Device locked

Availability	File System	Keychain
When unlocked	<code>...ProtectionComplete</code>	<code>...WhenUnlocked</code> <code>...WhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly</code>
After first unlock		<code>...AfterFirstUnlock</code> <code>...AfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly</code>
Always	<code>...ProtectionNone</code>	<code>...Always</code> <code>...AlwaysThisDeviceOnly</code>

# Summary

- Protection extends through the keybag
  - From user secrets and device keys
  - To Filesystem and Keychain
- Passcode key derivation resistant to brute-force attacks
- Keychain contents migratable via protected backups

# Configuration for Data Protection

Which knobs to turn

**John Wright**

Director, Platform Technology

# Enabling Data Protection

By the end user

- To enable on any iPhone 4:
  - Simply set the user passcode on the device
- To enable on any iPhone 3GS or iPod touch (3rd gen):
  - Must do an Erase Install first
- Coming to the iPad with iOS 4
- To check if Data Protection is enabled:
  - Go to Settings -> General -> Passcode Lock



# Enabling Data Protection

## For managed devices

- Configuration Profiles can enforce security requirements:
  - Require Data Protection is enabled
  - Require passcode length and complexity
  - Require maximum passcode grace period
  - Require encrypted backups
- Mobile Device Management
  - Initial device configuration and automatic updates
  - Remote Wipe capabilities

# Configuration

- Simple for users
- Fully manageable by enterprises

# Adoption

Adding data protection to your application

**Mitch Adler**

Architect, Embedded Security



# Protect Your Customer's Data



- Assume the data needs protection
- Put data into the right class
  - The most protective class you can
- Purge user data when the device locks

# Analyzing Data for Protection

- What data of the user's do I have?
- Do I need this when the device is locked?
- Does it belong on the keychain?
- Should it move from device to device?

# What Data of the User's Do I have?

- Everything they create
- And credentials they enter
- Credentials you create on their behalf

# Do I Need This When the Device Is Locked?

- No, for most
- Some background-aware applications need credentials
  - Use `kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlock`

# Does This Belong on the Keychain?

- Credentials—particularly those that migrate
  - Passwords
  - Keys
  - Identities
- Large bulk data: no

# Should It Move from Device to Device?

- Yes
- Unless you have a compelling reason not to
  - e.g., device identities for VPN

# Protection Choices Example

## Game

	When locked	Migrate	Keychain	Protection
Online Play Credentials	No	Yes	Yes	<code>kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlocked</code>
Saved Games	No	Yes	No	<code>NSFileProtectionComplete</code>

# Protection Choices Example

## Online Service

	When locked	Migrate	Keychain	Protection
Service Credentials	Background Task Completion	Yes	Yes	<code>kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlock</code>
Data being uploaded	Yes	No	No	<code>NSFileProtectionNone</code>
Cached Data	No	No	No	<code>NSFileProtectionComplete</code>



# Protection Choices Example

## Diary

	When locked	Migrate	Keychain	Protection
Diary Entries	No	Yes	No	NSFileProtectionComplete

# Device Locking

## What your application needs to do

- Handle Notification
  - `UIApplicationProtectedDataWillBecomeUnavailable`
- In response to notification
  - Purge data in memory not necessary while locked
    - Close files, delete memory copies
  - 10s limit to complete handling
- Protected data access after handling will fail
  - Be resilient to these failures—don't crash

# Filesystem

## Interfaces

- `-[NSData writeToFile:options:error:]`
  - Creates and associates with protection class
  - Options:
    - `NSDataWritingFileProtectionComplete`,  
`NSDataWritingFileProtectionNone`
- `-[NSFileManager setAttributes:ofItemAtPath:error:]`
  - Change the class of a file
  - Attribute: `NSFileProtectionKey`
    - `NSFileProtectionComplete`, `NSFileProtectionNone`
- Protection class persists and is not disturbed by other access
- Update protection class for existing files

# Filesystem

## Protection selection

- Use
  - ...ProtectionComplete
- Until you find a good reason to not protect your user's data

# Keychain

## Interfaces

- Select protection via SecItem API attributes
  - SecItemAdd, SecItemUpdate
  - Using attributes:
    - `kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlocked`
    - `kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlock`
    - `kSecAttrAccessibleAlways`
    - `kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly`
    - `kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly`
    - `kSecAttrAccessibleAlwaysThisDeviceOnly`
- Update existing data to appropriate class
  - Existing data defaults to `kSecAttrAccessibleAlways`

# Keychain

## Protection selection

- Start with most restrictive but migratable
  - Use `...AccessibleWhenUnlocked`
- If you find reasons to access while locked
  - Use `...AccessibleAfterFirstUnlock`
- If you create data for this device only
  - Be sure it's really only for this device
  - Use `...ThisDeviceOnly` variants

# Example

## Adding protection attributes

```
CFMutableDictionaryRef query = CFDictionaryCreateMutable(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);

CFDictionarySetValue(query, kSecClass, kSecClassGenericPassword);
CFDictionarySetValue(query, kSecAttrAccount, account);
CFDictionarySetValue(query, kSecAttrAccessible, kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlocked);
CFDictionarySetValue(query, kSecValueData, pwdata);

SecItemAdd(query, NULL);

CFRelease(query);
```

# Adoption

- Protect your user's data
  - Choose the strongest protection class you can
  - Update existing data's protection
    - Filesystem and Keychain
- Use the keychain
  - Supports migration now—last missing feature



# Wrap-up

# Why



- Devices are more mobile
- Mobile devices are more active
- Data is more personal
  - More data, higher value
- Tie data to user secret



# Data Protection



- Protect data with passcode
  - Strengthen against compromise
- Passcode key tied to hardware
  - Strengthen against brute force
- Always on when passcode enabled
- No performance impact

# Adoption

## Protect your customer's data



- In **all** applications
  - User information is everywhere
- We're adopting it—Mail first
  - More to come!
- Put data into appropriate classes
  - Update your existing data
- Use the Keychain for credentials!

# More Information

**Paul Danbold**

Evangelist

[danbold@apple.com](mailto:danbold@apple.com)

**Apple Developer Forums**

<http://devforums.apple.com>

# Related Sessions

Adopting Multitasking on iPhone OS, Part 1

Presidio  
Tuesday 11:30AM

Adopting Multitasking on iPhone OS, Part 1 (R)

Marina  
Friday 9:00AM

Adopting Multitasking on iPhone OS, Part 2

Mission  
Tuesday 3:15PM

Adopting Multitasking on iPhone OS, Part 2 (R)

Marina  
Friday 10:15AM

Managing Mobile Devices

Nob Hill  
Tuesday 3:15PM

# Labs

iPhone OS and Mac OS X Security Lab

Core OS Lab A  
Thursday 2:00PM





