Your Apps and Evolving Network Security Standards

Session 701

Bailey Basile, Secure Transports Engineer Chris Wood, Secure Transports Engineer BEAST FREAK CRIME

POODLE LogJam

Lucky13 Mis-issuance BREACH

DROWN 3HS

BEAST FREAK CRIME

POODLE Sweet32 SLOTH LogJam

FLAME SHAttered

Lucky13 NOMORE Factoring BREACH

DROWN Mis-issuance 3HS

App Transport Security update

App Transport Security update

Transport Layer Security

No "set and forget"

No "set and forget"

Standards bodies, academic research, and industry best practices

No "set and forget"

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Update libraries

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Standards bodies, academic research, and industry best practices

Update libraries

OS removes insecure options

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OS removes insecure options

ATS enforces best practices

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Update libraries

OS removes insecure options

ATS enforces best practices

Worth the maintenance cost

BEAST FREAK CRIME POODLE

Sweet32 SLOTH NOMORE FLAME

SHAttered Lucky13 LogJam Factoring

Encryption

BEAST FREAK CRIME POODLE

Sweet32 SLOTH NOMORE FLAME

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Encryption

Cryptographic hashes

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Protocols

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Encryption

Cryptographic hashes

Public keys

Protocols


Revocation

BEAST FREAK CRIME POODLE

Sweet32 SLOTH NOMORE FLAME

SHAttered Lucky13 LogJam Factoring


Encryption	BEAST	FREAK	CRIME	POODLE
Cryptographic hashes	Sweet32	SLOTH	NOMORE	FLAME
Public keys				
Protocols	SHAttered	Lucky13	LogJam	Factoring
Revocation	BREACH	DROWN	Mis-issuan	ce 3HS



RC4

3DES-CBC

AES-CBC



RC4

3DES-CBC

AES-CBC

Future removal: RC4 and 3DES





RC4


3DES-CBC

AES-CBC

AES-GCM


ChaCha20/Poly1305

Future removal: RC4 and 3DES



MD5


SHA-1



MD5

SHA-1

New removal: SHA-1 signed certificates for TLS





MD5


SHA-2 Family

SHA-1

New removal: SHA-1 signed certificates for TLS



<1024-bit RSA




<2048-bit RSA



<2048-bit RSA

New removal: <2048-bit RSA for TLS





<2048-bit RSA

≥ 2048-bit RSA

Elliptic Curves

New removal: <2048-bit RSA for TLS

Protocols

Protocols




http://

SSLv3

TLS 1.0

TLS 1.1

Protocols





http://

SSLv3


TLS 1.0

TLS 1.1

https://

TLS 1.2

Protocols






http://

SSLv3 TLS 1.2

TLS 1.0

TLS 1.1

New addition: TLS 1.3 (draft)



No checking





No checking


OCSP Stapling


Online Certificate Status Protocol


Certificate Authority


Server

Client









Online Certificate Status Protocol

Additional network connection

Online Certificate Status Protocol

Additional network connection

Compromises user privacy

Online Certificate Status Protocol

Additional network connection

Compromises user privacy

Requires app opt-in


OCSP Stapling

Certificate Authority


Server

Client

OCSP Stapling




OCSP Stapling




Client

OCSP Stapling



Client

OCSP Stapling



OCSP Stapling

OCSP Stapling

Slow adoption

OCSP Stapling


Slow adoption

Does not protect against malicious servers

Enhancement

Apple

Enhancement




Enhancement


Certificate Authority

Certificate Authority

> Certificate Authority



Enhancement



Enhancement

Certificate Authority


Certificate Authority

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Apple




Enhancement





Enhancement



Improvements

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Reduced privacy compromise

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Reduced privacy compromise

Automatic updating


Improvements

Reduced privacy compromise

Automatic updating


Faster connections

Evolving Standards






Evolving Standards





ChaCha20/Poly1305


Evolving Standards





Encryption	RC4, CBC modes	AES-GCM ChaCha20/Poly1305
Hashes	MD5, SHA-1	SHA-2 family

Evolving Standards





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
Evolving Standards





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Evolving Standards





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Revocation	No checking	Certificate Transparency OCSP Stapling

TLS Trust Removals

SHA-1 signed certificates for TLS

SHA-1 signed certificates for TLS

Certificates using <2048-bit RSA for TLS


Does not affect


Root certificates

- Root certificates
- Enterprise-distributed certificates

- Root certificates
- Enterprise-distributed certificates
- User-installed certificates

- Root certificates
- Enterprise-distributed certificates
- User-installed certificates
- Client certificates





InvalidCertChain (-9807) SSL errors with URLSession

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Servers to upgrade to new certificates

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Servers to upgrade to new certificates

https://support.apple.com/kb/HT204132

Check your implementations, libraries, and servers

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Server Developers

Replace any SHA-1 certificates or weak RSA keys

Check your implementations, libraries, and servers

- Replace any SHA-1 certificates or weak RSA keys
- Upgrade servers to TLS 1.2 and authenticated encryption ciphers

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App Developers

Check your implementations, libraries, and servers

Server Developers

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- Check that your certificates are in CT logs

App Developers

Avoid ATS exceptions

App Transport Security Update

Chris Wood, Secure Transports Engineer

App Transport Security

Current standards

App Transport Security

Current standards

From HTTP to HTTPS

- TLS 1.2
- Strong cryptography—AES and SHA-2
- Forward Secrecy—ECDHE

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Exceptions—per-domain, narrow

Exception Updates

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Expansion beyond WebKit

- AVFoundation loads
- WebView requests
- Local network connections

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Expansion beyond WebKit

- AVFoundation loads
- WebView requests
- Local network connections

Certificate Transparency requirement

ATS-Compliant Services

Practice what you preach

APNs iWork

FaceTime Spotlight

Game Center iAd

Apple Services iTunes

iCloud Services (Mail, CloudKit)

Software Update

ATS adoption is increasing

ATS adoption is increasing

Still more work to be done

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Still more work to be done

Minimize or reduce exceptions


Transport Layer Security

A long road

TLS 1.0

1999














Best practice by design

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Strong cryptography and Forward Secrecy by default

Legacy options, ciphers, and key exchange algorithms removed

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Legacy options, ciphers, and key exchange algorithms removed

Overall simpler specification

Best practice by design


Strong cryptography and Forward Secrecy by default

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
Improved network efficiency

Improved efficiency




Improved efficiency






TLS 1.3




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Improved efficiency





TLS 1.3




CH - Client Hello

SH - Server Hello


KEX - Key Share

Improved efficiency



CH - Client Hello SH - Server Hello

Improved efficiency



CH - Client Hello SH - Server Hello

It is not on by default

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You can install a profile on iOS https://developer.apple.com/go/?id=tls13-mobile-profile

It is not on by default


You can install a profile on iOS https://developer.apple.com/go/?id=tls13-mobile-profile

You can enable system-wide TLS 1.3 on macOS

defaults write /Library/Preferences/com.apple.networkd tcp_connect_enable_tls13 1

IETF standardization (2017-2018)





Implement best practices

Implement best practices

Avoid new and future algorithm removals

Implement best practices

Avoid new and future algorithm removals

Continue upgrading to modern TLS configurations

Implement best practices

Avoid new and future algorithm removals

Continue upgrading to modern TLS configurations

Minimize or remove App Transport Security exceptions

Implement best practices

Avoid new and future algorithm removals

Continue upgrading to modern TLS configurations

- Minimize or remove App Transport Security exceptions
- Try out TLS 1.3

More Information

https://developer.apple.com/wwdc17/701

Related Sessions

Privacy and Your Apps	Executive Ballroom	Tuesday 11:20AM
Advances in Networking, Part 1	Executive Ballroom	Wednesday 3:10PM
Advances in Networking, Part 2	Executive Ballroom	Wednesday 4:10PM

Labs

Security & Privacy	Technology Lab D	Tue 1:50PM-3:50PM
Security & Privacy	Technology Lab J	Wed 1:00PM-3:30PM
Networking Lab	Technology Lab D	Thu 9:00AM-11:00AM
Networking Lab	Technology Lab J	Fri 1:50PM-3:50PM

SWWDC17