

FROM CHINA WITH LOVE



by Oleg Kupreev & Nikita Tarakanov



WHO IS OLEG KUPREEV?

- ❖ Russian Security Researcher
- ❖ Hardware researching
- ❖ Software researching
- ❖ Reverse engineering
- ❖ Exploit development

WHO IS NIKITA TARAKANOV?

- ❖ Independent Russian Security Researcher
- ❖ Aka Vulnerability Assassin
- ❖ Aka Crazy Wild Russian
- ❖ Aka Stars Alinger
- ❖ Nice dude ☺



AGENDA

- ❖ **Hardware overview**
- ❖ **Software overview**
- ❖ **Infection ideas**
- ❖ **Pwning ideas**
- ❖ **Conclusion**
- ❖ **Q&A**



HARDWARE

- ❖ **Many** Mobile Partners (Beeline, Megafon, MTS, T-Mobile, Vodafone) users in different countries
- ❖ **One** modem vendor - HUAWEI
- ❖ **One** SOC vendor – Qualcomm

3G MODEMS



E173



E171



E171

MORE 3G MODEMS



4G LTE MODEMS



E 3276 (M150)

E 392



VENDOR SOFTWARE


❖ Huawei Dashboard Tool for ISO dumping and executable

dashboard generation


❖ Qualcomm QPST,QXDM,QMAT are used for all kind of

baseband reverse engineering

HUAWEI TOOL



HUAWEI_TOOL.AU3



```
        ContinueCase
    EndIf
    RunWait('' & $temp_file & '\ResHacker.exe" -modify '' & $temp_file & '\Dashboard.exe'
    If FileExists('' & $temp_file & '\Dashboard.exe'' = 1 Then
        MsgBox(16, "Error", "ResHacker modify error")
    ContinueCase
    EndIf

    it('' & $temp_file & '\ResHacker.exe" -add '' & $temp_file & '\Dashboard.exe", '' & $temp_file & '\Dashboard.exe'
    leExists('' & $dashboard_file & '') = 1 Then
        MsgBox(16, "Error", "ResHacker add error")
    ContinueCase

    it('' & $temp_file & '\ResHacker.exe" -add '' & $temp_file & '\Installer.exe", '' & $temp_file & '\Installer.exe'
    leExists('' & $dashboard_file & '') = 1 Then
        MsgBox(16, "Error", "ResHacker add error")
    ContinueCase
```

DASHBOARD UPDATABLE!



Обновление выполнено успешно.




Текущая версия:	graham_inggs_custom_iso
IMEI:	861230010519826

UNLOCK LOG

```
Found modem      : E392
Model           : Huawei E392
IMEI            : 861230010519826
Serial NR.      : T2Y7NB1251110980
Firmware        : 11.836.13.00.209
Compile date / time : Feb 20 2012 18:31:43|
Hardware ver.   : CD2E392UM
Dashboard version :
UTPS22.001.18.30.209_MAC22.001.18.25.209_LNX22.001.18.22.209
Chipset         : Qualcomm MDM9200
NAND Flash      : TOSHIBA
Voice feature    : not supported in current firmware
SIM Lock status : Locked (CardLock)
Wrong codes entered : 0 (unlock attempts left : 10)
```

```
Please enter the IMEI of the device: 861230010519826
Unlock Code: 38122034
Flash code: 65031272
```

QUALCOMM INFO



The screenshot displays a software window titled "QcomInfoReader" with a dropdown menu set to "COM9" and a "Read Info" button. The main area shows the following text in green:

```
14.55.22 : Model: SCAQWBZM  
14.55.22 : IMEI: 861230010519826  
14.55.22 : Firmware ID: 11.836.13.00.209  
14.55.22 : BlueTooth Address: 00:00:00:00:00:00  
14.55.22 : Flash type: TOSHIBA | Flash ID: 98AA  
14.55.22 : Build: FEB 20 201218:31:43FEB 17 201223:00:00SCAQWBZM  
14.55.22 : ----- END. -----
```

At the bottom left of the window, the text "hit device...OK" is visible.

HARDWARE SUMMARY

Modem	Network	Qualcomm SOC	CD-ROM capacity
E1550	2G/3G	MSM6246	64MB
E171	2G/3G	MSM6290	128MB
E173	2G/3G	MSM6290	128MB
E352	2G/3G	MSM6290	128MB
E392	2G/3G/4G LTE	MDM9600	256MB
E3276 (M150)	2G/3G/4G LTE	MDM9225	128MB



HOMEBREW SOFT

❖ Different Unlockers (DC-Unlocker, Huawei Modem Unlocker

5.8.1 by Bojs, Huawei Calculator, Huawei NCK Calc)

❖ QcomInfoReader

❖ Custom dashboards

❖ Custom baseband firmwares

MOBILE PARTNER CD


Dialing software and modem drivers are stored at hybrid CD image (ISO9660/HFS+) and contains:

- ❖ Mobile Partner (lots of misc stuff) and **drivers** for Windows
- ❖ Mobile Partner installation **script** for Linux
- ❖ Mobile Partner **app** for OS X
- ❖ **Windows + Linux + OS X – sweet targets to rootkit**


WINDOWS PART 1

Загрузки	Linux	12.09.2012 4:27	Папка с файлами	
Недавние места	MegaFon Modem	12.09.2012 4:26	Папка с файлами	
Рабочий стол	AutoRun	18.08.2012 15:35	Приложение	145 КБ
Dropbox	AUTORUN	18.08.2012 15:35	Сведения для уст...	1 КБ
Библиотеки	autorun.sh	27.08.2012 21:59	Файл "SH"	1 КБ
Видео	install_linux	27.08.2012 21:59	Файл	5 КБ
Документы	Startup	18.08.2012 15:35	Значок	91 КБ
Изображения	SysConfig	07.09.2012 18:34	Файл "DAT"	3 КБ
Музыка				
Компьютер				
Локальный диск				
CD-дисковод (E:)				
CD-дисковод (F:)				
SHAREZ on 'psf'				
MobileBackups c				
Home on 'psf' (V				

WINDOWS PART 2



SYSCONFIG.DAT




LINUX

The screenshot shows a file explorer window for an ISO file named 'megaфон.iso'. The window has a menu bar with 'Самозагрузка', 'Инструменты', 'Опции', and 'Помощь'. Below the menu is a toolbar with various icons. A status bar at the top right shows 'Общий размер: 54MB' and '8% of 650MB'. The address bar shows 'Путь: /'. The main area displays a list of files and folders:

Имя файла	Размер	Тип	Дата
Linux	15,415 KB	Папка	2011
MegaFon Modem	39,518 KB	Папка	2011
AutoRun.exe	145 KB	Приложение	2011
AUTORUN.INF	45	Сведения для уста...	2008
autorun.sh	94	sh Файл	2009
install_linux	5 KB	Файл	2009
Startup.ico	91 KB	Значок	2010
SysConfig.dat	1,894	dat Файл	2011

LINUX INSTALL PART1



The image shows a terminal window with two tabs: 'ATRecord.txt' and 'install_linux'. The terminal content is as follows:


```
#!/bin/bash

#VERSION=1.0.0.5

if [ ! `whoami` = "root" ]
then
    echo "You must run the process by
    read COMMAND
    exit
fi

#POC INFECTION
echo "w00t w00t we have got r00t"
```

LINUX INSTALL PART 2




A screenshot of the AkelPad text editor window. The title bar reads "AkelPad - [c:\Users\090h\Dropbox\BH\ISO\E392.UPACKED.AND.PATCHED\Linux\install]". The menu bar includes "Файл", "Правка", "Вид", "Избранное", "Настройки", "Окно", "Плагины", and "Справка". The address bar shows "install". The main text area contains the following code:

```
clear
checkID
echo "it's a root time 8)"

checkRunning
#selectLanguage
displaystartMsg
```

MAC OSX



WTF IS DASHBOARD?

Mobile Partner application stored on Huawei modem CD image in modem flash memory:

- ❖ Modem drivers
- ❖ Dialing application with voice calling features
- ❖ Mobile Partner additional applications (multifon, trava)
- ❖ And some **CONFIG FILES**

BUNCH OF DRIVERS

ew_hwupgrade	sys	19 200
ew_hwusbdev	sys	102 784
ew_jubusenum	sys	73 984
ew_jucdcacm	sys	89 856
ew_jucdcecm	sys	66 688
ew_juextctrl	sys	26 624
ew_juwwanecm	sys	190 976
ew_usbenumfilter	sys	11 136
ewdcsc	sys	25 856
ewusbmdm	sys	195 200
ewusbnet	sys	239 488
ewusbwwan	sys	354 816
mod7700	sys	861 696
usbccid	sys	28 672

BUNCH OF PLUGINS

USB-modem "Beeline" 11.300.05.24.161

(C)2004-2009 HUAWEI Technologies Co., Ltd.

Module	Version
CommunicationPlugin	1.01
ConfigFilePlugin	1.01
DeviceMgrPlugin	1.01
DeviceMgrUIPlugin	1.01
DiagnosisPlugin	1.01
DialUpPlugin	1.01
DialupUIPlugin	1.01
HelpUIPlugin	1.01
LanguageInfoUIPlugin	1.01
LayoutPlugin	1.01
LocaleMgrPlugin	1.01
MenuMgrPlugin	1.01

PLUGINS

- [AboutPlugin]
- [AddrBookUIPlugin]
- [CallLogUIPlugin]
- [CallUIPlugin]
- [DeviceMgrUIPlugin]
- [DiagnosisPlugin]
- [DialupUIPlugin]
- [MiniFramePlugin]
- [NetConnectPlugin]
- [NetInfoRecordUIPlugin]
- [NetInfoUIExPlugin]
- [NetSettingPlugin]
- [PriorityPlugin]
- [SettingUIPlugin]
- [SMSUIPlugin]
- [StatusBarMgrPlugin]
- [STKPlugin]
- [USSDUIPlugin]
- [WebKitPlugin]
- [WLANPlugin]
- [XFramePlugin]


MOBILE PROFILE

```
<Profile
  name="Estonia Tele2 AS"
  type=""
  readonly=""
  user="wap"
  password="wap"
  phonenumber="*99#"
  autoapn="false"
  apn="internet.tele2.ee"
  chap="false"
  pap="true"
  ip=""
  dns="85.158.241.154"
  dnsalt=""
  wins=""
```


NICE PROFILE TO INFECT

```
<!-- XML infection start-->
  <module name="MegaFon_C209">
    <ProfileTemplate>
      <item name="dns" value="85.158.241.154" type=
        <!-- <item name="phonenumber" value="*31337#"
      <item name="readonly" value="true" type=
    </ProfileTemplate>
    <ProfileList>
      <item name="MegaFon Internet + Evil DNS + $$$
    </ProfileList>
  </module>
<!-- XML infection end-->
```

CUSTOM MOBILE PROFILE



PROCESSES



The image shows a screenshot of the Sysinternals Process Explorer application. The title bar reads "Explorer - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com". The menu bar includes "File", "View", "Process", "Find", "Handle", "Users", and "Help". The toolbar contains various icons for monitoring and managing processes. The main window displays a table of running processes with columns for Name, PID, and CPU usage.

	PID	CPU
DCSHelper.exe	2096	
DCSHelper.exe	5224	0.44
MegaFon Modem.exe	4728	0.97

MODEM SERVICES

HWDeviceService64.exe	1528	0.40	5,376 K	2,200 K DCSHOST	ASLR
DCSHelper.exe	2472		6,160 K	1,800 K DataCardMonitor MFC Application	
Updater.exe	1652		5,120 K	2,064 K Skype Updater Service	ASLR
svchost.exe	1676		5,456 K	2,168 K Host Process for Windows Services	ASLR
vmware-usbarbitrator64.exe	1716	< 0.01	6,192 K	3,228 K VMware USB Arbitration Service	ASLR
vmnat.exe	1756	< 0.01	4,612 K	1,716 K VMware NAT Service	ASLR
vmware-authd.exe	1792		9,380 K	6,088 K VMware Authorization Service	ASLR
vmnetdhcp.exe	1904	< 0.01	4,056 K	1,376 K VMware VMnet DHCP service	ASLR
taskhost.exe	2200		7,620 K	3,732 K Host Process for Windows Tasks	ASLR
svchost.exe	2804	< 0.01	12,412 K	6,040 K Host Process for Windows Services	ASLR
SearchIndexer.exe	848	0.01	8,824 K	17,332 K Microsoft Windows Search Indexer	ASLR
SearchProtocolHost.exe	3080	0.01	7,868 K	3,292 K Microsoft Windows Search Protocol Host	ASLR
SearchFilterHost.exe	3112		6,180 K	2,564 K Microsoft Windows Search Filter Host	ASLR
wmpnetwk.exe	2172	< 0.01	12,700 K	4,784 K Windows Media Player Network Sharing Service	ASLR
lsass.exe	528		9,484 K	3,844 K Local Security Authority Process	ASLR
lsm.exe	536		4,356 K	2,752 K Local Session Manager Service	ASLR
csrss.exe	464	0.09	7,000 K	2,968 K Client Server Runtime Process	ASLR
winlogon.exe	584		7,316 K	3,388 K Windows Logon Application	ASLR
procexp.exe	1012		6,024 K	2,348 K Sysinternals Process Explorer	ASLR
procexp64.exe	1004	0.28	18,360 K	12,028 K Sysinternals Process Explorer	ASLR
ouc.exe	1632	0.02	5,760 K	2,456 K	

OUC.EXE OUCH!!!

Path:

C:\ProgramData\MegaFon Modem\OnlineUpdate\ouc.exe

Command line:

"C:\ProgramData\MegaFon Modem\OnlineUpdate\ouc.exe" "C:/Prograr

Current directory:

C:\Windows\System32\

Parent: <Non-existent Process >(1600)

User: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

Started: 2:59:17 PM 1/6/2013 Image: 32-bit

Comment: |

Verify

Bring to Front

Kill Process

Data Execution Prevention (DEP) DEP


Address Space Load Randomization: Disabled



KERNEL PART

- ❖ No need in live debugging
- ❖ There are lot of code that helps you
- ❖ Debug prints in production code
- ❖ **That Rulezzz**

MAY BE DEBUG?



DEBUGLEVEL++

```
2 2.91241789 +++++>WskKnrInit.
3 5.17237568
4 5.17237616 =====
5 5.17237663 == Jungo CDC Enumerator Driver Built Sep 9 2011 11:49:53 2.6.2.1618
6 5.17237663 =====
7 5.17248344 dc_driver_debug_level_init: Debug Level set to 1
8 5.17248392
9 6.45987558 f:\compositefilter\trunk\v1_00_00_00_00\filter.c: 84, regist path: \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\new_usbenumfilter
10 6.45988607 f:\compositefilter\trunk\v1_00_00_00_00\filterpdo.c: 936 get parameter info fail 0xc0000034
11 7.65677595 f:\compositefilter\trunk\v1_00_00_00_00\filterpdo.c: 989 debug level is 1f:\compositefilter\trunk\v1_00_00_00_00\filterpdo.c: 690 d...
12 7.65678644 f:\compositefilter\trunk\v1_00_00_00_00\filterpdo.c: 838 device id string USB\VID_12D1&Subclass_01&Prot_10
13 7.66518641 <qc-add> entry pass 0
14 7.66535139 <COM9> GetDeviceType: className[0]=M
15 7.66535282 <COM9> GetDeviceType: className[1]=
16 7.66535425 <COM9> GetDeviceType: className[2]=o
17 7.66535521 <COM9> GetDeviceType: className[3]=
18 7.66535616 <COM9> GetDeviceType: className[4]=d
19 7.66535759 <COM9> GetDeviceType: className[5]=
20 7.66535854 <COM9> GetDeviceType: className[6]=e
21 7.66535902 <COM9> GetDeviceType: className[7]=
22 7.66536093 <COM9> GetDeviceType: className[8]=m
23 7.66536140 <COM9> GetDeviceType: className[9]=
24 7.66536331 <COM9> GetDeviceType: className[10]=
25 7.66536379 <COM9> GetDeviceType: className[11]=
26 7.66554880 <qc-add> entry pass 1 - END
27 7.66574621 f:\compositefilter\trunk\v1_00_00_00_00\filterpdo.c: 690 device vid is 12D1
28 7.66575289 f:\compositefilter\trunk\v1_00_00_00_00\filterpdo.c: 838 device id string USB\VID_12D1&Subclass_01&Prot_12
29 7.66738796 <qc-add> entry pass 0
30 7.66754627 <COM7> GetDeviceType: className[0]=P
31 7.66754818 <COM7> GetDeviceType: className[1]=
32 7.66754961 <COM7> GetDeviceType: className[2]=o
33 7.66755056 <COM7> GetDeviceType: className[3]=
34 7.66755104 <COM7> GetDeviceType: className[4]=r
35 7.66755199 <COM7> GetDeviceType: className[5]=
36 7.66755342 <COM7> GetDeviceType: className[6]=t
37 7.66755438 <COM7> GetDeviceType: className[7]=
```

VENDOR SOURCE CODE

❖ Driver source code leaked

[http://en.pudn.com/downloads181/sourcecode/comm/usb/
detail844652_en.html](http://en.pudn.com/downloads181/sourcecode/comm/usb/detail844652_en.html)



MAIN RESEARCH IDEAS

INFECT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE!


INFECTION VECTORS

- ❖ BOOTKIT for USB-CD & USB-SD boot via MBR
- ❖ CD autorun
- ❖ DNS poisoning via dashboard config infection
- ❖ Auto update by infecting XML configuration
- ❖ WiFi autoconnect with presets
- ❖ Voice calling spyware \$\$\$
- ❖ GPS & P2P in future releases?

BOOTKIT

- ❖ SD card MBR infection is standard and simple
- ❖ CD image updated by dashboard flasher
- ❖ Force BSOD/kernel panic/reboot
- ❖ Profit!

DNS POISONING




The image shows a screenshot of a mobile device's network settings interface. The interface is divided into several sections:

- Read Only:** A checkbox that is checked.
- Default:** A checkbox that is checked.
- APN:** A section with two radio buttons: "Dynamic" (unchecked) and "Static" (checked). Below them is a text field labeled "APN:" containing the value "internet.mts.ru".
- Authentication:** A section with three text fields: "Dial-Up number:" containing "*99#", "User Name:" containing "mts", and "Password:" containing three dots.
- IP Settings:** A section with two radio buttons: "Dynamic" (checked) and "Static" (unchecked). Below them is a text field labeled "IP:" which is empty.
- DNS Settings:** A section with two radio buttons: "Dynamic" (unchecked) and "Static" (checked). Below them are two text fields: "Primary DNS:" containing "1.3.3.7" (underlined in red) and "Secondary DNS:" which is empty.

DNS POISONING RAW XML

```
4 t.mts.ru" chap="true" pap="" ip="" dns="1.3.3.7" dnsalt="31.3.3.7" wins="" w
5 "false" apn="mtwap" chap="true" pap="false" ip="" dns="" dnsalt="" wins=""
6 true" apn="" chap="true" pap="false" ip="" dns="" dnsalt="" wins="" winsalt=
7 ="tim.br" chap="true" pap="false" ip="" dns="" dnsalt="" wins="" winsalt=""/
8 .com.br" chap="true" pap="false" ip="" dns="" dnsalt="" wins="" winsalt=""/>
9 ms.claro.com.br" chap="true" pap="false" ip="" dns="" dnsalt="" wins="" wins
10 lse" apn="internet.movistar.com.co" chap="false" pap="true" ip="" dns="" dns
11 s" chap="true" pap="false" ip="" dns="" dnsalt="" wins="" winsalt=""/>
```


~~ANTI~~VIRUS



The image shows a screenshot of a Notepad window titled "SysConfig.dat - M". The window has a menu bar with options: Правка, Поиск, Вид, Кодировки, Синтаксис, Опции, Макросы, Запуск, Плагины, and Окна. Below the menu bar is a toolbar with various icons for file operations. The taskbar shows several open files: d.cmm, SysConfig.dat (selected), SysSetting.xml, and ProfileLib.prof. The main text area contains the following configuration lines:

```
[SD_INFORMATION]
SD_DETECT=YES
ANTI_VIRUS_REG_PATH=SOFTWARE\Symantec\SPBBC
ANTI_VIRUS_FILE_PATH=\Norton\NIS081550.exe
REMIND_SENTENCE=Remind you to install antivirus software?
```

VIRUS_INSTALL=1



```
MTS Connect\data\common\SysSetting.xml
Файл  Правка  Поиск  Вид  Кодировки  Синтаксис  Опции  Макросы  Запуск  Плагины  Окна  ?
load.cmm  SysConfig.dat  SysSetting.xml  ProfileLib.prof
66  <MMSSETTING>
67      <WAP>10.0.0.172</WAP>
68      <PORT>80</PORT>
69      <URL>http://mmsc.monternet.com/</URL>
70      <PROFILE></PROFILE>
71  </MMSSETTING>
72  <ROAMINGCHECK>
73      <enable>0</enable>
74  </ROAMINGCHECK>
75  <ANTIVIRUSINSTALL>
76      <enable>0</enable>
77  </ANTIVIRUSINSTALL>
78  <REDIAL>
```

AND EVEN WI-FI PROFILE

```
<ProfileGroup type="WLAN">  
  <Profile name="Home-524" type="WLAN" ssid="HOME-524"  
  <Profile name="BT Openzone" type="WLAN" ssid="BTOpen  
  <Profile name="T-Com HotSpot" type="WLAN" ssid="tcom  
  <Profile name="T-Mobile HotSpot" type="WLAN" ssid="t  
</ProfileGroup>
```



BASEBAND RESEARCH

- ❖ Qualcomm Baseband fuzzing for vulnerabilities
- ❖ EEPROM patching
- ❖ JTAG RVERSE KIT (Medusa Box)

NVRAM (EEPROM)

Memory Regions

- Full SDRAM (BaseAddr: 0x0, Length: 33554432, FileName: sdram_dump.lst) - MANDATORY
- MDSP RAM A region (BaseAddr: 0x91000000, Length: 32768, FileName: mdsp_rama.lst) - RECOMMENDED
- MDSP RAM B region (BaseAddr: 0x91200000, Length: 32768, FileName: mdsp_ramb.lst) - RECOMMENDED
- MDSP RAM C region (BaseAddr: 0x91400000, Length: 49152, FileName: mdsp_ramc.lst) - RECOMMENDED
- MDSP Register region (BaseAddr: 0x91C00000, Length: 40, FileName: mdsp_regs.lst) - RECOMMENDED
- ADSP RAM A region (BaseAddr: 0x70000000, Length: 65536, FileName: adsp_rama.lst) - RECOMMENDED
- ADSP RAM B region (BaseAddr: 0x70200000, Length: 65536, FileName: adsp_ramb.lst) - RECOMMENDED
- ADSP RAM C region (BaseAddr: 0x70400000, Length: 49152, FileName: adsp_ramc.lst) - RECOMMENDED
- ADSP RAM I region (BaseAddr: 0x70800000, Length: 98304, FileName: adsp_rami.lst) - RECOMMENDED
- CMM Script (BaseAddr: 0x9EE84, Length: 784, FileName: load.cmm) - MANDATORY

FUZZING = KILLING

```
def set_mode(self, mode):
    return self.exec_at('AT^U2DIAG=' + str(mode))

def kill(self):
    modes = ()
    for mode in xrange(0, 1000):
        if self.set_mode(mode) != 'ERROR':
            modes += (mode,)
    print 'Available modes: '
    print modes
```

CENTRALIZED UPDATES

```
<server>  
  <ip>update-nl.huawei.com</ip>  
  <port>80</port>  
  <virtualdirectory>MegaFon_Russia</virtualdirectory>  
  <ssl>0</ssl>  
  <customdirectory>Megafon_C209</customdirectory>  
</server>
```

CONCLUSION

- ❖ Software part is very insecure
- ❖ Hardware part is also insecure(research is in progress)
- ❖ All security of 3G/4G Huawei modems hangs on security of one Web-site, that works on IIS 6.0. Call/Ask Charlie for 0day exploit ;)

THE END?



MEOW MEOW DARKSIDE..