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Hacking Capitalism
Exploring Financial Services Protocols

Agenda

- What are we talking about?
- Elemental Pieces
- Key Protocols
- General problems
- Tools for testing

What are we talking about?

- Finance runs on a different set of standards than everyone else
 - HTTP/HTTPS dominates in the normal world for “general” application use
 - Finance world is made up of all sorts of weird protocols
- The protocols aren’t as thoroughly beaten up as everything else
 - Financial protocols aren’t general use
 - You can’t build a network at home
 - *Ok that’s a lie, you can...*
 - Their use isn’t obvious
 - *And they all seem to do the same thing*
 - *But differently*

State of the finance protocol world

- Design goals
 - Availability
 - Availability
 - Availability
- General protocols
 - Assumed to be running over private networks
 - Encryption often provided by external sources
 - *Stunnel*
 - *VPN*
 - *PGP (Yeah, no joke!)*
 - Where string encryption is possible, its slow

Building Blocks

- All sorts of odd protocols
 - The SoupTCP
 - Rendezvous
 - Smart Sockets

Example: The SoupTCP

QuickTime™ and a
TIFF (LZW) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.

- Super simple protocol
- Handful of packet types
- Quick punchlines
 - Login request uses a cleartext username and password
 - Password is case insensitive alphanumeric of 10 chars or less, padded with spaces
 - Sequenced, but sequence can be guessed
 - Only TCP sequence numbers prevent simple teardown attacks



Key Protocols

- Lots of protocols with funny acronyms and capital letters
 - FIX
 - QIX
 - OUCH
 - OTTO
 - RASHport
 - DROP
 - CTCI
 - ITCH
- For more information: <http://www.nasdaqtrader.com>



FIX: Financial Information Exchange

- Complicated protocol
 - Runs over TCP
 - Session Layer Protocol Plus FIXML messages
 - Over 1000 pages of specifications (as of FIX 5.0)
 - Security concerns barely mentioned
- Here are your encryption options:
 - None / Other
 - PKCS (Proprietary)
 - DES (ECB Mode)
 - PKCS / DES (Proprietary)
 - PGP / DES (Defunct)
 - PGP / DES-MD5
 - PEM / DES-MD5

FIX: Authentication

- Username and password based
- On many systems the passwords never change
 - These passwords are often like
- On a frightening number of systems, there are no passwords
 - Logging in just requires guessing a SenderCompID (Think username)

Assessing Financial Apps

- What the CIA Triad means here:
 - Availability. Not being able to execute trades can be disastrous.
 - Confidentiality. Just knowing what transactions are occurring is enough for a well funded entity to profit.
 - Integrity. Changing transaction amounts is obviously bad. But it is likely to get caught on the backend.

Assessment Methodology

- Security 101
 - Are you doing session layer encryption?
 - Are you using passwords?
 - Are you changing passwords?
 - Has that system been patched in the past 5 years?
- Security 102
 - Test Implementations
 - Fuzz for the standard cruft (lots of C and C++ here)
 - Test protocol logic bugs (what can I do pre-authentication?)
 - Test application logic bugs (All hail the BBS time bank withdraw negative time trick)

References

- FIX Specifications
 - <http://www.fixprotocol.org/>
- Open Implementations
 - <http://www.quickfixengine.org/>
- NASDAQ Protocols
 - <http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/>



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Questions

Your way of proving you listened...