

How the analysis of electrical current consumption of embedded systems could lead to code reversing ?

“Code extraction via Power analysis”
Focus on “Embedded systems”

Yann ALLAIN / Julien MOINARD

AGENDA

- Who we are
- Research context & goals
- Electronic 101 for Security Guys
- Proof of concept (soft, hard, ...)
- Our experiments
- Results & Limits
- Further researches (Prospective)
- How to limit the risk
- Conclusion

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WHO WE ARE?

- From France
 - @OPALE SECURITY Company
 - IT Security & Embedded System Security
- Yann ALLAIN
 - 18 Years in IT security and electronic industry
 - Former CSO of application domain for an Hotel company
 - CEO and Owner of OPALE SECURITY
- Julien MOINARD
 - Electronic specialist
 - In charge of most technical implementation regarding this research

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Research context


- An another way to audit some Embedded system



- Classical audit approach is done via
 - External pentest (IP Connexion, Web Interfaces...)
 - Hardware hacking stuff (Defeating anti tampering system, Opening the box)
 - Etc...
- ...but we want more...

Research context

- There always another access available on all Embedded system:
 - The electric power line !



Research context

- As Security auditor, may we use this access to do something ?
- This our research & experimentation starting point
- Please remind that this is an '*in progress research project*'

So...

- As security guys, we wondered if

“Is there a way

to extract the code executed

on an embedded system

from its current/power consumption ?”



(≈ From the Power connector...)

Our wishlist

- Be pragmatic
- Keep it simple as possible
- No math and complex stuff
- Cheap approach (as much as possible)

Existing research on this area?

- Yes...(many!) **but** with different goals
- Power analysis technics (DPA, SPA) and researchers seems to **focus on extracting the cipher keys** of sensitive device (Crypto system, Credit Card...)



Existing research on this

- But ... **Few papers related to code**
- We only find **3 available papers** using the power consumption for finding instructions

Cool ! ...but researcher only focus on finding instructions...we need to access to Data also...(But great Paper!)

- Too specific : Javacards (Barth)
- Discovery of information on encryption keys (Valette, <http://www.ssi.gouv.fr/archive/fr/sciences/fichiers/lcr/dalemuva05.pdf>)
- Example adapted to JAVACARDS (Vermoen, <http://ce.et.tudelft.nl/publication>)

Some chapters dedicated to our goals but no so much information disclosed (Gouv.fr closed to 'sort of' military domain ?...)

Already existing research on this area?

- But these publications are **full of mathematical formulae**

E.g. : Inference of the secret by current analysis by correlation (!)

$$\rho_{WH'} = \frac{\text{cov}(aH + b, H')}{\sigma_W \sigma_{H'}} = \frac{a \text{cov}(H, H')}{\sigma_W \sigma_{H'}} = \rho_{WH} \rho_{HH'} = \rho_{WH} \frac{m-2k}{m}.$$

$$\hat{\rho}_{WH}(R) = \frac{N \sum W_i H_{i,R} - \sum W_i \sum H_{i,R}}{\sqrt{N \sum W_i^2 - (\sum W_i)^2} \sqrt{N \sum H_{i,R}^2 - (\sum H_{i,R})^2}},$$

- which are more or less complex (*from our point of view!*)
- Not for us.... ;-)

Back to our goals...

Question

*“What is the **link** between the **power consumption***

*and **instruction and data executed***


*On most of **embedded systems***

*based on **microcontroller (or other stuff like that)?”***

Answer

- A fundamental and basic electronic component....
- Used everywhere !
- Please gentlemen welcome to, our friends:

Transistors




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Electronic 101

- Embedded systems are (could be) composed of microcontrollers (μ C) that contain :

- MEMORIES (Ram, Rom,..)
- ALU (Arithmetic Logic Unit)
- TIMER (Counter)
- SERIAL INTERFACES
- I/O BUS (Latch)




Electronic 101

- Each basic functions included in μC are designed **@electronic level** with **transistors**
- For example , see how a “NAND” is designed **@electronic level** (simplification view of)


Logical view

b	a	X
0	0	1
0	1	1
1	0	1
1	1	0

Electronic view
(used only few transistors)




Physical
Electric signal
associated




Electronic 101

- When a transistor “process” a bit @ physical level (Current, Voltage) , it “commutes”
- Transistor = sort of digital switch



Electronic 101


- When a Transistor “commutes”, there is a **current peak** !



- Let see what going on in practice (Labs...)


Electronic 101

- Labs #1 – Screenshot 1 – Hardware stuff



Electronic 101


- Labs #1 – Screenshot 2 – One Transistor !



Electronic 101

- Labs #1 – Screenshot 3


current peak !



Electronic 101

- Labs #1 – Screenshot 4

Zoom of current peak !



Brief

- Transistors everywhere in μC
- When a transistor “process” a bit, there is a current peak

*“We just find the **link** between the **power consumption** and **bits processed**”*

- *Information leakage from power consumption validated !*



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Proof of concept


- How to move from one bit grabbed (step1) to a set of data & instructions code (step2) with our approach ?
- We have designed a proof of concept tool to analyze the electrical current consumption of embedded systems to extract the code it executes

Proof of concept

- We need to acquire more bits...via a current consumption analysis
- “Acquiring current consumption” : How?


Proof of concept

- What we need : A “homemade” embedded system (the target...)
 - Based on PIC18F4620 μ C



Proof of concept

- What we need : An Agilent oscilloscope for acquiring current consumption
 - AGILENT Dso3024a



Proof of concept

- What we need : A programmer /Debugger (Microchip Real Ice)




Proof of concept

- What we need : A current probe
 - Very expensive Professional tools (magnetic or electromagnetic current probe) > 400\$ each

Or

- a simple resistor which cost less than 1 \$

- We choose the resistor !




Proof of concept


- What we need : A bit of software
 - Homemade code (VB.NET...sorry 😊) used to control and pilot the oscilloscope
 - The code used the Standard protocol: VISA COM 3.0
 - It's a Free Library that let us communicate with agilent oscilloscope with simple set of commands
 - Get datum measurement, Launch voltage or current acquisition process, Send numerical value of current acquired,...

Proof of concept

- What we need : A GUI




↔
Command/Data



GUI of our Proof
of concept tool


Proof of concept

- Our acquisition chain looks like that :



Proof of concept


- In practice, it looks like that...




How we proceed to grab the current and extract the code?

Step 1 send a dummy code to μC

PC 1




Embedded System



Embedded
system is
Ready to use

Programmer



Proof of concept


Step 2, In lab

Embedded System with probes




**Current
Consumption**

Oscilloscope (Measure)



**Our tool try to find
instruction & data
executed from the
current consumption**

**PC 2
(Lab machine)**



	Weight Hamming	Instruction 1 possible	Data 1 possible	Instruction 2 + DATA possible
0				
1				
2				
3				
4				
5		MOVBL	TF	NEP
6				
7				
8				

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Our Experiments

- #1: Does the code really impacts the power consumption?
- #2: Do a MOVLW 0xFF & a MOVLW 0x00 lead to measurable differences in power analysis?
- #3: Why μ C's instructions Pipeline impact current consumption?
- #4: How to overcome Pipeline issues for our goals?
- #5: Could we create a (sort of) 'disassembler' over electricity?

Does the code really impacts
the power consumption?

(Experiment #1)

Does the code really impacts the power consumption? (Experiment #1)

- Result #1 : We have a current consumption related with nop instructions

```
CONFIG OSC = INTIO7
CONFIG FCMEN = OFF
CONFIG IESB = OFF

LIST p=18F4620
#include <p18F4620.inc>


ORG 0

movlw 0x00
movwf TRISA
suite
movlw 0xFF
movwf LATA

nop
nop
nop
nop

movlw 0x00
movwf LATA

goto suite
ENE
```



In **Red** → Current during the execution
In **Blue** → Synchronization signal
In **Green** → Clock embedded system

Do a `MOVLW 0xFF` & a `MOVLW 0x00`
lead to measurable differences
in power analysis?

(Experiment #2)


Do a MOVLW 0xFF & a MOVLW 0x00
lead to measurable differences
in power analysis?

(Experiment #2)

- Note : to limit impacts of parasites, our system take differential analysis
- @First time, we measured the difference between
 - Current consumption of 4 nop instructions
 - Current consumption of **movlw 0xFF** with 3 nop
- @Second time, we measured the difference between
 - Current consumption of 4 nop instructions
 - Current consumption of **movlw 0x00** with 3 nop

Do a MOVLW 0xFF & a MOVLW 0x00 lead to measurable differences in power analysis? (Experiment #2)

- Result #2 : Current Trace related to Movlw 0xFF




In Red → Difference of current

In Blue → Synchronization signal

In Green → Clock embedded system

Do a MOVLW 0xFF & a MOVLW 0x00 lead to measurable differences in power analysis? (Experiment #2)

- Result #2 : Current Trace related to Movlw 0x00




In **Red** → Difference of current
In **Blue** → Synchronization signal
In **Green** → Clock embedded system

Do a MOVLW 0xFF & a MOVLW 0x00
lead to measurable differences
in power analysis?
(Experiment #2)


- Result #2 : We have a correlation between different value of data and amplitude of current consumption

MOVLW 0x00



Encoding of the movlw 0x00 instruction
→ 0000 1110 0000 0000

MOVLW 0xFF




Encoding of the movlw 0xFF instruction
→ 0000 1110 1111 1111

More bits = 1 -> More current consumption !

Do a MOVLW 0xFF & a MOVLW 0x00
lead to measurable differences
in power analysis?
(Experiment #2)

- The current value measured depend on the **hamming weight** groups of the data & instruction processed
- Example below (0x24 is in a hamming group of 2)

0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---



Hamming Group	Number of instruction or data value by hamming groups
0	1
1	8
2	28
3	56
4	70
5	56
6	28
7	8
8	1

Do a MOVLW 0xFF & a MOVLW 0x00
lead to measurable differences
in power analysis?
(Experiment #2)

- The hamming weight groups limits!

Description	Instruction	Coding instruction	Instruction Hamming Weight
No Operation	NOP	0000 0000	0
Multiply W with f	MULWF	0000 00 10	1
Subtract W from Literal	SUBLW	0000 1000	1
Negate f	NEGF	0 110 1100	4
Move W to f	MOVWF	0 110 1110	5
Move Literal to W	MOVLW	0000 1110	3
Set f	SETF	0 110 1000	3

Some instructions have the same Hamming weight (Collision)
so we don't able to differentiate MOVLW and SETF for
example. It's a **limit** of our analyze.


Why μ C's instructions Pipeline
impact current consumption?

(Experiment #3)


Why μ C's instructions Pipeline
impact current consumption?
(Experiment #3)

- Result of our 3rd experimentation

MOVLW 0x00



MOVLW 0xFF



- But why we have **two overshoots** of current **when** the code only have **one instruction that has been changed** ?


Why μ C's instructions Pipeline impact current consumption? (Experiment #3)

- Influence of Pipeline

C1	C2	C3	C4
Decoding	Read data here 0x00 (movlw 0x00)	ALU Calculation	ALU write the word in registers

Why μ C's instructions Pipeline impact current consumption? (Experiment #3)

- Influence of Pipeline



D = Decode the instruction
R = Read the operand
P = Process (eg. ADDLW)
W = Write the result to destination register

Why μ C's instructions Pipeline
impact current consumption?
(Experiment #3)

- Influence of Pipeline

Pipeline is not our friend because **the current consumption of next instruction depend of previous instructions.**



How to overcome Pipeline
issues for our goals?

(Experiment #4)

How to overcome Pipeline
issues for our goals?
(Experiment #4)

- The main idea is use the principal of pre-calculated hash table
- The idea is to memorize a signature of electricity consumption for each pair of consecutive instructions in an exhaustive way. The idea is to create a sort of dictionary.
- We can now compare the current consumption of any (uncontrolled) executed code with the dictionary

How to overcome Pipeline issues for our goals? (Experiment #4)

- Generation of the dictionary

PC 2
(Lab machine)

Programmer

Embedded System





Send code with hamming code

Save a dictionary

Current Consumption


```
Dictionary.csv
1 MOVLN hamming: 0,NOP;100;100;100;100;100;100;100;100;100;100;100;100;100;100;100;100;100;100;100;100;101;101;1
2 MOVLN hamming: 1,NOP;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;100;100;100;100;100;100;101;101;
3 MOVLN hamming: 2,NOP;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;100;100;100;100;100;100;100;101;
4 MOVLN hamming: 3,NOP;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;100;100;100;100;100;100;101;10
5 MOVLN hamming: 4,NOP;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;99;100;100;100;100;100;100;100;1
6 MOVLN hamming: 5,NOP;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;100;100;100;100;100;100;100;1
7 MOVLN hamming: 6,NOP;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;100;100;100;100;100;100;100;1
8 MOVLN hamming: 7,NOP;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;100;100;100;100;100;100;100;1
9 MOVLN hamming: 8,NOP;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;98;100;100;100;100;100;100;100;1
```

Oscilloscope (Measure)



How to overcome Pipeline issues for our goals? (Experiment #4)

- One button in our GUI 😊




Could we create a (sort of)
'disassembler' over electricity?

(Experiment #5)

Could we create a (sort of)
'disassembler' over electricity?
(Experiment #5)

Trying to find an instruction

- On PC 1, We sent to microcontroller the program with `movlw 0x57` for example



```
suite
    movlw    0xFF
    movwf    LATA

    movlw    0x57
    nop
    nop
    nop


    movlw    0x00
    movwf    LATA

    goto     suite
END
```

Could we create a (sort of)
'disassembler' over electricity?
(Experiment #5)

Trying to find an instruction

On PC2, We use the software to find instruction & data



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'disassembler' over electricity?
(Experiment #5)

Trying to find an instruction

– Perfect, the instruction was found !

Curent 2 Code

Main Differential Analysis Find instructions Dictionary

Weight Hamming	Instruction 1 possible	Data 1 possible	Instruction 2 + DATA possible
0			
1			
2			
3			
4			
5	MOVLW	1F	NOP
6		1F	
7		2F	
8		37	
		B	
		3	
		3E	
		4F	
		57	
		5B	
		5D	

MOVLW 0x57

AGENDA

- Who we are
- Research context & goals
- Electronic 101 for Security Guys
- Proof of concept (soft, hard, ...)
- **Results & Limits**
- Further researches (Prospective)
- How to limit the risk
- Conclusion

Results & Limits

- Extracting part of the code with current consumption seems to be a validated approach 😊
- But limits exist !
- Limited by hamming group / Collision of instructions
- Some issues regarding several specific set of instructions:
 - Branch and Jump instructions, I/O manipulation instruction,
 - more than 1 cycle instruction.
 - The influence on current consumption for those later would be different for sure (further investigation need to be scheduled!)
- Dictionary imply that our method could only be adapted to reverse the code of embedded system based on well know board or ready to use system (FGPA based board, Development board, Pre designed embedded system board...).

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Prospective



- We based our approach on current amplitude measurement
- May be , we could add a temporal dimension to our measure to extract more information from the current consumption
 - Spot when the transistors commute
 - to be able to make a distinction of what bits is set to 1 (To be tested soon!)
- We may also measure the electromagnetism waves create by the μC when code is executed

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How to limit the risk

- Create a complementary current consumption (via soft or hardware) to hide the true power consumption



(source : <http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-04302007-134556/unrestricted/Thesis.pdf>)

- The μ C manufacturers must be careful when designing the microcontroller instructions encoding table

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Conclusion

- #1: Does the code really impacts the power consumption? -> **YES**
- #2: Do different instructions & Data could be retrieved via power analysis? -> **YES**
- #3: Could we create a (sort of) 'disassembler' over electricity? -> **YES but with limits...**
- A Hardware IDA plugins ...Blackhat USA 2013 ? 😊
(#teasing)
 - Don't hesitate to donate... ;-p

Conclusion

- Cheap approach
 - 4500\$ → oscilloscope
 - 10\$ → Programmer / Debugger
 - 2\$ → Embedded system
 - 1\$ → Resistor
- Our code is open source ... Download it ! Use it ! Improve it (and send us an update ;-p)

Q/A?

- To contact us :
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