

Easy local Windows Kernel exploitation

Cesar Cerrudo
CTO at IOActive Labs



Introduction

- Windows kernel exploitation is still kind of a dark art
 - Not many good and reliable kernel exploits available
- Write “what” “where” exploitation
 - Some techniques are not reliable and/or complicated
 - Few techniques are generic and work across different Windows versions
 - Sometimes “what” is a fixed value, sometimes is NULL, sometimes is just one or two bytes, sometimes you can only increment or decrement the value on “where”, etc.
 - No generic technique for hard to exploit vulnerabilities
 - Always run code on kernel mode

All started with a good paper

- On January 2010 Matthew “j00ru” Jurczyk and Gynvael Coldwind published “GDT and LDT in Windows kernel vulnerability exploitation”¹
 - NtQuerySystemInformation(SystemHandleInformation) to get kernel address of KPROCESS

```
typedef struct _SYSTEM_HANDLE_TABLE_ENTRY_INFO {  
    USHORT UniqueProcessId;  
    USHORT CreatorBackTraceIndex;  
    UCHAR ObjectTypeIndex;  
    UCHAR HandleAttributes;  
    USHORT HandleValue;  
    PVOID Object;  
    ULONG GrantedAccess;  
} SYSTEM_HANDLE_TABLE_ENTRY_INFO, *PSYSTEM_HANDLE_TABLE_ENTRY_INFO;
```

Making exploitation easier

- What if we can remove ACLs of almost any Windows object?
- What if we can set any privilege to a process token?
- What if we can replace a process token?
- It's possible to do any of the above with just one write to kernel and without running code in kernel mode
- Why do you want a System shell?



Making exploitation easier

- Windows object ACL

```
kd> dt nt!_OBJECT_HEADER
```

+0x000	PointerCount	: Int4B	//keeps reference counting
+0x004	HandleCount	: Int4B	
+0x004	NextToFree	: Ptr32 Void	
+0x008	Lock	: _EX_PUSH_LOCK	
+0x00c	TypeIndex	: UChar	
+0x00d	TraceFlags	: UChar	
+0x00e	InfoMask	: UChar	
+0x00f	Flags	: UChar	
+0x010	ObjectCreateInfo	: Ptr32 _OBJECT_CREATE_INFORMATION	
+0x010	QuotaBlockCharged	: Ptr32 Void	
+0x014	SecurityDescriptor	: Ptr32 Void	//Body -0x4 x86 or -0x8 x64 >=Win2K
+0x018	Body	: _QUAD	//Here starts the object structure

Making exploitation easier

- Nulling out ACLs
 1. Get target object (process, thread, etc.) kernel address using `NtQuerySystemInformation(SystemHandleInformation)`
 2. Write NULL to [object address–0x4] on x86 or [object address – 0x8] on x64
 3. Manipulate the target object (inject code, read memory, etc.) to escalate privileges from user mode.
- Demo



Making exploitation easier

- Token privileges (Windows>=Vista)

```
typedef struct _TOKEN
{
    ...
    (same offset and structure on Vista, Win7, Win2008 R1 & R2 x86 x64)
/*0x040*/    typedef struct _SEP_TOKEN_PRIVILEGES
{
    ...
    UINT64 Present;
    UINT64 Enabled;
    UINT64 EnabledByDefault;
} SEP_TOKEN_PRIVILEGES, *PSEP_TOKEN_PRIVILEGES;
...
} TOKEN, *PTOKEN;
```



Making exploitation easier

- Token privileges (Windows XP, 2003)

```
|kd> dt _TOKEN
```

...

```
+0x074 Privileges  Ptr32 _LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES //points to VariablePart
```

...

```
+0x0a0 VariablePart  : Uint4B
```

```
|kd> dt _LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES
```

```
+0x000 Luid      : _LUID
```

```
+0x008 Attributes  : Uint4B      //0x0 disabled, 0x1 enabled by default, 0x2 enabled
```

```
|kd> dt _LUID
```

```
+0x000 LowPart    : Uint4B      //number identifying a privilege
```

```
+0x004 HighPart   : Int4B
```



Making exploitation easier

- Powerful privileges
 - Debug programs
 - Take ownership
 - Restore files and directories
 - Impersonate a client after authentication
 - Load and unload device drivers
 - Create a token object
 - Act as part of the operating system, etc.



Making exploitation easier

- Enabling privileges
 1. Get process primary token and then search its kernel address using NtQuerySystemInformation(SystemHandleInformation)
 2. Write 0xffffffff or the value you can to [_TOKEN+0x48] to enable privileges in the process primary token (on Win>=Vista)
Or
Write some value (0x14 to enable debug privilege) to [_TOKEN+0xA0] on WinXP or 2003
 3. Perform privileged actions depending on enabled privileges

Making exploitation easier

- Exploit for Tarjei Mandt kernel vulnerability, use after free (Windows>=Vista)
 - dec dword ptr [eax+4] // we can only control eax
 - [_TOKEN+0x48] ==0x800000 (Enabled privs) by default on Win7
 - 0x800000==10000000000000000000000000b just one priv enabled by default (SeChangeNotifyPrivilege)
 - 0x800000-0x1==0x7fffff==111111111111111111111111b lots of privs enabled
 - Demo



Making exploitation easier

- Exploit for Tarjei Mandt kernel vulnerability, use after free (Windows XP or 2003)
 - dec dword ptr [eax+4] // we can only control eax
 - [_TOKEN+0xA0] ==0x15 (Audit privilege)
 - 0x15-0x1==0x14==Debug privilege
 - Can do multiples dec to get to 0x9 (Take ownership privilege) or others



Making exploitation easier

- Process primary token

```
typedef struct _EPROCESS (Win7 RTM x86)
{
...//this offset changes in some Win versions but stable on different service pack level
/*0x0F8*/  struct _EX_FAST_REF Token; //0x4 bytes x86 or 0x8 bytes x64)
...
}EPROCESS, *PEPROCESS;
```

```
kd> dt nt!_OBJECT_HEADER
+0x000 PointerCount : Int4B
...
```




Making exploitation easier

- Replacing process token
 - 1. Get System Identity token by hooking NtOpenThreadToken() and calling MsilInstallProduct(), then get object kernel address using NtQuerySystemInformation(SystemHandleInformation)
 - If multiple writes
 - 2. Increase ref count with first write to PointerCount [_TOKEN – 0x18] on x32 or [_TOKEN – 0x30] on x64 >= Win 2000
 - 3. Second write to replace Token on _EPROCESS with System token
 - If one write
 - 2. Replace Token on _EPROCESS
 - 3. After elevation and before exploit finishes duplicate the System token twice in other process that never terminates like LSASS, etc.

Conclusions

- Exploiting some kernel vulnerabilities is really easy with help of `NtQuerySystemInformation(SystemHandleInformation)`
 - Allows to quickly build reliable and multi version kernel exploits even when the vulnerability is “difficult” to exploit
- These are just some ways I found and researched but there should be other ones that maybe allow even more easier exploitation
- You don't always need a System shell



References & Thanks

- 1 - <http://j00ru.vexillium.org/?p=290#more-290>
- Thanks to Ruben Santamarta and Tarjei Mandt for feedback and PoCs



Fin

- Questions?
- Gracias.
- E-mail: ccerrudo>at<ioactive>dot<com
- twitter: @cesarcer

