CUCKOO



HERE

- Claudio "nex" Guarnieri @botherder
 - Security Researcher at Rapid7 Labs
 - Core member of The Shadowserver Foundation
 - Core member of The Honeynet Project
 - Creator of Cuckoo Sandbox
 - Founder of Malwr.com



HERE

- Mark "rep" Schloesser @repmovsb
 - Security Researcher at Rapid7 Labs
 - Core Member of The Honeynet Project
 - Core developer of Cuckoo Sandbox
 - Developed other tools such as Dionaea



HERE

- Jurriaan "skier" Bremer @skier_t
 - Freelance Security Researcher
 - Core developer of Cuckoo Sandbox



NOT HERE

- Alessandro "jekil" Tanasi @jekil
 - Core developer of Cuckoo Sandbox
 - Co-founder of Malwr.com
 - Creator of Hostmap
 - Creator of ImageForensics.org



AGENDA

- Introduction to Sandboxing
- Introduction to Cuckoo
- Components of Cuckoo
- Anti-Anti-Virtualization
- Virtual Machine Introspection



SANDBOXING

How does a sandbox look like?
Software or hardware appliances
that receive suspicious files and
returns an overview of their
functionality.



PROBLEMS

- Process high volumes?
- Automate specific tasks?
- Integrate with defenses?
- Support your T1 analysts?
- Digital forensics/incident response?



PROS

- Automate the whole analysis process
- Process high volumes of malware
- Usable by virtually anyone
- Get the actual executed code
- Can be very effective if used smartly



CONS

- Can be expensive :-(
- Some portions of the code might not be triggered
- Environment could be detected
- Can be a complete waste



CUCKOO SANDBOX

Automated malware analysis system, easy to use and customize.



Powered by **RAPID**



WHY?

- We believe in open source
- Empower students and researchers
- Open architecture for more flexibility and creativity



SOME NUMBERS

- Around 50000 lines of code, Python and C
- More than 2000 commits
- 4 core developers
- ~25 contributors over time
- ~15000 downloads in the last 6 months



BITS OF HISTORY






WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Basic usage of Linux
- Basic usage of virtual machines
- Knowledge to leverage the results
 - Windows APIs
 - Malicious behaviors
- With Python you can get awesome!
 - Customization
 - Modules





How it works



KEY FEATURES

- Almost everything is a module
- Completely automated
- Run concurrent analysis
- Able to trace processes recursively
- Customize analysis process
- Create behavioral signatures
- Customize processing and reporting



GETTING STARTED

REQUIREMENTS AND EXPECTATIONS

- What is your goal?
- Who is going to use the sandbox?
- How are they going to consume the data?
- How many samples do you expect?
- What kind of results are mostly relevant?
- Do you need all features to meet your goal?



DESIGN YOUR ENVIRONMENT

- Do you want to run Office exploits?
- Do you want to run PDF exploits?
- Do you want to run 64 bit malware?
- Do you want to run URLs?
- Do you need script interpreters?



IDEAS

- Look for the *most exploitable* version of applications (*metasploit, exploitable* version)
- Create multiple VMs with multiple versions of applications
- Leave some fake credentials and tokens around
- Disguise the VM as much as possible



Installation in a Nutshell

- Install VirtualBox, VMWare or QEMU/KVM
- Download & extract Cuckoo
- Install dependencies
- Create a virtual machine, copy over and run
 agent.py and take a snapshot (need to be able to
 communicate with the host).
- Configure the files in conf/
- \$ python cuckoo.py



SETUP DISCLAIMERS

- It's not point-and-click, you need to work a bit
- Virtualization software are not intended for massive and continuous restore
- There are some key steps to do, if one is skipped nothing works
- There's an extensive documentation, mailing list and Q&A platform: check them out.



USAGE

SUBMISSION

- utils/submit.py
- utils/api.py
- Django Web Interface
- Python API

```
1 import sys
2 sys.path.append('/opt/cuckoo/')
3 from lib.cuckoo.core.database import Database
4
5 db = Database()
6 db.add_path(file_path)
7 db.add_url(url)
```



OPTIONS

- Analysis Package + Options
- Timeout
- Priority
- Machine
- Platform
- Memory Dump
- Enforce Timeout
- Clock



RESULTS

- Raw results stored in storage/analysis/<id>/
- Reports stored in storage/analysis/<id>/reports/
 - Depends on what was enabled in conf/reporting.conf



RESULTS

- Trace of API calls
- File dumps
- Screenshots
- Network traffic
- Process memory dump
- System memory dump



CORE MODULES

MACHINERY MODULES

- In Core (under modules/machinery/)
- Python class
- Define interaction with the virtualization software
- Default:
 - VirtualBox
 - VMWare
 - QEMU/KVM
 - Generic LibVirt



```
# Copyright (C) 2010-2013 Cuckoo Sandbox Developers.
   # This file is part of Cuckoo Sandbox - http://www.cuckoosandbox.org
   # See the file 'docs/LICENSE' for copying permission.
 3
 4
 5
   import logging
 6
   from lib.cuckoo.common.abstracts import LibVirtMachinery
 8
 9
   class KVM(LibVirtMachinery):
        """Virtualization layer for KVM based on python-libvirt."""
10
11
12
       # Set KVM connection string.
13
       dsn = "qemu:///system"
```

14

AUXILIARY MODULES

- In Core (under modules/auxiliary/)
- Python class
- No specific use, just run concurrently to each analysis.
- Default:
 - Network traffic capture



```
class Auxiliary(object):
23
        """Base abstract class for auxiliary modules."""
24
25
       def init (self):
26
27
            self.task = None
28
            self.machine = None
29
            self.options = None
30
       def set task(self, task):
31
32
            self.task = task
33
       def set machine(self, machine):
34
35
            self.machine = machine
36
37
       def set_options(self, options):
            self.options = options
38
39
       def start(self):
40
41
            raise NotImplementedError
42
43
        def stop(self):
44
            raise NotImplementedError
```

Processing Modules

- In Core (under modules/processing/)
- Python class
- Process raw results (sample, API logs, files, memory)
- Populate collection of results



```
import re
    from lib.cuckoo.common.abstracts import Processing
    from lib.cuckoo.common.exceptions import CuckooProcessingError
 5
 6
    class Strings(Processing):
        """Extract strings from analyzed file."""
 8
 9
        def run(self):
            """Run extract of printable strings.
10
            @return: list of printable strings.
11
            .....
12
13
            self.key = "strings"
14
            strings = []
15
            if self.task["category"] == "file":
16
17
                 try:
                     data = open(self.file_path, "r").read()
18
                 except (IOError, OSError) as e:
19
                     raise CuckooProcessingError("Error opening file {0}".format(e))
20
                 strings = re.findall("[\times1f-\times7e]{6,}", data)
21
22
23
             return strings
```

SIGNATURES

- In Core (under analyzer/windows/modules/signatures/)
- Python class
- Isolate specific events
 - Identify malware family
 - Identify malicious behavior
 - Extract configuration
 - •



```
from lib.cuckoo.common.abstracts import Signature
 2
 3
    class SpyEyeMutexes(Signature):
        name = "banker_spyeye_mutexes"
 4
 5
        description = "Creates known SpyEye mutexes"
 6
        severity = 3
 7
        categories = ["banker"]
 8
        families = ["spyeye"]
 9
        authors = ["nex"]
10
        minimum = "0.5"
11
12
        def run(self):
13
            indicators = [
14
                "zXeRY3a_PtW.*",
15
                "SPYNET",
16
                "__CLEANSWEEP__",
                "__CLEANSWEEP_UNINSTALL__",
17
                "__CLEANSWEEP_RELOADCFG__"
18
19
20
21
            for indicator in indicators:
                if self.check_mutex(pattern=indicator, regex=True):
22
23
                     return True
24
25
            return False
```

```
from lib.cuckoo.common.abstracts import Signature
    class Prinimalka(Signature):
        name = "banker_prinimalka"
        description = "Detected Prinimalka banking trojan"
        severity = 3
 6
        categories = ["banker"]
 8
        families = ["prinimalka"]
        authors = ["nex"]
        minimum = "0.5.1"
10
11
12
        def run(self):
            server = ""
13
            path = ""
14
15
16
            for process in self.results["behavior"]["processes"]:
                 for call in process["calls"]:
17
18
                     if call["api"] != "RegSetValueExA":
19
                         continue
20
21
                     correct = False
22
                     for argument in call["arguments"]:
23
                         if not server:
24
                             if argument["name"] == "ValueName" and argument["value"] == "nah opt server1":
25
                                 correct = True
26
27
                             if correct:
28
                                 if argument["name"] == "Buffer":
                                     server = argument["value"].rstrip("\\x00")
29
30
                         else:
                             break
31
32
33
                     if server:
34
                         break
35
36
                 if server:
37
                     self.description += " (C&C: {0})".format(server)
38
                     return True
39
40
            return False
```

COMMUNITY SIGNATURES

- Community Repository
 - https://github.com/cuckoobox/community
- utils/community.py –signatures (--force)





SHARING IS CARING!



REPORTING MODULES

- In Core (under analyzer/windows/modules/reporting/)
- Python class
- Make use of abstracted results
- Default:
 - JSON
 - HTML
 - MAEC
 - MongoDB



```
import os
   import json
    import codecs
 5
    from lib.cuckoo.common.abstracts import Report
    from lib.cuckoo.common.exceptions import CuckooReportError
 8
    class JsonDump(Report):
        """Saves analysis results in JSON format."""
 9
10
11
        def run(self, results):
            """Writes report.
12
            @param results: Cuckoo results dict.
13
14
            @raise CuckooReportError: if fails to write report.
15
16
            try:
17
                report = codecs.open(os.path.join(self.reports_path, "report.json"), "w", "utf-8")
                json.dump(results, report, sort keys=False, indent=4)
18
19
                report.close()
20
            except (UnicodeError, TypeError, IOError) as e:
                raise CuckooReportError("Failed to generate JSON report: %s" % e)
21
22
```

ANALYZER MODULES

ANALYSIS PACKAGES

- In Analyzer (under analyzer/windows/modules/packages/)
- Python modules
- Define how to interact with the malware and the system
- Can be used for scripting tasks



```
from lib.common.abstracts import Package
   from lib.api.process import Process
    from lib.common.exceptions import CuckooPackageError
 8
 9
    class Exe(Package):
        """EXE analysis package."""
10
11
12
        def start(self, path):
13
            free = self.options.get("free", False)
14
            args = self.options.get("arguments", None)
15
            suspended = True
            if free:
16
17
                suspended = False
18
19
            p = Process()
            if not p.execute(path=path, args=args, suspended=suspended):
20
                raise CuckooPackageError("Unable to execute initial process, analysis aborted")
21
22
23
            if not free and suspended:
24
                p.inject()
25
                p.resume()
26
                p.close()
27
                return p.pid
28
            else:
29
                return None
30
        def check(self):
31
32
            return True
33
34
        def finish(self):
            if self.options.get("procmemdump", False):
35
                for pid in self.pids:
36
                     p = Process(pid=pid)
37
                    p.dump_memory()
38
39
40
            return True
41
```

AUXILIARY MODULES

- In Analyzer (under analyzer/windows/modules/auxiliaries/)
- Python modules
- Run concurrently to the analysis
- Default:
 - Screenshots
 - Emulation of human interaction



```
68 ▼ class Human(Auxiliary, Thread):
        """Human after all"""
69
70
71▼
        def __init__(self):
72
            Thread.__init__(self)
73
            self.do_run = True
74
75
        def stop(self):
76
            self.do_run = False
77
        def run(self):
78▼
79▼
            while self.do_run:
80
                move_mouse()
81
                click_mouse()
                USER32.EnumWindows(EnumWindowsProc(foreach_window), 0)
82
83
                KERNEL32.Sleep(1000)
```

CUSTOMIZATION: POISONIVY

- Leverage Cuckoo process dumping to automatically extract Poisonlyy configuration
- Custom Processing Module to match patterns in the dumps
- In case of successful extraction, upload to special server for further monitoring



```
signatures = {
 9
         'namespace1' : 'rule pivars {strings: $a = { \
10
            53 74 75 62 50 61 74 68 ?? 53 4F 46 54 57 41 52\
11
            45 5C 43 6C 61 73 73 65 73 5C 68 74 74 70 5C 73\
12
            68 65 6C 6C 5C 6F 70 65 6E 5C 63 6F 6D 6D 61 6E\
13
            64 [22] 53 6F 66 74 77 61 72 65 5C 4D 69 63 72 6F\
            73 6F 66 74 5C 41 63 74 69 76 65 20 53 65 74 75\
14
15
            70 5C 49 6E 73 74 61 6C 6C 65 64 20 43 6F 6D 70\
16
            6F 6E 65 6E 74 73 5C } condition: $a}'
17
    }
18
19
    class PoisonIvy(Processing):
20
        def run(self):
            self.key = "poisonivy"
21
22
             results = {}
23
24
             rules = yara.compile(sources=signatures)
25
26
            dumps = []
27
             for root, dirs, files in os.walk(self.pmemory_path):
28
                 if files:
29
                     for file_name in files:
30
                         dumps.append(os.path.join(root, file_name))
31
32
             for dump in dumps:
33
                 matches = rules.match(dump)
34
35
                 if not matches:
36
                     continue
37
38
                 data = open(dump, "rb")
39
40
                 offset = matches[0].strings[0][0]
41
                 data.seek(offset + 0x6eb)
42
                 results["identifier"] = data.read(100).split("\x00")[0]
43
                 data.seek(offset + 0x2a2)
                 results["persistence"] = data.read(100).split("\x00")[0]
44
45
                 data.seek(offset - 0x27e)
                 results["server"] = data.read(100).split("\x00")[0]
46
47
                 break
48
49
50
             return results
```

```
import requests

from lib.cuckoo.common.abstracts import Report

class PoisonReport(Report):

def run(self, results):
    if not "poisonivy" in results or not results["poisonivy"]["domain"]:
    # No PoisonIvy detected.
    return

requests.post("http://192.168.1.10/report/poisonivy", data=results["poisonivy"])
```

CUCKOOMON

CuckooMon

- DLL Injection
- Inline Hooking
- Logging to the host over TCP connection
- Follow execution of child processes or injection of target processes



ANALYZER PACKAGE


- Analyzer is uploaded to the VM through the Agent
- By default the analysis package will:
 - Start suspended process
 - Inject CuckooMon
 - Resume process

```
p = Process()
if not p.execute(path=path, args=args, suspended=suspended):
    raise CuckooPackageError("Unable to execute initial process, analysis aborted")

if not free and suspended:
    p.inject()
    p.resume()
    p.close()
    return p.pid
```



CHILD INJECTION




EVASION ARMS RACE

- Malware often injects into other processes to avoid detection (e.g. iexplore.exe)
- Also creates child processes for other purposes
- To track this, we monitor for such events and inject CuckooMon in 3rd processes too.



PROCESS INJECTION



API HOOKING OVERVIEW

- Cuckoo logs about 170 APIs
- Hook lowest APIs without loosing context
 - Not CreateProcessA
 - Not CreateProcessW
 - Not CreateProcessInternalA
 - But CreateProcessInternalW
- However also higher level APIs
 - ShellExecute (protocol handlers, URLs)
 - system (pipe multiple processes)



HOOKING + MAGIC = PROFIT

- Use standard inline hooking with a few twists
 - Support for random preambles (jmp/push+ret/etc)

- First hook run is interesting, ignore recursive ones down on the callstack
- Transparently manage these situations in hooking mechanism




ASSEMBLY TRAMPOLINES

```
unsigned char pre backup[] = {
118
119
120
             0x50,
121
122
             // mov eax, fs:[TLS HOOK INFO]
123
             0x64, 0xa1, TLS HOOK INFO, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
124
125
             0x85, 0xc0,
126
127
             0x75, 0x0d,
128
129
                 0x60,
                 // call ensure valid hook info
130
131
                 0xe8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
132
                 0x61,
133
                 // mov eax, fs:[TLS HOOK INFO]
134
135
                 0x64, 0xa1, TLS HOOK INFO, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
136
137
             0x83, 0x78, offsetof(hook info t, hook count), 0x00,
138
139
140
             0x7f, 0x11,
                 // inc dword [eax+hook info t.hook count]
141
                 0xff, 0x40, offsetof(hook info t, hook count),
142
143
                 // push dword [esp+4]
144
                 0xff, 0x74, 0xe4, 0x04,
145
                 // pop dword [eax+hook info t.ret last error]
                 0x8f, 0x40, offsetof(hook info t, ret last error),
146
147
                 // mov dword [esp+4], new return address
148
                 0xc7, 0x44, 0xe4, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
149
150
151
             0x58,
152
         };
```



RESULTING HOOKS





WORK IN PROGRESS

- Return address + module tracking
 - Only log when coming from interesting sources (reduce noise when malware injects into other processes)

StubDLL

 Don't hook, shadow DLL that "overloads" functions

(avoid inline hooking countermeasures / detection)



ANTI-ANTI-SANDBOX

With sandboxes getting popular, malware writers are increasingly trying to bypass them.



COMMON TRICKS

- Sleep before main execution
- Monitor mouse events (SetWindowsHookEx 0x07, 0x0E)
- Check for virtualization software:
 - Files
 - Processes
 - Devices (cd-rom, HDD)
 - Registry keys



ANTI-SLEEP

 Cuckoo Sandbox skips sleeps that are launched within the first seconds of a process execution.



ANTI-MOUSE-MONITOR

- Cuckoo Sandbox emulates human interaction
 - Move the mouse cursor
 - Click on mouse buttons
 - Click on dialogs



ANTI-VIRTUALIZATION

- It's painful
- Depends on the virtualization software of your choice
- You can do something about it
- However you won't be able to kill all indicators



VIRTUALBOX EXTRA DATA

\$ VBoxManage setextradata < label > VBoxInternal/Devices/ +

- pcbios/0/Config/DmiBIOSFirmwareMajor
- pcbios/0/Config/DmiBIOSFirmwareMinor
- pcbios/0/Config/DmiBIOSReleaseDate
- pcbios/0/Config/DmiBIOSReleaseMajor
- pcbios/0/Config/DmiBIOSReleaseMinor
- pcbios/0/Config/DmiBIOSVendor
- pcbios/0/Config/DmiBIOSVersion
- pcbios/0/Config/DmiChassisAssetTag
- pcbios/0/Config/DmiChassisSerial
- pcbios/0/Config/DmiChassisVendor
- pcbios/0/Config/DmiChassisVersion
- pcbios/0/Config/DmiSystemFamily
- pcbios/0/Config/DmiSystemProduct

- pcbios/0/Config/DmiSystemSKU
- pcbios/0/Config/DmiSystemSerial
- pcbios/0/Config/DmiSystemUuid
- pcbios/0/Config/DmiSystemVendor
- pcbios/0/Config/DmiSystemVersion
- piix3ide/0/Config/Port0/ATAPIProductId
- piix3ide/0/Config/Port0/ATAPIRevision
- piix3ide/0/Config/Port0/ATAPIVendorId
- piix3ide/0/Config/PrimaryMaster/Firmwar eRevision
- piix3ide/0/Config/PrimaryMaster/ModelN umber
- piix3ide/0/Config/PrimaryMaster/SerialN umber



DO NOT INSTALL

THE GUEST ADDITIONS.



WINDOWS REGISTRY

- HKLM\HARDWARE\Description\System\System\System\square
 mBiosVersion
- HKLM\HARDWARE\Description\System\Video
 BiosVersion
- HKLM\HARDWARE\DEVICEMAP\Scsi\Scsi Port
 0\Scsi Bus 0\Target Id 0\Logical Unit Id 0
- HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\IDE\



CUCKOOVMI

ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES

- CuckooMon: userland DLL injection
 - comfortable, simple, still effective
 - sadly easy to detect/circumvent
- Commercial sandboxes often kernel based tracing, sometimes combined with userland components
- Even harder to detect: introspection from outside the OS

Cuckoo VMI?



GENERALIZING CUCKOO LOG DATA

- Necessary changes to Cuckoo
 - Generalizing behavior semantics for Mac/Linux platforms anyway
- More visibility / possibilities with VMI
 - Might need more flexible configuration of the analyzer engine



VIRTUAL MACHINE INTROSPECTION

- Observe the memory and execution flow from the outside
- Look at kernel structures to differentiate between processes / libraries
- Depending on virtualization technique use its features to pause VM execution and extract function arguments / memory contents



WINDOWS KERNEL DETAILS

- What do we need for inspecting Windows from the outside?
 - Processes (track cr3)
 - Libraries / Modules
- Kernel structures:
 - EPROCESS (ActiveProcessHead list)
 - Process Object Tables (HANDLE_TABLE)
 - Virtual Address Descriptor tree (VAD tree)



WIP: CUCKOOVMI BASED ON QEMU

- QEMU: binary translation engine: TCG (Tiny Code Generator)
- Great base for both coarse- and fine-grained tracing of the guest and its processes
- Focus on Windows XP/7 find kernel process structs and track their executable memory
- Full tracing or specific locations
- Never miss executed code



AUTOMATED FUNCTIONCALL LOGGING

- Windows APIs mostly use stdcall calling convention
 - Callee cleans up the stack, EAX = returnvalue
- This allows for generic parameter logging
 - Note stack pointer when entering function
 - Note stack pointer when returning
 - Everything in between was a parameter
- Still needs knowledge of types for special logging (Strings, structs, etc)



AUTOMATED LOGGING CONT.

Type information can be automatically extracted from development headers

NTSTATUS NtCreateFile(HANDLE* FileHandle, FILE_ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES* ObjectAttributes, IO_STATUS_BLOCK* IoStatusBlock, LARGE_INTEGER* AllocationSize, FILE_ATTRIBUTES_ULONG FileAttributes, FileShareMode ShareAccess, NtCreateDisposition CreateDisposition, NtCreateOptions CreateOptions, VOID* EaBuffer, ULONG EaLength)

- Specify list of interesting variables in all those structs, generate dereference/offset code automatically
- Comes down to only implementing specific code for elementary types (char *, wchar_t *, UNICODE_STRING)



CUCKOOVMI EXAMPLE

```
--- Tracking Process amstreamx.tmp PID 1292 TID 1288 ---
    [\ldots]
    PID:1292 TID:1288 call 0x402682->0x7c80b731 --
                                                   kernel32.dll:GetModuleHandleA([4239724])
     -> additional: {u'lpModuleName': u'KERNEL32'}
    PID:1292 TID:1288 call 0x402692->0x7c80ae30 --
                                                    kernel32.dll:GetProcAddress([2088763392, 2088808122])
    PID:1292 TID:1288 call 0x40269e->0x7c80aeba
                                                    kernel32.dll:IsProcessorFeaturePresent([0])
                                                    ntdll.dll:RtlAllocateHeap([8716288, 9, 2048])
    PID:1292 TID:1288 call 0x4099e5->0x7c9100a4
                                                    kernel32.dll:SetUnhandledExceptionFilter([4228645])
    PID:1292 TID:1288 call 0x408670->0x7c8449fd
    PID:1292 TID:1288 call 0x40258d->0x7c801ef2
                                                    kernel32.dll:GetStartupInfoA([1245028])
                                                    kernel32.dll:GetModuleHandleA([0])
    PID:1292 TID:1288 call 0x4025b0->0x7c80b731 --
    -> additional: {u'lpModuleName': u'KERNEL32'}
    PID:1292 TID:1288 call 0x40182c->0x7c835de2 --
                                                    kernel32.dll:GetTempPathA([256, 4247808])
12
                                                    kernel32.dll:CreateFileA([1244452, 1073741824, 3, 1244296])
    PID:1292 TID:1288 call 0x4084b0->0x7c801a28 --
13
     -> additional: {u'lpFileName': u'C:\\DOCUME~1\\john\\LOCALS~1\\Temp\\desktopc.ini'}
    PID:1292 TID:1288 call 0x4084bd->0x7c810ee1 --
                                                    kernel32.dll:GetFileType([40])
15
    PID:1292 TID:1288 call 0x40140f->0x7c835de2 --
                                                    kernel32.dll:GetTempPathA([260, 1243400])
    PID:1292 TID:1288 call 0x4084b0->0x7c801a28 --
                                                    kernel32.dll:CreateFileA([1243140, 1073741824, 3, 1242900])
     -> additional: {u'lpFileName': u'C:\\DOCUME~1\\john\\LOCALS~1\\Temp\\~WRL0000l.tmp'}
                                                    kernel32.dll:GetFileType([44])
    PID:1292 TID:1288 call 0x4084bd->0x7c810ee1 --
    PID:1292 TID:1288 call 0x4012d4->0x7c801a28 --
                                                   kernel32.dll:CreateFileA([4243608, 0, 3, 0])
     -> additional: {u'lpFileName': u'\\\\.\\PhysicalDriveO'}
21
    PID:1292 TID:1288 call 0x4012ff->0x7c801629 -- kernel32.dll:DeviceIoControl([48, 458752, 0, 0])
     -> additional: {u'lpInBuffer': Binary('', 0), u'lpOutBuffer': Binary('', 0)}
    PID:1292 TID:1288 call 0x401310->0x7c809bd7 -- kernel32.dll:CloseHandle([48])
    PID:1292 TID:1288 call 0x403e31->0x7c9100a4 -- ntdll.dll:RtlAllocateHeap([8716288, 1, 4096])
    PID:1292 TID:1288 call 0x401521->0x7c82c2cb --
                                                   kernel32.dll:GetLogicalDriveStringsA([260, 0])
    PID:1292 TID:1288 call 0x401552->0x7e41a8ad --
                                                   user32.dll:wsprintfA([])
     -> additional: {u'lpFmt': u'\\\.\\PhysicalDriveO'}
    PID:1292 TID:1288 call 0x4015af->0x7c809c88 --
                                                   kernel32.dll:MultiByteToWideChar([0, 0, 1243084, 2])
29
                                                    kernel32.dll:CreateFileA([1243096, 268435456, 3, 0])
    PID:1292 TID:1288 call 0x401339->0x7c801a28 --
     -> additional: {u'lpFileName': u'\\\\.\\C:'}
    PID:1292 TID:1288 call 0x401363->0x7c801629 --
                                                    kernel32.dll:DeviceIoControl([48, 475140, 0, 0])
32
     -> additional: {u'lpInBuffer': Binary('', 0), u'lpOutBuffer': Binary('', 0)}
    PID:1292 TID:1288 call 0x401373->0x7c809bd7 --
                                                    kernel32.dll:CloseHandle([48])
```

DEMO



RELATED WORK: DECAF PLATFORM

- Qemu based analysis framework out of Berkeley
- Base of Android analysis project "DroidScope"
- Also supports tracing / analysing x86 Windows guests
- Parts from closed **TEMU** and other related projects
- Rich hooking API
 - Specific addresses, all basic blocks, memory write, etc
- Experimental taint tracking features
- Too many features and too invasive (outdated QEMU, etc) for our purpose



ALTERNATIVE VMI SOLUTIONS

- Thin hypervisor for VM performance
 - Use page protection faults to trap to the hypervisor at interesting locations
- Other rootkit techniques? UEFI drivers?

- Cuckoo hopefully grows to other platforms and several analyzer techniques to choose from
 - Brings even more customization / flexibility



CONCLUSIONS

SUMMING UP

- Open source solution (and will remain so)
- Flexible and customizable
- Easy to integrate
- Very actively developed



FUTURE

- Improve performances
- Continue work on VMI techniques
- Bare-metal support (almost done)
- Add Linux support
- Add Mac OS X support
- Feedback?



OTHER STUFF

- Malwr
 - https://malwr.com
- VxCage
 - https://github.com/cuckoobox/vxcage





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