



Secure your  
organization from  
all mobile threats

# Practical Attacks against Mobile Device Management Solutions

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## About: Daniel

- Security researcher for nearly a decade
  - From PC to Mobile
- Researcher and Developer at Lagoon
  - Developing an App Analysis framework for spyphones and mobile malware

## About: Michael

- Decade of experience researching and working in the mobile security space
  - From feature-phones to smartphones
  - Mobile Security Research Team Leader at NICE Systems
- CEO and co-founder of Lagoon Mobile Security

# Targeted Attacks: From PC to Malware



Convergence of  
Personal and Business

Ubiquitous

Perfect Surveillance  
Hardware

# Targeted Attacks: From PC to Malware



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
# Agenda

- Rise of the spyphones
- Introduction to MDM and Secure Containers
- Bypassing secure container encryption capabilities
- Recommendations and summary

# TARGETED MOBILE THREATS



# The Mobile Threatscape



# Mobile Remote Access Trojans (aka Spyphones)



# Recent High-Profile Examples

FinFisher spyware goes global, mobile and undercover  
Report claims to have found C&C servers in 25 countries

By [Phil Muncaster](#) · [Get more from this author](#)

Posted in [Security](#), 19th March 2013 06:34 GMT

[Free whitepaper – IT infrastructure monitoring strategies](#)

Security researchers have warned that the controversial FinFisher spyware has been updated to evade detection and has now been discovered in 25 countries across the globe, many of them in APAC.

January 14, 2013, 8:00AM

## Rocra Espionage Malware Campaign Uncovered After Five Years of Activity

by [Michael Mimoso](#)

Follow [@Mike\\_Mimoso](#)



**Parmy Olson**, Forbes Staff

I cover agitators and innovators in mobile.

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TECH | 3/26/2013 @ 8:32PM | 4,646 views

## First-Known Targeted Malware Attack On Android Phones Steals Contacts And Text Messages

## 'Crisis' OS X Trojan made by lawful intercept vendor, HackingTeam

Russian AV vendor Dr Web says the company behind it has a version for smartphones too.

Liam Tung (CSO Online (Australia)) — 27 July, 2012 07:48

### Mobile attacks!

0.3



Victor Chebyshev

Kaspersky Lab Expert

Posted February 01, 12:31 GMT

Tags: Mobile Malware, Google Android

Users of inexpensive Android smartphones typically look for ways to accelerate their devices, for example, by freeing up memory. Demand for software that makes smartphones work a little faster creates supply, some of which happens to be malicious. In addition to legitimate applications, apps that only pretend to clean up the system have appeared on Google Play.

## 'Luckycat' APT Campaign Building Android Malware

**Trend Micro researchers discover evidence of cyberespionage actors targeting Android users as well**

Jul 30, 2012 | 09:09 PM | [0 Comments](#)

By [Kelly Jackson Higgins](#)


*Dark Reading*

DEF CON 20 -- Las Vegas, NV -- Windows long has been the favorite target of cyberespionage actors, but newly discovered evidence shows they are also setting their sites on mobile platforms, namely the Android.

# Commercial mRATS

Rank	#1	#2	#3	#4	#5	#6	#7	#8	#9	#10
10-9 Excellent	<a href="#">PhoneSheriff</a>	<a href="#">mSpy</a>	<a href="#">Mobile Spy</a>	<a href="#">My Mobile Watchdog</a>	<a href="#">MobiStealth</a>	<a href="#">StealthGenie</a>	<a href="#">SpyPhone Basic Internet</a>	<a href="#">SpyBubble</a>	<a href="#">eBlaster Mobile</a>	<a href="#">Flexispy</a>
8-6 Good										
5-4 Average										
3-2 Poor										
1-0 Bad										
<b>Print/Email</b>										
Reviewer Comments	<a href="#">Read Review</a>	<a href="#">Read Review</a>	<a href="#">Read Review</a>	<a href="#">Read Review</a>	<a href="#">Read Review</a>	<a href="#">Read Review</a>	<a href="#">Read Review</a>	<a href="#">Read Review</a>	<a href="#">Read Review</a>	<a href="#">Read Review</a>
Lowest Yearly Price	<a href="#">Buy Now</a>	<a href="#">Buy Now</a>	<a href="#">Buy Now</a>	<a href="#">Buy Now</a>	<a href="#">Buy Now</a>	<a href="#">Buy Now</a>	<a href="#">Buy Now</a>	<a href="#">Buy Now</a>	<a href="#">Buy Now</a>	<a href="#">Buy Now</a>
	\$49.97	\$159.00	\$99.97	\$59.40	\$89.99	\$99.99	\$349.00	\$49.95	\$69.95	\$149.00
Ratings	9.70	9.68	8.78	8.65	8.15	8.15	7.80	7.40	6.90	6.38
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Overall Rating</li> <li>Reporting &amp; Logging</li> <li>Features</li> <li>Tracking &amp; Security</li> <li>Help &amp; Support</li> </ul>										
Reporting & Logging										
<a href="#">Report Display (percentage)</a>	95	100	60	50	70	60	40	50	40	20
<a href="#">Call History/Details</a>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<a href="#">Text/SMS</a>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<a href="#">Email</a>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<a href="#">GPS</a>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓


# A Double-Edged Sword



# Survey: Cellular Network 2M Subscribers

Sampling: 500K

## Spyphone Distribution by OS



Count

## Infection rates:


June 2013:

**1 / 800** devices

# Survey: Cellular Network 2M Subscribers


Sampling: 500K

### Spyphone Distribution by OS



**Count**

### Mobile OS Market Share



**Market Share**

Source: IDC Worldwide Quarterly Mobile Phone Tracker, May 2013

# MDM and SECURE CONTAINERS 101



# Mobile Device Management

- Policy and configuration management tool
- Helps enterprises manage BYOD and mobile computing environment
- Offerings include separating between business data and personal data

# MDM: Penetration in the Market

“Over the 5 years,  
**65%** of enterprises  
will adopt a mobile device  
management (MDM)  
solution for their  
corporate liable users”



Gartner, Inc. October 2012

# MDM Key Capabilities

- Software management
- Network service management
- Hardware management
- Security management
  - Remote wipe
  - Secure configuration enforcement
  - Encryption

# Secure Containers

All leading MDM solutions provide secure containers

MobileIron


AirWatch

Fiberlink

Zenprise

Good Technology


# Behind the Scenes: Secure Containers



Enterprise



Application  
Sandbox



Encrypted Storage

# MDMs and Secure Containers

**3 assumptions:**

- **Encrypt business data**
- **Encrypt communications to the business (SSL/ VPN)**
- **Detect Jailbreak/ Rooting of devices**


# MDMs and Secure Containers

**Let's test these assumptions...**

# BYPASSING MOBILE DEVICE MANAGEMENT (MDM) SOLUTIONS




# Overview



DEMO

ANDROID

# Step 1: Infect the Device



# Step 1: Technical Details

## Publish an app through the market

Use “Two-Stage”: Download the rest of the dex later and only for the targets we want

## Get the target to install the app

Through spearphishing or physical access to the device

# Step 2: Install a Backdoor (i.e. Rooting)

## Root

Any process can run as root user if it is able to trigger a vulnerability in the OS

## Vulnerability

Android device vulnerabilities are abundant

## Exploit

On-Device detection mechanisms can't look at apps exploiting the vulnerability

## Step 2: Technical Details

### Privilege escalation

We used the Exynos exploit (Released Dec., 2012)

Create the hidden 'suid' binary and use it for specific actions

Place in a folder with --x--x--x permissions

Undetected by generic root detectors

# Step 3: Bypass Containerization



Storage

# Step 3: Bypass Containerization



Storage



# Step 3: Bypass Containerization



Storage



Memory

# Step 3: Technical Details

## We listen to events in the log

For  $\leq 2.3$  we can just use the logging permissions

For  $>4.0$  we access the logs as root

## When an email is read...

L...	Time	PID	TID	Application	Tag	Text
I	01-24 12:47:3...	2099	2134		ClipboardS...	mCBPickerDialog enter case. MSG_DISMISS_DIALOG
D	01-24 12:47:3...	2099	2153		KeyguardVi...	setHidden false
D	01-24 12:47:3...	2099	2153		KeyguardVi...	setHidden false
D	01-24 12:47:3...	2099	2153		KeyguardVi...	setHidden false
D	01-24 12:47:3...	2099	2153		KeyguardVi...	setHidden false
I	01-24 12:47:3...	3569	5579		GATE	<GATE-M>DEV_ACTION_COMPLETED</GATE-M>
I	01-24 12:47:3...	2099	2134		ClipboardS...	mCBPickerDialog enter case. MSG_DISMISS_DIALOG
D	01-24 12:47:3...	2099	2153		KeyguardVi...	setHidden false
D	01-24 12:47:3...	2099	2153		KeyguardVi...	setHidden false
D	01-24 12:47:3...	2099	2153		KeyguardVi...	setHidden false
D	01-24 12:47:3...	2099	2153		KeyguardVi...	setHidden false
I	01-24 12:47:3...	1904	2052		SurfaceFli...	id=17 Removed HomeScreenActivity idx=2 Map Size=4

# Step 4: Exfiltrate Information



Storage



Memory



Exfiltrate information

# Step 4: Technical Details

We dump the heap using `/proc/<pid>/maps` and `/mem`

Then search for the email structure, extract it, and send it home

```
00153C90 02 00 00 00 C3 0A 00 00 3C 21 44 4F 43 54 59 50 .....Q...<!DOCTYPE
00153CA0 45 20 48 54 4D 4C 20 50 55 42 4C 49 43 20 22 2D E HTML PUBLIC "-//
00153CB0 2F 2F 57 33 43 2F 2F 44 54 44 20 48 54 4D 4C 20 //W3C//DTD HTML
00153CC0 33 2E 32 2F 2F 45 4E 22 3E 0D 0A 3C 48 54 4D 4C 3.2//EN">..<HTML
00153CD0 3E 0D 0A 3C 48 45 41 44 3E 0D 0A 3C 4D 45 54 41 >..<HEAD>..<META
00153CE0 20 48 54 54 50 2D 45 51 55 49 56 3D 22 43 6F 6E HTTP-EQUIV="Con
00153CF0 74 65 6E 74 2D 54 79 70 65 22 20 43 4F 4E 54 45 tent-Type" CONTE
00153D00 4E 54 3D 22 74 65 78 74 2F 68 74 6D 6C 3B 20 63 NT="text/html; c
00153D10 68 61 72 73 65 74 3D 57 69 6E 64 6F 77 73 2D 31 harset=Windows-1
00153D20 32 35 32 22 3E 0D 0A 3C 4D 45 54 41 20 4E 41 4D 252">..<META NAM
00153D30 45 3D 22 47 65 6E 65 72 61 74 6F 72 22 20 43 4F E="Generator" CO
00153D40 4E 54 45 4E 54 3D 22 4D 53 20 45 78 63 68 61 6E NTENT="MS Exchan
```

# DEMO

# IOS

# Step 1: Infect the device



# Step 2: Install a Backdoor (i.e. Jailbreaking)

## Community



**Andy Greenberg**, Forbes Staff  
Covering the worlds of data security, privacy and hacker culture.  
[+ Follow](#) (757)



SECURITY | 2/08/2013 @ 8:00AM | 53,976 views

### Evasion Is The Most Popular Jailbreak Ever: Nearly Seven Million iOS Devices Hacked In Four Days

## Jailbroken

### 10 Reasons Why You Should Jailbreak Your iPhone

Dylan Love | Feb. 4, 2013, 2:31 PM | 🔥 192,667 | 💬 5



## xCon

### Bypassing Jailbreak Detection

Recently, a sizable handful of applications in Apple's own App Store have been implementing procedures to check for risks of jailbreaking your device (e.g. banking companies don't want the blame for some rogue keylogger disguised as their apps. Video streaming apps are notorious for this; the companies don't want users bypassing restrictions or malicious intent or lack thereof.

## Step 2: Technical Details

### Install signed application

Using Enterprise/ Developer certificate


### Use the Jailbreak

To complete the hooking

### Remove any trace of the Jailbreak



# Step 3: Bypass Containerization



# MITIGATION TECHNIQUES

# MDM

MDMs are good for:

**Management**

**Compliance Enforcement**

**DLP**

**Physical Loss**

However...



MDM is static and inefficient against the dynamic nature of cybercrime



# Do We Have Visibility?



# Can We Assess Risk in Real-Time?



# Can We Mitigate Targeted Threats?







**LACCON**

MOBILE SECURITY

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Attacks are going to happen

It's a question of assessing risk

And mitigating the effects

“Life is inherently risky. There is only one big risk you should avoid at all costs, and that is the risk of doing nothing.”

Denis Waitley

## **Vulnerabilities and Usage**

**Is the device up-to-date?**

**Any known vulnerabilities pertaining to the OS?**

**Is the device connecting to a public hotspot?**

## **App Behavioral Analysis**

**What is the common app behavior? (static analysis)**

**What is the app doing? (dynamic analysis)**

## **Funky Correlation of Events**

**Is the device sending an SMS when the phone is locked?**

## Network Behavioral Analysis

- **Anomaly detection of communications of apps**
- **Outgoing content inspection (unencrypted)**
- **Blocking of exploit and drive-by attacks**

# Thank You.

Michael Shaulov, CEO

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MOBILE SECURITY