

Denial of Service.... as a Service

Investigation and arrest of a DDoS attacker



About Me

The "call"

- Mid-sized ISP doing enterprise and personal
- Largest ISP in the geographic region
- Attacks started November 25 2012
- Started at 1 attack a week escalated quickly
- Major outages occurred in 300km+ radius
 - Emergency services
 - VOIP
 - Chicken farms

The investigation

- Traffic would start during "business hours"
- Ramp up quickly into GB+ traffic
- Initial attack target customer of ISP
- Eventually ISP was targeted
- ISP did not use RFC 1918 addresses internally...
- Everything would go down
- VOIP conference calls going down...

Where to start?

- Logs
 - Looked for pre-attack activity from potential command and control
 - Nothing useful
- List Potential Suspects
 - One lead

The Suspect

- Network admin background
- Used to work for a company called "Concepta"
- Left Concepta to start his own company
- ... that specializes in DDOS protection
- Let's use some open source intelligence to see what we can find on the suspect
 - LinkedIn
 - Facebook
 - WHOIS
 - Message boards (always get hits on this for technical people)

Suspect LinkedIn page



Descriptif de

Poste actuel

Oirecteur Général chez

Administrateur Réseau che Concepta ystème informatique Administrateur Réseau che
Formation

VQTR

Recommandations
Relations

Relations

Résumé de

Depuis quelques années le mot « cloud » revient partout. L'idée principale de ce service est de migrer nos données dans un endroit sécuritaire afin de ne jamais se les faires voler ou effacer par erreur. Ce nouveau concept prend beaucoup d'ampleur dans le domaine informatique et c'est avec raison. D'ici quelques années, toutes les entreprises auront migré vers ce service.

Le « cloud » offert actuellement par nos compétiteurs est très limité et non transparent. De plus, il nécessite une équipe de techniciens à votre disposition et ce en tout temps. C Sécurité Inc., nous avons innové et mis en place un système clé en main afin de faire profiter de ce nouveau concept à toute la population et ce avec une simplicité jamais vue.

Une fois le forfait choisi avec notre service à la clientèle, un technicien ira prendre une image des données de votre serveur, installera nos équipements de cryptage afin de sécuriser les données qui transigeront entre votre commerce et nos serveurs. Le tout prend approximativement 2 heures et se fait sans déranger vos employés. Nous assurons ensuite que chaque poste voit le nouveau serveur « nuagique », puis nous allons implanter cette image dans nos serveurs. En une demi-journée, vous pouvez dire adieu à votre serveur, à vos sauvegardes en ligne tout en vous assurant d'une redondance en cas de bris matériel et un accès en tout temps à vos dossiers, de partout dans le monde.

Ce service est aussi sécuritaire qu'une transaction à la banque. Chaque donnée étant cryptée en 256bits, soit le maximum possible mondialement et avec le meilleur algorithme possible. Notre équipement est à la fine pointe de la technologie et protège contre les attaques de type DDOS en filtrant ceux-ci.

Administrateur Réseau


Concepta système informatique

mai 2009 - mai 2012 (3 ans 1 mois) Trois-Rivieres


Hackforum & Hacksociety

- Found messages on hacker forums with "Concepta" user name
- Messages were written as a French Canadian speaking English
- Signed up November 25 2012 asking DDOS questions
- Same day as attacks started on ISP
- More activity in December 2012
- Likes "Demolition Stresser" around the exact same date and time on his Facebook


Hacksociety evidence




Hackforum evidence




Hackforum evidence



Hackforum evidence




Suspect Facebook page



Suspect Facebook page



Demolition stresser link = Rage



Enough evidence?

- Contact local police
- Referred us to Provincial/State police
- No local expert available
- But officer was nice and sympathetic
- Unfortunately we had no "meat"
- We were on our own
- We needed more information
- Time to learn more about Ragebooter...


DDoS as a Service - awesome


- We have all heard of or been victim of DDOS
- But where do you start finding out where the attacks are coming from?
- Logs are useless
- Luckily we had an initial clue with Ragebooter
- Booters are the name for the attack tools
- Went to Ragebooter, signed up for 200\$
 "Lifetime" membership!
- Messed with a few friends "testing"...


Easy plans and pricing!

PLANS & PRICING










Rage Platinum Monthly	
\$ 50.00 /mo	
Slupe Pareluar	





RAGE BRONZE LIFETIME
\$ 20.00
Slavno Poroluor

Easy to use GUI! Everyone can be Mafiaboy!




Asymmetrical warfare


- 50\$ can take down a multi million dollar infrastructure
- 99% of my customers would be negatively impacted by RageBooter, almost impossible to stop quickly
- Even RageBooter was protected by Cloudflare antiddos service ©
- Even buying all the standard "anti-ddos" equipment doesn't defy physics
- 10GB peak of traffic is 10GB of traffic how many companies run a 1GB Internet pipe let alone 10?
- You have to work with upstream providers

Thinking out of the box


- Sales guy from the company called "Bro, ask the guy for the logs"
- Dumb idea!
- Uuuh wait..
- What did we have to lose?
- Let's call contact customer support!




The conversation




The "ask"



The "ask"




The "ask"




Asymmetrical warfare

- Our friend copy/pastes the logs into the chat as well as other Booter sites belonging to Rage Productions
- Logs included
 - Destination
 - Username
 - Attack variables
- He realizes it and deletes
- Is the chat still in memory?
- Google "dump OSX memory"
- OSXPmem looks good
- Run the tool and pray



Run strings for November - bingo



Now we have enough evidence


- Suspect is an ex-employee of Concepta who previously admitted to owner he has DDOS botnets
- Suspect started a new company after leaving Concepta that specializes in "DDOS protection"
- Suspect has a "LIKE" on his open Facebook page for Demolition Stresser that points to Ragebooter
- As per the admin on Ragebooter, his website is being used to attack the IPs of my customer
- We have 2 log entries that show a user "Concepta2" launching attacks against customer

Legal strategy – civil first

- After all the evidence collected, we can now act
- First step is to go the Civil route
- Anton Piller order
- A good analogy is a Civil search warrant
 - Allows you to search and seize evidence
 - Tough to get from a judge
- We were granted the order to search two locations:
 - House
 - Office (shared space)
- Judge wanted execution Sunday morning
- Off we go!

The hammer of justice

- Bright and early, -4F morning
- Each location:
 - Police
 - Bailiffs
 - Locksmith
 - Computer forensic expert
 - Lawyer of customer
 - Customer
 - Independent lawyer
 - Me



- Police show up, confirm identity with bailiff
- We go in Bad news...


Leaked intel...

- The suspect wasn't surprised
- His wife was surprised (just annoyed)
- Suspect visited my LinkedIn 2 days before...
- What does that mean?
- How did he know?
- Set expectations with customer that he most likely wiped data
- Finished house, went to office
- Suspect smiling the whole time

Criminal investigation

- We leave the office and head back home
- The next day we get word about a crown prosecutor in Quebec who is interested in what we found
- Suspect's legal team attempts to quash the Anton Piller
- Prosecutor requests a copy of our evidence
- We went from no interest to lots of interest in 1 day
- Judge denies quashing Anton Piller, customer provides hard disk to prosecutor
- A few days later...

Perp walk



Lessons learned

- When you wipe the drive, wipe the whole drive
- Don't create accounts with your name
- Police can only do so much you need to be proactive
- Don't "Like" web sites you use to commit a crime
- Don't pay with paypal
- Don't think you're that smart everyone makes mistakes
- Think out of the box

Thank you!

Please fill out speaker feedback!

Contact info:

rmasse@swiftidentity.com

Follow me on Twitter #rob_masse