The CSRF middleware and template tag provides easy-to-use protection against Cross Site Request Forgeries. This type of attack occurs when a malicious Web site contains a link, a form button or some javascript that is intended to perform some action on your Web site, using the credentials of a logged-in user who visits the malicious site in their browser. A related type of attack, ‘login CSRF’, where an attacking site tricks a user’s browser into logging into a site with someone else’s credentials, is also covered.
The first defense against CSRF attacks is to ensure that GET requests (and other ‘safe’ methods, as defined by 9.1.1 Safe Methods, HTTP 1.1, RFC 2616) are side-effect free. Requests via ‘unsafe’ methods, such as POST, PUT and DELETE, can then be protected by following the steps below.
To enable CSRF protection for your views, follow these steps:
Add the middleware 'django.middleware.csrf.CsrfViewMiddleware' to your list of middleware classes, MIDDLEWARE_CLASSES. (It should come before any view middleware that assume that CSRF attacks have been dealt with.)
Alternatively, you can use the decorator csrf_protect() on particular views you want to protect (see below).
In any template that uses a POST form, use the csrf_token tag inside the <form> element if the form is for an internal URL, e.g.:
<form action="." method="post">{% csrf_token %}
This should not be done for POST forms that target external URLs, since that would cause the CSRF token to be leaked, leading to a vulnerability.
In the corresponding view functions, ensure that the 'django.core.context_processors.csrf' context processor is being used. Usually, this can be done in one of two ways:
Use RequestContext, which always uses 'django.core.context_processors.csrf' (no matter what your TEMPLATE_CONTEXT_PROCESSORS setting). If you are using generic views or contrib apps, you are covered already, since these apps use RequestContext throughout.
Manually import and use the processor to generate the CSRF token and add it to the template context. e.g.:
from django.core.context_processors import csrf
from django.shortcuts import render_to_response
def my_view(request):
c = {}
c.update(csrf(request))
# ... view code here
return render_to_response("a_template.html", c)
You may want to write your own render_to_response() wrapper that takes care of this step for you.
The utility script extras/csrf_migration_helper.py can help to automate the finding of code and templates that may need these steps. It contains full help on how to use it.
While the above method can be used for AJAX POST requests, it has some inconveniences: you have to remember to pass the CSRF token in as POST data with every POST request. For this reason, there is an alternative method: on each XMLHttpRequest, set a custom X-CSRFToken header to the value of the CSRF token. This is often easier, because many javascript frameworks provide hooks that allow headers to be set on every request. In jQuery, you can use the ajaxSend event as follows:
jQuery(document).ajaxSend(function(event, xhr, settings) {
function getCookie(name) {
var cookieValue = null;
if (document.cookie && document.cookie != '') {
var cookies = document.cookie.split(';');
for (var i = 0; i < cookies.length; i++) {
var cookie = jQuery.trim(cookies[i]);
// Does this cookie string begin with the name we want?
if (cookie.substring(0, name.length + 1) == (name + '=')) {
cookieValue = decodeURIComponent(cookie.substring(name.length + 1));
break;
}
}
}
return cookieValue;
}
function sameOrigin(url) {
// url could be relative or scheme relative or absolute
var host = document.location.host; // host + port
var protocol = document.location.protocol;
var sr_origin = '//' + host;
var origin = protocol + sr_origin;
// Allow absolute or scheme relative URLs to same origin
return (url == origin || url.slice(0, origin.length + 1) == origin + '/') ||
(url == sr_origin || url.slice(0, sr_origin.length + 1) == sr_origin + '/') ||
// or any other URL that isn't scheme relative or absolute i.e relative.
!(/^(\/\/|http:|https:).*/.test(url));
}
function safeMethod(method) {
return (/^(GET|HEAD|OPTIONS|TRACE)$/.test(method));
}
if (!safeMethod(settings.type) && sameOrigin(settings.url)) {
xhr.setRequestHeader("X-CSRFToken", getCookie('csrftoken'));
}
});
Note
Due to a bug introduced in jQuery 1.5, the example above will not work correctly on that version. Make sure you are running at least jQuery 1.5.1.
Adding this to a javascript file that is included on your site will ensure that AJAX POST requests that are made via jQuery will not be caught by the CSRF protection.
The above code could be simplified by using the jQuery cookie plugin to replace getCookie, and settings.crossDomain in jQuery 1.5 and later to replace sameOrigin.
In addition, if the CSRF cookie has not been sent to the client by use of csrf_token, you may need to ensure the client receives the cookie by using ensure_csrf_cookie().
When using a different template engine than Django's built-in engine, you can set the token in your forms manually after making sure it's available in the template context.
For example, in the Cheetah template language, your form could contain the following:
<div style="display:none">
<input type="hidden" name="csrfmiddlewaretoken" value="$csrf_token"/>
</div>
You can use JavaScript similar to the AJAX code above to get the value of the CSRF token.
Rather than adding CsrfViewMiddleware as a blanket protection, you can use the csrf_protect decorator, which has exactly the same functionality, on particular views that need the protection. It must be used both on views that insert the CSRF token in the output, and on those that accept the POST form data. (These are often the same view function, but not always).
Use of the decorator by itself is not recommended, since if you forget to use it, you will have a security hole. The 'belt and braces' strategy of using both is fine, and will incur minimal overhead.
Decorator that provides the protection of CsrfViewMiddleware to a view.
Usage:
from django.views.decorators.csrf import csrf_protect
from django.shortcuts import render
@csrf_protect
def my_view(request):
c = {}
# ...
return render(request, "a_template.html", c)
By default, a '403 Forbidden' response is sent to the user if an incoming request fails the checks performed by CsrfViewMiddleware. This should usually only be seen when there is a genuine Cross Site Request Forgery, or when, due to a programming error, the CSRF token has not been included with a POST form.
The error page, however, is not very friendly, so you may want to provide your own view for handling this condition. To do this, simply set the CSRF_FAILURE_VIEW setting.
The CSRF protection is based on the following things:
A CSRF cookie that is set to a random value (a session independent nonce, as it is called), which other sites will not have access to.
This cookie is set by CsrfViewMiddleware. It is meant to be permanent, but since there is no way to set a cookie that never expires, it is sent with every response that has called django.middleware.csrf.get_token() (the function used internally to retrieve the CSRF token).
A hidden form field with the name 'csrfmiddlewaretoken' present in all outgoing POST forms. The value of this field is the value of the CSRF cookie.
This part is done by the template tag.
For all incoming requests that are not using HTTP GET, HEAD, OPTIONS or TRACE, a CSRF cookie must be present, and the 'csrfmiddlewaretoken' field must be present and correct. If it isn't, the user will get a 403 error.
This check is done by CsrfViewMiddleware.
In addition, for HTTPS requests, strict referer checking is done by CsrfViewMiddleware. This is necessary to address a Man-In-The-Middle attack that is possible under HTTPS when using a session independent nonce, due to the fact that HTTP 'Set-Cookie' headers are (unfortunately) accepted by clients that are talking to a site under HTTPS. (Referer checking is not done for HTTP requests because the presence of the Referer header is not reliable enough under HTTP.)
This ensures that only forms that have originated from your Web site can be used to POST data back.
It deliberately ignores GET requests (and other requests that are defined as 'safe' by RFC 2616). These requests ought never to have any potentially dangerous side effects , and so a CSRF attack with a GET request ought to be harmless. RFC 2616 defines POST, PUT and DELETE as 'unsafe', and all other methods are assumed to be unsafe, for maximum protection.
If the csrf_token template tag is used by a template (or the get_token function is called some other way), CsrfViewMiddleware will add a cookie and a Vary: Cookie header to the response. This means that the middleware will play well with the cache middleware if it is used as instructed (UpdateCacheMiddleware goes before all other middleware).
However, if you use cache decorators on individual views, the CSRF middleware will not yet have been able to set the Vary header or the CSRF cookie, and the response will be cached without either one. In this case, on any views that will require a CSRF token to be inserted you should use the django.views.decorators.csrf.csrf_protect() decorator first:
from django.views.decorators.cache import cache_page
from django.views.decorators.csrf import csrf_protect
@cache_page(60 * 15)
@csrf_protect
def my_view(request):
# ...
The CsrfViewMiddleware will usually be a big hindrance to testing view functions, due to the need for the CSRF token which must be sent with every POST request. For this reason, Django's HTTP client for tests has been modified to set a flag on requests which relaxes the middleware and the csrf_protect decorator so that they no longer rejects requests. In every other respect (e.g. sending cookies etc.), they behave the same.
If, for some reason, you want the test client to perform CSRF checks, you can create an instance of the test client that enforces CSRF checks:
>>> from django.test import Client
>>> csrf_client = Client(enforce_csrf_checks=True)
Subdomains within a site will be able to set cookies on the client for the whole domain. By setting the cookie and using a corresponding token, subdomains will be able to circumvent the CSRF protection. The only way to avoid this is to ensure that subdomains are controlled by trusted users (or, are at least unable to set cookies). Note that even without CSRF, there are other vulnerabilities, such as session fixation, that make giving subdomains to untrusted parties a bad idea, and these vulnerabilities cannot easily be fixed with current browsers.
Certain views can have unusual requirements that mean they don't fit the normal pattern envisaged here. A number of utilities can be useful in these situations. The scenarios they might be needed in are described in the following section.
This decorator marks a view as being exempt from the protection ensured by the middleware. Example:
from django.views.decorators.csrf import csrf_exempt
@csrf_exempt
def my_view(request):
return HttpResponse('Hello world')
Normally the csrf_token template tag will not work if CsrfViewMiddleware.process_view or an equivalent like csrf_protect has not run. The view decorator requires_csrf_token can be used to ensure the template tag does work. This decorator works similarly to csrf_protect, but never rejects an incoming request.
Example:
from django.views.decorators.csrf import requires_csrf_token
from django.shortcuts import render
@requires_csrf_token
def my_view(request):
c = {}
# ...
return render(request, "a_template.html", c)
This decorator forces a view to send the CSRF cookie.
Most views requires CSRF protection, but a few do not.
Solution: rather than disabling the middleware and applying csrf_protect to all the views that need it, enable the middleware and use csrf_exempt().
There are cases when CsrfViewMiddleware.process_view may not have run before your view is run - 404 and 500 handlers, for example - but you still need the CSRF token in a form.
Solution: use requires_csrf_token()
There may be some views that are unprotected and have been exempted by csrf_exempt, but still need to include the CSRF token.
Solution: use csrf_exempt() followed by requires_csrf_token(). (i.e. requires_csrf_token should be the innermost decorator).
A view needs CRSF protection under one set of conditions only, and mustn't have it for the rest of the time.
Solution: use csrf_exempt() for the whole view function, and csrf_protect() for the path within it that needs protection. Example:
from django.views.decorators.csrf import csrf_exempt, csrf_protect
@csrf_exempt
def my_view(request):
@csrf_protect
def protected_path(request):
do_something()
if some_condition():
return protected_path(request)
else:
do_something_else()
A page makes a POST request via AJAX, and the page does not have an HTML form with a csrf_token that would cause the required CSRF cookie to be sent.
Solution: use ensure_csrf_cookie() on the view that sends the page.
Because it is possible for the developer to turn off the CsrfViewMiddleware, all relevant views in contrib apps use the csrf_protect decorator to ensure the security of these applications against CSRF. It is recommended that the developers of other reusable apps that want the same guarantees also use the csrf_protect decorator on their views.
A number of settings can be used to control Django's CSRF behavior.
Default: None
The domain to be used when setting the CSRF cookie. This can be useful for easily allowing cross-subdomain requests to be excluded from the normal cross site request forgery protection. It should be set to a string such as ".lawrence.com" to allow a POST request from a form on one subdomain to be accepted by a view served from another subdomain.
Please note that, with or without use of this setting, this CSRF protection mechanism is not safe against cross-subdomain attacks -- see Limitations.
Default: 'csrftoken'
The name of the cookie to use for the CSRF authentication token. This can be whatever you want.
Default: '/'
The path set on the CSRF cookie. This should either match the URL path of your Django installation or be a parent of that path.
This is useful if you have multiple Django instances running under the same hostname. They can use different cookie paths, and each instance will only see its own CSRF cookie.
Default: False
Whether to use a secure cookie for the CSRF cookie. If this is set to True, the cookie will be marked as "secure," which means browsers may ensure that the cookie is only sent under an HTTPS connection.
Default: 'django.views.csrf.csrf_failure'
A dotted path to the view function to be used when an incoming request is rejected by the CSRF protection. The function should have this signature:
def csrf_failure(request, reason="")
where reason is a short message (intended for developers or logging, not for end users) indicating the reason the request was rejected.
May 10, 2012