

QCon 全球软件开发大会 【北京站】2016

点线面，一个安全人员的漏洞世界

张祖优 (Fooying)

QCon

2016.10.20~22
上海·宝华万豪酒店

全球软件开发大会 2016

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关于我

Fooying

来自知道创宇安全研究团队**404**
安全研究员，产品经理



微博: <http://weibo.com/fooying>

知乎专栏: <http://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/fooying>

关于我



安全研究人员

08年接触黑客与安全，4年安全行业工作经验
在 *KCon*、*WOT2014*、*ISF* 等会议上做过安全
相关演讲，给腾讯、微软、阿里等报送过漏洞



程序猿

软件技术专业毕业，学过.net、PHP等，
Pythoner，自学会点前端、会点 PS 等



半吊子产品经理

负责知道创宇漏洞社区，是 *Seebug.org* 产
品经理，同步算是 *ZoomEye.org*、*Kcon* 官网等
平台产品经理

目录

黑客与黑客思维

那些被忽略的安全问题

你不知道的点到面的攻击

成为一名黑客


01

黑客与黑客思维

什么是黑客？

创造与突破，守正出奇

创造与突破



		Request Headers	
<input type="checkbox"/>	-折叠 2015-09-22 09:54:42	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> location : http://kefu.game.corp.qihoo.net:8360/monitor_onlinework.html# toplocation : http://kefu.game.corp.qihoo.net:8360/monitor_onlinework.html# cookie : TD=t%3D1437139960%26s%3D2b35ce4fb5184c524046e38a5f69adb7%26a%3D1; QD=u%3Dlnatfra%26m%3Dlnatfra%40360.pa; kefu=3c612cc89141d1daf7fba11fee6da844; PS_LOGI_NLIST=-1; ExpirePage=-; PS_TOKENEXPIRE=-1; PS_TOKEN=-; svcUser=yangsen%40360.cn--CN%3DDomain Users%2CCCN%3DUsers%2CDC%3Dcorp%2CD%3Dqihoo%2CDC%3Dnet--yangsen--%E6%9D%A8%E6%A3%AE--61f9707208f9c21286c69c7675289274 opener : 	删除
<input type="checkbox"/>	-折叠 2015-09-22 08:57:07	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> location : http://kefu.game.corp.qihoo.net:8360/monitor_onlinework.html toplocation : http://kefu.game.corp.qihoo.net:8360/monitor_onlinework.html cookie : TD=t%3D1437139960%26s%3D2b35ce4fb5184c524046e38a5f69adb7%26a%3D1; QD=u%3Dlnatfra%26m%3Dlnatfra%40360.pa; kefu=3c612cc89141d1daf7fba11fee6da844; PS_LOGI_NLIST=-1; ExpirePage=-; PS_TOKENEXPIRE=-1; PS_TOKEN=-; svcUser=yangsen%40360.cn--CN%3DDomain Users%2CCCN%3DUsers%2CDC%3Dcorp%2CD%3Dqihoo%2CDC%3Dnet--yangsen--%E6%9D%A8%E6%A3%AE--61f9707208f9c21286c69c7675289274 opener : 	删除

<input type="checkbox"/>	+全部	时间	接收的内容	Request Headers	操作
<input type="checkbox"/>	+展开	2015-09-23 13:23:27	• location : http://www.coolpad.com/FFFa	• HTTP_REFERER : http://www.coolpad.c	删除
<input type="checkbox"/>	+展开	2015-09-23 13:23:08	• location : http://www.coolpad.com/FFFa	• HTTP_REFERER : http://www.coolpad.c	删除
<input type="checkbox"/>	+展开	2015-09-22 09:54:42	• location : http://kefu.game.corp.qihoo.ne	• HTTP_REFERER : http://kefu.game.corp.	删除
<input type="checkbox"/>	+展开	2015-09-22 08:57:07	• location : http://kefu.game.corp.qihoo.ne	• HTTP_REFERER : http://kefu.game.corp.	删除
<input type="checkbox"/>	+展开	2015-02-08 19:54:45	• location : http://www.coolpad.com/FFFa	• HTTP_REFERER : http://www.coolpad.c	删除
<input type="checkbox"/>	+展开	2015-02-08 19:38:23	• location : http://www.coolpad.com/FFFa	• HTTP_REFERER : http://www.coolpad.c	删除
<input type="checkbox"/>	+展开	2015-01-11 12:13:13	• location : http://118.145.22.73/juaicai-us	• HTTP_REFERER : http://118.145.22.73/j	删除
<input type="checkbox"/>	+展开	2015-01-11 18:03:20	• location : http://union.xyz.cn/uni	• HTTP_REFERER : http://union.xyz.cn/uni	删除
<input type="checkbox"/>	+展开	2015-01-11 17:53:13	• location : http://union.xyz.cn/uni	• HTTP_REFERER : http://union.xyz.cn/uni	删除
<input type="checkbox"/>	+展开	2014-08-29 16:18:54	• location : http://union.xyz.cn/unionApi/in	• HTTP_REFERER : http://union.xyz.cn/uni	删除
<input type="checkbox"/>	+展开	2014-08-29 11:19:42	• location : http://admin.t.so.com:8361/ind	• HTTP_REFERER : http://admin.t.so.com:	删除
<input type="checkbox"/>	+展开	2014-08-29 11:05:54	• location : http://admin.t.so.com:8361/ind	• HTTP_REFERER : http://admin.t.so.com:	删除
<input type="checkbox"/>	+展开	2014-08-28 15:01:38	• location : http://admin.t.so.com:8361/ind	• HTTP_REFERER : http://admin.t.so.com:	删除
<input type="checkbox"/>	+展开	2014-08-11 18:00:59	• location : http://newadmin.mail.sina.co	• HTTP_REFERER : http://newadmin.mail.	删除
<input type="checkbox"/>	+展开	2014-08-11 17:46:42	• location : http://newadmin.mail.sina.co	• HTTP_REFERER : http://newadmin.mail.	删除
<input type="checkbox"/>	+展开	2014-08-04 14:31:06	• location : http://newadmin.mail.sina.co	• HTTP_REFERER : http://newadmin.mail.	删除
<input type="checkbox"/>	+展开	2014-08-04 14:31:06	• location : http://newadmin.mail.sina.co	• HTTP_REFERER : http://newadmin.mail.	删除

看到框就想X

Fooying 2:54:20

你是怎么找到我的？

TEL输入起^づ 7:15:48

真是，是不是在打飞机，没仔细看啊？打开网页-下载-安装，找我要房间号和密码，就这么简单。点这里下载：<http://www.baidu.com> <http://url7.me/3JSK1>

Fooying 9:52:34

我就喜欢你这种给我送漏洞的

Fooying 9:52:43

又是一个百度跳转

02


那些被忽略的安全问题

轻而易举突破的限制

只需15秒，手机号注册送**36分钟**话费！

手机注册

手机号： 手机号不能为空

验证码：  [换一张](#)

提交注册


我已阅读并同意 [的服务条款](#)

注册 · 网络电话：
 国内长途低至5分，国际长途7分起
 所有会员夜间通话完全免费
 手机，电脑多方式随意拨打

and

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[直接登录>>](#)
有问题? [寻找帮助](#)

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Burp Suite Professional v1.6.32 - licensed to Larry_Lau

Burp Intruder Repeater Window Help

Target Proxy Spider Scanner Intruder Repeater Sequencer Decoder Comparer Extender Options Alerts

Site map Scope

Filter: Hiding not found items; hiding CSS, image and general binary content; hiding 4xx responses; hiding empty folders

Contents

Host	Method	URL	Params	Status	Length	MIME type

Request Response

Raw Hex

Issues


Advisory

?


< > + >

Type a search term

0 matches

A screenshot of the Burp Suite Professional interface. The top menu bar includes 'Burp', 'Intruder', 'Repeater', 'Window', and 'Help'. Below the menu is a toolbar with buttons for 'Target', 'Proxy', 'Spider', 'Scanner', 'Intruder', 'Repeater', 'Sequencer', 'Decoder', 'Comparer', 'Extender', 'Options', and 'Alerts'. The 'Target' button is highlighted. Below the toolbar are two tabs: 'Site map' and 'Scope', with 'Scope' being the active tab. A filter bar at the top of the main content area reads 'Filter: Hiding not found items; hiding CSS, image and general binary content; hiding 4xx responses; hiding empty folders'. The main content area is divided into two panels: 'Contents' on the left and 'Issues' on the right. The 'Contents' panel contains a table with columns for Host, Method, URL, Params, Status, Length, and MIME type. The 'Issues' panel contains a table with a single row labeled 'Advisory'. At the bottom of the interface are search and navigation buttons: '?', '< >', '+ >', a search input field 'Type a search term', and a status message '0 matches'.


利用流程



Results Target Positions Payloads Options

Filter: Showing all items

Request	Payload	Status	Error	Timeout	Length	Com
1237	2236	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	431	
0		200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	215	has
1	1000	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	215	
2	1001	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	215	
3	1002	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	215	
4	1003	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	215	
5	1004	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	215	
6	1005	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	215	
7	1006	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	215	
8	1007	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	215	
9	1008	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	215	
10	1009	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	215	




不可信的安全来源



The screenshot shows a browser window with the URL <http://www.cnblogs.com/youming/articles/4257544.html>. The page content includes a message about history, a timestamp of 13:02:58, and a link to <http://www.cnblogs.com/y0umer/>. A sidebar on the right is titled "XSS绕过" (XSS Bypass) with a timestamp of 2012-12-03 18:07. It discusses the possibility of executing XSS attacks even after character encoding. A screenshot of an "Alert" dialog box is shown, containing the text "/xss/". Below this, a section titled "首先看一个JS的例子：" (First look at a JS example) is present. The bottom half of the screenshot is a table listing findings:

2015/02/15	QQ客户端页面预览XSS[复查异议][复查异议][复查异议]	已修复
2015/02/04	QQ客户端页面预览XSS[复查异议][复查异议]	已完成
2015/01/28	QQ客户端页面预览XSS[复查异议]	已完成
2015/01/23	QQ客户端页面预览XSS	已完成

不可信的安全来源



不可信的安全来源



不可信的安全来源

- 1、登录注册跳转链接的可替换导致的XSS
- 2、拍拍网店存储型XSS利用QQ昵称构造 *Payload*

...

失效的权限控制

API详情

API名称: API-08280912217

审核状态: 返回修改

联系人姓名: test

联系人Email: adfldlf@163.com


联系电话: 123000000000

需求描述:

[修改](#) [删除](#)

http://www.example.com/detail.php?userid=123

那些被忽略的安全问题



03

你不知道的点到面的攻击

漏洞应急与研究

黄金应急时间

[1h]


[6h]

[12h]

[24h]

漏洞应急与研究

应急流程



漏洞应急与研究

全球无验证可直接利用 Redis TOP 10 国家与地区

国家/地区	数量
中国	16,000
美国	13,000
德国	2,000
荷兰	1,500
法国	1,000
俄罗斯	1,000
日本	1,000
土耳其	1,000
英国	1,000
香港	1,000


作者 Root 共获得 0KB

全球无验证可直接利用 Redis 分布情况

```
19 appPowerLink = 'http://redis.io/'  
20 appName = 'Redis'  
21 appVersion = 'All'  
22 vulType = 'Unauthorized access'  
23 desc = ''  
24     redis 默认不需要密码即可访问，黑客直接  
25     ...  
26     samples = ['']  
27  
28     def _verify(self):  
29         result = {}  
30         payload = '\x2a\x31\x0d\x0a\x24\x34\x  
31         s = socket.socket()  
32         s.settimeout(10)  
33         s.connect((self.host, self.port))  
34         s.send(payload)  
35         result['content'] = s.recv(1024)  
36         s.close()  
37         return result  
38  
39     def verify(self):  
40         return self._verify()  
41  
42     def exploit(self):  
43         return self._verify()  
44  
45     def _check(self):  
46         result = self._verify()  
47         if result['content']:  
48             return '存在未授权访问漏洞，可以直接利用'  
49         else:  
50             return '不存在未授权访问漏洞'
```

International Software Development Conference

QCon 全球软件开发大会



面的攻击

- 1、自动化的获取存在该漏洞的目标
- 2、漏洞验证脚本
- 3、自动化的获取目标+调用验证脚本

```

1. fooying@pocsuite-test: ~/pocsuite (zsh)
..v/ks/Pocsuite (zsh) ~/pocsuite (zsh) ~/pocsuite (zsh) ~ (zsh)
mode: mode: mode:
--verify Run poc with verify mode
--attack 视角 Run poc with attack mode Blog 更多
注册账号 | 登录

request:
--cookie COOKIE HTTP Cookie header value
--referer REFERER HTTP Referer header value
--user-agent AGENT HTTP User-Agent header value
--random-agent Use randomly selected HTTP User-Agent header value
--proxy PROXY Use a proxy to connect to the target URL
--proxy-cred PROXYCRED Proxy authentication credentials (name:password)
--timeout TIMEOUT Seconds to wait before timeout connection (default 30).
--retry RETRY Time out retrials times.
--delay DELAY Delay between two request of one thread
--headers HEADERS Extra headers (e.g. "key1: value1\nkey2: value2")
--host HOST Host in HTTP headers.

params:
--extra-params EXTRA_PARAMS Extra params (e.g. "{username: '***', password: '***'}")
Port 6379 112094
6379 112094 -ERR unknown command '\*1'
-ERR unknown command '$4'
-NOAUTH Authentication required.


optimization:
--threads THREADS Max number of concurrent HTTP(s) requests (default 1)
--report REPORT Save a html report to file (e.g. "./report.html")
--batch BATCH Automatically choose default choice without asking.
--requires 754 Check install_requires
--quiet 126 Activate quiet mode, working without logger.
--requires-freeze 689 Check install_requires after register.

Zoomeye or Sebug:
--dork DORK Zoomeye dork used for search.
--max-page MAX_PAGE Max page used in ZoomEye API(10 targets/Page).
--search-type SEARCH_TYPE search type used in ZoomEye API, web or host
--vul-keyword VULKEYWORD Sebug keyword used for search.

fooying@pocsuite-test.local ~/pocsuite

```

面的攻击



根据 ZoomEye 最新于 2015 年 11 月 12 日 0 点探测结果显示：
总的存在无验证可直接利用 Redis 服务的目标全球有 49099，其中
中国有 16477。其中已经被黑的比例分别是全球 65% (3.1 万)，中
国 67.5% (1.1 万)。


面的攻击

RedisDDoS——第一个利用Redis漏洞的僵尸网络出现

2015-11-18 启明星辰 ADLab

自从Redis漏洞公布之后，网络空间出现了大量利用该漏洞进行攻击的事件，启明星辰ADLab捕获到一款新的僵尸程序，这款僵尸程序已经渗透进入大量服务器中，并利用这些服务器资源进行大规模的DDoS攻击。

启明星辰ADLab通过对攻击源主机的查证，发现这是一款专门为Redis漏洞定制的僵尸程序，该僵尸除了具有DDoS攻击的功能外还具有下载任意程序执行以及执行任意远程命令的功能，并可随时进行样本更新，目前捕获到的样本控制端来自于广东省潮州市。



面的攻击

面，思考其他NoSQL

Memcached、ElasticSearch、MongoDB ...

ZoomEye

port:27017

探索一下

搜索结果 全球视角

搜索类型

公网设备 Web 服务

Service

Unknown 157909

mongodb 102311

至少4.7万个MongoDB IP在网络空间里暴露
无口令的至少有3.8万IP，其中6.7万个DB

MongoDB:2.6.5

Japan

十一月 12, 2015

27017


MONGODB

```
:0hostsgk-test-db01version2.6.5processmo  
PtA localTime }LPassertsAregul  
ushestotal_ms<average_ms?last_ms  
otalCreated+cursorsnote&deprecated, use  
enpinnedtotalNoTimeouttimedOutdurcommits  
sInWriteLockearlyCommitstimeMs`dtopenLoc
```

面的攻击

ElasticZombie

<https://www.recordedfuture.com/elasticzombie-botnet-analysis/>



面的攻击

ElasticZombie

210 阅读 0 回复

[系统和服务器安全]ElasticSearch命令执行漏洞：通过perl进行反弹shell [复制链接]

楼主 发表于: 03-06 只看楼主 倒序阅读 使用道具

关键词: ElasticSearch perl 命令执行漏洞 shell

ElasticSearch是一个基于Lucene的搜索服务器。它提供了一个分布式多用户能力的全文搜索引擎，基于RESTful web接口。Elasticsearch是用Java开发的，并作为Apache许可条款下的开放源码发布，是第二最流行的企业搜索引擎。设计用于云计算中，能够达到实时搜索，稳定，可靠，快速，安装使用方便。目前网络公开部署Elasticsearch大概有数万台服务器，内部网络部署就不计其数了。Elasticsearch用了两个危险性的脚本MVEL和Groovy。2014年5月MVEL爆出来命令执行漏洞，这次轮到Groovy了，Elasticsearch 1.3.0-1.3.7 和 1.4.0-1.4.2的Groovy 脚本引擎存在漏洞。这个漏洞允许攻击者构造Groovy脚本绕过沙箱检查执行shell命令，已修复的版本是Elasticsearch 1.3.8 和 1.4.3。这个漏洞不亚于Java Struct执行命令漏洞，对与Linux和Windows平台都适用，在实际测试中也有授权为最高权限root或者system权限的，可以获取webshell和最高系统权限。

受影响版本：


- cpe:/a:elasticsearch:elasticsearch:1.4.2
- cpe:/a:elasticsearch:elasticsearch:1.4.0
- cpe:/a:elasticsearch:elasticsearch:1.3.7
- cpe:/a:elasticsearch:elasticsearch:1.4.0:beta1
- cpe:/a:elasticsearch:elasticsearch:1.4.1

(一)可利用POC



面的攻击

ElasticZombie



root@133: ~

1. root@133-130-100-155: ~ (ssh)



```
http://81.95.144.69:9200/
```

INT SQL XSS Encryption Encoding Other

Load URL http://81.95.144.69:9200/

Split URL

Execute


Enable Post data Enable Referrer

```
{  
  "status" : 200,  
  "name" : "Galactus",  
  "cluster_name" : "elasticsearch",  
  "version" : {  
    "number" : "1.4.0",  
    "build_hash" : "bc94bd81298f81c656893ab1dddd30a99356066",  
    "build_timestamp" : "2014-11-05T14:26:12Z",  
    "build_snapshot" : false,  
    "lucene_version" : "4.10.2"  
  },  
  "tagline" : "You Know, for Search"  
}
```

1.4.0版本，漏洞影响版本


面的攻击

摄像头风险




面的攻击

摄像头风险



面的攻击

摄像头风险



面的攻击

路由器威胁

ZoomEye 路由器专题

<https://www.zoomeye.org/project/router>



面的攻击

D-Link 后门

The screenshot shows the ZoomEye search interface with the query "app:'D-Link DIR-100 http config'" entered. The results page displays a list of findings, with the first two entries detailed below:

212.67.69.242

Service: http (2300 results)

Country: BRAZIL (280), SÃO PAULO (85), RIO DE JANEIRO (27), BELO HORIZONTE (9), SANTO ANDRÉ (5), FLORIANÓPOLIS (4), SANTOS (4)

Details for 212.67.69.242

- Service**: D-Link DIR-100 http config
- Country**: Czechia Prague
- Date**: November 19, 2015
- Ports**: 8080 (HTTP)
- HTTP Headers**:
HTTP/1.0 302 Found
Server: Alpha_webserv
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2015 02:43:19 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Location: /public/login.htm
X-Pad: avoid browser bug

212.77.145.163


Service: http (2300 results)

Country: BRAZIL (280), SÃO PAULO (85), RIO DE JANEIRO (27), BELO HORIZONTE (9), SANTO ANDRÉ (5), FLORIANÓPOLIS (4), SANTOS (4)

Details for 212.77.145.163

- Service**: D-Link DIR-100 http config
- Country**: Brazil (280), São Paulo (85), Rio de Janeiro (27), Belo Horizonte (9), Santo André (5), Florianópolis (4), Santos (4)
- Ports**: 8080 (HTTP)
- HTTP Headers**:
HTTP/1.0 302 Found
Server: Alpha_webserv
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2015 02:43:16 GMT


D-Link 后门



面的攻击

全球影响

There were about 67,000 affected devices worldwide. Only part of pins are shown due to browser performance.



面的攻击

磊科(NetCore)路由器 后门

2014/8/25, 趋势科技研究员Tim Yeh发文描述了磊科疑似后门的`igdmptd`程序, 全球有200多万台磊科路由受影响

2014/10/3, Tim Yeh再次发文称磊科官方发布了新版固件, 但新固件中只是默认关闭了「后门」程序, 而并未将其删除。ShadowServer的统计受影响路由器仍有100多万台

2014/12/28, 国内研究员h4ckmp发文详细分析了该「后门」

2014/12/31, ZoomEye Team进行了细节验证并发文

2015/9, ZoomEye Team的探测发现UDP 53413端口的IP总数约为140万, 其中110万左右是存在后门的磊科路由器, 占比近80%

其中95%在中国:(

面的攻击

工控安全

The screenshot shows a web-based industrial control system interface. At the top, there is a browser-like header with a back/forward button, a refresh button, and a URL field showing `217.1.100:81/cgi-bin/read.cgi?page=../../../../etc/passwd`. Below this is a command line interface showing the content of the `/etc/passwd` file.

The main part of the interface is a status table with the following data:

Transparent Queries	
Number of Connections	1
Valid Responses	10693
Serial Timeouts	30
CRC Errors	112
Buffer Overruns	0
Frame Errors	0
Exception Responses	131

Below the table is a **clear** button. At the bottom left is an **Anybus** logo with a red and blue circular icon. At the bottom right is a **close** button.

On the right side of the interface, there is a vertical sidebar with the word **WAY** at the top. Below it, there is a list of system components and services:

- webs InitialPage.asp
- S WebServer
- Service HTTPserv:00001
- ge
- eb Server/1.00
- Modicon M340 CPU
- PLC
- Portal0000.htm

面的攻击

工控安全


The image displays two instances of the Hikvision DS-7804HW-E1/M surveillance software interface. Each interface has a top bar with the Hikvision logo, the model name 'DS-7804HW-E1/M', and a language selection box showing 'English'. The left interface shows two camera feeds: one from an external station and one from an internal station. The right interface shows two camera feeds from an external station. Below the interfaces is a table of network connection status:

Port	Status
Serial port	ESTABLISHED
192.168.1.10:5000	LISTEN
192.168.1.10:5001	LISTEN
192.168.1.10:5002	ESTABLISHED
192.168.1.10:5003	ESTABLISHED
192.168.1.10:5004	ESTABLISHED
192.168.1.10:5005	ESTABLISHED
192.168.1.10:5006	SYN RECEIVED
192.168.1.10:5007	ESTABLISHED
192.168.1.10:5008	SYN RECEIVED
192.168.1.10:5009	SYN RECEIVED

At the bottom of the interface, there are four status indicators: 'RTS Services' (green), 'Generic' (green), 'Generic' (green), and 'RTS SCADA Server' (blue).

面的攻击

工控安全



SIMATIC 300
Industrial Ethernet

Parameters Statistics TCP connections UDP connections

Number	Local IP address	Partner IP address	Local port	Partner port
1	90.100.1.99	---	102	---
2	90.100.1.99	---	80	---
3	90.100.1.99	90.100.1.98	102	1050
4	90.100.1.99	106.100.1.3	80	4802
5	90.100.1.99	101.100.1.21	80	47531

04

成为一名黑客

如何成为一名黑客

- 1、保持你的好奇心
- 2、对一切都可以持怀疑态度
- 3、突破，转换思维，学会不同角度看待问题

守正出奇



THANKS!