











# **New White Card Schemes** and Java Card<sup>™</sup> Technology

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TS-3814



## **White Card Opportunities**

Where this talk is going

Learn about the new opportunities related to white card schemes, and how application developers can seize them





## **Agenda**

The White Card Concept

Case Studies: 2 New Architectures

Responsibility and Trust

**Constraints for Developers** 

Practical Impact on an Application

Interfacing with Java ME

Opportunities: What? Where? When?





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### White Card Scheme

- A white card is...
  - …a card with no default application
  - …a card with no issuer
  - ...owned by the cardholder
- In a traditional card scheme, a card...
  - ...comes preloaded with at least one application
  - …is associated to a card issuer
  - ...is owned by its issuer





# The Ultimate Flexibility

The promise of Java Card technology

- Proprietary cards
  - One issuer, one application provider
  - Typically, one main application, possibly two or three
- City cards
  - One issuer, several application providers
  - A few applications, often related to public service
- White cards
  - No issuer, several application providers
  - Many possible applications of different kinds



# Why It Hasn't Worked

- Money: Who pays for the card?
  - The cardholder won't spend any money
  - Why spend money without owning the card?
- Responsibility: Who is responsible for the card?
  - Who will bring guarantees to the application providers?
- Marketing: Whose logo is on the card?
  - Why do you have 50 cards in your wallet?
  - The single sign-on card remains a dream



# What Has Changed Recently

- Somebody is willing to pay for the card
  - The card is embedded in another device
  - You get it "free" when you buy this device
- Some people don't need their logo on the card
  - In particular, public service providers
  - For them, card issuance is a cost, and no advertising
- Certification technologies are available
  - Card certification schemes are converging
  - Automated application certification is available





### What We Will See Next

- How some issues have been addressed
- Which issues remain to be addressed
- How to take advantage of it





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# **Embedding Smart Cards in Devices**

- Useful as a security element
  - For instance, to protect content
  - Or just to hold a few sensitive data
    - Authentication data
    - Certificates and other credentials
- Most useful if it is open
  - Embedding Java Card technology is useful
    - It is even a strong enabler
- Java Card technology is now cheap enough
  - It is available on small chips





# From NFC to Smart NFC (1)

- NFC is a standard for contactless communication
  - Targeting in particular mobile phones
  - Allowing phones to be used as contactless cards
  - Originally promoted by Philips, Sony, and Nokia
- Similar technology is already in use
  - Mobile Felica is successful in Japan
    - Used for mobile payment and transport applications
  - Experiments are performed in Europe and USA
    - A NFC experiment (payment, ticketing) in Caen (France)
    - A multi-application NFC experiment in Atlanta's stadium (USA)





# From NFC to Smart NFC (2)

- NFC is a simple communication chip
  - The intelligence in in the mobile phone
  - There is a problem for managing sensitive data
    - A secure element of some kind must be used (e.g., a SIM)
  - Chipmakers are adopting it beyond Philips and Sony
    - For instance, Inside Contactless has introduced eNFC
- Smart NFC includes a smart card chip
  - The technology is promoted by Philips
    - NFC communication is proposed on high-end SmartMX






# **Smart Memory Cards (1)**

- Memory cards only include data
  - Very often, sensitive or protected data
  - Most attempts to include security have been flawed
    - Lack of experience in security software and hardware
- New kinds of cards include a smart card chip
  - For instance, the X-Mobile Card from Renesas
  - Companies like SanDisk also consider it
  - In both cases, they include Java Card technology





# **Smart Memory Cards (2)**







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## Responsibility and Trust Issues

#### Several different layers

- On the card architecture
  - Allow several actors to manage their applications
  - Keep some level of control on the card
- About card and application certification
  - Some certification is required by sensitive applications
  - Who can manage this certification?
- About production and distribution
  - Smart object producers can't handle sensitive data
  - The initialization of the chip must be minimal
    - In particular, the security requirements must be minimal





#### Trust Issues at the Card Level

#### The GlobalPlatform solution


- GlobalPlatform defines several roles
  - The card issuer is responsible for the card
  - Application providers can be represented
  - Certification authorities as well
- GlobalPlatform defines relationships
  - Application providers have security domains
  - Certification authorities have DAP verification
- Open issue: Replace the issuer





## **GlobalPlatform Roles**


Relationships between actors








Loading an issuer application (1/3)








Loading an issuer application (2/3)








Loading an issuer application (3/3)








Loading a third-party application (1/3)








Loading a third-party application (2/3)







Loading a third-party application (3/3)







## Trust Issues at the Application Level

Card and application certification

- Cards and application can be certified
  - By mandating external certifications (CC?)
  - By using specific procedures and evaluations
    - OK for applications, difficult for cards because of cost
- Criteria needs to be defined
  - Criteria for the card (for security and interoperability)
  - Criteria for applications (for security and portability)
- Open issue: What level of criteria
  - Depends of the target applications
  - For instance, Pay-TV is much stronger than GSM





## **Card Certification**

#### Why certify a card?

- Guaranteeing interoperability
  - By providing a complete specification
    - Listing all required features
  - By enforcing interoperability guidelines
    - In particular for proprietary specifications
- Guaranteeing a level of security
  - Level required by an industry
    - Low for GSM
      Always on-line
    - Medium for banking, transport
      Often on-line
    - High for Pay-TV
      Never on-line
  - For white cards, most likely medium-level security





### **Card Certification**

How to certify a card?

- Reusing other certification results
  - The card has a Common Criteria certificate
    - With all the desired properties
  - The card has been certified by Visa, MasterCard
    - OK if their process suits your specific needs
- Using your own certification
  - Could be efficient for interoperability
    - Develop a test suite and methodology
    - Then, have a low-cost certification procedure
  - For security, the prices are quite high
    - Who will assume the costs?





## **Application Certification**

Why certify an application?

- Checking for portability
  - Making sure it uses only available features
    - With all the desired properties
- Checking for security issues
  - Making sure the application contains no malware
    - Checking for its use of resources
    - Checking how it shares data and code with others
  - Verifying that the application is safe for the others
    - Making sure it cannot harm other applications
  - Verifying the security of an application
    - Depends on its specification, may be too costly





## **Application Certification**

How to certify an application?

- Black-box automated certification
  - Suited for portability checks
  - Suited for generic security checks
    - Use of sharing, use of sensitive APIs
  - Inexpensive and highly scalable
- White-box code review
  - Verifying the security of an application
  - Takes into account the specificity of the application
  - Expensive and not scalable





### Trust Issues at the Production Level

Producing cards embedded in objects

- Solution 1: The object is a "big smart card"
  - The smart card is initialized in a secure factory
  - The process is traditional, by a card manufacturer
- Solution 2: The object is a standard object
  - The smart card hardware includes additional security
  - The initialization process is very simple
    - For instance, writing a public key in memory
  - The real initialization happens later
    - Over-the-air in the case of phones
    - Over Internet (with a reader) in other cases





## Where Are We Today?

Trust remains a major issue

- Java Card technology and GlobalPlatform are commodities
  - Java Card technology is now reaching all markets
  - Issuers start to see the interest of GlobalPlatform
    - Including its more advanced features
- Certification is evolving rapidly
  - EMVCo is replacing Visa and MasterCard
  - Automated application validation is available
- Standardization is not yet there
  - Business models need to clarify first





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## **Applications for White Cards**

#### Opportunities for developers

- Open schemes represent an opportunity
  - Any open scheme allow a developer to piggyback a large issuer
  - City cards can significantly lower the cost of issuance
  - White cards can make cards widely available
- Openness comes at a price
  - The target cards are restricted in some ways
  - Developer becomes more responsible





## **Constraints for Application**

#### White card specificities

- Dynamic application management
  - The application is not the card
  - Be ready for updates and versioning
- Certification
  - Be very cautious in the design of external interfaces
  - Make your application easily provable
- End-user management
  - Be ready for deletion, possibly backup and restoration
  - Be ready to interface with other applications





## The Application Is Not the Card

Manage their security separately

- Common confusion in many specs
  - "If the counter overflows, terminate the card"
- Security issues need to be sorted out
  - Some threats apply only to the application
    - The PIN try counter has reached 0
  - Some threats are global to the card
    - There are repeated memory integrity errors
  - Some threats are difficult to sort
    - There is a memory integrity on a crucial application data
- Finally, beware of required privileges
  - Terminating a card requires special privileges





### The Application Is Not the Card

Manage their lifecycles separately

- Common confusion in many specs
  - "Populate the data before issuing the card"
- Typical mistakes
  - "Installation is performed in a secure environment"
    - Keys and PINs get default values
  - "The application is installed just after being loaded"
    - What is the process is interrupted?
- "I completely control my application's lifecycle"
  - What if the card is locked or terminated?
- Most existing specs are incorrect
  - Be careful when you get inspiration





# **Updates and Versioning**

Java Card technology's little problem

- Why updates are important
  - Changing an application without changing the card
  - More applications, more bugs, more updates
- There is no provision for updates
  - In Java Card platform, code cannot be updated
    - Data has to be destroyed first
  - In GlobalPlatform, update is not considered
- The application may include update functions
  - These functions can be used for evolution
  - They are more difficult to use for bug fixing





### **Programming for Updates**

Use Java Card platform and GlobalPlatform

- Use Java Card platform's service framework
  - Services can be shared quite easily
  - Services can be added dynamically
- Use shareable containers
  - This is the most difficult part
  - How to make the sensitive data accessible to updates
- Use GlobalPlatform for security
  - In particular, rely on security domains if possible
    - For the application's secure sessions
    - For loading, installing, and personalizing the updates





### **Programming for Certification**

Be obviously portable and secure

- Only use sensitive features if required
  - Accessing a system feature (or another application's)
    - For instance, terminating the card
- Follow guidelines if there are any
  - Do not try to bend the rules
    - Automated provers simply hate it
  - Make your application easily provable
    - For instance, make sure to remove all dead code
  - Be particular careful with shared data
    - Use of another's application data puts you under scrutiny





### Programming for an End-User

#### Prepare for the worst

- Only applies to real white cards
  - Applications are managed by the user
  - A smart card only has finite resources
- Some applications will have to be deleted
  - A backup/restore feature may be available
    - At the platform level (with some constraints)
    - At the application level (designed in the application)
  - Backup and restore may also be useful for updates





### Programming with an End-User

Prepare to share some data

- Some data is global to the card
  - Basic data about the user (name, etc.)
  - Possibly some authentication (global PIN, biometry)
- If you are lucky, you may get useful identification
  - Unique card serial number
  - Unique end user identifier
- This data will be managed by a global application
  - Accessible through a specific sharing mechanism
  - You need to use this mechanism
    - And you need to use it correctly (remember the certification)





### Legacy vs. New Applications

#### A cruel dilemma

- Legacy applications are simple to use
  - Their security has often been assessed
  - The infrastructure often already exists
    - Terminal software, servers, personalization,
  - But they are difficult to adapt to new situations
- New applications are more flexible
  - They can be specifically designed for open systems
  - But they are new
    - Their security is hard to design from scratch
    - The entire infrastructure has to be designed





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### Careful Design of an Application


Preparing for open deployments

- Step 1: Be ready for updates
  - Design the application to be modifiable
- Step 2: Be ready for backup and restore
  - Allow the application to be temporarily deleted
- Step 3: Include security
  - Make sure the process cannot be abused
- Step 4: Prepare the infrastructure
  - Consider all the other elements





# **Typical Command Processing**








### **Typical Processing Sequence**

With standard security








# **Typical Processing Sequence**


With updates







#### The Java Card Service Framework








#### Required features

- Dynamic management
  - Updates can be added at any time
  - Updates can be added for any phase
  - An update may be replaced by another one
- Code extension
  - Updates are allocated in another context
  - Updates may need to access some data
- Simplicity
  - Update management must be simple
  - The number/size of updates must remain under control






#### Minimal features








#### Adding access to data







#### Adding backup and restore







#### **A Few Trivial Details**

- How to identify an update
  - void AppManager.addUpdate
    (byte phase, short id, UpdateService service)
- How to identify a data container
  - void AppManager.getData(short id)
- How to perform a data backup
  - byte DataContainer.backup (byte seq, APDU apdu)





### Is It That Simple?

#### Of course not

- The sequencing of updates is important
  - A patch has to be inserted in the correct spot
  - This is very much application-dependent
- Exchanging actual data is not obvious
  - Firewall constraints are quite strong
- Backup and restore is difficult
  - There is no reflection in Java Card platform
  - Reallocation on restore is a difficult issue





### **Security Issues**

#### Applications and updates

- An update must be authenticated
  - A patch is always sensitive
  - An application can only accept authenticated patches
- The application may need to be authenticated
  - Some updates may be sensitive
- Data containers must be protected
  - Making data accessible through sharing is sensitive
  - The distribution of references must be controlled





### **Security Solutions**

Using the available mechanisms

- Personalizing updates addresses the issues
  - Updates can have knowledge of a shared secret
  - Authentication is made easier
- Use the GlobalPlatform mechanisms
- Use the security domain's secure channels
  - Use all available options (including output protection)
  - Use the personalization mechanisms
- Think system, not only card application
  - Many security mechanisms can involve a server





#### **Final Recommendations**

#### Evolution, not revolution

- Simple is beautiful
  - More complexity, more bugs
- Refactor, don't rewrite
  - Don't throw away code that works
- Structure your code
  - Partial, localized updates are simpler
- Specify the security
  - Adding security later creates holes





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### An Open System

#### Mobile Felica


- Introduced by DoCoMo, Sony, and partners
  - A contactless chip embedded in a phone
  - The chip is connected to the phone
- APIs are available on the phones
  - Allowing exchanges with remote servers
  - Using the phone's user interface
- Two levels of API are available
  - A basic level for simple applications
  - An advanced level for sensitive applications





#### **Possible Architectures**

Smart card, NFC, and mobile phone



- Contactless interface
  - NFC for communication
  - Applications on the phone
- Security in the SIM card
  - Sensitive apps on the SIM
  - Accessed only through the phone/NFC

Simple NFC Chip Integrated in the Phone





#### **Possible Architectures**

Smart card, NFC, and mobile phone



- Contactless interface
  - NFC for communication
  - Applications on the phone
- Security in the Smart NFC
  - Sensitive apps on the chip
  - Communication link with the phone
  - Chip can be independent

Complex NFC Chip Integrated in the Phone





#### The Smart NFC Architecture


#### Pros and cons

- Main advantage: An independent chip
  - Works independently of the phone
    - Does not require power from the phone
  - Phone software can be secured
- Potential problem: New security element
  - Could be useful for phone manufacturers
  - The operators are wary of this new development





# **Complete Application Architecture**







#### **Smart NFC and Mobile Phones**

#### Typical usage patterns

- The Smart NFC is used as a smart card
  - Independently of the phone's functions
  - For instance, as a transport token
- The Smart NFC is used through the phone
  - For instance, to access a reload server
    - The phone performs the user interface
    - The phone then acts as a proxy with the server
  - In many cases, the phone is transparent
    - The communication is secured between the Smart NFC and the server





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#### Where Are We Now?


#### The situation in early 2006

- People are busy preparing their offers
  - Silicon vendors are preparing their chips
  - Hardware vendors are integrating products
  - Service providers are preparing their offers
- Many prototypes and pilots are scheduled
  - Following the 2005 pilots
- Good time to prepare applications
  - Get the ideas straight, study the feasibility
  - Remain flexible in terms of architecture





#### What Is a Product?








#### What Is a Product?

#### Elements of a product





**Smart Card Maker** Axalto, Gemplus, G&D Other Manufacturer Nokia, Renesas, ...





### Marketing (Non) Issues

Why some people don't need their logo on the card

- Some issuers don't care about image
  - For instance, public services (transport)
- Some issuers put their logo elsewhere
  - For instance, on the mobile application (banking)
- Integration with a mobile is a driving force
  - For instance, for mobile payment
- Interaction with a memory card is a driving force
  - For instance, for digital rights management





### **Business Opportunities**

#### Example 1: Transport, with RATP



- RATP uses a contactless application
  - The NaviGo pass, based on the Calypso specification
- They have shown interest in Java Card technology
  - Objective: Stop issuing cards themselves
  - For them, cards are a pure cost
  - They see Java Card platform as an enabler for
    - Dynamic management of the application
    - Hosting of the application on other cards
- Some experiments are under way





### **Business Opportunities**

Example 2: From mobile payment to home banking

- Mobile payment is growing everywhere
  - Many experiments occur in Europe
  - In North America, it builds on contactless payment
  - It has been commercially introduced in Asia
- The context is quite specific
  - Mobile operators are strongly involved
  - Banks are not the simplest kind of issuer
- Home banking also is an opportunity
  - Phishing is an increasing concern for banks
  - Mobile phones are a way to secure home banking





### **Business Opportunities**

#### Example 3: Personal applications

- End-user chooses the applications to load
  - Standalone applications: password safes, etc.
  - Parts of other applications: best scores, etc.
- Only possible with really open cards
  - More forward-looking than other schemes
  - No existing trials for now
  - Also requires NFC on terminals (like home PCs)





### **Summary**

- More open card systems are becoming common
  - Some companies are ready to share cards
- NFC devices may be strong enablers
  - They address the cost issue for white cards
- Applications need to be ready
  - User control implies some new constraints
  - Applications need to be ready for certification
- Many prototypes are happening now
  - It is time to design applications



#### For More Information

- Java-based standards
  - Java Card 2.2.2
    - java.sun.com/products/javacard
  - Security and Trust Services API for J2ME<sup>™</sup> (JSR 177), Contactless Communication API (JSR 257)
    - www.jcp.org/en/jsr/detail?id=177
    - www.jcp.org/en/jsr/detail?id=257
- Standard organizations
  - GlobalPlatform
    - www.globalplatform.org
  - NFC Forum
    - www.nfcforum.org



# Q&A

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