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You Are Hacked ⊗: AJAX Security Essentials for Enterprise Java[™] Technology Developers

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TS-6014

Speaker Qualifications

- Karthik Shyamsunder
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 - Adjunct Faculty at Johns Hopkins University
- James Gould
 - Principal Engineer, VeriSign, Inc.
 - Application Architect for VeriSign Naming Services



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Overall Presentation Goal What will you learn?

- 1. Understand the AJAX security model.
- 2. Identify the various threats to your AJAX web applications.
- 3. Learn what you can do to protect your application from these threats.



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Agenda

Internet Threat Model

Browser Security Model

- Vulnerabilities, Attacks, and Countermeasures
- Secure Software-Development Process

Summary

Q&A





Agenda **Internet Threat Model Browser Security Model** Vulnerabilities, Attacks, and Countermeasures Secure Software-Development Process Summary Q&A



JavaScript worm 🛛 🚢 📋 targets Yahoo!

Malware latches onto unpatched flaw

By John Leyden \rightarrow More by this author Published Monday 12th June 2006 15:28 GMT Research library - All papers free to download.

A JavaScript worm that takes advantage of an unpatched vulnerability in Yahool's webmail service has been discovered on the net.

The JS-Yamanner worm spreads when a Windows user accesses Yahoo! Mail to open an email sent by the worm. The attack works

Netflix fixes Web 2.0 bugs

By Joris Evers, CNET News.com Published on ZDNet News: October 16, 2006, 5:05 PM PT



ZDNet Tags: Entertainment, Security,

Netflix has fixed weaknesses in its Web site that could have let outsiders change a user's address, add movies to their rental queue, and potentially hijack their account.

Cross-Site Scripting Worm Hits MySpace

By Nate Mook, BetaNews October 13, 2005, 6:28 PM

With the advent of social <u>networking</u> sites, becoming more popula few lines of JavaScript code, it seems.

One clever MySpace user looking to expand his buddy list recent others to become his friend, and ended up creating the first self-p



Updated 8/4/2006 3:33 AM ET

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
By Byron Acohido and Jon Swartz, USA TODAY

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The Problem Is Real

- Cyber crimes and incidents are on the rise
- 3 out of 4 business web sites are vulnerable to attack (Gartner)
- 75% of the hacks occur at the application level (Gartner)




Source: Gartner

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Architecture of Traditional Web


- Browser—A thin client
- Most of the Application logic resides almost exclusively on server
 - Flow/business logic
 - Presentation logic
- Client acts as a dumb terminal sending actions to the server
- Server does all the processing and returns whole new page





Attacks Against Traditional Web

- Attacks involve:
 - Sending malicious data
 - Sending code as data
 - Trying to access unauthorized data
- Malicious command hits edge cases in application design
- What did we say?
 - Validate input parameters
 - Encode output data
 - Use proper authentication
 - Use proper authorization







Web Security— 2004 JavaOneSM Conference




Download presentation from www.youarehacked.com



2007 JavaOneSM Conference | Session TS-6014

Architecture of an AJAX Application

- Browser—Rich/thick-client application
- Application logic resides both on client and server
- JavaScript[™] technology takes on a bigger role
- Uses XmIHttpRequest object
- Fetch any kind of resource
 - HTML, GIF (view centric)
 - XML, JSON (data centric)
 - JavaScript technology (code centric)
- Client DOM tree is being manipulated





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Web 2.0 Mashup Applications

- Aggregates services offered by other 3rd-party applications to form a new application
- www.housingmaps.com
- Mashup of craigslist and Google Maps www.craigslist.com maps.google.com www.housingmaps.com


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Attacks Against AJAX Applications

- Traditional web application attacks still apply
- Attacker is inside your application
 - Knowledge increases
 - Larger attack surface
 - Data serialization from unknown/untrusted sources
 - Companies migrate to AJAX without much thought to security
- In the case of mashups, attacking 3rd-party servers





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Agenda

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Internet Threat Model

Browser Security Model

Vulnerabilities, Attacks, and Countermeasures

Secure Software-Development Process

Summary

Q&A



JavaScript Security in the Browser

- "Mobile code" = potential security risk
- Browsers execute JavaScript code in a sandbox
- Restrictions on JavaScript code in the sandbox
 - Cannot read/write files from/to the local system
 - Cannot execute any other programs
 - Cannot read the history of the browser
 - Cannot close a window that mobile code did not open
 - Cannot open a window that is too small



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Browser's "Same Origin" Policy


- Also called "Server of Origin" Policy
- "Origin" = (protocol + host + port) parts of the URL
- Restriction was put to limit interaction between frames, iframes, and script tags from different origins
- Restriction extended to include XMLHttpRequest
 - Prevents client-side JavaScript from making requests to any server other than the server from which it was downloaded
 - Different browser vendors implement this security somewhat differently



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"Same Origin" Policy for AJAX







More "Same Origin" Policy Cases

	URLs	ALLOWED?	REASON
1	http://www.mysite.com/webapp1/action1 http://www.mysite.com/webapp2/action2	Yes	Although paths come from 2 different applications, the protocol, host and port is the same
2	http://www.mysite.com:8080/action1 http://www.mysite.com/action2	No	Port numbers don't match
3	http://www.mysite.com/action1 https://www.mysite.com/actions2	No	Protocols don't match
4	http://www.mysite.com/action1 http://128.220.101.100/action2	No	Although www.mysite.com resolved to 128.220.101.100, but the browser does not work this out
5	http://www.mysite.com/action1 http://scripts.mysite.com/action2	No	Sub-domains are treated as separate domains



Dancing Around the "Same Origin" Policy

- 1. Manipulate Browser Security Policy
- 2. Proxy Remote Services
- 3. Dynamic <SCRIPT> Tag



1. Manipulate Browser Security Policy

Internet Explorer

- IE security system is based on the concept of "zones"
- Contacting external sites makes IE popup warning window
- IE trusts AJAX applications running from the local file system
- Mozilla
 - Mozilla security system is based on the concept of privileges
 - Application needs to request for privilege
 - Privileges handled by netscape.security.PrivilegeManager
 - To request privilege programmatically call enablePrivilege
 - Firefox can be configured to not listen to privilege manager


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2. Proxy Remote Services

- Also called "bridge" or "server-side proxy"
- 3rd-party proxy such as Apache mod proxy
- Custom proxy






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3. Dynamic <SCRIPT> tag

- Create dynamic **<SCRIPT>** HTML tag instead of XMLHTTPRequest
- Assign the **src** attribute the URL of the web service
- Append the **<SCRIPT>** to the page, which triggers the request
- Server returns JavaScript (or JSON object) executed in the browser





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The Internet Threat Model

Browser Security Model

Vulnerabilities, Attacks, Countermeasures

Secure Software-Development Process

Summary

Q&A



Exposure of Internal Details

Vulnerabilities

Profiling



HTTP 200 /somepage

GET /somepage HTTP/1.1



- What's new in Web 2.0?
 - Better Tools
 - Firebug
 - . View DOM tree
 - Put breakpoints
 - Alter values
 - Watir
 - . Ruby-based tool
 - Selenium
 - Java technologybased Tool

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Exposure of Internal Details Vulnerabilities

- What's new in Web 2.0?
 - Much more client-side code for hacker to view and dissect
 - Potentially more client-side comments for hacker to view
 - Better social community (blogs, newsgroups, forums)
 - Hackers' knowledge has increased
 - Application architecture/design details
 - Program business/logic flow details
 - Function names, variable names, return types
 - Helps build a footprint of the web application
 - Direct API access
 - Developers encouraged to expose more web services
 - Attacker calls your backend functions directly
 - Bypasses logic in the client side
 - Calls functions out of order



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Exposure of Internal Details Countermeasures

- Do not give out unnecessary information
- Remove comments from HTML/JavaScript technology code
 - Developer names, design details, notes, build numbers
 - Use build-time tools to remove comments
- Turn off WSDL for your web services
 - Many tools auto generate WSDLs—turn them off
 - No need to expose all services, inputs, and types to users



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Exposure of Internal Details Countermeasures

- Is AJAX the appropriate technology?
 - Use traditional web-application technology where security is a high priority
- Obfuscate your JavaScript technology code

```
function helloWorld(name) {
    alert("Hello World " + name + "!");
}
```

• Note: obfuscation is not fool-proof



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Cross-Site Scripting

Vulnerabilities

. . .

. . .

🗐 Done

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Accomplished by code injection (HTML, JavaScript technology)

```
http://www.hackmebank.com/welcome.jsp?name=john
```

```
<h1>Hello <%= request.getParameter("name") %></h1>
```



🙋 Internet

Hello CSS Vulnerable



?name=<script>alert("You%20are%20a%20Donkey");</script>



Cross-Site Scripting acct = {

Vulnerabilities

- What's new in Web 2.0?
 - JavaScript Technology **Object Poisoning**
 - Manipulate the fields
 - Manipulate the functions
 - Same applies for Arrays



- Poison data in server
- Poison data in other server
- Man in the middle attack can inject poison data


```
number : 1234,
balance : 99.99,
name : "John Doe",
update : function() { ... },
delete : function() { ... }
};
```

```
acct.update = function() {// malicious
   code }
```

```
temp = acct.delete;
```

```
acct.delete = acct.update;
```

```
acct.update = acct.delete;
```





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Cross-Site Scripting

Vulnerabilities

- Presentation/View Poisoning
 - Attacker does not attack the logic
 - Manipulates the CSS objects
 - Changes labels, re-skinning and repositioning UI components
- SCRIPT Injection
 - Injects malicious <SCRIPT> tag
 - New scripts
 - Invoke back-end functions
 - Make existing functions invalid

Please complete all of the information.

From:	Select Account	•
To:	Select Account	•
Amount:	\$	
Frequency:	One time, immediately	•
	Continue	



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Cross-Site Scripting

Countermeasures

- Practice input validation!
- Practice output encoding
 - HTML encoding when sending output to browser to avoid XSS
 - Practice JavaScript technology encoding to neutralize XSS



Cross-Site Request Forgery


Vulnerabilities

- Also known as XSRF and CSRF and Cross-Site Reference Forgery
- Works by exploiting a trust that a user has in the application
 - •
 - •<script src="http://host/command">
 - •<iframe src="http://host/command">

```
•<script>
```

```
var foo = new Image();
foo.src = "http://host/command";
</script>
```

- What's new Web 2.0?
 - •Use **XMLHttpRequest** object to perform CSRF requests
 - Exposed web services amplify this attack
 - Better control over the request that can be sent
 - Can send HTTP headers, and make GET/POST request
 - Can receive HTTP status code, headers, and response data





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Cross-Site Request Forgery

Countermeasures

- Common Misconceptions About Cross-Site Request Forgery
 - It is only exploitable in browser-based applications
 - Scripts embedded into Word, Flash, Movie, RSS, or Atom web feed
 - It is not exploitable in POST-based services
 - <FORM> tag can be used to submit POST requests
 - It can be prevented by implementing **Referer** header checking
 - Referer header can be spoofed by using XMLHttpRequest
 - It can be prevented by using the "one time token" pattern
 - Attacker can use existing XSS flaw to grab the token

Potential Solutions

- Implement POST-based service and Referer header checking and token approach
- Prompt the user with PIN or strong CAPTCHA before each important action
- Set a short time period for user sessions
- Prevent XSS flaw



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Improper Validation

Vulnerability

- Application accepts invalid/malicious input
 - SQL Injection, XSS, Parameter Tampering
- What's new in Web 2.0?
 - Validation confusion
 - Where is the validation done (client/server/both)?
 - With Sophisticated drag and drop IDEs, validation details are hidden
 - Complexity of data has increased
 - Lack of good toolkits/regular expressions available to validate these types of input
 - What input gets validated?
 - Developers usually validate GET/POST parameters
 - Developers often forget about HTTP Headers
 - Developers forget about file input (images, audio, video)
 - Trusting data from B2B partners
 - Mashups are bringing data from non-validated sources




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Improper Validation

Countermeasures

- Never trust the client!
- Validate all input data to the application
- Use strong validation techniques
 - Correctness, type, format, length, range, and context
 - Use white-listing instead of Black-listing
 - Escaping input if possible
- Always validate on the server side
 - Server-side validation = data integrity and security
- Client-side validation as a subset of server side
 - Client-side validation = usability and performance
- For mashups, never trust the external server





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Exploit Broken Authentication

Vulnerabilities

- Authentication
 - Act of proving who you say you are
 - Methods
 - User Name and Password
 - Certificate
- Broken Authentication leads to:
 - Identity theft
 - Session hijacking
 - Loss of data
- Attack types
 - Man-in-the-middle attack
 - Replay attack



www.glasbergen.com

"Someone got my Social Security number off the internet and stole my identity. Thank God — I hated being me!"



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Copyright 2002 by Randy Glasbergen.

Exploit Broken Authentication

Vulnerabilities

- What's new in Web 2.0?
 - Most Web 2.0 applications are HTTP-based community sites
 - Scenario—HTTP AJAX application with HTTPS authentication
 http://www.mysite.com/homepage



http Home page response returned

https://www.mysite.com/login

- What do developers typically do?
 - Use HTTP for entire AJAX application



http://www.mysite.com/homepage

http Home page response returned

http://www.mysite.com/login -



Exploit Broken Authentication

Countermeasures

- Option 1: Use HTTPS for the entire Web 2.0 application
 - Does address the "Same Origin" Policy
 - Hacker cannot sniff any packets
 - Frequent SSL handshakes is expensive
 - Full or partial SSL handshake is dependent on the browser

Home page response returned	
https://www.mysite.com/login	
Logged in page	

https://www.mysite.com/homepage



Authentication Issues

Countermeasures

- Option 2: Use HTTP with the "Direct Login" AJAX pattern
 - Addresses the "Same Origin" Policy
 - Does not incur the HTTPS cost
 - Requires encrypting password so it cannot be decoded or replayed
 - Use server one-time random challenge token
 - Use of double-hashed password

http://www.mysite.com/homepage



Home page with challenge token

```
Hash ((hash(password)) + challenge token)
http://www.mysite.com/login
```



Calculates double-hashed password and compare and Return Success



Authentication Issues

Countermeasures

- Option 3: Use traditional HTTPS login page with redirect to HTTP AJAX application
 - Can use plain HTTP for AJAX application
 - Can use a secure transport when passing user credentials
 - Simpler than the "Direct Login" AJAX pattern

http://www.mysite.com/homepage

Home page response returned



https://www.mysite.com/login

Logged in; send http redirect

http://www.mysite.com/logged-in-homepage

Logged AJAX application





Exploit Broken Access Control Vulnerabilities

- Access Control is also called Authorization
- Implementing correct access control is not trivial
- Broken Access Control leads to:
 - Unauthorized access to sensitive data
 - Unauthorized users executing illegal transactions
- What's new in Web 2.0?
 - Authorization logic can be exposed in the client
 - Exposure of Role names
 - Exposure of unauthorized functions
 - Hacker can by-pass client-side authorization logic
 - Increased number of services that need to be protected
 - Hackers can obtain the services from the client-side code
 - · Hackers can guess the names of services from the client-side code
 - Hackers can obtain the services from published WSDLs
 - · Hackers can call services out-of-order



Exploit Broken Access Control Countermeasures

- Minimize exposure of authorization logic in the AJAX client!
- Always check authorization on the server
- Java Platform security model still applies (declarative and programmatic)

```
throw new UnAuthorizedException();
```


}

Denial of Service

Vulnerabilities

- Attack by which a hacker prevents legitimate users of a service from using that service
- Misconception is DOS and DDOS are primarily network-level attacks and not application attacks
- What's new in Web 2.0?
 - Attacks against the client:
 - Can tie up client host CPU with infinite loop
 - Can use window.setInterval() command to avoid being shutdown
 - Can take advantage of browser bugs
 - Can inject bad data to make browser crash








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Denial of Service

Vulnerabilities

- What's new in Web 2.0? (Cont.)
 - Attacks against the server
 - Directly call exposed web services uncontrollably
 - Insert malicious scripts to invoke services uncontrollably
 - Call exposed web services out of order
 - Insert malicious scripts that spread over time
 - For example, Samy worm






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Vulnerabilities

- What's new in Web 2.0? (Cont.)
 - Attacks against the server's server
 - Also called "smashing the mashup"
 - Attacks the proxy bridge to attack the "other site"
 - Takes advantage of trust between B2B •
 - Takes advantage of the resource capabilities in B2B applications
 - Difficult for the "other site" to distinguish normal usage vs. an attack





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Denial of Service

Countermeasures

- Since most of the DOS is caused by code injection, cross-site scripting bugs need to be eradicated
 - Validate input data effectively
 - Practice output encoding
- Rate-limit requests in B2C and B2B services
 - Limit Number of requests in a given period (by minute, hour, day)
 - Implement Dynamic bandwidth limitation
 - Decrease bandwidth with increased volume
- Prevent automation
 - Use CAPTCHA schemes
 - Use "one time token" design pattern
- Have good monitoring, real-time analysis, and alert systems in place
- Tune system for "at most" performance (CPU, Java Virtual Machine (JVM[™]), network, …)
- Over-provision your system

The terms "Java Virtual Machine" and "JVM" mean a Virtual Machine for the Java™ platform.



Code Complexity Issues Vulnerabilities

- Already developers have to master a lot!
 - If the technology is not well understood the risk of introducing vulnerabilities increases
- What's new in Web 2.0?
 - Now there are even more technologies to master!
 - JavaScript technology is playing a bigger role
 - Dynamic language (RTTI, dynamic types, closures)
 - Dynamic code generation and execution using eval()
 - Most errors happen at runtime
 - Not only master new concepts, but how they interact
 - Thread-safety issues



Code Complexity Issues

Countermeasures

- Education, Education, Education!
 - Learn JavaScript technology!
 - Pass this security presentation around in your group
- Practice unit testing for JavaScript technology code too
- Understand issues related to AJAX concurrency
 - Both client and server side
 - Understand that browsers launch requests simultaneously
 - Potentially synchronize on session object in servlets
- Build time in schedule for developers to ramp up



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Agenda

- Internet Threat Model
- **Browser Security Model**
- Vulnerabilities, Attacks, and Countermeasures
- **Secure Software-Development Process**

Summary

Q&A



Seven Steps of DOOM






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Steps to Success

Security in Software-Development Life Cycle

- Secure design
- Secure development
- Secure testing
- Secure deployment and operations
- Audit process





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Application Security Review

Security in Software-Development Life Cycle

- 1. Identify assets
- 2. Create a security architecture
- 3. Identify and document vulnerabilities
- 4. Assess your risk
- 5. Plan for risk mitigation



Summary

- AJAX is a powerful suite of technologies
 - AJAX can improve user experience
- But, be aware of security risks
 - Creates new ways to attack via old vulnerabilities
- Always keep security in mind when building applications



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For More Information

- http://www.youarehacked.com
- http://www.owasp.org
- http://www.cgisecurity.com/
- http://www.webhackingexposed.com/
- TS-6536
 - Enabling Identity 2.0 in Java Technology URLs







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