
RSACONFERENCE ASIA PACIFIC 2013

ADVANCED THREATS AND INTELLIGENT DEFENSE

Amit Yoran
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Security in knowledge



Session ID: SEC-T04

Session Classification: Intermediate

Agenda


- Overview of current threats
- Detection and defense





Threat Landscape Overview

- Crimeware as a Service (CaaS)
 - DDoS, Hacking services
- Crimeware Exploit Kits
 - Eleanor, Liberty, Blackhole, Poison Ivy
- Botnets
 - Zeus, Andromeda, SpyEye
- Malicious Code & Content Networks (Malnets)
- Fraud Networks (Fraudnets)
- Laundering Networks
- Spam, Spear Phishing and Targeted Phishing
- Malicious Infector Sites
- Waterholing Sites
- APT campaigns
- SMT campaigns
- Criminal and subnational campaigns








Scams are getting cooler

Betting on "Rock Paper Scissors"

Usual scam links







Manufacturer DDoSed after Firefox announcement

Mozilla's Firefox OS smartphone to be launched in Japan soon through KDDI

posted on FEBRUARY 25, 2013 by IDA TORRES in TECH



Tales From the Darkside: Firefox OS Phone Manufacturer DDoS'ed

Posted by Fielder Feb 25, 2013



Make sure CISO involved in announcements!



ICMP (4,277)



Fake identities still big

caroline1970

lots a diff. things outside. IM not out there for booty calls. I would love to meet an honest guy out there. I dont like cheaters . Im a happy go lucky

person. If u would like to know more give me a shout. A man ages 41 to 50 to date Didn't Say

business

Generates fake ID data

Based upon real people, real data formats

Data gleaned from social

networking sites





Refresh Data

From APTs to SMTs

Evolution of advanced threats

	Advanced Persistent Threat	Subversive Multivector Threat
Target	Military, Intelligence, DIB	Much wider realm – media, financial services
Methods	Largely exploits technical vulnerability	Union of technical, people and process weaknesses
Adaptability	Largely linear in nature until goal is reached	Highly dynamic based upon path of least resistance

Attribution: Gragido/Pirc





Example: The VOHO Campaign?

- Discovered in July 2012 by RSA FirstWatch
 - Infrastructure was shared for multiple threat campaigns
 - Trojan payload via browser-based exploits to delivers exploits to website visitors
- At first glance appeared to be "garden variety" drive by attack
 - However, victims seemed to be geographically clustered
- Further research found campaign used brand new attack approach utilizing 'water holing' method
- Multistage Campaign: Redirection with a heavy dependency on JavaScript on two specific domains for majority of promulgation



VOHO Waterholing Attack Flow

Who do I want to compromise?

What websites do they frequent?

Where can I host my malware?

How do I get my victims to the "watering hole"

Identify Target compromise hosts

Identify Target
Websites

Create "watering hole" malware site

Compromise
Websites to redirect
to watering hole





VOHO Watering Hole Leveraged

- Sample targeted websites (redacted)
 - hxxp://www.xxxxxxxxtrust.com
 - hxxp://xxxxxxxxxcountymd.gov
 - hxxp://xxxxxxcenter.org
 - hxxp:/xxxxxxxxpolitics.com
 - hxxp://www.xxxxxantennas.com
- Water Hole site (redacted)
 - hxxp://xxxxxxxxcurling.com

Political Activism "Watering Metro Washington, Defense Hole" Pivot DC Industrial Government Sites Education Metro Boston Financial

Svcs



Base

Detection Scenario


- Look for communication with blacklisted hosts
 - Known C2 sites
 - Known malware domains
- Look for suspect network traffic
 - "Gh0st" or "HTTPS" in first 5 packets of non-RFC compliant session
 - Use of web redirect using xKungFoo script



Indicators Defined To Help Identify


Attack

- Look for Command and Control (C2) IP addresses
- Look for Control Channel IP addresses
- Parser created





The Cyber Kill Chain




Attribution: Lockheed Martin





The Traditional Security Paradigm




"Single events are rarely indicative of the scope of an event, and also easily obfuscated."





The "Complex Event" Paradigm

Forensic Use Case





lacked, high potential for failure.

To Defend you need

Big Data Infrastructure

"Need a fast and scalable infrastructure to conduct short term and long term analysis"



Comprehensive Visibility

"See everything happening in my environment and normalize it"



High Powered Analytics

"Give me the speed and smarts to discover and investigate potential threats in near real time"



Integrated Intelligence


"Help me understand what to look for and what others have discovered"







Defense Architecture



THREAT INTELLIGENCE





Summary

- Adversary is getting smarter
- Threats evolving to complex mix of technology people and process
- Defense is a combination of
 - Visibility
 - Analytics
 - Intelligence
 - Response

