

EXTENDING NETWORK SECURITY: TAKING A THREAT CENTRIC APPROACH TO SECURITY

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Sourcefire


Security in
knowledge



Industrialisation of Threat Factories

Goal: **Glory**, mode: **Noise**

Goal **Profit**, mode: **Stealth**



***Attackers and defenders drive each other to innovate...
...resulting in distinct threat cycles***

“Once a deviant industry is professionalized, crackdowns merely promote innovation.”

Nils Gilman, 4th European Futurists Conference



Blackhole

- ▶ 28%
- ▶ Received

Blackhole v.1.2.0 interface showing various statistics and data tables. The interface includes a navigation bar with tabs for STATISTICS, THREADS, FILES, SECURITY, and PREFERENCES. A top banner displays an advertisement for selling iframe traffic. Below the banner, there are input fields for start and end dates, an 'Apply' button, and an 'Autoupdate interval' set to 10 seconds.

STATISTIC

TOTAL INFO: 23948 HITED, 13247 HOSTS, 1490 LOADS, 11.25% LOADS

TODAY INFO: 23948 HITED, 13247 HOSTS, 1490 LOADS, 11.25% LOADS

EXPLOITS

EXPLOITS	LOADS	%
Java OBE	569	36.69
PDF LIBTIFF	326	21.02
Java SMB	227	14.64
FLASH	162	10.44
PDF ALL	112	7.22
JAVA SKYLINE	103	6.64
HCP	52	3.35

OS

OS	HITS	HOSTS	LOADS	%
Windows 7	10506	5609	293	5.22
Windows Vista	1015	636	79	12.42
Windows XP	12427	7366	1136	15.44

BROWSERS

BROWSERS	HITS	HOSTS	LOADS	%
Firefox	5912	3855	465	12.08
MSIE	6570	3728	569	15.28
Opera	11466	6165	484	7.85

THREADS

THREADS	HITS	HOSTS	LOADS	%
>	11967	6850	745	10.88
>	6784	3926	453	11.54
>	5182	3064	314	10.25
default	11	8	0	0.00
>	4	3	0	0.00


COUNTRIES

COUNTRIES	HITS	HOSTS	LOADS	%
Russian Federation	23937	13239	1490	11.25
Germany	3	2	0	0.00
United Kingdom	2	2	0	0.00
Ukraine	2	1	0	0.00
Netherlands	2	1	0	0.00
United States	1	1	0	0.00
Greece	1	1	0	0.00

Buttons: Add widget

Blackhole v.1.2.0

New Model of Security



There is no Silver Bullet

▶ You need to address the full Attack Continuum



Before

Policy & Control

Discover environment

Implement policy and control

Harden assets



During

Identification & Block

Detect

Prevent



After

Analysis & Remediation

Determine scope of damage

Contain the spread of attacks

Remediate


What is needed is a new Technique to protect your organization

Before the Threat:

▶ Discover Your Environment



Before
Policy & Control



Before the Threat:

- ▶ Implement Policy & Control



Before
Policy & Control



Policy Enforcement:



Application Control:



Automated Tuning:




URL Filtering:

During the Threat:

▶ Security Intelligence – Contextual Decisions



During
Identification & Block





- ▶ World Class Research
- ▶ Global Data Collection
- ▶ Openly Published

Content

 A focused list of the vulnerabilities you're most likely to be affected by
this week

 Top in field malware detections last week

 Notable new attack methods, and how attacks work

<http://vrt-blog.snort.org>



During
Identification & Block



▶ Intelligence by the numbers



During
Identification & Block



14,443,920 pieces of
malware submitted for analysis



>2,250,000 end points
*feeding real-time threat
intelligence to FireCLOUD*

98.9%

Industry's **best** vulnerability
*coverage achieved in NSS Labs
IPS group test*

100%

Same-day protection
*for Microsoft vulnerabilities
for all customers*


After the Threat:

▶ Leverage Context




After Analysis & Remediation


Browse all application traffic...




Look for risky applications...




Who is using them?



What else have these users been up to?



On what operating systems?



What does their traffic look like over time?



After the Threat:

- ▶ Continuous Analysis & Remediation
- ▶ Network Detection – Endpoint Remediation

—●—

After
Analysis & Remediation



After the Threat:


▶ Device Trajectory

Outgoing connection from Google Chrome 24.0.1312.52 (62ca2bc..59a3cb), most common filename chrome.exe, at TCP port 1156 to http://10.180.0.144:8888/exploit.html (10.180.0.144 port 8888).
Neutral disposition.
At 23:50:44, Thu Jan 10 2013 UTC



After
Analysis & Remediation

Device Trajectory for Java-0-Day



After the Threat:

▶ File Trajectory

After
Analysis & Remediation

File Trajectory for b0e1d4e24373cb7945c5630829c2c53954bed1617a636cadec2cab604705b4ac.

Visibility	your network	community
First Seen	June 8, 2012 at 13:50	

Entry Point	Default Group / Papi-HP
First Seen On	

The point of entry

Visibility	your network
First Seen	June 8, 2012 at 13:50
Last Seen	June 8, 2012 at 21:59
Observations	30 (as target), 0 (as source)

The time of entry

File introducing threat

Systems Infected



After the Threat:

▶ Network File Trajectory

After
Analysis & Remediation

File Trajectory for 8fe98673...267e06b9

File SHA256: 8fe98673...267e06b9
File Name: sample.msi
File Type: MSOLE2
File Category: Office Documents

First Seen: 2013-01-16 12:29:18 on 10.22.75.2
Last Seen: 2013-01-16 14:42:11 on 10.22.75.18
Event Count: 6
Seen On: 4 Hosts (2 senders, 4 receivers)
Current Disposition: Malware

Trajectory: A diagram showing the file's path between IP addresses: 10.22.75.2, 10.5.32.125, 10.22.75.7, and 10.22.75.18. A red arrow labeled "Systems Infected" points to the diagram.

Events:


Time	Event...	Sending IP	Receiving IP	File Name	Dispo...	Action	Pro...	Client	We...	Description
2013-01-16 12:29:18	Transfer	10.22.75.2	10.5.32.125	sample.msi	Malware	Malware Cloud Lookup	SMTP	Thunderbird		
2013-01-16 12:29:20	Transfer	10.5.32.125	10.22.75.7	sample.msi	Malware	Malware Cloud Lookup	IMAP	IMAP client		
2013-01-16 12:29:20	Transfer	10.5.32.125	10.22.75.7	sample.msi	Malware	Malware Cloud Lookup	IMAP	IMAP client		
2013-01-16 12:29:24	Transfer	10.5.32.125	10.22.75.2	sample.msi	Malware	Malware Cloud Lookup	POP3	POP3 client		

Last login on Wednesday, 2013-01-16 at 09:43:02 AM from 10.2.100.228

The time of entry

Systems Infected

Address the Entire Attack Continuum



Addressing Threat Evolution

- ▶ Vendors
malware
are all the
- ▶ Threat C
- ▶ Obsessi
Single B
- ▶ Assump
Unrealis




intrusions,
s ... what
eats
e ?
n Bigger,
e

Detection Race

- ▶ Defining a Failed Technology Frames New Technology as Advancement
- ▶ Vendor Should Focus on What is Not Working Not On Infosec Arms Race
 - ▶ Amazing How Quickly Countermeasures Are Redundant
- ▶ Failed Detections Are Expensive!
 - ▶ Skills and Costs Massively Higher
- ▶ The Detection Race Hurts the Technology Buyer

Guns Need Bullets




— Technique Vs Technology

- ▶ Technology Lifecycles are Short
- ▶ Modular Frameworks With Multiple Technologies
 - ▶ Give Longer Technology Cycles
 - ▶ Allow Technologies to Co-Exist
- ▶ Let's Look At 2 Emergent Technologies

Technology Example: Sandboxing

Point In Time Analysis – Enterprise



Detected Clean - Analysis Stops

Continuous Analysis - Cloud



Detected Clean

Analysis Continues - Retrospective Alert

Technology Example: IOCs


- ▶ Generic Indicators of Compromise – Attack Pathology
- ▶ May be Behavioural, Intrinsic Characteristic, Almost Anything
 - ▶ Process Name, Communication Metadata, Registry Key, Encoding
- ▶ Can Be Shared
- ▶ Weak Signal In Isolation - Can Be Weighted
- ▶ Particularly Promising As An Analysis and Recognition Technology Post Compromise

— Cloud Enables Technique

- ▶ Both These Technologies Are Promising
- ▶ Centralised Support and Huge Processing Capability Coordinates Many New Technologies
- ▶ ... and Reinvigorates the Old

Detection Lattice


▶ Co-Ordinated Detection Technologies



Cloud-based delivery, results in better protection plus lower storage & compute burden within the Enterprise


Continuous Capability

▶ Coherent & Co-Ordinated



Breadth & Depth

▶ Address the Entire Attack Continuum



Open Platform

▶ Open Detections, Open Data Model

BEFORE

See it,
Control it

DURING

Intelligent &
Context Aware

AFTER

Retrospective
Security

Vulnerability Management



Custom Detection



Full Packet Capture



NAC



Incident Response



Network Access/Data Capture



Visualization



SIEM



Sourcefire STP Program – API Framework

— More

- ▶ @VRT_Sourcefire
- ▶ <http://vrt-blog.snort.org>
- ▶ www.sourcefire.com
- ▶ go.sourcefire.com/sourcefirechalktalks
- ▶ VRT Service Blog

THANK YOU

Dean Frye
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Security in
knowledge

