

THE DROID EXPLOITATION SAGA



Security in
knowledge



ADITYA GUPTA
XYSEC

SUBHO HALDER
XYSEC

Session ID: MBS-T01

Session Classification: Intermediate

— Who Are We

- ▶ Mobile Security Researchers
- ▶ Penetration Testers & Creators of AFE
- ▶ XYSec
- ▶ Have found numerous vulnerabilities in websites such as Microsoft, Google, Facebook, Paypal, Adobe etc
- ▶ Also like finding exploits ;)



— Some companies we've found vulnerabilities in



Microsoft



PayPal™

YAHOO!



tumblr.

rediff.com



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Agenda

- ▶ Android Security Overview
- ▶ Android Malwares and Recent trends
- ▶ AFE : The Android Framework for Exploitation
- ▶ Android 0-days and exploits
- ▶ App-based vulnerabilities
- ▶ BYOD

Quick Intro to Android

- ▶ Open-source platform by Google inc
- ▶ Generic builds which can be deployed in any hardware configuration

```
/android$ lunch  
  
You're building on Linux  
  
Lunch menu... pick a combo:  
1. generic-eng  
2. simulator  
3. full_passion-userdebug  
4. full_crespo4g-userdebug  
5. full_crespo-userdebug  
6. crane_Ainol_Novo7A-eng  
  
Which would you like? [generic-eng] □
```

Quick Intro to Android

- ▶ Linux Kernel, Webkit Browser, Applications

```
1|shell@GT-I9100:/proc $ cat version  
Linux version 2.6.38-uHD+ (build@MacBuildServer) (gcc version 4.5.2 (Ubuntu/Linaro 4.5.2-8ubuntu4) ) #55  
Thu Mar 21 13:41:12 IST 2013
```

- ▶ Mostly focus on Webkit for exploit-dev

```
shell@GT-I9100:/lib $ ls -l | grep webcore  
-rw-r--r-- root      root      13964197 2013-03-21 00:20 libwebcore.so  
-rw-r--r-- root      root      6452924  2013-03-21 00:24 libwebcore.so-arm
```

— Android Security Overview

- ▶ Apps run in virtual env/sandbox
- ▶ Privilege Separation
- ▶ Each app with own UID and GID

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------|------|------|--------|---|----------|----------|---|------------------------------------|
| radio | 1520 | 1426 | 139680 | 0 | ffffffff | 00000000 | S | com.android.phone |
| app_45 | 1599 | 1426 | 143888 | 0 | ffffffff | 00000000 | S | com.bluestacks.home |
| app_48 | 1766 | 1426 | 153080 | 0 | ffffffff | 00000000 | S | com.google.process.gapps |
| app_31 | 1863 | 1426 | 127872 | 0 | ffffffff | 00000000 | S | com.bluestacks.bstfolder |
| system | 1870 | 1426 | 130180 | 0 | ffffffff | 00000000 | S | com.bluestacks.BstCommandProcessor |
| root | 2657 | 2 | 0 | 0 | ffffffff | 00000000 | S | kworker/0:3 |
| app_34 | 3438 | 1426 | 136428 | 0 | ffffffff | 00000000 | S | getjar.android.client |
| root | 4590 | 2 | 0 | 0 | ffffffff | 00000000 | S | kworker/0:0 |
| app_49 | 4619 | 1426 | 154300 | 0 | ffffffff | 00000000 | S | com.android.vending |

— Android Security Overview

- ▶ ASLR
- ▶ DVM

```
shell@GT-I9100:/proc/sys/kernel $ cat randomize_va_space  
1
```

—


Permission Model

- ▶ Which App would you trust :
 - ▶ An game with **INTERNET** permission
 - ▶ An game with **READ_LOGS** permission
 - ▶ An game with **ALL** permissions
 - ▶ A game with **NO** permissions



— Malwares

- ▶ Android malwares rising day by day
- ▶ Getting more complicated



— Malwares

- ▶ Most of the anti-malwares are signature-based



| | |
|------------------|--|
| SHA256: | 718910c7d9ebab4d6a19b7f1be64b6ca7978920ae1c01e6e37dff30b017d7221 |
| File name: | file-4832922_apk |
| Detection ratio: | 30 / 46 |
| Analysis date: | 2012-12-03 18:52:50 UTC (1 day, 11 hours ago) |

More details

A circular gauge with a red needle pointing upwards, indicating a high detection ratio. To the left of the gauge are two red smiley faces with the number '0' next to each. To the right are two green smiley faces with the number '0' next to each.

— Malwares

- ▶ Malwares can easily bypass “**all**” of the known anti-malwares



SHA256: b4dc06304259198a361c180d36b5bfc85c36e4dd10b4cae06f20c3780eeddc99

SHA1: 5ea259c8e1bad5c67c0947e671559d95177ece36

MD5: 9e40e3b02f4e664390c7c6ab3f4022c0

File size: 68.4 KB (69992 bytes)

File name: 1-stringcrypt.apk

File type: Android

Detection ratio: 4 / 46

Analysis date: 2012-12-05 05:29:29 UTC (0 minutes ago)

A circular gauge with a red sad face on the left and a green smiley face on the right. The needle points halfway between them, indicating a low detection ratio. The numbers "0" are displayed next to both faces.

Less details

— Google Bouncer

- ▶ Virtual Environment to check if app is malicious
- ▶ Runs the app in a phone like environment for around 5 mins before publishing
- ▶ Detects most of the malwares
- ▶ Can be bypassed easily

Google Bouncer

The screenshot shows a terminal window titled "root@ip-10-160-33-53:/home/ec2-user". The window has three tabs:

- root@ip-10-160-33-53:/home/ec2-user
- root@ip-10-160-33-53:/home/ec2-user
- jono@apollo:~/bouncershell

The terminal output is as follows:


```
00 -
173.194.99.21 - - [12/May/2012 19:13:42] "POST /?v=2.2&id=9774d56d682e549c HTTP/1.1"
200 -

dr-x----- root      root          2012-05-12 11:31 config
drwxrwx--- system   cache         2012-05-12 11:31 cache
lrwxrwxrwx root     root          2012-05-12 11:31 sdcard -> /mnt/sdcard
drwxr-xr-x root     root          2012-05-12 11:31 acct
drwxrwxr-x root     system        2012-05-12 11:31 mnt
lrwxrwxrwx root     root          2012-05-12 11:31 d -> /sys/kernel/debug
lrwxrwxrwx root     root          2012-05-12 11:31 etc -> /system/etc
drwxr-xr-x root     root          2012-03-27 01:48 system
drwxr-xr-x root     root          1970-01-01 00:00 sys
drwxr-xr-x app_55534 app_55534  2012-03-06 03:25 sbin
dr-xr-xr-x root     root          1970-01-01 00:00 proc
-rwxr-x--- app_55534 app_55534  13289 2012-03-06 08:15 init.rc
-rwxr-x--- app_55534 app_55534  1681  2012-03-06 08:15 init.goldfish.rc
-rwxr-x--- app_55534 app_55534  107412 2012-03-06 08:15 init
-rw-r--r-- app_55534 app_55534  118   2012-03-06 08:15 default.prop
drwxrwx--- system   system        2012-05-12 11:36 data
drwx----- root     root          2011-09-15 00:53 root
drwxr-xr-x root     root          2012-05-12 11:32 dev
jono@bouncer $ cat /proc/cpuinfo
```

Analyzing malwares

- ▶ Decompile an app -> Analyze the code
- ▶ Apktool, dex2jar, Jd-GUI, Androguard, IDA Pro
- ▶ Droidbox, Mobile-sandbox, dexter labs, Taintdroid
- ▶ Grep + regex with the smali codes

— Android Framework for Exploitation



— Android Framework for Exploitation

Offensive

Malware Creation

BotNet Automation

Exploit Writing

Injecting

Defensive

Content Query

App Assessment

Fuzzing


Kernel Assessment

— Android Framework for Exploitation

Demo

— Fake legitimate apps

- ▶ Malware set up as legitimate application
- ▶ Infected Apps
- ▶ Have seen few cases
- ▶ Took Google's lead in dealing with fake apps



ps in

—Fake legitimate apps

The screenshot shows a mobile application listing for "Angry Birds FREE" on the Google Play Store. The listing is presented as if it were a legitimate app from Rovio Entertainment.

App Details:

- Name:** Angry Birds FREE
- Developer:** Rovio Entertainment
- Rating:** ★★★★☆ (10)
- Install Button:** INSTALL

Description:

Use the unique powers of the Angry Birds to destroy the greedy pigs' fortresses! The survival of the Angry Birds is at stake. Dish out revenge on the greedy pigs and their eggs. Use the unique powers of each bird to destroy the pigs' fortresses! Features challenging physics-based gameplay and hours of replay value. Each level requires logic, skill, and force to solve.

More from developer:

- Cut the Rope FREE** (Rovio Entertainment) - ★★★★☆ (42) - Free
- Assassin's Creed® Revelations** (Ubisoft) - ★★★★☆ (21) - Free

Links:

- Email Developer
- App Screenshots

—Fake legitimate apps



— App vulnerabilities

- ▶ Apps could contain a lot of vulnerabilities
- ▶ Leaking content providers
- ▶ Insecure storage / data transmission
- ▶ SQLi/LFI
- ▶ Other issues

— Using AFE to find vulns

Demo

— Android 0-days

- ▶ How to find 0-days on Android
- ▶ Webkit FTW!
- ▶ ASLR makes things tough
- ▶ Tough but not impossible
- ▶ Contact us ;)

— BYOD

- ▶ BYOD : Next-gen issue
- ▶ Enterprises need to be careful
- ▶ If a malware gets on a phone, it could jump on the enterprise's wifi network
- ▶ We provide solutions for BYOD

Conclusion

- ▶ Be safe
- ▶ Don't download apps from 3rd party markets
- ▶ Turn USB debugging OFF
- ▶ Anti-virus vendors -> Switch to dynamic analysis
- ▶ Focus on BYOD security
- ▶ Use AFE (personal/enterprise) to protect apps
- ▶ We also conduct trainings on Advanced Mobile Hands-on Security/Exploitation for both Android and iOS
- ▶ Questions – **security@xysec.com**

Contacts us at

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