

Practical Attacks against Mobile Device Management (MDM) Solutions

SESSION ID: MBS-T08

Dan Koretsky

Sr. Security Strategist Lacoon Mobile Security @LacoonSecurity





Agenda

- Intro to Mobile Cyber-Espionage
 - The proliferation of mobile surveillance toolkits
- Your Data
 - Exploits to target enterprise data on mobile devices
- Your information
 - Point & Click mRATs to target business activity
- Your Life
 - Mobile device Trojans as a Service (M-TaaS) to target it all








DROPOUTJEEP

ANT Product Data

(TS//SI//REL) DROPOUTJEEP is a STRAITBIZARRE based software implant for the Apple iPhone operating system and uses the CHIMNEYPOOL framework. DROPOUTJEEP is compliant with the FREEFLOW project, therefore it is supported in the TURBULENCE architecture.

10/01/08



(U//FOUO) DROPOUTJEEP - Operational Schematic

(TS//SI//REL) DROPOUTJEEP is a software implant for the Apple iPhone that utilizes modular mission applications to provide specific SIGINT functionality. This functionality includes the ability to remotely push/pull files from the device, SMS retrieval, contact list retrieval, voicemail, geolocation, hot mic, camera capture, cell tower location, etc. Command, control, and data exfiltration can occur over SMS messaging or a GPRS data connection. All communications with the implant will be covert and encrypted.

(TS//SI//REL) The initial release of DROPOUTJEEP will focus on installing the implant via close access methods. A remote installation capability will be pursued for a future release.

Unit Cost: \$ 0

Status: (U) In development

POC: U//FOUO , S32222, @nsa.gov

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52 Dated: 20070108 Declassify On: 20320108

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY





TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY




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
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
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SS8





Page last updated at 11:50 GMT, Tuesday, 21 July 2009 12:50 UK

E-mail this to a friend



UAE Blackberry update was spyware

By Ben Thompson BBC Middle East Business Report, Dubai

An update for Blackberry users in the United Arab Emirates could allow unauthorised access to private information and e-mails.

The update was prompted by a text from UAE telecoms firm Etisalat, suggesting it would improve performance.

Instead, the update resulted in crashes or drastically reduced battery life.

Blackberry maker Research in Motion (RIM) said in a statement the update was not authorised, developed, or tested by RIM.



Etisalat sent a text to its 145,000 Blackberry users

Etisalat is a major telecommunications firm based in the UAE, with 145,000 Blackberry users on its books.







Why Hack Mobile Devices?



By 2016, 65% of smartphones and tablets will be used in BYOD environments

IDC Research





Impacts of a Mobile Attack



- Snooping on corporate emails and application data
- Record calls and SMSs
- Infiltrating internal LANs
- Activate the Microphone
- Extracting contact lists, call and text logs
- Track locations
- Steal App Data







MDMs, Secure Containers & Wrappers

3 main features:


- Encrypt business data
- Encrypt communications to the business
- Detect Jailbreak / Rooting of devices



Self-Defense Apps







Who Are These Attackers?



















12 Hours | 1000USD








Anatomy of an Attack







Infect the Device 1

Install a Backdoor (a.k.a. Rooting),

2


- Administrative
- Vulnerability
- Exploit

Bypass the Containerization 3

 Exfiltrate Information in Plain Text



Step 1: Attack the Device











Step 2: Install a Backdoor / aka Rooting

Administrative

 Every process can run as an administrative (root) user if it is able to trigger a vulnerability in the OS

Vulnerability

Each Android device had/ has a public vulnerability

Exploit

 Detection mechanisms don't look at apps that exploit the vulnerability







Storage










Storage



















How Many Privilege Escalation Exploits are Out There?

Date	Name	CVE / Bug #	Affected Devices
12/2012	Exynos	CVE-2012-6422	Most Samsung Devices (Galaxy S2/3, Note)
2013	MasterKey 1-3	CVE-2013-4787, #9695860 #9950697	3 vulnerabilities which affect all devices
2013	V-Root	CVE-2013-6282	All devices, bypass SEAndroid
06/2014	TowelRoot	CVE-2014-3153	Most new android devices














Point n' Click | Free (0 USD)








AndroRAT - Point n' Click mRAT Generator


- Injects polymorphic mobile remote access Trojan to any Android application
- Released as Open Source on Nov 2012
- https://github.com/DesignativeDave/androrat
- Forked many times
- Available on many dark forums











Mobile Trojans as a Service (M-TaaS)

(Commercial Surveillance Tools)









Read the Manual | 60 USD per Year





Spy on Android to get the truth today!

Searching for aparting wells of truth? Tred of being led to 7 Not sure you really know what's your employees or family members are up to 7 Stop worrywrinking your brain and heart over R I Now you get a chance to make less disappear from your life by recoloring that Audisdi.

BUY NOW



PEATURES



RECORD CALLS

Truth is a time-size worth digging for. Digitar to be using indigit as a rull incomfling tool. Any exequitions conducte in the phone book 1 Reported safe received from them and brains to the receiving thrust the solutions.



TRACK GPS LOCATION

Faul that if a time for hyblins excited to be resustant? Morned about consecute's safety? First and where they are, whose they will be, and where they have been. Teach their location and their study testing and their study will be in the foreign.



SPY ON TEXT MESSAGES

Some test messages our leave you is pass or lift a hope weight off your phositions. Expensity if they weren't issent for you. Heady to face the truth? View the content of all soft messages with and received by the larget Analysis phone.



SPY ON GMAIL

It's no secret that Great rents enough the tap apps for Android Suspect that your target Android user in foliag something from you'l Member that Christ communication and get the amount you are tanking for amount you are tanking for



VIEW MULTIMEDIA FILES

Smarghous have become the go-to device for many users who wind to take photos and oldate on the fty. Meast to fruit and an much velo as possible about to the account of the model to the thing of the model device and test through all the neutronation.




INTERCEPT INSTANT

Does your tracking needs souther spying on instant reseasurgers? One religy to read reseasurgers? One religy to read reseasurgers sectionaged the Bitype, Whitelyton, and Wiles Needs to muritar Equations photo?

Click here to chat












Rank	#1	#2	#3	#4	#5	#6	#/	#8	#9	#10
10-9 Excellent 8-6 Good 5-4 Average	PhoneSheriff	<u>mSpy</u>	Mobile Spy	My Mobile Watchdog	MobiStealth	StealthGenie	SpyPhone Basic Internet	SpyBubble	eBlaster Mobile	Flexispy
3-2 Poor 1-0 Bad Print/Email	phase heat		MOLES S		And Colombia	Finds	Principal and a service of the servi		chancer to the first the f	
Reviewer Comments	Read Review	Read Review	Read Review	Read Review	Read Review	Read Review	Read Review	Read Review	Read Review	Read Review
Lowest Yearly Price	Buy Now \$49.97	Buy Now \$159.00	Buy Now \$99.97	Buy Now \$59.40	Buy Now \$89.99	Buy Now \$99.99	Buy Now \$349.00	Buy Now \$49.95	Buy Now \$69.95	Buy Now \$149.00
Ratings	9.70	9.68	8.78	8.65	8.15	8.15	7.80	7.40	6.90	6.38
■ Overall Rating	10	0.00	0110	0.00	0.10	0.10	1100	71-10	0.00	0.00
Reporting & Logging Features Tracking & Security Help & Support	9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2									1
Reporting & Logging										
Report Display (percentage)	95	100	60	50	70	60	40	50	40	20
Call History/Details	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~
Text/SMS	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~
<u>Email</u>	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~
GPS	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~
<u>Picture</u>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	×	Y	
Internet Contact Details	×	×	×	×	- ×	×	×	×	~	~
Video	ž	ž	Ž	ž	ž	ž	•	•	~	•
Calendar Updates	ž	Ž	Ž	Ž	Ž	Ž			•	
Bookmark	~	Ž	•	Ž	Ž	Ž		~		
Features										
Compatibility Score (percentage)	100	100	100	40	100	80	100	100	60	100
Number of Phones	1	1	3	5	1	1	1	1	1	1
Stealth	~	~	~		~	~	~	~	~	~
Ability to Filter or Search	~	~		~		~	~	~		~
Keyword Alerts	~	~		~		~				~
Web Blocking	~	~		~						



Lacoon Research – Targeted Infection Realities



Sampling of 650,000 devices in July, 2013





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How to Extract Data From a non-JB iOS7 iPhone?

Malicious Configuration Profiles









Malicious Configuration Profiles

















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MitM Attack Demo


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Current Solutions in Use to Protect Mobility

72% of IT admins believe there is a gap between current mobile security solutions and the threats that businesses face today.

-Forrester Research







Current Mitigation: Static Controls

Mobile Device Management (MDM)

Containers

Wrapper

Active Sync

NAC





Required Mitigation: Real-time, Adjustable Controls

Mobile Device Management (MDM)


Containers

Wrapper

Active Sync

NAC





Preserve User Privacy and Experience



Use Multi-Layer Detection to Calculate Device Risk

Apps Behavioral Analysis Device Behavioral Analysis

Vulnerability Assessment

Pattern Recognition







Thank You.

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Twitter: @LacoonSecurity



