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#### Mobile Devices Security: Evolving Threat Profile of Mobile Networks

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### **Objectives**

- Mobile Security Threat Landscape
- Mobile Network Security
- Cybersecurity Implications, Mitigations & Future Developments





#### **THREAT LANDSCAPE**



#### **Current Threat Landscape**





#### Top 15 Mobile Device Threats

ID	Mobile Threat	Threat Description
1	Malware Targeting Mobile Platforms	Malicious software such as viruses, Trojan horses, spyware, and malicious active content.
2	Mobile Spoofing	A malicious person or program could misrepresent as another in order to acquire sensitive personal information
3	Infected Applications	Application Downloads containing malicious software
4	Web Browser Attacks	Exploitation of malicious web applications to steal credentials, perform fraudulent transactions or compromise information.
5	SMS Redirection, SMS Hijack or SMS Exploit Forwarding	An SMS message can be used to redirect a mobile web browser to a malicious website
6	Vendor Breach	Compromise of a vendor's infrastructure could result in the loss of confidential information. Now includes Carriers
7	Transport/ Protocol Gap	Weakness in network or transport layer could allow eavesdropping or takeover
8	User Device Control	Mobile device could be lost, stolen or inappropriately borrowed or misused
9	Platform/Device Attacks	Utilization of known platform/device specific weaknesses to perpetrate malicious activities
10	Limited Control on App Stores	Market place enforces less constraints on applications hosted (Application that can automatically track spouse)
11	Cloning of Mobile Devices	Cloned smartphone/tablet mobile device built using feature phone/feature tablet ingredients.
12	Social Engineering of Mobile Device Data	Leveraging user's behavior of creating consistent username and password for all accounts,
13	Side-Load Physical Attacks	Leverage wired IO interfaces and wireless interfaces to launch side-loading attacks.
14	Rootkit Specific Anti-Virus/Anti- Malware Attacks	Kernel rootkit type attacks are increasing on the PC as well as the mobile device
15	Uncontrolled Context-Awareness Data Gathering	Limited control is enforced on applications accessing sensors.





#### MOBILE NETWORK SECURITY



#### Mobile Network Security – Helicopter View



### **UMTS Security: Architecture**



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HSS: Home Subscriber Subsystem; ME: Mobile Equipment; USIM: Universal Subscriber Identity Module

### LTE Security: Architecture



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USIM: Universal Subscriber Identity Module; ME: Mobile Equipment; HSS: Home Subscriber Subsystem

# LTE Security: Mobility aspects



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# **Security Considerations**



BSS: Billing Support System; DoS: Denial of Service; DDoS: Distributed DoS; O&M: Operations and Management; OSS: Operations Support System

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CYBERSECURITY IMPLICATIONS, MITIGATIONS, AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS



# **Cybersecurity Implications**

	GSM	GPRS	UMTS	SAE/LTE
Security Services	<ul><li>Ciphering</li><li>User authentication</li><li>Equivalent to wired</li></ul>	Ciphering User authentication	<ul><li>Ciphering &amp; integrity</li><li>Mutual auth.</li></ul>	<ul><li>Ciphering &amp; integrity</li><li>Mutual auth.</li></ul>
Authentication	Authentication: 3 values		UMTS-AKA: 5 values	EPS-AKA: 5 values
Keys	Derivation of a ciphering key after auth.		Derivation of CK & IK	Separate keys for each purpose
Key Length	<ul> <li>Shared key 128 bits for auth.</li> <li>Derived 64 bits out of which 54 used for ciphering</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Shared key 128 bits for auth.</li> <li>Derived 64 bits for ciphering</li> </ul>	128 bits	128 bits
Key handling	Changed on authentication			Changed on each handover
Algorithm	A5/1 / 2 /3; specification is confidential. A5/3 is based on Kasumi	GPRS Encryption Algorithm (GEA): GEA0/GEA1/GEA2/ GEA3	Kasumi from Rel. 4	SNOW 3G, AES and ZUC
End-Point Security	BTS	SGSN	RNC / SGSN	<ul> <li>eNB for UP &amp; RRC</li> <li>MME for NAS</li> </ul>
Network Security	None	None initially	MAPsec and IPsec	IPsec



# **Cybersecurity Implications**

- Threat landscape and computational power have evolved much faster, with no significant updates in the overall security architecture
- Local DoS attack against the cell service
- Heterogeneous networks (Metrocells, Femtocells and WiFi)
- Local radio jamming attacks
- Complex DDoS threats targeting essential EPC elements, such as the HSS

# **Cybersecurity Implications**

Attack Mode	Local (Femto/RAN/eNB/WiFi)	EPC (Core)	PDN (Global)
DoS	<ol> <li>Jamming Attack         <ul> <li>DL-LP</li> <li>UL-LP</li> <li>Femto-based</li> </ul> </li> <li>BS Vulnerabilities</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>Femto-based Attack</li> <li>Core Network Vulnerabilities in GW, MME</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>APT</li> <li>Malware</li> </ol>
DDoS	<ol> <li>LP Jamming Attack</li> <li>BS saturation with SMS</li> <li>Protocol Misbehavior</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>Botnet of MEs</li> <li>Amplification Attacks</li> <li>HSS Saturation</li> <li>EPC Saturation</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>Botnet of MEs</li> <li>Attack against Internet Nodes</li> </ol>
Insider	<ol> <li>Jamming with a BS</li> <li>BS Shutdown</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>Node Damage</li> <li>HSS Saturation</li> <li>EPC Saturation</li> </ol>	1. HSS Saturation



# Mitigations & Future Developments

	HSS Saturatio n Attacks	EPC Amplificati on Attacks	Scalabilit y Attacks	Jamming Attacks
Flexible/Distributed Load Balancing (SDN)	Х			
Flexible/Adaptive Management of the EPC (SDN)		Х	Х	
Advanced Anti-Jamming Techniques (e.g., Multi-Antenna Jamming Mitigation)				Х
Distribution/Optimization of EPC Functions	Х	Х	Х	
Optimization of Radio Resource Management		Х	Х	
Advanced Data Mining Techniques to Detect Attacks	Х	Х	Х	Х

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# Summary

- Mobile Network Security
- Cybersecurity Implications
- Mitigations & Future Developments



# Q&A

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#### **APPENDICES**





### References

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- 3GPP TS 33.401: "3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE); Security architecture".
- 3GPP TS 33.102: "3G security; Security architecture".



	Definitions
APT	Advanced Persistent Threat
BS	Base Station
BTS	Base Transceiver Station
DDoS	Distributed Denial of Service (Attack)
DL	Down Link
DoS	Denial of Service (Attack)
EDGE	Enhanced Data rates for GSM Evolution
EPC	Evolved Packet Core
GERAN	GSM EDGE Radio Access Network
GPRS	General Packet Radio Service
GSM	Global System for Mobile Communications
GW	Gateway
eNB	Evolved NodeB



	Definitions
EPS	Evolved Packet System
IMS	IP Multimedia Subsystem
KDF	Key Derivation Function
LP	Low Power
LTE	Long Term Evolution
ME	Mobile Equipment
MME	Mobility Management Entity
NAS	Non-Access Stratum
NCC	Next hop Chaining Counter
NGMN	Next Generation Mobile Networks
NH	Next Hop



	Definitions
PCI	Physical Cell Identity
PDG	Packet Data Gateway
PDN	Packet Data Network
PLMN	Public and Mobile Network
PSTN	Public Switched Telephone Network
RAT	Radio Access Technology
RNC	Radio Network Controller
RRC	Radio Resource Control
SAE	System Architecture Evolution (3GPP)
SGSN	Serving GPRS Support Node
SIM	Subscriber Identity Module
SMS	Short Message Service



	Definitions
UE	User Equipment
UL	Upward Link
UMTS	Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
USIM	Universal Subscriber Identity Module
UTRAN	Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network
WiFi	Wireless Fidelity, Wi-Fi is a trademarked term meaning IEEE 802.11x
WLAN	Wireless Local Area Network
USIM UTRAN WiFi WLAN	Universal Subscriber Identity Module Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network Wireless Fidelity, Wi-Fi is a trademarked term meaning IEEE 802.11x Wireless Local Area Network

