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Cyber Early Warning & the Commonality of Cyber Warfare and Electronic Warfare

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Cyber Early Warning Key Difficulty

The Goal: Early warning of cyber attacks

Currently: Many tools & techniques

to detect "non-legitimate" activity or "abnormal" behavior


Suggested: A new layer to handle complex & sophisticated attacks

The Too many False Alarms that cannot be handled;

Challenge: OR:

Reduce false alerts by stricter criteria, while unfortunately

masking out subtle events, typical to APT attacks



Unclassified



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Towards Cyber Warfare

Electronic Warfare (EW)

Integrated SIGINT (ELINT&COMINT) Solutions









Cyber Warfare


Intelligence & Situation Awareness

Communication & C4I













Cyber Warfare vs. Electronic Warfare

	Electronic Warfare	Cyber Warfare
Mission	 Air-situation picture (surveillance) Guiding missiles Navigation C&C/data networks 	ITSCADABusinessGovernment services
Intelligence	SIGINT (ELINT, COMINT)IMINT (Opt., Radar)	HackingAccessibility tools
Attack	 Electronic Attack (EA) ECM (Victim: radars) ComJam (Victim: comm. links) 	Cyber attacks(Victim: network services & resources)
Attack type	 Jamming Spoofing, noise Deception False targets, missile stealing 	 Jamming DoS, DDoS Deception Identity theft, MITM, phishing, Trojan horses
Counter- measures	 ECCM: Filters, guards, SLB&SLC,Decoys, Immunity LPI: waveform, agility, 	 Counter-measures FW, IPS, Honeypots, Immunity Encryption, virtualization





Cyber & EW Integration in Battlefield


- An example:
 The US Army has published^(*) the ICE (Integrated Cyber & Electronic Warfare) program
 - Define common data contexts & mechanisms to allow Cyber & EW frameworks to communicate and combat the threats in an integrated fashion







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Multi-Entity
Multi-Sensor
Scenario
&
Multi-Hypothesis
Tracking

Cyber Early Warning Challenges

Huge amount of activity

- Data availability, especially in real time
 - Technical & regulatory difficulty to maintain effective coverage of everything
- Derive insight from the mass of data
- Data diversity
- Data dynamics

Attacker/defender asymmetry

- Proliferation of attack types
- Difficulty of "attribution" to actual actors

Attacks that involve subtle activities

 Eliminating false alarms: Discrimination between legitimate activity and cyber incidents

Attacks that involve multiple assets

Identification based on the aggregated picture





Persistent Surveillance Challenges

- A multitude of entities, of various types
- Dynamic scenario
- Integration of different sensors
 - Each interprets the situation picture in its manner
 - Some get only a partial situation picture; Some overlap

Discrimination between "innocent" entities (false)
 and "malicious" targets (real threats)
 discrimination


Threats attempt to avoid interception by hiding or behaving

like legitimate entities

Challenges are similar to Cyber situation awareness; Solutions can be similar, too...

quantity, variability, dynamics

integration





Multi-hypothesis Tracking for Cyber Situation Awareness

- Multi-Hypothesis Tracking (MHT)
 is a powerful means towards achieving
 Cyber Situation Awareness
- Situation Awareness is a broader & better concept than Alert
 - more information & comprehension
 - more threat assessment
 - more reliable & informative alerts



Cyber Multi-Hypothesis Tracking





Cyber Multi-Hypothesis

 Multi-Hypothesis Analysis is a method to <u>handle the uncertainty</u>

An algorithmic methodology to handle complex & dynamic data

- Collected with various sources/sensors,
- Involving many entities,
- Information is partial and/or ambiguous,
- Information is streaming & dynamically changing

For example:

- Physical situation awareness (e.g., air situation picture)
- SIGINT-based order of battle (EOB)

Applicable to Cyber Situation Awareness

- Integrating the various security tools & techniques
- Handling the uncertainty and supporting decision making





Multi-Sensor Multi-Entity Tracking

Tracking is the logical process of associating data of activity (including past data) of various entities into disjoint sets - tracks

- Examples:
 - Geographical data of platform entities into physical movement tracks
 - EW & SIGINT data of electromagnetic entities into threat interception tracks
- Logical tracks of data enable
 - Verification of data consistency
 - Identifying the past origin of the track
 - Predicting the future evolution of the track





Cyber Tracking

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Cyber events data

Cyber entities

Cyber Incident tracks!

Eliminate False!

Attribution!

Threat Alert!





Cyber Multi-Hypothesis Tracking (MHT)

Cyber Multi-Hypothesis

Cyber Tracking

Cyber Multi-Hypothesis Tracking

- MHT associates distinct cyber events to a single cyber incident
 - When a new message from any sensor or information source is received, to which incident track does that message correspond?
- Events may initially be distinct

by "time": evolution in time

by "location": events detected at different items/hosts/etc.


by "sensor": events detected by various sensor & security tools

by "type": events of different type (a malicious file, illegitimate login, etc.)





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MHT Algorithm Main Modules

Hypothesis Management engine

- A generic module
 - Applicable to physical entities, electronic warfare signals or cyber events
- Maintaining ambiguities, tracks, pictures, and history

Correlation & Scoring


- Specific modules
 - Depend on the application sensor characteristics
- Correlating observations to system states and to previous data based on specific models





Tracks & Pictures

- A Track consists of set of data that may be associated with a single platform/system/incident
 - There can be alternative tracks to the same data
- A Picture includes a set of alternative tracks that are consistent with each other
 - There can be alternative pictures to the same data




 The "best" picture in any moment is the one which is selected for report, but many are maintained





Tracks & Pictures Schematic Example








Observations & Hidden States

States describe the status, behavior or properties of a system

There are transition probabilities between system states

- Observations include the data streaming from the sensors
- Observations relate to the system states, but the relationship may be ambiguous



Example in Electronic Warfare

- Looking at the electronic order of battle (EOB) picture:
 The hidden states are the emitter/system type and the platform carrying it, while the observations are the intercepted electronic parameters
- Looking at the geographic situation picture: The hidden states are the position
 & velocity of the platforms that should be estimated from observed bearings





 X_1

 X_2

Y₂

 X_3

Correlation & Tracking Models

 Models are used to correlate between the observations and the hidden-states of the system, based on the knowledge of expected processes & behavior

Model types

- Kinematic for continuous dynamics
 - e.g., platform trajectory based on direction observations
- Rule-based for simple logic correlation
 - e.g., emitter type based on electronic parameters
- Discrete Markov chain for discrete states
- Hidden Markov model (HMM) when the states are not directly observable
- Ontology-based analytics of related entities using patterns

In Cyber

- The hidden states can be individual host states (trusted, compromised, etc.)
- The observations derive from firewalls, IDS sensors, server/network logs, etc. as well as context & intelligence
- Relevant models are HMM and ontology-based with adaptation to attack types (worm, virus, DDOS, etc., and combinations)





More Aspects of MHT Algorithms

Observability

- A state cannot always be estimated from a sequence of observations;
 necessary and sufficient conditions for observability should be evaluated
- In Cyber: The state of a host or network may not be identifiable from the reported events; the conditions can be estimated using attack models


Hypotheses management

- The number of hypotheses may increase exponentially as observations arrive; consequently the computational complexity of maintaining the hypotheses and finding the optimal solution may grow too much
- Algorithms of clustering & pruning are employed to overcome the complexity of growing number of hypotheses
 - Deleting tracks, which have not been updated during a "purge time", which depends on estimated progress rate
 - Pruning the unlikely (low-score) hypotheses, with the risk of eliminating the future optimal hypothesis
- Clustering the tracks into independent sets and using scalability in the algorithms enable distributing the computational load





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MHT & Cyber Early Warning

Cyber MHT Process (1)

- The hidden states can be individual states (trusted, compromised, etc.) of a host, a network, or a service
- The observations derive from firewalls, IDS sensors, server/network logs, etc., as well as context & intelligence
- Relevant models are HMM and ontology-based;
 Models are adapted to attack types (worm, virus, DDOS, etc., and their combinations)
- Each picture hypothesis represents a set of events associated to an independent cyber incident





Context & Intelligence



- Context refers to internal (organization) information
 - Structure, procedures, etc.
- Intelligence refers to relevant external data collected using WEBInt & accessibility tools
 - Hints to expected attackers, their behavior and their targets

Context & Intelligence are key factors for decision making

They add an important dimension to MHT scoring by allowing to judge events using adapted criteria





Cyber MHT Process (2)

- Hypothesis score (track & picture) depends on
 - Information quality & consistency
 - Likelihood as estimated by the tracking model
 - Intelligence & relevant context
 - Impact assessment
- The hypothesis with the highest score is reported
- Many of the other hypotheses & tracks are maintained
- Each new event is checked against many hypotheses (not just the previously best)
 - An updated set of hypotheses is formed with updated scoring
- MHT keeps some history, in a special way of tracks & pictures, which is more efficient to utilize, when data is streaming and early response is required
 - (All data is logged for later forensic research)





Multi-Hypothesis Tracking on Time

 MHT associates events on a time scale to follow cyber incident evolution backward & forward

Backward



- Confirm information consistency
- Investigate overlooked or dropped events
- Look for actor trend & behavior

- Predict "expected" information
- Guide efforts of monitoring events to suspicious paths
- Project situation evolutionto assess impact

ALERT





Track Triggering


In Electronic Warfare MHT

- Usually, any new intercept data is a possible trigger for tracking
 - For example: each plot of Radar, every signal in EW
- All entities (including legitimate) are tracked, to distinguish the hostile ones

At a Cyber Warfare scenario

- The amount of data is enormous
- Tracking all legitimate activity is impossible
- However, analysis of known APT attacks, demonstrate that (eventually) suspect activity has been overlooked, resulting in miss of detection












Track before Detect

 The approach is to track the events even before making the decision

IF an hypothesis track is consistent and has a high scoring, if its backward evolution suggests a threat actor and/or its forward projection indicates possible impact

THEN Report "Detection"

- And immediately get Incident track details
 - All associated events
 - Possible actor attribution
 - Estimated future impact






Research Challenges

Ongoing research to improve performance


- Flexible data modeling to handle all types of information, structured & unformatted, activity & intelligence
- Best tracking models of events and attacks
- Analytic engines & optimal hypothesis scoring
- Efficient pruning & clustering
- etc.







New Generation Cyber Situation Awareness





New Generation Cyber Situation Awareness

Standard Operational Procedures

Incident Response Workflow

Cyber Situation Awareness

MHT: Multi-Hypothesis Tracking
Decision making & Alert

AE

AE

AnalyticsVarious Analysis & Processing Engines

AE

AE

AE

Ontology based on Cyber Defense Models

Common language to all Data, revealing relationship & tracks

Heterogeneous Information & Data Sources

Activity

Context

Intelligence

Customer

AE

Execution

Actionable Intelligence

Predictive Analysis

Contextual Information

Data Normalization

Data, Structured & unstructured

Jata - information



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