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#### THE GREAT CIPHER

MIGHTIER THAN THE SWORD 伟大的密码胜于利剑



# Why is SCADA Security an Uphill Battle?

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### Agenda 议程

SCADA Basics
Threats (where, why & how)
Challenges
Recommendations and Proposals
ScadaScan tool



# What are SCADA systems?















### accidents

#### liquid pipeline failures

http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/safetystudies/SS0502.pdf

#### power failures

http://www.nerc.com/docs/docs/blackout/Status\_Report\_081104.pdf

#### other accidents

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\_of\_industrial\_disasters



### vandalism

#### vandals destroy insulators

http://www.bpa.gov/corporate/BPAnews/archive/2002/NewsRelease.cfm?ReleaseNo=297



# insider

#### disgruntle employee

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/10/31/hacker\_jailed\_for\_revenge\_sewage/



### APT


(advance persistent threats)

#### terrorism or espionage

http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security\_response/whitepapers/w32\_duqu\_the\_precursor\_to\_the\_next\_stuxnet.pdf



# basics



Field Control Center



# acquisition

Convert parameters like light, temperature, pressure or flow to analog signals Analog voltage out Protocols • FEP Sensors · PLC IMH Meters Wired · IED DCS Field Devices Wireless · RTU SCADA



### conversion


Converts analog and discrete measurements to digital information













### communication


Front end processors (FEP) and protocols Wired or wireless communication







Modbus	DNP 3	OPC
ICCP	ControlNet	BBC 7200
ANSI X3.28	DCP 1	Gedac 7020
DeviceNet	DH+	ProfiBus
Tejas	TRE	UCA







#### presentation & control

Control, monitor and alarming using human machine interface (HMI)














### threats?







## io & remote






- Requires physical access
- Field equipment generally does not contain process knowledge
- Without process knowledge leads to nuisance disruption



### communication





Protocol threats




# ScadaScan (an example)

```
C:\SCADA>perl scadascan.pl -m 10.40.1.182
Working on 10.40.1.182..... Modbus unit ID 28 found
```



### Protocols

What do SCADA protocols like modbus or DNP 3 provide?





## Secure DNP 3.0

Version 1.0 specification released in Feb 2007

Authentication

Initialization

Periodic

Critical Function Code Requests

Implementation Specific

Cryptography


Keyed Hashing for Message Authentication (HMAC)

Key Management

**New Function Codes** 




#### master threats



- Control system network connected to corporate network or internet
- No authentication or per user authentication
- Shared passwords or default passwords
- No password change policy



## master threats



- No patching
- Not restarted in years
- Unnecessary services
- Off-the-shelf software





# challenges 挑战

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- SCADA system long life cycle
- Difficulty and cost of upgrading
- No testing or guidance about OS patches from SCADA vendors
- Some systems managed by SCADA vendors
- Data historians and other systems on the SCADA network
- Wrong mentality SCADA too obscure for hackers



# idea 主意

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- Strategy for password policy, access control, access roles
- Strategy for software upgrades and patches
- SCADA Test environment
- Demand from SCADA vendors:
  - Expedite testing and approval of OS patches
  - Newer and secure protocols
- Apply experience from IT network management and security
- SCADA vendors Auditing and Scanning



#### Thank You

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