

The 7 Habits of Highly Successful Security Awareness Programs

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Why Security Awareness?

Captain Kirk

- Who wouldn't guess a password of "Captain" on an account with the user ID, "Kirk"?
- This happened at NSA





Whose Fault Is it?

- She sounds like an idiot
- She is an Ivy League graduate
- Why was she not previously told that she shouldn't have that as a password?
- Why was the password allowed in the first place?



This Is Not Unique

- Security professionals make assumptions in the base level of knowledge in end users
- Also extends to knowledge assumptions about other technical professionals
- As per Felix Unger, when you assume you make an ass/u/me





Common Sense

- The problem is that security professionals assume that the users should exercise common sense
- There is no such thing as common sense without a base common knowledge
- Security programs fail, because they assume there is the common knowledge



It's Not Stupid Users

- It's incompetent security professionals
- While there are some stupid activities on the part of the users, I always ask what could the security staff have done better?
- Does your staff stop and ask how could the incident have been prevented
- Is there a discussion of both modifying user activity and preventing user activity





Security Awareness is Implementing Security Culture

- Not exactly, but close enough
- Security awareness is to get people to implement secure practices into their daily activities
- Security awareness is to strengthen security culture
- Must instill common knowledge of concerns and base actions





Why Security Awareness?

- The human factor
- Technology can only help so much
- Security Awareness programs are in integral part of a mature security program
- Cost-Effective Solution
- Required by standards and regulations





The Problem with Security Awareness Programs

- Varying degrees of quality in awareness programs
- The 3-year cycle
- Poor security cultures







The Study: Opportunity Statement and Methodology

Opportunity Statement

- My work experience allowed me the unique experience to build a program from scratch
- The local ISSA chapter's Security Awareness user group (a.k.a. "Support Group") meets bimonthly and delegates were willing participants
- Security Awareness material is seen as nonproprietary



Approach/Methodology

- Qualitative
 - Face-to-face interviews with Security Awareness Specialists
- Quantitative
 - 2 Surveys
 - 1 for Security employees
 - 1 for Non-Security employees
- Limitations







Study: Analysis

Analysis: General Trends

- In the end a total of 7 companies participated
 - 2 from the Health Sector
 - 2 from the Manufacturing Sector
 - 1 from the Food Sector
 - 1 from the Financial Sector
 - 1 from the Retail Sector
- Companies were often surprisingly honest about the success of their programs
- No participating company had any metrics to assess their effectiveness





Analysis: General Trends

- Most companies struggle to gain support:
 - From upper management
 - From key departments
 - From their user population
- Compliance:
 - PCI helps with support and budget
 - HIPAA does not





Analysis: General Trends

- Variety of approaches
 - Some Security Awareness Specialists had a security background while others had a marketing or communications background
 - Companies had 1-26 employees contributing to efforts



Analysis: Security Respondents

- 87% of Security Respondents ("SRs") reported their programs are successful
- Roughly half reported having difficulty encouraging their employees to take security seriously
- Only 19% reported a lack of support from management



Analysis: Security Respondents

- 26% reported a lack of enthusiasm for their efforts
- 50% reported having difficulty receiving funding for their initiatives



Analysis: Non-Security Respondents

- 100% of Non-Security employees reported having learned something from their company's Security Awareness program
- 100% reported being "security-minded individuals"
- 100% reported thinking their company's Security Awareness programs are successful



Analysis: Non-Security Respondents

- Only 60% reported changing their behavior as a result of Security Awareness
- 92% reported viewing their Security team positively
- 12% reported having conflicts with their Security team





Results

- Security is difficult to administer at most companies
- PCI compliance helps with enforcement and awareness
- Creativity and/or mandatory training are the key(s) to success
- Companies with more top-level support are more successful





The Habits

Habit 1-Create a Strong Foundation

- This is the main source of failure
- Make a 3-month plan
- Topics may change





Assess Approach

- Softball
- Hard push
- Avoid fear-mongering



Deciding Which Components the Program Should Have

- Which mediums of communication will be most effective at your company?
- Which mediums are already saturated?
- What are employees most receptive to?





Recommended Components

- Website
- Posters
- Newsletters/Blog
- Monthly tips
- Lunch and Learns
- Roadshows
- Speakers
- Security Week





Keep the Program Fresh

- Easy to fall behind
- Pay attention to the news
- Create new material for every month



Habit 2-Organizational Buy-In

- Appeal to the highest level you are able to engage
- Market some materials to the C-level
- Stress benefits of Security Awareness



Habit 3-Participative Learning

- Learning modules
- Interactive components
 - Make user feel involved
- Additional tools--Phishing



Habit 4-More Creative Endeavors

- Guerilla marketing campaign
- Security Cube
- Demonstrations and movie showings



Habit 5-Gather Metrics

- No participating company gathered metrics
- Compare rate of reported incidents pre and post
 - Collecting metrics ahead of time so you can potentially measure success after the fact
 - Should you do a pen test/assessment?





Assessing Success

- Assess which components have been successful
- Administer a survey
 - Try to keep it anonymous
 - Offer a drawing that employees can enter for a prize
- Understand limitations



Habit 6-Partner with Key Departments

- Reinforces company message vs. security message
- Consider departments such as:
 - Legal
 - Compliance
 - Human Resources
 - Marketing
 - Privacy
 - Physical Security





Habit 7-Be the Department of How

- Department of "How" vs. Department of "No"
- Teach instead of dictate
- Establish positive security culture







Conclusions

Next Steps

- ISSA's "Great Security Awareness Experiment" series
- Many opportunities for additional research
 - Non-security employees should be re-surveyed
 - Additional companies from different sectors could be included
 - A deeper dive into participating companies could be conducted to ask about discrepancies



Apply

- Focus on building support before spending too much time on other aspects
- Do a thorough assessment of culture before starting or revamping program
- Consider partnership with other key departments
- Focus security awareness on common knowledge so users can exercise common sense



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