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# DEFENDING AGAINST LOW-BANDWIDTH, ASYMMETRIC DENIAL-OF-SERVICE ATTACKS

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F5 Networks

**RSA**CONFERENCE  
EUROPE 2013

Session ID: HT-R02

Session Classification: Intermediate

# AGENDA

- ▶ Introduction
  - ▶ Why does this matter?
  - ▶ General Methods
- ▶ Asymmetric Taxonomy
  - ▶ Network
  - ▶ Session
  - ▶ Application
- ▶ Countermeasures
  - ▶ Strategic Defenses
  - ▶ Mitigation Architecture
- ▶ Conclusion

*“In the last 18 months, 100% of customer DDoS engagements I’ve been involved with have had an asymmetric component.”* – Security Solution Architect, F5 Networks

Take advantage of the enemy's un-readiness, make your way by unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots.

*--Sun Tzu*




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# Why is it Asymmetric?

- ▶ Asymmetry in Resources



Attacker



Defender

# Why is this Important?

- ▶ Famed US Patriot Hacker @Th3J35t3r (The Jester)
- ▶ Selling the laptop that he used to bring down WikiLeaks and many targets with asymmetric Attacks
- ▶ A single agent, with a single laptop...



- ▶ See paper written about the Jester – “The Jester Dynamic: A Lesson in Asymmetric Unmanaged Cyber Warfare”

# Why is this Important?

## ► Case Study: Commander X



- Attacked Santa Cruz County web servers
- From a Starbucks just a few blocks away
- Arrested when he returned to same Starbucks
- Jumped bail, tried to hike to Canada
- Woken up by bear eating his laptop
- Eventually made it across border, where he now resides as a fugitive

• Source: Ars Technica – full story [links.f5.com/14YnY11](http://links.f5.com/14YnY11)

# Asymmetric Attacks vs. Hacking



## DENY SERVICE

- Make site unavailable



## ACTION IN REAL-TIME


- Hacking may go on for months



## STEALTH

- Asymmetric attacks avoid auto-detection

# Masking Source IP



- Low-bandwidth attacks can go through TOR network.
- Can proxy via malware infection
- New: Rent cloud resources using stolen credit card numbers



# Asymmetric Taxonomy



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
# Layer 4 –Asymmetric Network Attacks

Goal: Consume Connection Table


TCP SYN  
Flood

TCP Zero  
Window


# Normal TCP Setup



# SYN-Flood – Consume Session Table



# Countermeasure – SYN-Cookies



# Layer 4 –Asymmetric Network Attacks

## Countermeasures

TCP SYN

Flood

**SYN-Cookies  
(Not Syn-Cache)**

TCP Zero

Window

**Zero-Window  
Timeouts**

# Session Table Attacks

Goal: Consume Session Table

DNS  
NXDOMAIN  
Flood

SSL  
Renegotiation

# DNS NXDOMAIN Attack

## Querying Random Hostnames

```
xtzhvxodnsunwow.com
xtzhvxodnsunwowjp.com
xtzhvxodnsunwowiyq.com
xtzhvxodnsunwowimyo.com
xtzhvxodnsunwowthzqx.com
xtzhvxodnsunwowocktsq.com
xtzhvxodnsunwowdgnllyw.com
xtzhvxodnsunwowkynfkplf.com
xtzhvxodnsunwowuoziwaser.com
xtzhvxodnsunwowuoziwaser7308.com
xtzhvxodnsunwowuoziwaser45743.com
xtzhvxodnsunwowuoziwaser675380.com
xtzhvxodnsunwowuoziwaser0043663.com
xtzhvxodnsunwowuoziwaser95996758.com
xtzhvxodnsunwowuoziwaser672467651.com
xtzhvxodnsunwowuoziwaser8224819180.com
xtzhvxodnsunwowuoziwaser44638662616.com
xtzhvxodnsunwowuoziwaser415619407700.com
```

Querying for randomly-generated non-existent hostnames


- Causes enormous work on DNS resolver
- Blows out DNS caches
- Easy to generate – single packets
- Easy to spoof source address – UDP
- Asymmetric
- Low-Bandwidth



# SSL Renegotiation DoS

RSA public encrypt = 1/10 cost of decrypt

```
% ./src/thc-ssl-dos 30.1.1.134 443;
```



```
http://www.thc.org
```

```
Twitter @hackerschoice
```

```
Greetingz: the french underground
```

```
Handshakes 0 [0.00 h/s], 1 Conn, 0 Err
```

```
Handshakes 417 [455.74 h/s], 37 Conn, 0 Err
```

```
Handshakes 924 [515.36 h/s], 52 Conn, 0 Err
```

```
Handshakes 1410 [486.44 h/s], 62 Conn, 0 Err
```

```
Handshakes 1916 [504.41 h/s], 71 Conn, 0 Err
```

```
...
```

# Session Table Attacks

## SOLUTIONS

DNS  
NXDOMAIN  
Flood

**Overprovision**

SSL  
Renegotiation

**Easy Way:  
Disable this!**

# Layer 7+ Application Attacks

Goal: Attack Application Tier

SlowPOST

Web Application

Firewall

HTTP  
GET Flood

# Application Reconnaissance


## Goal of the asymmetric warrior

- Obtain list of site URIs
- Sort by time-to-complete (CPU cost)
- Sort list by megabytes (Bandwidth)

## Spiders for rent on Internet that will do this

- Though they are often known by security community
- Can be done with simple wget script

```
# wget -r --wait=1 -nv https://the.target.com
```



# Network Recon + HTTP Pipelining

GET /download/doc.pdf?121234234fgsefasdf11 HTTP/1.1\r\n

Host: [www.xxxxyyyyzzzz.com](http://www.xxxxyyyyzzzz.com)\r\n

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0\r\n

Connection: keep-alive\r\n

GET /download/doc.pdf? qXs5udkLDd7DNG9ub HTTP/1.1\r\n

Host: [www.xxxxyyyyzzzz.com](http://www.xxxxyyyyzzzz.com)\r\n

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0\r\n

Connection: keep-alive\r\n

GET /download/doc.pdf?DLGgun1nEmfm5eid76 HTTP/1.1\r\n

Host: [www.xxxxyyyyzzzz.com](http://www.xxxxyyyyzzzz.com)\r\n

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0\r\n

Connection: keep-alive\r\n

GET /download/doc.pdf? 6ndfTygZPImXsNW22a HTTP/1.1\r\n

Host: [www.xxxxyyyyzzzz.com](http://www.xxxxyyyyzzzz.com)\r\n

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0\r\n

Connection: keep-alive\r\n

Randomized Query Parameters  
Avoid Cache Defenses



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# Countermeasures



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# What Doesn't Work?

Defensive Technology	Protection Profile	Notes
Conventional Firewall	Weak	At least you can block IPs
Content Delivery Network	Moderate	Asymmetric attackers know to evade.
Anti-DDoS Scrubbers	Weak	
Service Provider Anti-DDoS	Weak	No SSL. Not right use case.
IDS/IPS	Moderate	A good asymmetric attack will not set off IDS.


# Countermeasure Table

Attack	Countermeasure	Locate Defense
SYN-Flood	SYN-Cookies	Firewall
Zero-Length TCP Window	Signature or Full Proxy	Firewall
DNS NXDOMAIN	Authoritative Resolver	DMZ
SSL Renegotiation	Cryptographic Offload	ADC
HashDos	Signature or Patch	ADC or Server
Slowloris / Slow POST	Full Proxy	ADC, WAF
Pipelining	Disallow pipelining	
Apache Killer	Signature or Patch	ADC or Server
ReDos	?	?




# Use Case - Mitigate Network Recon

IP reputation- Identify and allow or block IP addresses with malicious activity



# Hardened Hot-Site with Login-Wall

Temporarily reduce Layer 7 attack surface



Activated during DDoS Attack

- No **Unauthenticated** Requests
- No HTTP – Only HTTPS
- No Search Feature
- No Store Locator
- Real users maintain most of the normal site functionality during attack

# Other L7 Options

If you can't extend your perimeter to only known users...

- ▶ CAPTCHA
- ▶ JavaScript Redirect

But what about these guys?




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The advertisement features a woman with tattoos and a white cross over her face, set against a dark background with a red 'X' mark.

# Multi-tier DDoS Mitigation Architecture



# On Your Own with Asymmetric DDoS

## Plan

- Determine your risk profile
  - Talk to your marketing people, they know site metrics!
  - Spider your own site
  - You can start with wget, use a script to parse the data.
- Think Asymmetric!

## Execute

- Develop a Asymmetric Attack DoS Playbook
  - Practice it!
- Need a set of TURING tests that you can enable
  - CAPTCHA
  - Authentication
  - Javascript Redirects



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Thank you!

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