

The First 24: Responding to an Attack Within the Critical First Day

David Amsler, CEO/CIO

Foreground Security

Session ID: DAS-107

Session Classification: Intermediate


RS\(\text{CONFERENCE}\)2012

THE FIRST 24


- True Story: The Incident = OWNED!
 - Names & details have been redacted to protect the innocent
- Our Response
 - It was a bloody battle
- Failures
 - No one is perfect
- Successes
 - What did we do in advance to make us successful








Incident = OWNED



WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 2011. 10:00pm













Incident








Incident









Our Team Responds

Step 1: SOC Analysis






Tier 1 Analysts Investigate

- Gather Data
- Investigate the IP's: Internal & External
- This is LARGE and traffic looks very suspicious (encrypted and tunneled)





Investigate







Step 1: SOC Analysis

- Tier 1 AnalystsInvestigate
- Create Incident Report
- Call in the Calvary!!!







Step 2: Here comes the Calvary!

Tier 2 & 3 Analysts Investigate



Step 2: IR Response

Do not alert the adversary = Change Nothing YET

Indicators of Compromise


Make Forensic Images of Infected Systems

Communication Plan





Investigation








Step 3: Indicators of Compromise




Analysis







Analysis







Analysis

192.168.129.182	93.24.111.48	HTTP	GET /bash/getcom.
93.24.111.48	192.168.129.182	HTTP	HTTP/1.1 200 OK
192.168.129.182 192.168.129.182	93.24.111.48 93.24.111.48	TCP	ansoft=1m=1 > htm [TCP segment of a
192.108.129.182	93.24.111.48	TCP	TICP Seament of a
L SOUSEAN BURSARY AVIV	TEXTSTILL ESQUESES	эпиоле і	
[Next sequence number: 4408 (relative sequence number)			
Acknowledgement number: 5341 (relative ack number)			
Header length: 20 bytes			
El Flags: 0x18 (PSH, ACK)			
Window size: 37386			
■ Checksum: 0x8c6d [validation disabled]			
⊕ [SEQ/ACK analysis]	:-1		
Hypertext Transfer Protoc	.01		
■ HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n			
□ [Expert Info (Chat/Sequence): HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n]			
[Message: HTTP/1.1 200 oK\r\n]			
[severity level: chat]			
[Group: Sequence]			
Request Version: HTTP/1.1			
Response Code: 200			
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X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.11-1\r\n			
Vary: Accept-Encoding\r	\n		
Content-Type: text/html	\r\n		
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
Step 4: Full Incident Profile

- Complete Profile on Incident
 - Malware Profile
 - As best as we could at this point still needed more time to reverse and Analyze
 - Traffic Profile
 - Infection Profile



Step 4: Full Incident Profile

- Further Attack Profile
 - Hitting Domain Controllers and got a System Admin Account
- Now we are in trouble and we have to do something immediately!!!




Step 5: Respond/Remediate

Coordinated Response Effort



Step 5: Respond/Remediate

 However, attacker disappears in the middle of this!!!







Step 6: Re-verse Malware

- Analyze Malware
- Reverse
- "Black Hole Network"













Black Hole Network (DNS)











Performance


Image

Performance Graph

Threads













Step 6: Re-verse Malware cont.










Step 7: Investigate

How deep is the Hole?







Step 8: Communicate

- Who
- What
- When
- Where
- How







Step 9: Remediate

- Active Plan of Defense:
 - New Systems
 - Domain Controllers
 - Blocking
 - Active Monitoring
 - Encryption
 - New Capabilities/Tools








Step 10: Post-Mortem

- Success vs Failure
- What do we need to do differently
- Develop Intelligence
- Information Sharing







Failures



Some of our Failures

- Did not have full capabilities needed or implemented fully
- Communication Plan Lacking






Some of our Failures

Too many assumptions or rapid reactions

POINT = Never turn off systems (you alert the attacker and you lose valuable forensic data)







Successes

What did we do right?

Boy Scout Motto = "Always be prepared"











What did we do right?



- Logs/SEIM
- Having the Forensic tool sets
- Incident Response Plan & Process
- Full Cooperation of all teams



- You Must be Prepared in advance:
- Success =
 - People
 - Processes
 - Technology





People

- Skills (Malware Analysis, Full Packet Inspection, SOC Analysts, Incident Response Capabilities)
- This is the hardest part: find these people, train these people, retain these people
- What do we do that is unique here



People



- **Processes**
 - Incident Response Plan
 - Detailed and thorough for all types of incidents
 - Processes
 - Communication Plan and capabilities (Wiki, chat, etc)
 - Roles & responsibilities (you don't want people doing the same thing)



Process





- Technology
 - Full Packet Capture
 - Retention
 - Analysis (Manual & Automated)
 - SEIM/Log Analysis
 - IR&F Tools
 - Host Based & network
 - Scanning Tools (not vuln scanning)
 - Malware Lab/"Black Hole"







Follow Up

• Questions??



 Take Away – www.foregroundsecurity.com/RSA



