



Security in knowledge

FPKIMA: The Dial-Tone for FPKI

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Learning Objectives

1. UNDERSTANDING OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE (FPKI)
2. AWARENESS OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY (FPKIMA) SERVICES
3. KNOWLEDGE THAT THE FPKIMA IS WILLING TO HELP PROMOTE THE USE OF PKI TECHNOLOGIES

Agenda

- I. FPKIMA BACKGROUND
- II. WHY SHOULD YOU CARE?
- III. SUMMARY


Agenda

- FPKIMA BACKGROUND
 - WHO WE ARE
 - b. WHAT IS THE FPKI
 - c. WHAT WE PROTECT
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Who We Are

- The E-Government Act of 2002 appointed the General Services Administration (GSA) to manage the design, development, implementation, and operation of the Production FPKI Trust Infrastructure in support of the FPKI.
- GSA created the FPKIMA to manage the FPKI Trust Infrastructure.
- Find us at:
<http://www.idmanagement.gov/pages.cfm/page/Federal-PKI-Management-Authority-Home-Page>

Who We Are – The Big Picture



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
Federal Public Key Infrastructure (FPKI)

- Cryptographic infrastructure that **enables cross-organizational, interoperable security services** for **confidentiality, access control, and identity assurance**.
- Foundation for **secure e-government** transactions at the highest e-Authentication level.
- Enables numerous Federal directives and programs.
- Provides the **trust anchor** for the Federal Government's HSPD-12/Personal Identity Verification (PIV) and other FPKI services.

Customers of the FPKI

- Entities relying on U.S. Government trusted credentials are customers of the FPKIMA Program. For example, our customers include:
 - ▶ Federal Agencies for logical and physical access.
 - ▶ Shared Service Providers and certified PIV issuers relying on the trust chain provided by the federal root.
 - ▶ Business partners and relying parties who depend on certificate paths through the Federal Bridge CA to validate certificates issued by an FPKI Affiliate or certified PIV-I issuer.
 - ▶ External relying parties validating FPKI community credentials to the Federal Common Policy CA root certificate as a trust anchor.

The Federal PKI



FPKIMA Customers

Certificates Issued by the FPKI Trust Infrastructure CAs

▶ FBCA (12):

Common Policy
CertiPath Bridge
Verisign
Entrust
VBS
Identrust
Operational Research Consultants (ORC) (2)
GPO
PTO
DigiCert
State of Illinois

▶ Common Policy (11):

Federal Bridge
SHA-1 Federal Root
Department of Treasury
Department of State
VeriSign
Verizon Business
Entrust
ORC (2)
Legacy-Common Policy (issued to Common Policy)
SHA-1 Federal Root

▶ SHA-1 Federal Root (9):

CertiPath Bridge,
SAFE BioPharma Bridge
Department of Defense (DoD)
DoD ECA
DEA
VeriSign(4)

▶ E-Governance CAs (4):

Office of Personnel Management,
United States Department of Agriculture,
ORC
Department of Transportation

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What We Protect - Context

- Cyber security attacks are commonplace
 - ▶ Unauthorized access to data
 - ▶ Facility breaches
 - ▶ Sensitive data leakage
 - ▶ Information warfare
- Identity theft is commonplace
- Attacker sophistication is increasing
 - ▶ Advanced Persistent Threat
 - ▶ Organized Crime
 - ▶ Cloud based “attack for hire”
 - ▶ PKI elements being attacked

We Protect Sensitive Artifacts




We Protect Foundational Trust




What happens if foundational trust is in question?

- Serious adverse effect on agency operations
- Serious consequence for public confidence
- Private and public partners cost impact to recover
- Disruption of relying party applications and transactions

We Protect Business Partners



We Provide Authentication Assurance



Cost of Poor Protection?

Broken Trust.



Certificate hacks: PKI didn't fail us, humans did
September 08, 2011
The First Word on Tech
INFOWORLD TECH WATCH
After latest attack, GlobalSign stopped issuing SSL certificates. But the real problem is that few have a solution for aggressive anyway
By Roger A. Gramas | InfoWorld
With the high likelihood that GlobalSign hacked, this brings to at least three popular public PKI certification authorities attacked in recent months by a single other CA: Comodo and Digicert. The computer security world is afloat hundreds of bogus digital certificate issued. "It's a massive failure of PKI proves that there's too much trust in But it's hard for me to get worked up nobody pays serious attention to do I've yet to see the person who, when the website they were trying to access warning messages. How dare they it's not just mom and granddad who survives reveal that the more users

Hackers target Google, Skype with rogue SSL certificates
March 24, 2011
In root authority breach, fraudulent Comodo SSL certificates were created in a suspected state-sponsored attack by Iran
By Tony Bradley | PC World
Comodo's tag line is "creating trust online." That may be true most of the time, but after an attack resulted in nine fraudulent SSL certificates – targeting domains like Google, Yahoo, Skype, and Windows Live – it might be wise to trust Comodo a little less.
A statement from Comodo explains that a root authority (RA) was breached. The attacker created a user account and used the fraudulent account to issue nine rogue SSL certificates spanning seven different domains. The Comodo statement reads, "The attacker was well prepared and knew in advance what he was to try to achieve. He seemed to have a list of targets that he knew he wanted to obtain certificates for, was able quickly to generate the requests for these certificates and submit the orders to our system so that the certificates would be produced and made available to him."
[The Web browser is your portal to the world – as well as the conduit that lets in many security threats. InfoWorld's expert contributors show you how to secure your Web browsers in this "Web Browser Security Deep Dive" PDF guide.]
Comodo stresses that all nine certificates were revoked immediately upon discovery of the attack, and it has not detected any attempts to use the certificates after they were revoked. Comodo believes the attack originated in Iran, and based on the target domains, it may be a state-sponsored attempt to hack Web mail accounts of political dissidents.
Oliver Lavery, director of security research at eCircle, shared some thoughts about the attack. "What I find fascinating about this attack is the choice of domains because they aren't useful unless you have control of the DNS infrastructure." Lavery goes on to explain that a country like Iran does have control of the DNS infrastructure within its boundaries to an extent and speculates that

Weaknesses in SSL certification exposed by Comodo security breach
March 24, 2011
The scandal is that Comodo Group issued nine digital security certificates to someone with an Iranian IP address. The problem is much, much larger
By Woody Leonhard | InfoWorld
Comodo Group paints itself as a victim in the case of the hijacked SSL certificates, claiming to be duped by the government of Iran into releasing electronic certificates that would allow the country's regime to snoop on its citizens. That's only part of the tale. The whole story involves a betrayed our ince by is a system thy.
Insational fact that Comodo's site was hacked from an agus SSL certificates was used on an Iranian site for a short siking three questions:
th an Iranian IP address get a username and password rance to create SSL certificates?
rtificates for google.com, live.com, yahoo.com, mozilla.org, waiting?
I to revoke SSL certificates? That's preposterous.

Intel River Trail adds parallel dimension to JavaJSIT
The great Dropbox, Twitter Facebook mashup arrives

Recommended Res
Three ways to Prevent USB i White Paper
New Tools to Stop Today's H it Security Cost Reduction | Network Security with IP and Paper

Interim Report
September 5, 2011
DigiNotar Certificate Authority breach "Operation Black Tulip"

Most Popular
15 essential open source tools for Windows admins
10 best new features of Windows Server 8
Windows 8 Metro: The InfoWorld visual tour
Watch out, Apple: Windows 8 could trump the iPad
Microsoft? Winning? Guess who's behind it

Recommended Resources
Beyond Spam: Next-Generation Email Security | Webcast
The Latest Research on Security Challenges for SMBs | White Paper
Security: A Multilayered Approach with KnowledgeVault | White Paper
PCI 2.0: What's New? | White Paper
Realtime Publishers: Making SIM Work for Your Organization | White Paper
Going the MSSP Route: Understanding Total Cost of Ownership Issues | White Paper
See all White Papers / Webcasts

InfoWorld Guide to: Security threats and countermeasures
All you need to know about thwarting malware, preventing data loss, foiling intruders, and combating the insider threat

Figure 1: OCSP requests for the rogue *.google.com certificate

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 - WHAT WE DO
 - b. SERVICES YOU USE (OR WILL SOON)
 - c. FPKI USAGE STATISTICS

III. SUMMARY

FPKIMA Overview

- Perform Infrastructure (IT Service) Management
 - ▶ Manage the FPKI Trust Infrastructure CAs and their repositories.
 - ▶ Operate the FPKI Service Desk
 - ▶ FPKIPA-MA@listserv.gsa.gov
 - ▶ 1-888-754-1229 (1-888-PKI-1A2Z)
- Manage the full life cycle of digital certificates issued by the FPKI Trust Infrastructure
- Repository services to enable relying parties to locate certificate status

We Do – Community Working Groups

Working Group Name	Description
Federal Public Key Infrastructure Policy Authority (FPKIPA)	The FPKI governing body. It is an interagency body that develops digital certificate standards for trusted identity authentication across the federal agencies and between federal agencies and outside bodies, such as universities, state and local governments and commercial entities.
FPKI Technical Working Group (FPKI TWG)	<p>Discusses technical issues related to the usability of the PKI and future enhancements to the FPKI are brought to the TWG. It is focused on advancing PKI technology through collaboration, discussion and investigation.</p> <p>FPKIMA Co-chairs this working group.</p>
Certificate Policy Working Group (CPWG)	Serves as the advisory group to the Federal FPKI Policy Authority on policy mappings and changes to the FPKI CPs.
PKI Shared Service Provider Working Group (SSPWG)	Oversees the processes involved in the PKI Shared Service Provider (SSP) program.

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Why You Should Care – Our Services


- The FPKIMA Trust Infrastructure enables:
 - ▶ Smart card logon using PIV, PIV-Interoperable (PIV-I) or Common Access Card (CAC)
 - ▶ Facility access using PivAuth or cardAuth certificates
 - ▶ Authenticated access to web services or portals
- Fount of PKI knowledge to help in your PKI journey
 - ▶ CPS development
 - ▶ PKI-enablement information sharing
 - ▶ PKI implementation lessons learned
 - ▶ Technical and architectural concerns
 - ▶ etc.

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
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FPKI Statistics – Platform Usage




FPKI Statistics - Performance

FPKI Repository Daily Average Performance



FPKI Statistics – Repository Requests




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Summary

- The FPKI is critical infrastructure for high-assurance trust, security, and interoperability.
- The U.S. Government and various other communities rely on the FPKI to help meet their mission-critical objectives – including internal and cross-community (federation) purposes.
- FPKI importance and use continue to grow.
- Our team is willing to share our lessons-learned with your organization to help promote PKI or help with PKI-enablement.



"I lost my key to the kingdom."

Learning Objectives Review

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QUESTIONS?

Thank You and Contact Information

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