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Capitalizing on Collective Intelligence

DLL Side-Loading: A Thorn in the Side of the Anti-Virus (AV) Industry

SESSION ID: HTA-W04A

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Fireeye



Overview

- What is DLL Side-loading?
- APT using the technique
- How to recognize it?
- How to avoid it?




What is DLL Side-loading?

- History
 - Search-Order-Hijacking
 - (A.K.A: DLL preloading attack or binary planting attack)
- WinSxS (Side-by-Side) Assembly
 - Flexibility to update the binaries
 - May grant trusted installer priviledges




Traditional Search Order High-Jacking

Search for DLL in the first location then the second




DLL Side-loading

Search for DLL within the executable run path



APT PlugX


- Used in Office 2003 service pack 2 update executable
- Self Extracting Rar excutable drops all 3 files
- OInfo11.ocx and Oinfo.ISO same directory





APT PlugX

Dependency Walker





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OInfo11.ocx

FireEy Next Generation Threat Protect

Original Exported Function

	; intcdecl		Data(int, int lpUserNameBuf, LPCSTR lpOrgNameBuf)
.text:4C0AC4A1		public (GetOfficeData
ext:4C0AC4A1	GetOfficeData	proc nea	ar ; DATA XREF: .text:off_4C131938to
.text:4C0AC4A1			
.text:4C0AC4A1	arg_0	= dword	ptr 4
.text:4C0AC4A1	1pUserNameBuf	= dword	ptr 8
.text:4C0AC4A1	1pOrgNameBuf	= dword	ptr OCh
.text:4C0AC4A1	·		
.text:4C0AC4A1		push	[esp+arg 0]
.text:4C0AC4A5		push	offset aGetofficedataD ; "GetOfficeData (%d)"
.text:4C0AC4AA		call	nullsub 1
.text:4C0AC4AF		рор	ecx
.text:4C0AC4B0		pop	ecx
.text:4C0AC4B1		push	0 ; int
.text:4C0AC4B3		push	[esp+4+1p0rqNameBuf] ; 1p0rqNameBuf
.text:4C0AC4B7		mov	ecx, offset unk 4C133848
.text:4C0AC4BC		push	[esp+8+1pUserNameBuf] ; 1pUserNameBuf
.text:4C0AC4C0		push	[esp+0Ch+arg 0] ; int
.text:4C0AC4C4		call	sub 40008407
.text:4C0AC4C9		retn	
.text:4C0AC4C9	GetOfficeData	endp	

Fake Exported Function

.text:10001000 .text:10001000 GetOfficeData .text:10001000 .text:10001000 GetOfficeData .text:10001000	retn	; DATA XREF: .rdata:off_10009B68to ; DeleteOfficeData	
.text:10001000 ;			RSACONFERENCE20

Other Examples

- mcvsmap.exe 4e1e0b8b0673937415599bf2f24c44ad
- NvSmartMaxapp.dll 09b8b54f78a10c435cd319070aa13c28
- RASTLS.EXE 62944e26b36b1dcace429ae26ba66164






Why is this A Problem?

Slipping by AV Scanners

- For every new generated and compressed executable, blacklisting by hash and signature generation will not always be detected
- OINFOP11.EXE was listed on the NSRL database as a clean file
- Valid Certs/Binary Signatures




Malware Versions





Why is this A Problem?




Persistence

- If the malicious executable is built in memory, AV scanners cannot detect the catalyst.
- Every time that executable is called it will always rebuild the malicious executable components

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Why is this A Problem?





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How to recognize it?

- Various Tools
 - PE explorers to view DLL imports
 - http://www.heaventools.com/ overview.htm
 - Dependency Walker
 - http://www.dependencywalker.com/
 - SxStrace.exe (Found in MS Vista)
 - Validate manifests and dll tracing

EXPORT VIEWER					
	s 🔁				
Entry Point (Drd	Name			
4C105FF9h 1		DIICanUnloadNow			
4C105FF4h 2		DIIGetClassObject			
4C0AC4CAh 3		DeleteOfficeData			
4C0AC43Dh 4		DIRegisterServer			
4C0AC471h 5	i	DIIUnregisterServer			
4C0AC4A1h 6		GetOfficeData			
4C0AD4C3h 7		GetTemplate			

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How to avoid it?

Developer

- Validate Imported Functions
- Utilize DLL redirection or a Manifest
- Call SetDIIDirectory with an empty string.

Endpoint User

- Restrict write and execute permissions user folders
- Least privilege access

Manifest File Example

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?> <assembly xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v1" manifestVersion="1.0"> <assemblyIdentity publicKeyToken="75e377300ab7b886" type="win32" name="Test4Dir" version="1.0.0.0" processorArchitecture="x86"/> <file name="DirComp.dll" hash="35ca6f27b11ed948ac6e50b75566355f0991d5d9" hashalg="SHA1"> <comClass clsid="{6C6CC20E-0F85-49C0-A14D-D09102BD7CDC}" progid="DirComp.PathInfo" threadingModel="apartment"/> <typelibtlbid="{AA56D6B8-9ADB-415D-9E10-16DD68447319}" version="1.0" helpdir=""/> </file> </assembly>





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