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HUNTED TO THE HUNTER

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
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
CHANGE

Challenge today's security thinking



Need for a change

- ◆ Exponential attack surface, threat actor growth & evolution
- ◆ Current Strategies are ineffective
- ◆ Challenge exceeds resources
- ◆ Business & clients demand more security form less (budget & friction)
- ◆ New Platforms require new (unproven solutions)



We Must Change Our Approach

DDoS attack downs Twitch on news of Amazon acquisition

ComputerWeekly.com Warwick Ashford Wednesday 27 August 2014

What a major data breach costs: Target by the numbers
The Sydney Morning Herald May 6, 2014
Bryan Krebs




FBI Probing Cyber Attack on Major U.S. Banks
SHIRLEY LI

Health care data breaches have hit 30M patients and counting
The Washington Post By Jason Millman August 19



December 17, 2013
Foreign attackers hacked elections site during government shutdown

National Security
DHS contractor suffers major computer breach, officials say
The Washington Post By Ellen Nakashima August 6




What is Strategic Threat Intelligence?

- ◆ Threat actor focus
- ◆ Intelligence Analysis
- ◆ Collection planning
- ◆ Proactive approach

The data within the database — or the threat feed — can be highly useful to the intelligence process. But (and I am not picking nits here) it comprises a data feed, not an intelligence feed (except to marketers)."

Darkreading – Nick Selby



A New Approach to Cyber

“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles...”

- Sun Tzu, the Art of War



Militaries use intelligence




Global cyber war



Threats evolve & calibrate



Threats to clients



Business Drivers


- ◆ Merger / Acquisition
- ◆ Event
- ◆ Business Strategy
- ◆ Mature compliance
- ◆ Service continuity




Technical Drivers



- ◆ Disparate Data Sources
- ◆ Information Architecture
- ◆ Context and Relationships
- ◆ Retention and Elastic Search
- ◆ Attribution
- ◆ New and Emerging Threats
- ◆ New Command and Control






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Strategic Threat Assessment



 #RSAC

Strategic Threat Assessment




**Research
& Analysis**



**Wargame,
Test & Assess**



**Limited Stealth
Operations**




Strategic Threat Assessment

- ◆ Research Actors
- ◆ Attribution
- ◆ Attack Trees
- ◆ Capability synopsis
- ◆ Ecosystem Analysis



Research & Analysis



	Internal				Hostile Individuals	Terrorist	Organised Crime	Foreign-Sponsored	Hacktivist	Other

Intention										
Boundary (highest)										
Organisation (only one)										
Proficiencies (max)										
Purpose										
Attribution										
Phishing										
Impersonation										
Coercion										
Cryptography										

Organisations	Foreign-Sponsored			Hacktivist		Other
	Syrian Electronic Army	North Korea	Iran	Political Agenda Motivated	Other	
Anonymous						
Arab-Coal/Mining Lobby						
Refugee Advocated						
Rogue Political Operatives						



STRATEGIC THREAT ASSESSMENT

- ◆ Wargame
 - ◆ Specialists
 - ◆ Attack tree
 - ◆ Action – Reaction – Counteraction
- ◆ Threat course of action
 - ◆ Wargame analysis
 - ◆ Most Dangerous
 - ◆ Most Likely



**Wargame,
Test & Assess**

WARGAME Rules Handout

KEY POINTS

- SEQUENCE**
- Action
 - Reaction
 - Counter-Action

ROLES



- Coordinator
- Recorder
- Threat actor representati
- Client

CONDUCT

- Attack tree
- Trigger points

TERMINOLOGY

- Attack tree
- Named area of interest
- Trigger points




Strategic Threat Assessment

- ◆ Executive Report
- ◆ Intelligence Collection Plan
- ◆ Limited Stealth Operations
- ◆ Incident Response



Limited Stealth Operations


ID	Intelligence Requirement	COA Alignment	Priority	Task allocated	status	Assets allocated	Named Area of Interest	Potential collection platform(s)	Collection Time (days)	LTIOV (days)
IR-1	Increased media coverage of State Event	1, 2	Low	TBA	Pending assignment	TBA	Media Coverage	Open source media collation agencies	N-90 to N+1	N+1
IR-2	Announcement of attack	1	Medium	TBA	Pending assignment	TBA	Threat Actor Web pages	- Threat Actor web pages - Threat Actor forums - Protest / Action group websites. - Anarchist websites - Media announcements	N-60 to N+1	N+1



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
Limited Stealth Operations





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Limited Stealth Operations

- ◆ Execution of the Intelligence plan
- ◆ Predetermined focal points
- ◆ Monitor the Threat Actors – Command & Control
- ◆ Feed into SOC




Limited Stealth Operations



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
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Summary



Summary

- ◆ Compliance is failing
- ◆ Unique threat driven approach
- ◆ Focus, pragmatic and effective
- ◆ Supports business operations
- ◆ Turns the tables



Apply Slide

- ◆ Think like a Threat Actor
- ◆ Research your Threat Actors
- ◆ Categorize and prioritize
- ◆ Collection plan
- ◆ Monitor threat actors

