RSA Conference 2015

San Francisco | April 20-24 | Moscone Center

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Enterprise Cloud Security via DevSecOps



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Agenda

Who we are

- Applying DevSecOps for 3+ years to support Enterprise Cloud migrations
- ◆ 20+ yrs experience with Virtualization, Software Defined Environments and Cloud Security

What we'll cover

- Information about the DevSecOps model and the experiments that helped us discover it
- A path for developing your own Enterprise Cloud Security program using DevSecOps practices

Why it's important

- Cloud and DevOps adoption require a different approach to Enterprise Security
- Nearly 70% of All Workloads occur in Cloud Data Centers within 2015*
- Public Cloud growth is 50% higher than Private Cloud*

^{*} Cisco Global Cloud Index






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Spoiler Alert:

DevSecOps isn't DevOps + Security!





The Challenge

Securing Enterprise Workloads in the Cloud...

- Pain
- Trial & Error
- Blood, sweat & tears
- Ouch, my head hurts!



It would have been great to hear this talk a couple years ago....





The Team

#RSAC

Intuit Cloud Security


- Leading Cloud Security at Intuit
- DevSecOps
- Lean Start Principles
- Decision Support
- Assisting 3000+ Developers

AWS Professional Services

- Integrated solutions
- Delivery assistance
- Partner coaching
- Sample code & accelerators
- Access across AWS teams



The Timeline







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Drivers for DevSecOps

Embedding into DevOps Teams was a disaster...

- There aren't enough Security Professionals to embed into DevOps Teams...
- Compliance checklists didn't take us very far before we stopped scaling because of manual work...
- We learned we couldn't keep up with automated deployments without our own automation...
- Standard Security Operations did not work and continuous change became overwhelming...
- And we needed far more data than we expected to help the business make decisions...







The Art of DevSecOps

DevSecOps

Security Engineering Security Operations

Compliance Operations

Security Science

Experiment, Automate, Test

Hunt, Detect, Contain Respond, Manage, Train Learn, Measure, Forecast






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Step Zero: Establishing Principles


- Customer focused mindset
- 2. Scale, scale, scale
- 3. Objective criteria
- 4. Proactive hunting
- 5. Continuous detection & response














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Security as Word Doc

- Double-click installer
- Click "Next"

- Click "Next"
- Click "Next"
- Click "Next"
- Click "Next"
- Click "Next"
- Click "Next"
- Click "Next"
- Click "Next"



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Frozen in Time





Security as Code is Easy with AWS


AWS provides a programmable infrastructure

- Benefits
 - Easily automated
 - Repeatable
 - Auditable
 - Easy to iterate
- Forms of Code
 - Access Policy documents
 - CloudFormation templates
 - Ruby scripts
 - Custom APIs














Experiment with Centralized & Transparent Governance

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- Manage hundreds of AWS accounts
 - Push baseline IAM Roles and IAM Groups
 - Push associated trust policies and access policies
- Design to support an authoritative code source
 - Include git support
- Add behavior modifications
 - Discover only (--dry-run)
 - Detect drift and show differences (--diff)
 - Replace with approved baseline (no --dry-run)
 - Tune verbosity (--debug)







Centralized Governance

BU Accounts (Trusting)



How did we decide which roles would be deployed?


- Human
 - IAM Admin
 - Incident Response
 - Read Only
- Services
 - IAM Grantor
 - Instance Roles required to support security services
 - Read Only





Baseline IAM Role Catalog





Role Name


Access Policies



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Centralized Governance Workflow







Acting on Drift Detection

```
begin
    (iam.client.list_role_policies(:role_name => role)[:policy_names]\
            - roledb.list_policies(role)).each do |policy|
      log.warn("Deleting Policy \"#{policy}\", which is not part of the approved baseline.")
      if policydiff("{}",
        URI.decode(iam.client.get_role_policy(\
                                                                         Account Grade:
           :role_name => role,
           :policy_name => policy
        )[:policy_document]).
        {:argv => ARGV, :diff => options.diff})
      end
      options.dryrun ? nil : \
        iam.client.delete_role_policy(
            :role name => role.
            :policy_name => policy
                                                                           Heal Account?
end
```











Sec Ops Reloaded for the Cloud

applying these principles...


- Dynamic Attack Trees created and maintained by SecOps
- Data collection is tied to Threat Modeling
- Rules & Alerting support Hunting
- Inline Forensics...













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Threat Analytics Platform – Data Sources

PAST 24 HOURS:

APACHE_HTTP_SERVER	15.1M	AWS_CLOUDTRAIL	4.1M	BROCADE_VYATTA_VROUTER	1.8M	CISCO_ACS	8.6K
CISCO_ASA	37.0M	CISCO_ASA_THREAT_DETEC	4.5K	CISCO_FIREWALL	1.9M	CISCO_FWSM	34.1K
CISCO_IOS	71	CISCO_IRONPORT_HTTP_PR	36.1M	CISCO_NEXUS	1	CISCO_PIX	28
CISCO_VPN	5.6K	DHCLIENT_DHCP	75.9K	F5	137.0K	F5_BIGIP_APM	241.4K
FIREEYE	11	JBOSS_APP_SERVER	5.0M	JUNIPER_FLOW	325.7M	JUNIPER_VPN	585.8K
MS_WINDOWS_EVENT	1.5M	NGINX	416.5K	NTPD	33	PUPPET	6.2K
RSYSLOG	1.6K	SOURCEFIRE	4.7K	SPLUNK	128.3K	STUNNEL	5.6M
SYMANTEC_ENDPOINT_PRO	1.1K	UNIX	379	UNIX_AUDIT	42.0M	UNIX_CRON	8.1K
UNIX_INIT	3.2M	UNIX_KERNEL	2	UNIX_PAM	272	UNIX_SSH	34.4K
UNIX_XNTPD	541	UNKNOWN	97.0M	VMWARE_VSPHERE	14.8M	WEBSENSE_HTTP_PROXY	26.0M





Threat Analytics Platform - Trends








Threat Analytics Platform – Shared Rules

ID	Name	Rule Pack	Risk	Distinguisher	Status	
.1.613	AWS EC2 [Console Output Requested Via API]	Vendor - AWS CloudTrail	Low	username	Disabled	
.1.612	AWS EC2 [Instance Monitoring Turned Off]	Vendor - AWS CloudTrail	Low	username	Enabled	
.1.611	AWS EC2 [Encrypted Windows Password Retrieved]	Vendor - AWS CloudTrail	Low	username	Enabled	
.1.610	AWS EC2 [AMI Shared]	Vendor - AWS CloudTrail	Low	username	Disabled	
.1.609	AWS EC2 [AMI Made Public]	Vendor - AWS CloudTrail	Low	username	Disabled	
.1.608	AWS EC2 [EBS Volume Snapshot Shared]	Vendor - AWS CloudTrail	Low	username	Enabled	
.1.607	AWS IAM [Manual Action Without MFA]	Vendor - AWS CloudTrail	Low	username	Disabled	
1.606	AWS IAM [New Signing Certificate Uploaded]	Vendor - AWS CloudTrail	Low	username	Disabled	
.1.605	AWS IAM [New Server Certificate Uploaded]	Vendor - AWS CloudTrail	Low	username	Disabled	
.1.604	AWS IAM [Policy Change to Cloudtrail]	Vendor - AWS CloudTrail	Low	username	Disabled	
.1.603	AWS EC2 [Several Instances Manually Created/Started]	Vendor - AWS CloudTrail	Low	username	Enabled	
.1.602	AWS EC2 [EBS Volume Snapshot Made Public]	Vendor - AWS CloudTrail	Low	username	Disabled	
1.1.601	AWS [Non-service Root Account Usage]	Vendor - AWS CloudTrail	Low	username	Disabled	





Threat Analytics Platform - Visualization





Threat Analytics Platform - Alerts



Details

CREATED:

2014-12-12 23:11:18 UTC

LAST UPDATED:

2014-12-12 23:11:23 UTC

STATE: OPEN DISTINGUISHERS:

username - dsa-qdog-learning-awssandbox

DESCRIPTION:

This behavioral rule looks for AWS IAM policy changes specific to Cloudtrail. Allowing unauthorized users access to Cloudtrail could represent a policy violation, or an attacker giving a user account access to create, delete, or stop logging infrastructure.

QUERY:


class=aws_cloudtrail srczone=iam.amazonaws.com action=[putgrouppolicy,putrolepolicy,putuserpolicy] NOT username=[iss.casv1.awsuser, accessMgmt] rawmsg=/Action.*cloudtrail:(createtrail|deletetrail|updatetrail|start|ogging|stop|ogging|) NOT rawmsg=/"roleName": "kaos\-cloudtrail\-admin"/


Events (9)

Revisions (1)

Notes (0)











Compliance Operations for Actionable Inline Feedback

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
experimenting with these principles...

- Dynamic automated evaluations
- Compliance alerts are provided in real-time
- Self-Service Security Education
- Education on-demand














DevSecOps Toolkit – Cross-Account Roles



DevSecOps Toolkit - MFA via Google Authenticator

 Human Admins are dangerous and require AWS integrated MFA with Google Authenticator to protect your account.

 Important for AWS to a validate human being vs. using external MFA to support authentication that could be hijacked.

 MFA placed on the Assumed Role which is trusted by the child account role.







```
lioness-9:toolkit shannon$ bundle exec bin/tk help config
Usage:
 tk config
```

Options:

```
-i, [--interactive], [--no-interactive]
                                                 # interactive mode for q&a to set up config
-p, [--profile-name=PROFILE_NAME]
                                                 # profile name in .aws config file
-r, [--master-region=MASTER_REGION]
                                                 # region for master account
                                                 # Default: us-west-2
-a, [--master-account=MASTER_ACCOUNT]
                                                 # 12 digit AWS account number without dashes
-n, [--master-role-name=MASTER_ROLE_NAME]
                                                 # name of master role to assume cross-account roles
                                                 # Default: master-auditor
-t, [--target-account-list=TARGET_ACCOUNT_LIST]
                                                 # location for csv file containing accounts list to audit
                                                 # Default: config/accounts.csv
-d, [--output-dir=OUTPUT_DIR]
                                                 # directory for storing results
                                                 # Default: home
-f, [--output-type=OUTPUT_TYPE]
                                                 # supports csv
                                                 # Default: csv
```

Description: Using the devsecops toolkit requires a master configuration file to establish the credentials. role, MFA, etc. used to support cross-account usage. This command provides you with an interactive and advanced interface for creating a configuration file to support your usage. The configuration file can be found in your home directory under .tk/config and you can also hand edit this file using yaml.







DevSecOps Toolkit – Output to CSV

	A	В	С	D	Е	F	G	Н		J	K	L	M	N
1	account_alias ,	account_nun	check_date	iam_instance	image_id	instance_id	instance_typ	launch_time	owner_id	placement_a	placement_t	platform	private_dns_	private_ip_a pr
2	cto-dev-tramalfado	8.8507E+11	2014-11-13	22:48:43 UTC	ami-c9d89bf	i-f1e8e0fc	m3.medium	2014-10-02 22:1	8.8507E+11	us-west-2a	dedicated			10.81.3.171
3	cto-dev-tramalfado	8.8507E+11	2014-11-13	22:48:44 UTC	ami-9fa2efaf	i-4ddb2c47	c3.large	2014-10-10 23:0	8.8507E+11	us-west-2b	dedicated			10.81.3.25
4	cto-dev-tramalfado	8.8507E+11	2014-11-13	22:48:44 UTC	ami-9fa2efaf	i-c3839cce	c3.large	2014-10-10 22:5	8.8507E+11	us-west-2a	dedicated			10.81.3.6
5	tramalfadore-pre-p	7.7804E+11	2014-11-13	22:49:12 UTC	ami-b600bdo	i-0c1845e2	c3.large	2014-10-13 23:5	7.7804E+11	us-east-1b	dedicated		ip-10-80-200	10.80.200.14 ed
6	tramalfadore-pre-p	7.7804E+11	2014-11-13	22:49:12 UTC	ami-b600bdo	i-89ede862	c3.large	2014-10-13 23:5	7.7804E+11	us-east-1c	dedicated		ip-10-80-200	10.80.200.53 ed
7	tramalfadore-pre-p	7.7804E+11	2014-11-13	arn:aws:iam:	ami-c8cb41a	i-29ad33c3	m3.medium	2014-11-11 00:2	7.7804E+11	us-east-1c	dedicated		ip-10-80-204	10.80.204.154
8	tramalfadore-pre-p	7.7804E+11	2014-11-13	22:49:16 UTC	ami-9fa2efaf	i-7f699b75	c3.large	2014-10-13 23:5	7.7804E+11	us-west-2b	dedicated			10.80.192.65
9	tramalfadore-pre-p	7.7804E+11	2014-11-13	arn:aws:iam:	ami-2f9bd01	i-4774d84d	m3.medium	2014-11-11 00:2	7.7804E+11	us-west-2b	dedicated			10.80.195.75
10	tramalfadore-pre-p	7.7804E+11	2014-11-13	arn:aws:iam:	ami-2f9bd01	i-6474d86e	m3.medium	2014-11-11 00:2	7.7804E+11	us-west-2b	dedicated			10.80.195.146
11	tramalfadore-pre-p	7.7804E+11	2014-11-13	22:49:17 UTC	ami-9fa2efaf	i-7375167c	c3.large	2014-10-13 23:5	7.7804E+11	us-west-2c	dedicated			10.80.192.145

Count of subnet_id	Column Labels							
Row Labels	54.187.208.45	54.187.35.1	54.201.138.81	54.201.142.175	54.85.174.190	54.85.42.13	(blank)	Grand Total
subnet-009e6877							1	1
subnet-056d7371							1	1
subnet-1a9e686d		1						1
subnet-24aaa046			1					1
subnet-29aaa04b							2	2
subnet-57cbd523						1		1
subnet-9a88dfdc				1				1
subnet-9b7aabfe	1							1
subnet-a36f348b					1			1
(blank)								
Grand Total	1	1	1	1	1	1	4	10











The Principles of Security Science

- Death to F.U.D. (No proof, no problem)
- Rely on data
- Prove your assumptions
- Model the solutions
- Provide tools to support decisions







Goals of Security Science

- Empower teams to make sane security decisions
- Prevent security breaches by guiding process
- Uncover new threats and vulnerabilities through data analysis
- Seek out new life and new civilizations, to boldly go where no Security Team has gone before









Examples of Security Science

- 90 day password length vs. \$10k attacker offline cracker speed
 - ◆ MD-5 = 19 characters
 - ◆ SHA-512 = 11 characters
 - ◆ BCRYPT = 8 characters
- With RHEL6 and goal of CVSS < 4, how often to restack?</p>
 - Amazon RHEL 6 Server = 5.3 days
 - Our base AMI = 10.5 days















...profiling drift on accounts, services and instances...






DEVSECOPS


...egress monitoring + threat intel to detect Suspicious Exfiltration...















Apply What You Have Learned Today

- Next week you should:
 - Join the DevSecOps Community via the LinkedIn Group and Twitter
 - Determine which coding language makes sense for your team
 - Start with assessing your org's cloud adoption strategy, security requirements and work backwards
- In the first three months following this presentation you should:
 - Develop a whitelisting roadmap
 - Identify policies that need to be converted to code
 - Start with Access as a foundation and develop standard naming conventions
- Within six months you should:
 - Have a platform that supports basic decisions
 - Have a wealth of data to gain insights
 - Begin to provide real-time insights for teams to remediate their issues based on scores/grades



