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
Lie. Cheat. Deceive. How to Practice the Art of Deception at Machine Speed

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@securedsensibly


CHANGE

Challenge today's security thinking




Why continue to do things the way we always have?


- ◆ Imagine:
 - ◆ Within every aspect of our lives there are rules, legal and moral guidelines that must be followed
 - ◆ These tell us what actions are permissible, what responses are appropriate, in short every element of our behaviour
 - ◆ Sport clearly illustrate this
 - ◆ Football, sorry Soccer – 11 people per team, rules govern the time they play, how they play, where they play, each role has it's own set of behavioural rules
 - ◆ **Do you really have to follow a set of rules for Cybersecurity?**



USA vs Scotland Match?




USA vs Scotland Match?




So How Do Attackers See Us?

- ◆ We are bloated, slow, overworked, underpaid, stressed
 - ◆ We are guided by the wrong people
 - ◆ Users: “it's too complicated and it doesn't have a fruit logo on it”
 - ◆ Auditor: “Get someone else to do it, and have you documented it?”
 - ◆ Procurement: “Choose the lowest bidder”
 - ◆ Board: “I don't understand, why are we doing it?”
- ◆ Attackers see us as static, easy to locate, easy to invade, always up, and there's plenty of people on the inside to rely on for help 😊




In short, we look like this...




Home Field Advantage?

- ◆ Over 5000 years of warfare “the defender” has always had the presumed advantage in any fight
 - ◆ Required a ratio of 4:1 for the attacker to be “assured” of victory over the defender
 - ◆ The defender picks the battlefield
 - ◆ The defender can typically move faster
 - ◆ The defender begins with forces that are optimally deployed to take advantage of the terrain
 - ◆ In cyber, this advantage should be even more pronounced
 - ◆ The defender can control what the attacker sees
 - ◆ The defender can dictate what they have access to
 - ◆ The defender can stop the attack simply by disconnecting
- ◆ Why did we give up the natural advantages we have in defending our networks and applications?



The Wrong Mind-set?


- ◆ We start with a mindset of losing:
 - ◆ The attacker only needs 1 vulnerability while the defender has to defend everything
 - ◆ The attacker has infinite time and infinite resources
- ◆ We forget that the attacker has to do “abnormal” things
 - ◆ Create *unusual* traffic
 - ◆ Create *failures*
- ◆ Why don't we catch them in time?



Practice the Art of Deception to Better Defend

- ◆ Be less predictable, Be faster, Be more aggressive
 - ◆ Lie
 - ◆ Cheat
 - ◆ Deceive


Change the Game.



Lie – Attackers don't tell the whole truth!

- ◆ Attackers falsify browser headers, spoof IP addresses, use other peoples machines in order to present a false front


CLICKS				All Columns ▾
UTC Time	Click Delta	IP Address	Page	
2012-01-04 10:00:26.189	00:00:00.000	23.34.161.51	home	
2012-01-04 10:00:33.800	00:00:07.611	23.34.161.51	product_category/cell_phones	
2012-01-04 10:00:51.960	00:00:18.160	23.34.161.51	login	
2012-01-04 10:00:58.883	00:00:06.923	23.34.161.51	login-incorrect-password	
2012-01-04 10:01:12.306	00:00:13.423	23.34.161.51	login-done	
2012-01-04 10:01:13.159	00:00:00.853	86.105.1.148	product_display/dvd_players	
2012-01-04 10:01:13.722	00:00:00.563	86.105.1.148	add_to_cart	
2012-01-04 10:01:14.744	00:00:01.022	86.105.1.148	change_shipping_address	
2012-01-04 10:01:15.400	00:00:00.656	86.105.1.148	checkout	



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- ◆ Attackers falsify browser headers, spoof IP addresses, use other peoples machines in order to present a false front

Data	SESSION	ip=23.34.161.51&referrer=http://www.domain58989.com&lang=EN&OS=win32&userAgent=Mozilla/5.0 (LINUX; U; Redhat 9.2; en-US; rv:1.8.1.11) Gecko/20080423 Firefox/2.0.0.11		
2012-01-04 10:00:26.189	00:00:00.000	23.34.161.51	home	
2012-01-04 10:00:33.800	00:00:07.611	23.34.161.51	product_category/cell_phones	
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2012-01-04 10:01:13.159	00:00:00.853	86.105.1.148	product_display/dvd_players	
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


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

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		2012-01-04 10:00:26.189	00:00:00.000	23.34.161.51	home
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		2012-01-04 10:01:13.159	00:00:00.853	86.105.1.148	product_display/dvd_players
		2012-01-04 10:01:13.722	00:00:00.363	86.105.1.148	add_to_cart

Data	SESSION	ip=86.105.1.148&referrer=http://www.badguysrus.com&lang=RU&OS=Linux&userAgent=Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0; SLCC1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; Media Center PC 5.0; .NET CLR 3.0.04506; InfoPath.2)			



Lie – So Why Should We ?




Cheat – There’s A Whole Army Against You

- ◆ Botnet armies give them superior power
 - ◆ Zeus EuroGrabber – Stole \$47million from 30,000 customers through mobile devices
 - ◆ ZeroAccess Botnet Network globally an estimated 1,000,000 devices
 - ◆ Mining bitcoin and other banking credentials, its estimated it generates \$100,000 per day for its operators

ZeroAccess Botnet Network (Europe)





Image source – TechnologyReview.com





Cheat – Multiply Forces, Coordinate Response



- ◆ Automate defensive capabilities internally, so you now have an army of analysts battling for you:




Cheat – Fight Fire with Fire



Deceive – Spear Phishing Attack (Infiltration)




Deceive – Ever Played 3 Cups ?





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

Ever Played when there is no winning cup?





Deceive – Today's 3 Cup: Maze





Deceive – Three Way Honeypot




Deceive – Take Back Home Field Advantage



Deceive – Change the Battle Field




Deceive – Frustrate Your Attacker





“This was just a Linux box!”



The HoneyPots are identical in design of servers, applications and devices. However all IP schema's are different and open port numbers for applications





Deceive – Frustrate Your Attacker



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Deceive – Frustrate Your Attacker




Break the Rules

Don't

- Become An Economical Target
- Be predictable
- Be passive
- Be transparent
- Constrain Your Team

Do

- ◆ Multiple forces through automation
- ◆ Switch network conditions
- ◆ Pre-approve Mitigation Actions
- ◆ Encode asset names
- ◆ Lead a team strategy



Apply

- ◆ What's a Single Simple Action that you can change next week?
 - ◆ Design your team strategy
 - ◆ Research automation capabilities
- ◆ In the next three months, what can you do?
 - ◆ Encode names for critical assets
 - ◆ Plan network changes
 - ◆ Identify and pre-approve known, frequent mitigations

