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SESSION ID: IDY-F01

The Emperor's New Password Manager: Security Analysis of Password Managers


Zhiwei Li

* collaborated with Warren He, Devdatta Akhawe, and Dawn Song from UC Berkeley


Research Scientist
Shape Security
@liwaius

CHANGE

Challenge today's security thinking



20 years later ...



EBay Urges New Passwords After Breach

White-hat hackers lifted 560,000 corporate passwords in 31 days. We're all screwed

Russian Hackers Amass Over a Billion Internet Passwords **Thousands Of Passwords Exposed**


By NICOLE PERLROTH

A Russian cybercriminal group has created an Internet credential database containing a combination of usernames and passwords. Researchers say the record includes confidential information from household name companies, including Sony.






Kids Cyber Safe?



Password Managers to the rescue

- ◆ Physically Effortless
- ◆ Resilient to Phishing
- ◆ Memorywise Effortless
- ◆ Scalable for Users
- ◆ Resilient to Physical Observation
- ◆ Resilient to Throttled Guessing
- ◆ Resilient to Unthrottled Guessing
- ◆ Resilient to Leaks from Other Verifiers
- ◆ ...





XXXX is a must-use freeware tool that supports multiple operating systems and browsers



XXXX Offers NSA-Level Protection for Your Passwords



Keep All of Your Logins Secure With XXXX



XXXX Never Forget a Password Again




XXXX: Unbreakable Passwords That You Don't Have to Remember



XXXX Surpasses Gmail for Top Productivity App



XXXX Wins Best Mobile App at CES 2014






US-CERT

UNITED STATES COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM

Password Security, Protection, and Management


Password Managers

A password manager is software for storing all your passwords in one location that is protected and accessible with one easy-to-remember master passphrase. It is one of the best ways to keep track of each unique password or passphrase that you have created for your various online accounts—without writing them down on a piece of paper and risking that others will see them. When using a password manager, you have one master passphrase that protects all of your other passwords. This leaves you with the ease of having to remember only one.





Are they truly secure?

- ◆ LastPass
- ◆ RoboForm
- ◆ My1login
- ◆ PasswordBox
- ◆ NeedMyPassword





How does it work?





Security Goals

- ◆ Master Account Security
 - ◆ impossible for an attacker to authenticate as the user to the password manager
- ◆ Credential Database Security
 - ◆ ensure the CIA of the credential database
- ◆ Unlinkability
 - ◆ use of password manager should not allow colluding web applications to track a single user across websites




Threat model

- ◆ Web attacker
 - ◆ control web servers
 - ◆ DNS domains
 - ◆ get a victim to visit controlled domains




Four classes of vulnerabilities

	Bookmarklet Vulnerabilities	Web Vulnerabilities	Authorization Vulnerabilities	UI Vulnerabilities
LastPass	Vulnerable	Vulnerable	Not discovered	Vulnerable
RoboForm	Vulnerable	Vulnerable	NA	Vulnerable
My1Login	Vulnerable	Not discovered	Vulnerable	Not discovered
PasswordBox	NA	Not discovered	Vulnerable	NA
NeedMyPassword	NA	Vulnerable	Not discovered	NA



Vulnerable
Not discovered
NA


NO product was safe against all four



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
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Bookmarklet Vulnerabilities



Bookmarklet

- ◆ A bookmarklet is a snippet of JavaScript code
 - ◆ install as a bookmark
 - ◆ when clicked, run in the context of the current page
 - ◆ interact with a login form



Alice

`_LASTPASS_RANDOM|h`

dropbox.com


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
Bookmarklet Click

LastPass





Alice clicks bookmarklet, which includes
`_LASTPASS_RANDOM` and **`h`**







Bookmarklet code is a stub that loads the main code from lastpass.com






Bookmarklet loads a LastPass page in an iframe






The iframe loads Alice's encrypted master key and encrypted credential for dropbox.com (specified by a URL parameter).

This is done using a <script> tag in the iframe.







PostMessage communicates the decryption key to the iframe, which decrypts the credential and sends it back through PostMessage




LastPass Bookmarklet Attack



Leaking sensitive data into untrusted pages

- ◆ All password managers that support bookmarklet leak their credentials
 - ◆ LastPass
 - ◆ RoboForm
 - ◆ My1login



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
Classic Web Vulnerabilities



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Web Vulnerabilities



- ◆ Subtleties of the web platform
- ◆ Focus on CSRF and XSS
- ◆ CSRF vulnerabilities
 - ◆ LastPass, RoboForm, and NeedMyPassword
- ◆ XSS vulnerability
 - ◆ NeedMyPassword






LastPass CSRF Vulnerability


- ◆ OTP feature
 - ◆ authentication code for the master account
 - ◆ only valid for one use

- ◆ Design flaw




Alicelastpass.com/otp.php
$$h = \text{hash}(\text{hash}(\text{alice} | \text{otp}) | \text{otp})$$
$$\text{rand_encrypted_key} = \text{encrypt}(\text{masterkey}, \text{hash}(\text{alice} | \text{otp}))$$
Alicelastpass.com/otp.php?forcelogin=1

OTP Attack



$h = \text{hash}(\text{hash}(\text{alice} | \text{otp}) | \text{any_otp})$
 $\text{rand_encrypted_key} = \text{encrypt}(\text{dummy}, \text{hash}(\text{alice} | \text{any_otp}))$


The attacker can then log into Alice's master account to view unencrypted information and delete credentials



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
Authorization Vulnerabilities



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Collaboration


- ◆ Ability to share passwords with a collaborator






- ◆ Alice requests to share a credential with Bob
- ◆ Password manager forwards the credential to Bob
- ◆ Both need accounts with the password manager


Authorization Vulnerabilities

- ◆ 3 support credential sharing
- ◆ Both My1login and PasswordBox mistook authentication for authorization







PasswordBox



(a) Sharing an asset



(b) Accessing a shared asset



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

User Interface Vulnerabilities



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
User Interface Vulnerabilities

- ◆ Resilient to Phishing
 - ◆ a major benefit of password managers
 - ◆ detects application
 - ◆ (auto-)fill the right password
- ◆ Vulnerable
 - ◆ LastPass
 - ◆ RoboForm



Logging into RoboForm

- ◆ Creates an iframe in the current web application to log in the user
- ◆ Attack
 - ◆ block the iframe
 - ◆ spoof an authentication dialog
 - ◆ steal master credentials




← → ↻ 🏠 <https://www.dropbox.com/login> ☆

RoboForm

Sign in (or create an account)

 Remember me

[Forgot your password?](#)



RoboForm Everywhere Authentication

Enter your RoboForm Everywhere User ID and Password:



User ID: 🌨

Password: 🌨

Advanced
.....

[Sign Up for RoboForm Everywhere account](#)


iframe



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
Mitigation



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
Apply Slide

- ◆ Bookmarklet Vulnerabilities
 - ◆ loads the password manager code in an iframe
 - ◆ `postMessage` with the right target
 - ◆ consider DJS (Defensive JavaScript) proposed by Karthikeyan Bhargavan
- ◆ Web Vulnerabilities
 - ◆ Content Security Policy (CSP)
 - ◆ CSRF prevention
- ◆ Authorization Vulnerabilities
 - ◆ simplify sharing logic
- ◆ UI Vulnerabilities
 - ◆ manually open a new tab



Take Homes

- ◆ Design and implement with security in mind
- ◆ Formalizing (better yet verifying) protocol pays off



Conclusions

- ◆ A wide spectrum of discovered vulnerabilities
 - ◆ logic mistakes
 - ◆ misunderstanding about the web security model
 - ◆ typical vulnerabilities like CSRF and XSS
- ◆ A single solution is unlikely
- ◆ Developing password manager entails a systematic, defense-in-depth approach



Stay Tuned.

<http://pepperword.com>

