### RSA Conference 2015

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### **Use Context to Improve Your User Identification Odds**



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VP Innovation & Emerging Technology

ForgeRock

@xmlgrrl




# We're in authentication Bizarro World



#### These have been hacked











Oh yes, of course we have two-factor authentication. We protect accounts with a password, and then if the customer forgets the password, they have to answer security questions.



#### A good case can be made that...

#### this:

Provider of trusted identity claims for your birth date, gender, and postal code:



#### ...is lower-risk than this:


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Password:



# Why were we performing authentication in the first place?









#### The Quest to Replace Passwords: A Framework for Comparative Evaluation of Web Authentication Schemes\*

Usability	Deployability	Security		
Memorywise-Effortless Scalable-for-Users Nothing-to-Carry Physically-Effortless Easy-to-Learn Efficient-to-Use Infrequent-Errors Easy-Recovery-from-Loss	Accessible Negligible-Cost-per-User Server-Compatible Browser-Compatible Mature Non-Proprietary	Resilient-to-Physical-Observation Resilient-to-Targeted-Impersonation Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing Resilient-to-Unthrottled-Guessing Resilient-to-Internal-Observation Resilient-to-Phishing Resilient-to-Theft No-Trusted-Third-Party Requiring-Explicit-Consent		


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
## But we're making the tradeoffs all wrong



Customer experiences often suffer from dismal security and usability











### The three pigs wishes billy goats gruff factors









### Regulations tend to be backwards-looking

**NIST Special Publication 800-63-2** 

### **Electronic Authentication Guideline**

Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council




3501 Fairfax Drive Room B7081a Arlington, VA 22226-3550 (703) 516-5588 FAX (703) 562-6446 http://www.ffiec.gov


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
**Authentication in an Internet Banking Environment** 

### Context has become a fourth "factor": everything you are observed to do
























A research project of the Electronic Frontier Foundation

### Panopticlick

How Unique ■ – and Trackable – Is Your Browser?


Is your browser configuration rare or unique? If so, web sites may be able to track you, even if you limit or disable cookies.

Panopticlick tests your browser to see how unique it is based on the <u>information</u> it will share with sites it visits. Click below and you will be given a uniqueness score, letting you see how easily identifiable you might be as you surf the web.

Only anonymous data will be collected by this site.







Identification is about more than authentication "factors"

### Authentication has always needed other elements too










## What are the benefits of the contextual approach? You can...

#RSAC

- Mobile-fuel your digital transformation
- Provide immediate personalization with privacy and risk backstops
- Save annoying security interactions for higher-risk transactions
- Enable progressive, finer-grained authorization
- Tune your risk exposure through policy



...but it doesn't have to be a zero-sum game



Bring responsive design to authentication

## Maximize your success by assessing your scenarios' unique aspects



Phase	Goal	Potential tasks	Upside potential vs. downside risk	
Initial approach	Create record, issue credential	Register, verify, link, set attributes	New relationship and upsell vs. identity theft	
Front door	ront door		Routine transaction vs. fraud	
High-risk transaction		Step up authentication/che ck attributes	High-risk/reward transaction vs. high-level fraud	
In-session	Prevent takeover	Various	Convenience of long session vs. sophisticated attack	
Lost credential	Prevent takeover	High-risk + Initial approach	Reestablished relationship vs. high-level fraud and identity theft	




## Taking it home



#### Apply what you've learned today

- If your organization has lost sight of the identification forest for the authentication trees...
- Next week, document your concerns you know what they are!
- Next month, research ways to fix them and reach out to your business (or operational) counterparts
  - ♦ See <u>The Quest to Replace Passwords</u>
- Within three months, pick the lowest hanging fruit for pilots that leverage context



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