clang API Documentation

MallocOverflowSecurityChecker.cpp
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00001 // MallocOverflowSecurityChecker.cpp - Check for malloc overflows -*- C++ -*-=//
00002 //
00003 //                     The LLVM Compiler Infrastructure
00004 //
00005 // This file is distributed under the University of Illinois Open Source
00006 // License. See LICENSE.TXT for details.
00007 //
00008 //===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
00009 //
00010 // This checker detects a common memory allocation security flaw.
00011 // Suppose 'unsigned int n' comes from an untrusted source. If the
00012 // code looks like 'malloc (n * 4)', and an attacker can make 'n' be
00013 // say MAX_UINT/4+2, then instead of allocating the correct 'n' 4-byte
00014 // elements, this will actually allocate only two because of overflow.
00015 // Then when the rest of the program attempts to store values past the
00016 // second element, these values will actually overwrite other items in
00017 // the heap, probably allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary code.
00018 //
00019 //===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
00020 
00021 #include "ClangSACheckers.h"
00022 #include "clang/AST/EvaluatedExprVisitor.h"
00023 #include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Core/BugReporter/BugReporter.h"
00024 #include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Core/Checker.h"
00025 #include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Core/PathSensitive/AnalysisManager.h"
00026 #include "llvm/ADT/SmallVector.h"
00027 
00028 using namespace clang;
00029 using namespace ento;
00030 
00031 namespace {
00032 struct MallocOverflowCheck {
00033   const BinaryOperator *mulop;
00034   const Expr *variable;
00035 
00036   MallocOverflowCheck (const BinaryOperator *m, const Expr *v) 
00037     : mulop(m), variable (v)
00038   {}
00039 };
00040 
00041 class MallocOverflowSecurityChecker : public Checker<check::ASTCodeBody> {
00042 public:
00043   void checkASTCodeBody(const Decl *D, AnalysisManager &mgr,
00044                         BugReporter &BR) const;
00045 
00046   void CheckMallocArgument(
00047     SmallVectorImpl<MallocOverflowCheck> &PossibleMallocOverflows,
00048     const Expr *TheArgument, ASTContext &Context) const;
00049 
00050   void OutputPossibleOverflows(
00051     SmallVectorImpl<MallocOverflowCheck> &PossibleMallocOverflows,
00052     const Decl *D, BugReporter &BR, AnalysisManager &mgr) const;
00053 
00054 };
00055 } // end anonymous namespace
00056 
00057 void MallocOverflowSecurityChecker::CheckMallocArgument(
00058   SmallVectorImpl<MallocOverflowCheck> &PossibleMallocOverflows,
00059   const Expr *TheArgument,
00060   ASTContext &Context) const {
00061 
00062   /* Look for a linear combination with a single variable, and at least
00063    one multiplication.
00064    Reject anything that applies to the variable: an explicit cast,
00065    conditional expression, an operation that could reduce the range
00066    of the result, or anything too complicated :-).  */
00067   const Expr * e = TheArgument;
00068   const BinaryOperator * mulop = nullptr;
00069 
00070   for (;;) {
00071     e = e->IgnoreParenImpCasts();
00072     if (isa<BinaryOperator>(e)) {
00073       const BinaryOperator * binop = dyn_cast<BinaryOperator>(e);
00074       BinaryOperatorKind opc = binop->getOpcode();
00075       // TODO: ignore multiplications by 1, reject if multiplied by 0.
00076       if (mulop == nullptr && opc == BO_Mul)
00077         mulop = binop;
00078       if (opc != BO_Mul && opc != BO_Add && opc != BO_Sub && opc != BO_Shl)
00079         return;
00080 
00081       const Expr *lhs = binop->getLHS();
00082       const Expr *rhs = binop->getRHS();
00083       if (rhs->isEvaluatable(Context))
00084         e = lhs;
00085       else if ((opc == BO_Add || opc == BO_Mul)
00086                && lhs->isEvaluatable(Context))
00087         e = rhs;
00088       else
00089         return;
00090     }
00091     else if (isa<DeclRefExpr>(e) || isa<MemberExpr>(e))
00092       break;
00093     else
00094       return;
00095   }
00096 
00097   if (mulop == nullptr)
00098     return;
00099 
00100   //  We've found the right structure of malloc argument, now save
00101   // the data so when the body of the function is completely available
00102   // we can check for comparisons.
00103 
00104   // TODO: Could push this into the innermost scope where 'e' is
00105   // defined, rather than the whole function.
00106   PossibleMallocOverflows.push_back(MallocOverflowCheck(mulop, e));
00107 }
00108 
00109 namespace {
00110 // A worker class for OutputPossibleOverflows.
00111 class CheckOverflowOps :
00112   public EvaluatedExprVisitor<CheckOverflowOps> {
00113 public:
00114   typedef SmallVectorImpl<MallocOverflowCheck> theVecType;
00115 
00116 private:
00117     theVecType &toScanFor;
00118     ASTContext &Context;
00119 
00120     bool isIntZeroExpr(const Expr *E) const {
00121       if (!E->getType()->isIntegralOrEnumerationType())
00122         return false;
00123       llvm::APSInt Result;
00124       if (E->EvaluateAsInt(Result, Context))
00125         return Result == 0;
00126       return false;
00127     }
00128 
00129     void CheckExpr(const Expr *E_p) {
00130       const Expr *E = E_p->IgnoreParenImpCasts();
00131 
00132       theVecType::iterator i = toScanFor.end();
00133       theVecType::iterator e = toScanFor.begin();
00134 
00135       if (const DeclRefExpr *DR = dyn_cast<DeclRefExpr>(E)) {
00136         const Decl * EdreD = DR->getDecl();
00137         while (i != e) {
00138           --i;
00139           if (const DeclRefExpr *DR_i = dyn_cast<DeclRefExpr>(i->variable)) {
00140             if (DR_i->getDecl() == EdreD)
00141               i = toScanFor.erase(i);
00142           }
00143         }
00144       }
00145       else if (isa<MemberExpr>(E)) {
00146         // No points-to analysis, just look at the member
00147         const Decl * EmeMD = dyn_cast<MemberExpr>(E)->getMemberDecl();
00148         while (i != e) {
00149           --i;
00150           if (isa<MemberExpr>(i->variable)) {
00151             if (dyn_cast<MemberExpr>(i->variable)->getMemberDecl() == EmeMD)
00152               i = toScanFor.erase (i);
00153           }
00154         }
00155       }
00156     }
00157 
00158   public:
00159     void VisitBinaryOperator(BinaryOperator *E) {
00160       if (E->isComparisonOp()) {
00161         const Expr * lhs = E->getLHS();
00162         const Expr * rhs = E->getRHS();
00163         // Ignore comparisons against zero, since they generally don't
00164         // protect against an overflow.
00165         if (!isIntZeroExpr(lhs) && ! isIntZeroExpr(rhs)) {
00166           CheckExpr(lhs);
00167           CheckExpr(rhs);
00168         }
00169       }
00170       EvaluatedExprVisitor<CheckOverflowOps>::VisitBinaryOperator(E);
00171     }
00172 
00173     /* We specifically ignore loop conditions, because they're typically
00174      not error checks.  */
00175     void VisitWhileStmt(WhileStmt *S) {
00176       return this->Visit(S->getBody());
00177     }
00178     void VisitForStmt(ForStmt *S) {
00179       return this->Visit(S->getBody());
00180     }
00181     void VisitDoStmt(DoStmt *S) {
00182       return this->Visit(S->getBody());
00183     }
00184 
00185     CheckOverflowOps(theVecType &v, ASTContext &ctx)
00186     : EvaluatedExprVisitor<CheckOverflowOps>(ctx),
00187       toScanFor(v), Context(ctx)
00188     { }
00189   };
00190 }
00191 
00192 // OutputPossibleOverflows - We've found a possible overflow earlier,
00193 // now check whether Body might contain a comparison which might be
00194 // preventing the overflow.
00195 // This doesn't do flow analysis, range analysis, or points-to analysis; it's
00196 // just a dumb "is there a comparison" scan.  The aim here is to
00197 // detect the most blatent cases of overflow and educate the
00198 // programmer.
00199 void MallocOverflowSecurityChecker::OutputPossibleOverflows(
00200   SmallVectorImpl<MallocOverflowCheck> &PossibleMallocOverflows,
00201   const Decl *D, BugReporter &BR, AnalysisManager &mgr) const {
00202   // By far the most common case: nothing to check.
00203   if (PossibleMallocOverflows.empty())
00204     return;
00205 
00206   // Delete any possible overflows which have a comparison.
00207   CheckOverflowOps c(PossibleMallocOverflows, BR.getContext());
00208   c.Visit(mgr.getAnalysisDeclContext(D)->getBody());
00209 
00210   // Output warnings for all overflows that are left.
00211   for (CheckOverflowOps::theVecType::iterator
00212        i = PossibleMallocOverflows.begin(),
00213        e = PossibleMallocOverflows.end();
00214        i != e;
00215        ++i) {
00216     BR.EmitBasicReport(
00217         D, this, "malloc() size overflow", categories::UnixAPI,
00218         "the computation of the size of the memory allocation may overflow",
00219         PathDiagnosticLocation::createOperatorLoc(i->mulop,
00220                                                   BR.getSourceManager()),
00221         i->mulop->getSourceRange());
00222   }
00223 }
00224 
00225 void MallocOverflowSecurityChecker::checkASTCodeBody(const Decl *D,
00226                                              AnalysisManager &mgr,
00227                                              BugReporter &BR) const {
00228 
00229   CFG *cfg = mgr.getCFG(D);
00230   if (!cfg)
00231     return;
00232 
00233   // A list of variables referenced in possibly overflowing malloc operands.
00234   SmallVector<MallocOverflowCheck, 2> PossibleMallocOverflows;
00235 
00236   for (CFG::iterator it = cfg->begin(), ei = cfg->end(); it != ei; ++it) {
00237     CFGBlock *block = *it;
00238     for (CFGBlock::iterator bi = block->begin(), be = block->end();
00239          bi != be; ++bi) {
00240       if (Optional<CFGStmt> CS = bi->getAs<CFGStmt>()) {
00241         if (const CallExpr *TheCall = dyn_cast<CallExpr>(CS->getStmt())) {
00242           // Get the callee.
00243           const FunctionDecl *FD = TheCall->getDirectCallee();
00244 
00245           if (!FD)
00246             return;
00247 
00248           // Get the name of the callee. If it's a builtin, strip off the prefix.
00249           IdentifierInfo *FnInfo = FD->getIdentifier();
00250           if (!FnInfo)
00251             return;
00252 
00253           if (FnInfo->isStr ("malloc") || FnInfo->isStr ("_MALLOC")) {
00254             if (TheCall->getNumArgs() == 1)
00255               CheckMallocArgument(PossibleMallocOverflows, TheCall->getArg(0),
00256                                   mgr.getASTContext());
00257           }
00258         }
00259       }
00260     }
00261   }
00262 
00263   OutputPossibleOverflows(PossibleMallocOverflows, D, BR, mgr);
00264 }
00265 
00266 void
00267 ento::registerMallocOverflowSecurityChecker(CheckerManager &mgr) {
00268   mgr.registerChecker<MallocOverflowSecurityChecker>();
00269 }