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syncookies.c
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1 /*
2  * Syncookies implementation for the Linux kernel
3  *
4  * Copyright (C) 1997 Andi Kleen
5  * Based on ideas by D.J.Bernstein and Eric Schenk.
6  *
7  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
8  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
9  * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
10  * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
11  */
12 
13 #include <linux/tcp.h>
14 #include <linux/slab.h>
15 #include <linux/random.h>
16 #include <linux/cryptohash.h>
17 #include <linux/kernel.h>
18 #include <linux/export.h>
19 #include <net/tcp.h>
20 #include <net/route.h>
21 
22 /* Timestamps: lowest bits store TCP options */
23 #define TSBITS 6
24 #define TSMASK (((__u32)1 << TSBITS) - 1)
25 
26 extern int sysctl_tcp_syncookies;
27 
30 
31 static __init int init_syncookies(void)
32 {
34  return 0;
35 }
36 __initcall(init_syncookies);
37 
38 #define COOKIEBITS 24 /* Upper bits store count */
39 #define COOKIEMASK (((__u32)1 << COOKIEBITS) - 1)
40 
41 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [16 + 5 + SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS],
42  ipv4_cookie_scratch);
43 
44 static u32 cookie_hash(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport, __be16 dport,
45  u32 count, int c)
46 {
47  __u32 *tmp = __get_cpu_var(ipv4_cookie_scratch);
48 
49  memcpy(tmp + 4, syncookie_secret[c], sizeof(syncookie_secret[c]));
50  tmp[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
51  tmp[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
52  tmp[2] = ((__force u32)sport << 16) + (__force u32)dport;
53  tmp[3] = count;
54  sha_transform(tmp + 16, (__u8 *)tmp, tmp + 16 + 5);
55 
56  return tmp[17];
57 }
58 
59 
60 /*
61  * when syncookies are in effect and tcp timestamps are enabled we encode
62  * tcp options in the lower bits of the timestamp value that will be
63  * sent in the syn-ack.
64  * Since subsequent timestamps use the normal tcp_time_stamp value, we
65  * must make sure that the resulting initial timestamp is <= tcp_time_stamp.
66  */
68 {
69  struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
70  u32 ts, ts_now = tcp_time_stamp;
71  u32 options = 0;
72 
73  ireq = inet_rsk(req);
74 
75  options = ireq->wscale_ok ? ireq->snd_wscale : 0xf;
76  options |= ireq->sack_ok << 4;
77  options |= ireq->ecn_ok << 5;
78 
79  ts = ts_now & ~TSMASK;
80  ts |= options;
81  if (ts > ts_now) {
82  ts >>= TSBITS;
83  ts--;
84  ts <<= TSBITS;
85  ts |= options;
86  }
87  return ts;
88 }
89 
90 
91 static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport,
92  __be16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 count,
93  __u32 data)
94 {
95  /*
96  * Compute the secure sequence number.
97  * The output should be:
98  * HASH(sec1,saddr,sport,daddr,dport,sec1) + sseq + (count * 2^24)
99  * + (HASH(sec2,saddr,sport,daddr,dport,count,sec2) % 2^24).
100  * Where sseq is their sequence number and count increases every
101  * minute by 1.
102  * As an extra hack, we add a small "data" value that encodes the
103  * MSS into the second hash value.
104  */
105 
106  return (cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) +
107  sseq + (count << COOKIEBITS) +
108  ((cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count, 1) + data)
109  & COOKIEMASK));
110 }
111 
112 /*
113  * This retrieves the small "data" value from the syncookie.
114  * If the syncookie is bad, the data returned will be out of
115  * range. This must be checked by the caller.
116  *
117  * The count value used to generate the cookie must be within
118  * "maxdiff" if the current (passed-in) "count". The return value
119  * is (__u32)-1 if this test fails.
120  */
121 static __u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie, __be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
122  __be16 sport, __be16 dport, __u32 sseq,
123  __u32 count, __u32 maxdiff)
124 {
125  __u32 diff;
126 
127  /* Strip away the layers from the cookie */
128  cookie -= cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) + sseq;
129 
130  /* Cookie is now reduced to (count * 2^24) ^ (hash % 2^24) */
131  diff = (count - (cookie >> COOKIEBITS)) & ((__u32) - 1 >> COOKIEBITS);
132  if (diff >= maxdiff)
133  return (__u32)-1;
134 
135  return (cookie -
136  cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count - diff, 1))
137  & COOKIEMASK; /* Leaving the data behind */
138 }
139 
140 /*
141  * MSS Values are taken from the 2009 paper
142  * 'Measuring TCP Maximum Segment Size' by S. Alcock and R. Nelson:
143  * - values 1440 to 1460 accounted for 80% of observed mss values
144  * - values outside the 536-1460 range are rare (<0.2%).
145  *
146  * Table must be sorted.
147  */
148 static __u16 const msstab[] = {
149  64,
150  512,
151  536,
152  1024,
153  1440,
154  1460,
155  4312,
156  8960,
157 };
158 
159 /*
160  * Generate a syncookie. mssp points to the mss, which is returned
161  * rounded down to the value encoded in the cookie.
162  */
164 {
165  const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
166  const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
167  int mssind;
168  const __u16 mss = *mssp;
169 
170  tcp_synq_overflow(sk);
171 
172  for (mssind = ARRAY_SIZE(msstab) - 1; mssind ; mssind--)
173  if (mss >= msstab[mssind])
174  break;
175  *mssp = msstab[mssind];
176 
178 
179  return secure_tcp_syn_cookie(iph->saddr, iph->daddr,
180  th->source, th->dest, ntohl(th->seq),
181  jiffies / (HZ * 60), mssind);
182 }
183 
184 /*
185  * This (misnamed) value is the age of syncookie which is permitted.
186  * Its ideal value should be dependent on TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT and
187  * sysctl_tcp_retries1. It's a rather complicated formula (exponential
188  * backoff) to compute at runtime so it's currently hardcoded here.
189  */
190 #define COUNTER_TRIES 4
191 /*
192  * Check if a ack sequence number is a valid syncookie.
193  * Return the decoded mss if it is, or 0 if not.
194  */
195 static inline int cookie_check(struct sk_buff *skb, __u32 cookie)
196 {
197  const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
198  const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
199  __u32 seq = ntohl(th->seq) - 1;
200  __u32 mssind = check_tcp_syn_cookie(cookie, iph->saddr, iph->daddr,
201  th->source, th->dest, seq,
202  jiffies / (HZ * 60),
203  COUNTER_TRIES);
204 
205  return mssind < ARRAY_SIZE(msstab) ? msstab[mssind] : 0;
206 }
207 
208 static inline struct sock *get_cookie_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
209  struct request_sock *req,
210  struct dst_entry *dst)
211 {
212  struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
213  struct sock *child;
214 
215  child = icsk->icsk_af_ops->syn_recv_sock(sk, skb, req, dst);
216  if (child)
217  inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(sk, req, child);
218  else
219  reqsk_free(req);
220 
221  return child;
222 }
223 
224 
225 /*
226  * when syncookies are in effect and tcp timestamps are enabled we stored
227  * additional tcp options in the timestamp.
228  * This extracts these options from the timestamp echo.
229  *
230  * The lowest 4 bits store snd_wscale.
231  * next 2 bits indicate SACK and ECN support.
232  *
233  * return false if we decode an option that should not be.
234  */
235 bool cookie_check_timestamp(struct tcp_options_received *tcp_opt, bool *ecn_ok)
236 {
237  /* echoed timestamp, lowest bits contain options */
238  u32 options = tcp_opt->rcv_tsecr & TSMASK;
239 
240  if (!tcp_opt->saw_tstamp) {
241  tcp_clear_options(tcp_opt);
242  return true;
243  }
244 
246  return false;
247 
248  tcp_opt->sack_ok = (options & (1 << 4)) ? TCP_SACK_SEEN : 0;
249  *ecn_ok = (options >> 5) & 1;
250  if (*ecn_ok && !sysctl_tcp_ecn)
251  return false;
252 
253  if (tcp_opt->sack_ok && !sysctl_tcp_sack)
254  return false;
255 
256  if ((options & 0xf) == 0xf)
257  return true; /* no window scaling */
258 
259  tcp_opt->wscale_ok = 1;
260  tcp_opt->snd_wscale = options & 0xf;
261  return sysctl_tcp_window_scaling != 0;
262 }
264 
265 struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
266  struct ip_options *opt)
267 {
268  struct tcp_options_received tcp_opt;
269  const u8 *hash_location;
270  struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
271  struct tcp_request_sock *treq;
272  struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
273  const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
274  __u32 cookie = ntohl(th->ack_seq) - 1;
275  struct sock *ret = sk;
276  struct request_sock *req;
277  int mss;
278  struct rtable *rt;
279  __u8 rcv_wscale;
280  bool ecn_ok = false;
281  struct flowi4 fl4;
282 
283  if (!sysctl_tcp_syncookies || !th->ack || th->rst)
284  goto out;
285 
286  if (tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow(sk) ||
287  (mss = cookie_check(skb, cookie)) == 0) {
289  goto out;
290  }
291 
293 
294  /* check for timestamp cookie support */
295  memset(&tcp_opt, 0, sizeof(tcp_opt));
296  tcp_parse_options(skb, &tcp_opt, &hash_location, 0, NULL);
297 
298  if (!cookie_check_timestamp(&tcp_opt, &ecn_ok))
299  goto out;
300 
301  ret = NULL;
302  req = inet_reqsk_alloc(&tcp_request_sock_ops); /* for safety */
303  if (!req)
304  goto out;
305 
306  ireq = inet_rsk(req);
307  treq = tcp_rsk(req);
308  treq->rcv_isn = ntohl(th->seq) - 1;
309  treq->snt_isn = cookie;
310  req->mss = mss;
311  ireq->loc_port = th->dest;
312  ireq->rmt_port = th->source;
313  ireq->loc_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->daddr;
314  ireq->rmt_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
315  ireq->ecn_ok = ecn_ok;
316  ireq->snd_wscale = tcp_opt.snd_wscale;
317  ireq->sack_ok = tcp_opt.sack_ok;
318  ireq->wscale_ok = tcp_opt.wscale_ok;
319  ireq->tstamp_ok = tcp_opt.saw_tstamp;
320  req->ts_recent = tcp_opt.saw_tstamp ? tcp_opt.rcv_tsval : 0;
321  treq->snt_synack = tcp_opt.saw_tstamp ? tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr : 0;
322  treq->listener = NULL;
323 
324  /* We throwed the options of the initial SYN away, so we hope
325  * the ACK carries the same options again (see RFC1122 4.2.3.8)
326  */
327  if (opt && opt->optlen) {
328  int opt_size = sizeof(struct ip_options_rcu) + opt->optlen;
329 
330  ireq->opt = kmalloc(opt_size, GFP_ATOMIC);
331  if (ireq->opt != NULL && ip_options_echo(&ireq->opt->opt, skb)) {
332  kfree(ireq->opt);
333  ireq->opt = NULL;
334  }
335  }
336 
337  if (security_inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req)) {
338  reqsk_free(req);
339  goto out;
340  }
341 
342  req->expires = 0UL;
343  req->retrans = 0;
344 
345  /*
346  * We need to lookup the route here to get at the correct
347  * window size. We should better make sure that the window size
348  * hasn't changed since we received the original syn, but I see
349  * no easy way to do this.
350  */
351  flowi4_init_output(&fl4, 0, sk->sk_mark, RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk),
353  inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk),
354  (opt && opt->srr) ? opt->faddr : ireq->rmt_addr,
355  ireq->loc_addr, th->source, th->dest);
356  security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4));
357  rt = ip_route_output_key(sock_net(sk), &fl4);
358  if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
359  reqsk_free(req);
360  goto out;
361  }
362 
363  /* Try to redo what tcp_v4_send_synack did. */
364  req->window_clamp = tp->window_clamp ? :dst_metric(&rt->dst, RTAX_WINDOW);
365 
366  tcp_select_initial_window(tcp_full_space(sk), req->mss,
367  &req->rcv_wnd, &req->window_clamp,
368  ireq->wscale_ok, &rcv_wscale,
369  dst_metric(&rt->dst, RTAX_INITRWND));
370 
371  ireq->rcv_wscale = rcv_wscale;
372 
373  ret = get_cookie_sock(sk, skb, req, &rt->dst);
374  /* ip_queue_xmit() depends on our flow being setup
375  * Normal sockets get it right from inet_csk_route_child_sock()
376  */
377  if (ret)
378  inet_sk(ret)->cork.fl.u.ip4 = fl4;
379 out: return ret;
380 }