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s3_srvr.c
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1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young ([email protected])
3  * All rights reserved.
4  *
5  * This package is an SSL implementation written
6  * by Eric Young ([email protected]).
7  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8  *
9  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10  * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson ([email protected]).
15  *
16  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17  * the code are not to be removed.
18  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22  *
23  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25  * are met:
26  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27  * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29  * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30  * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32  * must display the following acknowledgement:
33  * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34  * Eric Young ([email protected])"
35  * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36  * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38  * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39  * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson ([email protected])"
40  *
41  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44  * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51  * SUCH DAMAGE.
52  *
53  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54  * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55  * copied and put under another distribution licence
56  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57  */
58 /* ====================================================================
59  * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60  *
61  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63  * are met:
64  *
65  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66  * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67  *
68  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69  * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70  * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71  * distribution.
72  *
73  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74  * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75  * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76  * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77  *
78  * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79  * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80  * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81  * [email protected].
82  *
83  * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84  * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85  * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86  *
87  * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88  * acknowledgment:
89  * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90  * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91  *
92  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93  * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95  * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96  * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97  * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98  * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99  * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101  * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102  * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103  * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104  * ====================================================================
105  *
106  * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107  * ([email protected]). This product includes software written by Tim
108  * Hudson ([email protected]).
109  *
110  */
111 /* ====================================================================
112  * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113  *
114  * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115  * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116  *
117  * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118  * license provided above.
119  *
120  * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121  * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122  *
123  */
124 /* ====================================================================
125  * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126  *
127  * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128  * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
129  * license.
130  *
131  * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132  * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133  * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134  *
135  * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136  * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137  * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138  *
139  * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140  * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141  * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142  * to make use of the Contribution.
143  *
144  * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145  * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146  * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147  * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
148  * OTHERWISE.
149  */
150 
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
153 
154 #include <stdio.h>
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
165 #endif
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
169 #endif
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
171 
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
173 
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
175  {
176  if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177  return(SSLv3_server_method());
178  else
179  return(NULL);
180  }
181 
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
184  {
185  int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
186 
187  *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
188 
189  if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190  (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
191  {
192  if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
193  {
194  /* There isn't any srp login extension !!! */
195  ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
196  *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
197  }
198  else
199  {
200  ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
201  }
202  }
203  return ret;
204  }
205 #endif
206 
207 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
208  ssl3_accept,
209  ssl_undefined_function,
210  ssl3_get_server_method)
211 
212 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
213  {
214  BUF_MEM *buf;
215  unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
216  void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
217  int ret= -1;
218  int new_state,state,skip=0;
219 
220  RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
221  ERR_clear_error();
222  clear_sys_error();
223 
224  if (s->info_callback != NULL)
225  cb=s->info_callback;
226  else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
227  cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
228 
229  /* init things to blank */
230  s->in_handshake++;
231  if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
232 
233  if (s->cert == NULL)
234  {
235  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
236  return(-1);
237  }
238 
239 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
240  /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
241  * already got and don't await it anymore, because
242  * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
243  */
244  if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
245  {
246  s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
247  s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
248  }
249 #endif
250 
251  for (;;)
252  {
253  state=s->state;
254 
255  switch (s->state)
256  {
257  case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
258  s->renegotiate=1;
259  /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
260 
261  case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
262  case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
263  case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
264  case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 
266  s->server=1;
267  if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
268 
269  if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
270  {
271  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
272  return -1;
273  }
274  s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
275 
276  if (s->init_buf == NULL)
277  {
278  if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
279  {
280  ret= -1;
281  goto end;
282  }
283  if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
284  {
285  ret= -1;
286  goto end;
287  }
288  s->init_buf=buf;
289  }
290 
291  if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
292  {
293  ret= -1;
294  goto end;
295  }
296 
297  s->init_num=0;
298  s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
299 
300  if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
301  {
302  /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
303  * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
304  */
305  if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
306 
307  ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
308  s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
309  s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
310  }
311  else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
312  !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
313  {
314  /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
315  * client that doesn't support secure
316  * renegotiation.
317  */
318  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
319  ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
320  ret = -1;
321  goto end;
322  }
323  else
324  {
325  /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
326  * we will just send a HelloRequest */
327  s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
328  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
329  }
330  break;
331 
332  case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
333  case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
334 
335  s->shutdown=0;
336  ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
337  if (ret <= 0) goto end;
338  s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
339  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
340  s->init_num=0;
341 
342  ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
343  break;
344 
345  case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
346  s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
347  break;
348 
349  case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
350  case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
351  case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
352 
353  s->shutdown=0;
354  if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
355  {
356  ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
357  if (ret <= 0) goto end;
358  }
359 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
360  {
361  int al;
362  if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
363  {
364  /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
365  s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
366  goto end;
367  }
368  if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
369  {
370  ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
371  /* This is not really an error but the only means to
372  for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
373  if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
374  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
375  ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
376  ret= -1;
377  goto end;
378  }
379  }
380 #endif
381  s->renegotiate = 2;
382  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
383  s->init_num=0;
384  break;
385 
386  case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
387  case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
388  ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
389  if (ret <= 0) goto end;
390 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
391  if (s->hit)
392  {
393  if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
394  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
395  else
396  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
397  }
398 #else
399  if (s->hit)
400  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
401 #endif
402  else
403  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
404  s->init_num=0;
405  break;
406 
407  case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
408  case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
409  /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
410  /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
411  if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
412  && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
413  && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
414  {
415  ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
416  if (ret <= 0) goto end;
417 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
418  if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
419  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
420  else
421  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
422  }
423  else
424  {
425  skip = 1;
426  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
427  }
428 #else
429  }
430  else
431  skip=1;
432 
433  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
434 #endif
435  s->init_num=0;
436  break;
437 
438  case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
439  case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
440  alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
441 
442  /* clear this, it may get reset by
443  * send_server_key_exchange */
444  if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
445 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
446  && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
447 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
448  )
449  /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
450  * even when forbidden by protocol specs
451  * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
452  * be able to handle this) */
453  s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
454  else
455  s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
456 
457 
458  /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
459  * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
460  *
461  * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
462  *
463  * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
464  * message only if the cipher suite is either
465  * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
466  * server certificate contains the server's
467  * public key for key exchange.
468  */
469  if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
470  /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
471  * hint if provided */
472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
473  || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
474 #endif
475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
476  /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
477  || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
478 #endif
479  || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
480  || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
481  || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
482  && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
483  || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
484  && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
485  )
486  )
487  )
488  )
489  {
490  ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
491  if (ret <= 0) goto end;
492  }
493  else
494  skip=1;
495 
496  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
497  s->init_num=0;
498  break;
499 
500  case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
501  case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
502  if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
503  !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
504  /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
505  * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
506  ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
507  (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
508  /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
509  * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
510  * and in RFC 2246): */
511  ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
512  /* ... except when the application insists on verification
513  * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
514  !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
515  /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
516  (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
517  /* With normal PSK Certificates and
518  * Certificate Requests are omitted */
519  || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
520  {
521  /* no cert request */
522  skip=1;
523  s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
524  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
525  if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
526  if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
527  return -1;
528  }
529  else
530  {
531  s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
532  ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
533  if (ret <= 0) goto end;
534 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
535  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
536 #else
537  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
538  s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
539 #endif
540  s->init_num=0;
541  }
542  break;
543 
544  case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
545  case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
546  ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
547  if (ret <= 0) goto end;
548  s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
549  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
550  s->init_num=0;
551  break;
552 
553  case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
554 
555  /* This code originally checked to see if
556  * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
557  * and then flushed. This caused problems
558  * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
559  * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
560  * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
561  * still exist. So instead we just flush
562  * unconditionally.
563  */
564 
565  s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
566  if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
567  {
568  ret= -1;
569  goto end;
570  }
571  s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
572 
573  s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
574  break;
575 
576  case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
577  case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
578  /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
579  ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
580  if (ret <= 0)
581  goto end;
582  if (ret == 2)
583  s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
584  else {
585  if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
586  {
587  ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
588  if (ret <= 0) goto end;
589  }
590  s->init_num=0;
591  s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
592  }
593  break;
594 
595  case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
596  case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
597  ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
598  if (ret <= 0)
599  goto end;
600  if (ret == 2)
601  {
602  /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
603  * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
604  * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
605  * message is not sent.
606  * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
607  * the client uses its key from the certificate
608  * for key exchange.
609  */
610 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
611  s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
612 #else
613  if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
614  s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
615  else
616  s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
617 #endif
618  s->init_num = 0;
619  }
620  else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
621  {
622  s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
623  s->init_num=0;
624  if (!s->session->peer)
625  break;
626  /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
627  * at this point and digest cached records.
628  */
629  if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
630  {
631  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
632  return -1;
633  }
634  s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
635  if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
636  return -1;
637  }
638  else
639  {
640  int offset=0;
641  int dgst_num;
642 
643  s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
644  s->init_num=0;
645 
646  /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
647  * a client cert, it can be verified
648  * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
649  * should be generalized. But it is next step
650  */
651  if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
652  if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
653  return -1;
654  for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
655  if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
656  {
657  int dgst_size;
658 
659  s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
660  dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
661  if (dgst_size < 0)
662  {
663  ret = -1;
664  goto end;
665  }
666  offset+=dgst_size;
667  }
668  }
669  break;
670 
671  case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
672  case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
673 
674  /* we should decide if we expected this one */
675  ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
676  if (ret <= 0) goto end;
677 
678 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
679  s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
680 #else
681  if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
682  s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
683  else
684  s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
685 #endif
686  s->init_num=0;
687  break;
688 
689 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
690  case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
691  case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
692  ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
693  if (ret <= 0) goto end;
694  s->init_num = 0;
695  s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
696  break;
697 #endif
698 
699  case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
700  case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
701  ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
702  SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
703  if (ret <= 0) goto end;
704  if (s->hit)
705  s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
706 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
707  else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
708  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
709 #endif
710  else
711  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
712  s->init_num=0;
713  break;
714 
715 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
716  case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
717  case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
718  ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
719  if (ret <= 0) goto end;
720  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
721  s->init_num=0;
722  break;
723 
724  case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
725  case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
726  ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
727  if (ret <= 0) goto end;
728  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
729  s->init_num=0;
730  break;
731 
732 #endif
733 
734  case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
735  case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
736 
737  s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
738  if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
739  { ret= -1; goto end; }
740 
741  ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
742  SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
743 
744  if (ret <= 0) goto end;
745  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
746  s->init_num=0;
747 
748  if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
749  SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
750  {
751  ret= -1;
752  goto end;
753  }
754 
755  break;
756 
757  case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
758  case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
759  ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
760  SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
761  s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
762  s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
763  if (ret <= 0) goto end;
764  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
765  if (s->hit)
766  {
767 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
768  s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
769 #else
770  if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
771  s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
772  else
773  s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
774 #endif
775  }
776  else
777  s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
778  s->init_num=0;
779  break;
780 
781  case SSL_ST_OK:
782  /* clean a few things up */
783  ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
784 
785  BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
786  s->init_buf=NULL;
787 
788  /* remove buffering on output */
789  ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
790 
791  s->init_num=0;
792 
793  if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
794  {
795  s->renegotiate=0;
796  s->new_session=0;
797 
798  ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
799 
800  s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
801  /* s->server=1; */
802  s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
803 
804  if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
805  }
806 
807  ret = 1;
808  goto end;
809  /* break; */
810 
811  default:
812  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
813  ret= -1;
814  goto end;
815  /* break; */
816  }
817 
818  if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
819  {
820  if (s->debug)
821  {
822  if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
823  goto end;
824  }
825 
826 
827  if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
828  {
829  new_state=s->state;
830  s->state=state;
831  cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
832  s->state=new_state;
833  }
834  }
835  skip=0;
836  }
837 end:
838  /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
839 
840  s->in_handshake--;
841  if (cb != NULL)
842  cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
843  return(ret);
844  }
845 
846 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
847  {
848  unsigned char *p;
849 
850  if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
851  {
852  p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
853  *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
854  *(p++)=0;
855  *(p++)=0;
856  *(p++)=0;
857 
858  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
859  /* number of bytes to write */
860  s->init_num=4;
861  s->init_off=0;
862  }
863 
864  /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
865  return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
866  }
867 
868 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
869  {
870  int ok;
871  long n;
872 
873  /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
874  * so permit appropriate message length */
875  n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
876  SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
877  SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
878  -1,
879  s->max_cert_list,
880  &ok);
881  if (!ok) return((int)n);
882  s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
883  if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
884  {
885  /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
886  * negotiation. */
887  if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
888  {
889  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
890  return -1;
891  }
892  /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
893  * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
895  if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
896  {
897  DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
898  s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
899  }
900 #endif
901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
902  if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
903  {
904  EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
905  s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
906  }
907 #endif
908  s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
909  return 2;
910  }
911  return 1;
912 }
913 
914 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
915  {
916  int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
917  unsigned int cookie_len;
918  long n;
919  unsigned long id;
920  unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
921  SSL_CIPHER *c;
922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
923  SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
924 #endif
925  STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
926 
927  /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
928  * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
929  * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
930  * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
931  * TLSv1.
932  */
933  if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
934  )
935  {
936  s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
937  }
938  s->first_packet=1;
939  n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
940  SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
941  SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
942  SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
943  SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
944  &ok);
945 
946  if (!ok) return((int)n);
947  s->first_packet=0;
948  d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
949 
950  /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
951  * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
952  s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
953  p+=2;
954 
955  if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
956  (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
957  {
958  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
959  if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
960  {
961  /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
962  s->version = s->client_version;
963  }
964  al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
965  goto f_err;
966  }
967 
968  /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
969  * contain one, just return since we do not want to
970  * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
971  */
972  if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
973  {
974  unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
975 
976  session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
977  cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
978 
979  if (cookie_length == 0)
980  return 1;
981  }
982 
983  /* load the client random */
984  memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
985  p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
986 
987  /* get the session-id */
988  j= *(p++);
989 
990  s->hit=0;
991  /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
992  * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
993  * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
994  * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
995  * won't even compile against older library versions).
996  *
997  * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
998  * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
999  * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1000  * setting will be ignored.
1001  */
1002  if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1003  {
1004  if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1005  goto err;
1006  }
1007  else
1008  {
1009  i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1010  if (i == 1)
1011  { /* previous session */
1012  s->hit=1;
1013  }
1014  else if (i == -1)
1015  goto err;
1016  else /* i == 0 */
1017  {
1018  if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1019  goto err;
1020  }
1021  }
1022 
1023  p+=j;
1024 
1025  if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1026  {
1027  /* cookie stuff */
1028  cookie_len = *(p++);
1029 
1030  /*
1031  * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1032  * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1033  * does not cause an overflow.
1034  */
1035  if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1036  {
1037  /* too much data */
1038  al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1039  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1040  goto f_err;
1041  }
1042 
1043  /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1044  if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1045  cookie_len > 0)
1046  {
1047  memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1048 
1049  if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1050  {
1051  if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1052  cookie_len) == 0)
1053  {
1054  al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1055  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1056  SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1057  goto f_err;
1058  }
1059  /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1060  }
1061  else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1062  s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1063  {
1064  al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1065  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1066  SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1067  goto f_err;
1068  }
1069 
1070  ret = 2;
1071  }
1072 
1073  p += cookie_len;
1074  }
1075 
1076  n2s(p,i);
1077  if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1078  {
1079  /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1080  al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1081  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1082  goto f_err;
1083  }
1084  if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
1085  {
1086  /* not enough data */
1087  al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1088  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1089  goto f_err;
1090  }
1091  if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1092  == NULL))
1093  {
1094  goto err;
1095  }
1096  p+=i;
1097 
1098  /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1099  if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1100  {
1101  j=0;
1102  id=s->session->cipher->id;
1103 
1104 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1105  printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1106 #endif
1107  for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1108  {
1109  c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1110 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1111  printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1112  i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1113 #endif
1114  if (c->id == id)
1115  {
1116  j=1;
1117  break;
1118  }
1119  }
1120 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1121  * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1122  */
1123 #if 0
1124  if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1125  {
1126  /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1127  * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1128  * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1129  * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1130  * enabled, though. */
1131  c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1132  if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1133  {
1134  s->session->cipher = c;
1135  j = 1;
1136  }
1137  }
1138 #endif
1139  if (j == 0)
1140  {
1141  /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1142  * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1143  al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1144  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1145  goto f_err;
1146  }
1147  }
1148 
1149  /* compression */
1150  i= *(p++);
1151  if ((p+i) > (d+n))
1152  {
1153  /* not enough data */
1154  al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1155  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1156  goto f_err;
1157  }
1158  q=p;
1159  for (j=0; j<i; j++)
1160  {
1161  if (p[j] == 0) break;
1162  }
1163 
1164  p+=i;
1165  if (j >= i)
1166  {
1167  /* no compress */
1168  al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1169  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1170  goto f_err;
1171  }
1172 
1173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1174  /* TLS extensions*/
1175  if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1176  {
1177  if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1178  {
1179  /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1180  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1181  goto f_err;
1182  }
1183  }
1184  if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1185  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1186  goto err;
1187  }
1188 
1189  /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1190  * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1191  * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1192  * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1193  {
1194  unsigned long Time;
1195  unsigned char *pos;
1196  Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1197  pos=s->s3->server_random;
1198  l2n(Time,pos);
1199  if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1200  {
1201  al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1202  goto f_err;
1203  }
1204  }
1205 
1206  if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1207  {
1208  SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1209 
1210  s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1211  if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1212  ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1213  {
1214  s->hit=1;
1215  s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1216  s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1217 
1218  ciphers=NULL;
1219 
1220  /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1221  pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1222  if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1223  {
1224  al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1225  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1226  goto f_err;
1227  }
1228 
1229  s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1230 
1231  if (s->cipher_list)
1232  sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1233 
1234  if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1235  sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1236 
1237  s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1238  s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1239  }
1240  }
1241 #endif
1242 
1243  /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1244  * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1245  * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1246  s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1247 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1248  /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1249  if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1250  {
1251  int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1252  /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1253  /* Can't disable compression */
1254  if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1255  {
1256  al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1257  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1258  goto f_err;
1259  }
1260  /* Look for resumed compression method */
1261  for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1262  {
1263  comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1264  if (comp_id == comp->id)
1265  {
1266  s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1267  break;
1268  }
1269  }
1270  if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1271  {
1272  al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1273  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1274  goto f_err;
1275  }
1276  /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1277  for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1278  {
1279  if (q[m] == comp_id)
1280  break;
1281  }
1282  if (m >= i)
1283  {
1284  al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1285  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1286  goto f_err;
1287  }
1288  }
1289  else if (s->hit)
1290  comp = NULL;
1291  else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1292  { /* See if we have a match */
1293  int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1294 
1295  nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1296  for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1297  {
1298  comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1299  v=comp->id;
1300  for (o=0; o<i; o++)
1301  {
1302  if (v == q[o])
1303  {
1304  done=1;
1305  break;
1306  }
1307  }
1308  if (done) break;
1309  }
1310  if (done)
1311  s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1312  else
1313  comp=NULL;
1314  }
1315 #else
1316  /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1317  * using compression.
1318  */
1319  if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1320  {
1321  al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1322  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1323  goto f_err;
1324  }
1325 #endif
1326 
1327  /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1328  * pick a cipher */
1329 
1330  if (!s->hit)
1331  {
1332 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1333  s->session->compress_meth=0;
1334 #else
1335  s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1336 #endif
1337  if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1338  sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1339  s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1340  if (ciphers == NULL)
1341  {
1342  al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1343  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1344  goto f_err;
1345  }
1346  ciphers=NULL;
1347  c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1348  SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1349 
1350  if (c == NULL)
1351  {
1352  al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1353  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1354  goto f_err;
1355  }
1356  s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1357  }
1358  else
1359  {
1360  /* Session-id reuse */
1361 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1362  STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1363  SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1364  SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1365 
1366  if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1367  {
1368  sk=s->session->ciphers;
1369  for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1370  {
1371  c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1372  if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1373  nc=c;
1374  if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1375  ec=c;
1376  }
1377  if (nc != NULL)
1378  s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1379  else if (ec != NULL)
1380  s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1381  else
1382  s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1383  }
1384  else
1385 #endif
1386  s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1387  }
1388 
1389  if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1390  {
1391  if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1392  goto f_err;
1393  }
1394 
1395  /* we now have the following setup.
1396  * client_random
1397  * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1398  * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1399  * compression - basically ignored right now
1400  * ssl version is set - sslv3
1401  * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1402  * s->hit - session reuse flag
1403  * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1404  */
1405 
1406  if (ret < 0) ret=1;
1407  if (0)
1408  {
1409 f_err:
1410  ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1411  }
1412 err:
1413  if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1414  return(ret);
1415  }
1416 
1417 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1418  {
1419  unsigned char *buf;
1420  unsigned char *p,*d;
1421  int i,sl;
1422  unsigned long l;
1423 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1424  unsigned long Time;
1425 #endif
1426 
1427  if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1428  {
1429  buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1430 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1431  p=s->s3->server_random;
1432  /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1433  Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1434  l2n(Time,p);
1435  if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1436  return -1;
1437 #endif
1438  /* Do the message type and length last */
1439  d=p= &(buf[4]);
1440 
1441  *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1442  *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1443 
1444  /* Random stuff */
1445  memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1446  p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1447 
1448  /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1449  * back in the server hello:
1450  * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1451  * we send back the old session ID.
1452  * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1453  * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1454  * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1455  * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1456  * session ID.
1457  * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1458  * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1459  * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1460  * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1461  * to send back.
1462  */
1463  if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1464  && !s->hit)
1465  s->session->session_id_length=0;
1466 
1467  sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1468  if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1469  {
1470  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1471  return -1;
1472  }
1473  *(p++)=sl;
1474  memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1475  p+=sl;
1476 
1477  /* put the cipher */
1478  i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1479  p+=i;
1480 
1481  /* put the compression method */
1482 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1483  *(p++)=0;
1484 #else
1485  if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1486  *(p++)=0;
1487  else
1488  *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1489 #endif
1490 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1491  if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1492  {
1493  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1494  return -1;
1495  }
1496  if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1497  {
1498  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1499  return -1;
1500  }
1501 #endif
1502  /* do the header */
1503  l=(p-d);
1504  d=buf;
1505  *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1506  l2n3(l,d);
1507 
1508  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1509  /* number of bytes to write */
1510  s->init_num=p-buf;
1511  s->init_off=0;
1512  }
1513 
1514  /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1515  return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1516  }
1517 
1518 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1519  {
1520  unsigned char *p;
1521 
1522  if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1523  {
1524  p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1525 
1526  /* do the header */
1527  *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1528  *(p++)=0;
1529  *(p++)=0;
1530  *(p++)=0;
1531 
1532  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1533  /* number of bytes to write */
1534  s->init_num=4;
1535  s->init_off=0;
1536  }
1537 
1538  /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1539  return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1540  }
1541 
1542 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1543  {
1544 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1545  unsigned char *q;
1546  int j,num;
1547  RSA *rsa;
1548  unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1549  unsigned int u;
1550 #endif
1551 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1552  DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
1553 #endif
1554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1555  EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1556  unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1557  int encodedlen = 0;
1558  int curve_id = 0;
1559  BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1560 #endif
1561  EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1562  const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1563  unsigned char *p,*d;
1564  int al,i;
1565  unsigned long type;
1566  int n;
1567  CERT *cert;
1568  BIGNUM *r[4];
1569  int nr[4],kn;
1570  BUF_MEM *buf;
1571  EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1572 
1573  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1574  if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1575  {
1576  type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1577  cert=s->cert;
1578 
1579  buf=s->init_buf;
1580 
1581  r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1582  n=0;
1583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1584  if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1585  {
1586  rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
1587  if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1588  {
1589  rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1590  SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1591  SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1592  if(rsa == NULL)
1593  {
1594  al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1595  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1596  goto f_err;
1597  }
1598  RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1599  cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
1600  }
1601  if (rsa == NULL)
1602  {
1603  al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1604  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1605  goto f_err;
1606  }
1607  r[0]=rsa->n;
1608  r[1]=rsa->e;
1609  s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1610  }
1611  else
1612 #endif
1613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1614  if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1615  {
1616  dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
1617  if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1618  dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1619  SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1620  SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1621  if (dhp == NULL)
1622  {
1623  al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1624  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1625  goto f_err;
1626  }
1627 
1628  if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1629  {
1630  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1631  goto err;
1632  }
1633 
1634  if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1635  {
1636  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1637  goto err;
1638  }
1639 
1640  s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
1641  if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1642  dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1643  (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1644  {
1645  if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1646  {
1647  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1648  ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1649  goto err;
1650  }
1651  }
1652  else
1653  {
1654  dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1655  dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1656  if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1657  (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1658  {
1659  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1660  goto err;
1661  }
1662  }
1663  r[0]=dh->p;
1664  r[1]=dh->g;
1665  r[2]=dh->pub_key;
1666  }
1667  else
1668 #endif
1669 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1670  if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1671  {
1672  const EC_GROUP *group;
1673 
1674  ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1675  if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1676  {
1677  ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1678  SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1679  SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1680  }
1681  if (ecdhp == NULL)
1682  {
1683  al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1684  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1685  goto f_err;
1686  }
1687 
1688  if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1689  {
1690  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1691  goto err;
1692  }
1693 
1694  /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1695  if (ecdhp == NULL)
1696  {
1697  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1698  goto err;
1699  }
1700  if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1701  {
1702  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1703  goto err;
1704  }
1705 
1706  s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1707  if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1708  (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1709  (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1710  {
1711  if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1712  {
1713  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1714  goto err;
1715  }
1716  }
1717 
1718  if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1719  (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1720  (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1721  {
1722  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1723  goto err;
1724  }
1725 
1726  if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1727  (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1728  {
1729  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1730  goto err;
1731  }
1732 
1733  /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1734  * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1735  * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1736  */
1737  if ((curve_id =
1738  tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1739  == 0)
1740  {
1741  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1742  goto err;
1743  }
1744 
1745  /* Encode the public key.
1746  * First check the size of encoding and
1747  * allocate memory accordingly.
1748  */
1749  encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1750  EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1751  POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1752  NULL, 0, NULL);
1753 
1754  encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1755  OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1756  bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1757  if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1758  {
1759  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1760  goto err;
1761  }
1762 
1763 
1764  encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1765  EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1766  POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1767  encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1768 
1769  if (encodedlen == 0)
1770  {
1771  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1772  goto err;
1773  }
1774 
1775  BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1776 
1777  /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1778  * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1779  * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1780  * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1781  * structure.
1782  */
1783  n = 4 + encodedlen;
1784 
1785  /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1786  * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1787  */
1788  r[0]=NULL;
1789  r[1]=NULL;
1790  r[2]=NULL;
1791  r[3]=NULL;
1792  }
1793  else
1794 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1795 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1796  if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1797  {
1798  /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1799  n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1800  }
1801  else
1802 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1804  if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1805  {
1806  if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1807  (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1808  (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1809  (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1810  {
1811  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1812  goto err;
1813  }
1814  r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N;
1815  r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g;
1816  r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s;
1817  r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B;
1818  }
1819  else
1820 #endif
1821  {
1822  al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1823  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1824  goto f_err;
1825  }
1826  for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1827  {
1828  nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1830  if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1831  n+=1+nr[i];
1832  else
1833 #endif
1834  n+=2+nr[i];
1835  }
1836 
1837  if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1838  && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1839  {
1840  if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1841  == NULL)
1842  {
1843  al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1844  goto f_err;
1845  }
1846  kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1847  }
1848  else
1849  {
1850  pkey=NULL;
1851  kn=0;
1852  }
1853 
1854  if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1855  {
1856  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1857  goto err;
1858  }
1859  d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1860  p= &(d[4]);
1861 
1862  for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1863  {
1864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1865  if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1866  {
1867  *p = nr[i];
1868  p++;
1869  }
1870  else
1871 #endif
1872  s2n(nr[i],p);
1873  BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
1874  p+=nr[i];
1875  }
1876 
1877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1878  if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1879  {
1880  /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1881  * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1882  * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1883  * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1884  * the actual encoded point itself
1885  */
1886  *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1887  p += 1;
1888  *p = 0;
1889  p += 1;
1890  *p = curve_id;
1891  p += 1;
1892  *p = encodedlen;
1893  p += 1;
1894  memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1895  (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1896  encodedlen);
1897  OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1898  encodedPoint = NULL;
1899  p += encodedlen;
1900  }
1901 #endif
1902 
1903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1904  if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1905  {
1906  /* copy PSK identity hint */
1907  s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1908  strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1909  p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1910  }
1911 #endif
1912 
1913  /* not anonymous */
1914  if (pkey != NULL)
1915  {
1916  /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1917  * and p points to the space at the end. */
1918 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1919  if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1920  && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
1921  {
1922  q=md_buf;
1923  j=0;
1924  for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1925  {
1926  EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1927  EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1928  EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1929  ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1930  EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1931  EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1932  EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1933  EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1934  (unsigned int *)&i);
1935  q+=i;
1936  j+=i;
1937  }
1938  if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1939  &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1940  {
1941  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1942  goto err;
1943  }
1944  s2n(u,p);
1945  n+=u+2;
1946  }
1947  else
1948 #endif
1949  if (md)
1950  {
1951  /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
1952  * algorithm */
1953  if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1954  {
1955  if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
1956  {
1957  /* Should never happen */
1958  al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1959  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1960  goto f_err;
1961  }
1962  p+=2;
1963  }
1964 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
1965  fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
1966  EVP_MD_name(md));
1967 #endif
1968  EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1969  EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1970  EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1971  EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1972  if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1973  (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1974  {
1975  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
1976  goto err;
1977  }
1978  s2n(i,p);
1979  n+=i+2;
1980  if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1981  n+= 2;
1982  }
1983  else
1984  {
1985  /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1986  al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1987  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1988  goto f_err;
1989  }
1990  }
1991 
1992  *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1993  l2n3(n,d);
1994 
1995  /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1996  * it off */
1997  s->init_num=n+4;
1998  s->init_off=0;
1999  }
2000 
2001  s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2002  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2003  return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2004 f_err:
2005  ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2006 err:
2007 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2008  if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2009  BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2010 #endif
2011  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2012  return(-1);
2013  }
2014 
2015 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2016  {
2017  unsigned char *p,*d;
2018  int i,j,nl,off,n;
2019  STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2020  X509_NAME *name;
2021  BUF_MEM *buf;
2022 
2023  if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2024  {
2025  buf=s->init_buf;
2026 
2027  d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
2028 
2029  /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2030  p++;
2031  n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2032  d[0]=n;
2033  p+=n;
2034  n++;
2035 
2036  if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2037  {
2038  nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
2039  s2n(nl, p);
2040  p += nl + 2;
2041  n += nl + 2;
2042  }
2043 
2044  off=n;
2045  p+=2;
2046  n+=2;
2047 
2048  sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2049  nl=0;
2050  if (sk != NULL)
2051  {
2052  for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2053  {
2054  name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2055  j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2056  if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
2057  {
2058  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2059  goto err;
2060  }
2061  p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
2062  if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2063  {
2064  s2n(j,p);
2065  i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2066  n+=2+j;
2067  nl+=2+j;
2068  }
2069  else
2070  {
2071  d=p;
2072  i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2073  j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2074  n+=j;
2075  nl+=j;
2076  }
2077  }
2078  }
2079  /* else no CA names */
2080  p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
2081  s2n(nl,p);
2082 
2083  d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
2084  *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2085  l2n3(n,d);
2086 
2087  /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2088  * it off */
2089 
2090  s->init_num=n+4;
2091  s->init_off=0;
2092 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2093  p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2094 
2095  /* do the header */
2096  *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2097  *(p++)=0;
2098  *(p++)=0;
2099  *(p++)=0;
2100  s->init_num += 4;
2101 #endif
2102 
2103  s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2104  }
2105 
2106  /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2107  return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2108 err:
2109  return(-1);
2110  }
2111 
2112 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2113  {
2114  int i,al,ok;
2115  long n;
2116  unsigned long alg_k;
2117  unsigned char *p;
2118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2119  RSA *rsa=NULL;
2120  EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2121 #endif
2122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2123  BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
2124  DH *dh_srvr;
2125 #endif
2126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2127  KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
2128 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2129 
2130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2131  EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2132  EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2133  EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2134  BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2135 #endif
2136 
2137  n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2138  SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2139  SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2140  SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2141  2048, /* ??? */
2142  &ok);
2143 
2144  if (!ok) return((int)n);
2145  p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2146 
2147  alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2148 
2149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2150  if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2151  {
2152  /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2153  if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2154  {
2155  if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2156  rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2157  /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2158  * be sent already */
2159  if (rsa == NULL)
2160  {
2161  al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2162  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2163  goto f_err;
2164 
2165  }
2166  }
2167  else
2168  {
2169  pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2170  if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2171  (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2172  (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2173  {
2174  al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2175  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2176  goto f_err;
2177  }
2178  rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
2179  }
2180 
2181  /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2182  if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2183  {
2184  n2s(p,i);
2185  if (n != i+2)
2186  {
2187  if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2188  {
2189  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2190  goto err;
2191  }
2192  else
2193  p-=2;
2194  }
2195  else
2196  n=i;
2197  }
2198 
2199  i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2200 
2201  al = -1;
2202 
2203  if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2204  {
2205  al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2206  /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2207  }
2208 
2209  if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2210  {
2211  /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2212  * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2213  * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2214  * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2215  * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2216  * protocol version.
2217  * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2218  if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2219  (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2220  {
2221  al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2222  /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2223 
2224  /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2225  * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2226  * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2227  * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2228  * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2229  * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2230  * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2231  }
2232  }
2233 
2234  if (al != -1)
2235  {
2236  /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2237  * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2238  * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2239  ERR_clear_error();
2240  i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2241  p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2242  p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2243  if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2244  goto err;
2245  }
2246 
2247  s->session->master_key_length=
2248  s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2249  s->session->master_key,
2250  p,i);
2251  OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2252  }
2253  else
2254 #endif
2255 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2256  if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2257  {
2258  n2s(p,i);
2259  if (n != i+2)
2260  {
2261  if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2262  {
2263  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2264  goto err;
2265  }
2266  else
2267  {
2268  p-=2;
2269  i=(int)n;
2270  }
2271  }
2272 
2273  if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2274  {
2275  al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2276  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2277  goto f_err;
2278  }
2279  else
2280  {
2281  if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2282  {
2283  al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2284  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2285  goto f_err;
2286  }
2287  else
2288  dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2289  }
2290 
2291  pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2292  if (pub == NULL)
2293  {
2294  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2295  goto err;
2296  }
2297 
2298  i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2299 
2300  if (i <= 0)
2301  {
2302  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2303  BN_clear_free(pub);
2304  goto err;
2305  }
2306 
2307  DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2308  s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
2309 
2310  BN_clear_free(pub);
2311  pub=NULL;
2312  s->session->master_key_length=
2313  s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2314  s->session->master_key,p,i);
2315  OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2316  }
2317  else
2318 #endif
2319 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2320  if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2321  {
2322  krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2323  krb5_data enc_ticket;
2324  krb5_data authenticator;
2325  krb5_data enc_pms;
2326  KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2327  EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2328  const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2329  unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2330  unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2331  + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2332  int padl, outl;
2333  krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2334  krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2335 
2336  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2337 
2338  if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2339 
2340  n2s(p,i);
2341  enc_ticket.length = i;
2342 
2343  if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2344  {
2345  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2346  SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2347  goto err;
2348  }
2349 
2350  enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2351  p+=enc_ticket.length;
2352 
2353  n2s(p,i);
2354  authenticator.length = i;
2355 
2356  if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2357  {
2358  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2359  SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2360  goto err;
2361  }
2362 
2363  authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2364  p+=authenticator.length;
2365 
2366  n2s(p,i);
2367  enc_pms.length = i;
2368  enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2369  p+=enc_pms.length;
2370 
2371  /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2372  ** after decryption
2373  */
2374  if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2375  {
2376  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2377  SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2378  goto err;
2379  }
2380 
2381  if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2382  enc_pms.length + 6))
2383  {
2384  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2385  SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2386  goto err;
2387  }
2388 
2389  if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2390  &kssl_err)) != 0)
2391  {
2392 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2393  printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2394  krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2395  if (kssl_err.text)
2396  printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2397 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2398  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2399  kssl_err.reason);
2400  goto err;
2401  }
2402 
2403  /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2404  ** but will return authtime == 0.
2405  */
2406  if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2407  &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2408  {
2409 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2410  printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2411  krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2412  if (kssl_err.text)
2413  printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2414 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2415  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2416  kssl_err.reason);
2417  goto err;
2418  }
2419 
2420  if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2421  {
2422  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2423  goto err;
2424  }
2425 
2426 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2427  kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2428 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2429 
2430  enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2431  if (enc == NULL)
2432  goto err;
2433 
2434  memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2435 
2436  if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2437  {
2438  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2439  SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2440  goto err;
2441  }
2442  if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2443  (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2444  {
2445  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2446  SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2447  goto err;
2448  }
2449  if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2450  {
2451  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2452  SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2453  goto err;
2454  }
2455  if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2456  {
2457  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2458  SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2459  goto err;
2460  }
2461  outl += padl;
2462  if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2463  {
2464  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2465  SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2466  goto err;
2467  }
2468  if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2469  {
2470  /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2471  * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2472  * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2473  * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2474  * the protocol version.
2475  * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2476  * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2477  */
2478  if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2479  {
2480  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2481  SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2482  goto err;
2483  }
2484  }
2485 
2486  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2487 
2488  s->session->master_key_length=
2489  s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2490  s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2491 
2492  if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2493  {
2494  size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2495  if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2496  {
2497  s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2498  memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2499  }
2500  }
2501 
2502 
2503  /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2504  ** but it caused problems for apache.
2505  ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2506  ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2507  */
2508  }
2509  else
2510 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2511 
2512 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2513  if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2514  {
2515  int ret = 1;
2516  int field_size = 0;
2517  const EC_KEY *tkey;
2518  const EC_GROUP *group;
2519  const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2520 
2521  /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2522  if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2523  {
2524  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2525  ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2526  goto err;
2527  }
2528 
2529  /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2530  if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2531  {
2532  /* use the certificate */
2533  tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2534  }
2535  else
2536  {
2537  /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2538  * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2539  */
2540  tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2541  }
2542 
2543  group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2544  priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2545 
2546  if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2547  !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2548  {
2549  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2550  ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2551  goto err;
2552  }
2553 
2554  /* Let's get client's public key */
2555  if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2556  {
2557  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2558  ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2559  goto err;
2560  }
2561 
2562  if (n == 0L)
2563  {
2564  /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2565 
2566  if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2567  {
2568  al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2569  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2570  goto f_err;
2571  }
2572  if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2573  == NULL) ||
2574  (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2575  {
2576  /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2577  * authentication using ECDH certificates
2578  * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2579  * never executed. When that support is
2580  * added, we ought to ensure the key
2581  * received in the certificate is
2582  * authorized for key agreement.
2583  * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2584  * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2585  * group.
2586  */
2587  al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2588  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2589  SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2590  goto f_err;
2591  }
2592 
2593  if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2594  EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2595  {
2596  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2597  ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2598  goto err;
2599  }
2600  ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2601  }
2602  else
2603  {
2604  /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2605  * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2606  */
2607  if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2608  {
2609  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2610  ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2611  goto err;
2612  }
2613 
2614  /* Get encoded point length */
2615  i = *p;
2616  p += 1;
2617  if (n != 1 + i)
2618  {
2619  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2620  ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2621  goto err;
2622  }
2623  if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2624  clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2625  {
2626  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2627  ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2628  goto err;
2629  }
2630  /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2631  * currently, so set it to the start
2632  */
2633  p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2634  }
2635 
2636  /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2637  field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2638  if (field_size <= 0)
2639  {
2640  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2641  ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2642  goto err;
2643  }
2644  i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2645  if (i <= 0)
2646  {
2647  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2648  ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2649  goto err;
2650  }
2651 
2652  EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2653  EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2654  EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2655  BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2656  EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2657  s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2658 
2659  /* Compute the master secret */
2660  s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2661  generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2662 
2663  OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2664  return (ret);
2665  }
2666  else
2667 #endif
2668 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2669  if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2670  {
2671  unsigned char *t = NULL;
2672  unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2673  unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2674  int psk_err = 1;
2675  char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2676 
2677  al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2678 
2679  n2s(p,i);
2680  if (n != i+2)
2681  {
2682  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2683  SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2684  goto psk_err;
2685  }
2686  if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2687  {
2688  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2689  SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2690  goto psk_err;
2691  }
2692  if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2693  {
2694  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2695  SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2696  goto psk_err;
2697  }
2698 
2699  /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2700  * string for the callback */
2701  memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2702  memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2703  psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2704  psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2705  OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2706 
2707  if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2708  {
2709  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2710  ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2711  goto psk_err;
2712  }
2713  else if (psk_len == 0)
2714  {
2715  /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2716  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2717  SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2718  al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2719  goto psk_err;
2720  }
2721 
2722  /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2723  pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2724  t = psk_or_pre_ms;
2725  memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2726  s2n(psk_len, t);
2727  memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2728  t+=psk_len;
2729  s2n(psk_len, t);
2730 
2731  if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2732  OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2733  s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2734  if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2735  {
2736  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2737  ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2738  goto psk_err;
2739  }
2740 
2741  if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2742  OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2743  s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2744  if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2745  s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2746  {
2747  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2748  ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2749  goto psk_err;
2750  }
2751 
2752  s->session->master_key_length=
2753  s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2754  s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2755  psk_err = 0;
2756  psk_err:
2757  OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2758  if (psk_err != 0)
2759  goto f_err;
2760  }
2761  else
2762 #endif
2763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2764  if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2765  {
2766  int param_len;
2767 
2768  n2s(p,i);
2769  param_len=i+2;
2770  if (param_len > n)
2771  {
2772  al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2773  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2774  goto f_err;
2775  }
2776  if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2777  {
2778  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2779  goto err;
2780  }
2781  if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2782  OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2783  s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2784  if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2785  {
2786  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2787  ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2788  goto err;
2789  }
2790 
2791  if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2792  {
2793  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2794  goto err;
2795  }
2796 
2797  p+=i;
2798  }
2799  else
2800 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2801  if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2802  {
2803  int ret = 0;
2804  EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2805  EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2806  unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2807  size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2808  unsigned long alg_a;
2809 
2810  /* Get our certificate private key*/
2811  alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2812  if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2813  pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2814  else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2815  pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2816 
2817  pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2818  EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2819  /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2820  * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2821  * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2822  * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2823  client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2824  if (client_pub_pkey)
2825  {
2826  if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2827  ERR_clear_error();
2828  }
2829  /* Decrypt session key */
2830  if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2831  {
2832  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2833  goto gerr;
2834  }
2835  if (p[1] == 0x81)
2836  {
2837  start = p+3;
2838  inlen = p[2];
2839  }
2840  else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2841  {
2842  start = p+2;
2843  inlen = p[1];
2844  }
2845  else
2846  {
2847  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2848  goto gerr;
2849  }
2850  if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2851 
2852  {
2853  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2854  goto gerr;
2855  }
2856  /* Generate master secret */
2857  s->session->master_key_length=
2858  s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2859  s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2860  /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2861  if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2862  ret = 2;
2863  else
2864  ret = 1;
2865  gerr:
2866  EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2867  EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2868  if (ret)
2869  return ret;
2870  else
2871  goto err;
2872  }
2873  else
2874  {
2875  al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2876  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2877  SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2878  goto f_err;
2879  }
2880 
2881  return(1);
2882 f_err:
2883  ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2884 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2885 err:
2886 #endif
2887 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2888  EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2889  EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2890  if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2891  EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2892  BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2893 #endif
2894  return(-1);
2895  }
2896 
2897 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2898  {
2899  EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2900  unsigned char *p;
2901  int al,ok,ret=0;
2902  long n;
2903  int type=0,i,j;
2904  X509 *peer;
2905  const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2906  EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
2907  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2908 
2909  n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2910  SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2911  SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2912  -1,
2913  516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
2914  &ok);
2915 
2916  if (!ok) return((int)n);
2917 
2918  if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2919  {
2920  peer=s->session->peer;
2921  pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2922  type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2923  }
2924  else
2925  {
2926  peer=NULL;
2927  pkey=NULL;
2928  }
2929 
2930  if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2931  {
2932  s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2933  if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2934  {
2935  al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2936  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2937  goto f_err;
2938  }
2939  ret=1;
2940  goto end;
2941  }
2942 
2943  if (peer == NULL)
2944  {
2945  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2946  al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2947  goto f_err;
2948  }
2949 
2950  if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2951  {
2952  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2953  al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2954  goto f_err;
2955  }
2956 
2957  if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2958  {
2959  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2960  al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2961  goto f_err;
2962  }
2963 
2964  /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2965  p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2966  /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2967  /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2968  * signature without length field */
2969  if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2970  pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
2971  {
2972  i=64;
2973  }
2974  else
2975  {
2976  if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2977  {
2978  int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
2979  /* Should never happen */
2980  if (sigalg == -1)
2981  {
2982  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2983  al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2984  goto f_err;
2985  }
2986  /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
2987  if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
2988  {
2989  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2990  al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2991  goto f_err;
2992  }
2993  md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
2994  if (md == NULL)
2995  {
2996  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
2997  al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2998  goto f_err;
2999  }
3000 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3001 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3002 #endif
3003  p += 2;
3004  n -= 2;
3005  }
3006  n2s(p,i);
3007  n-=2;
3008  if (i > n)
3009  {
3010  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3011  al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3012  goto f_err;
3013  }
3014  }
3015  j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3016  if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3017  {
3018  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3019  al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3020  goto f_err;
3021  }
3022 
3023  if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3024  {
3025  long hdatalen = 0;
3026  void *hdata;
3027  hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3028  if (hdatalen <= 0)
3029  {
3030  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3031  al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3032  goto f_err;
3033  }
3034 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3035  fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3036  EVP_MD_name(md));
3037 #endif
3038  if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3039  || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3040  {
3041  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3042  al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3043  goto f_err;
3044  }
3045 
3046  if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3047  {
3048  al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3049  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3050  goto f_err;
3051  }
3052  }
3053  else
3054 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3055  if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3056  {
3057  i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3058  MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3059  pkey->pkey.rsa);
3060  if (i < 0)
3061  {
3062  al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3063  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3064  goto f_err;
3065  }
3066  if (i == 0)
3067  {
3068  al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3069  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3070  goto f_err;
3071  }
3072  }
3073  else
3074 #endif
3075 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3076  if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3077  {
3078  j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3079  &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3080  SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3081  if (j <= 0)
3082  {
3083  /* bad signature */
3084  al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3085  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3086  goto f_err;
3087  }
3088  }
3089  else
3090 #endif
3091 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3092  if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3093  {
3094  j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3095  &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3096  SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3097  if (j <= 0)
3098  {
3099  /* bad signature */
3100  al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3101  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3102  SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3103  goto f_err;
3104  }
3105  }
3106  else
3107 #endif
3108  if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3109  { unsigned char signature[64];
3110  int idx;
3111  EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3112  EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3113  if (i!=64) {
3114  fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3115  }
3116  for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3117  signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3118  }
3119  j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3120  EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3121  if (j<=0)
3122  {
3123  al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3124  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3125  SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3126  goto f_err;
3127  }
3128  }
3129  else
3130  {
3131  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3132  al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3133  goto f_err;
3134  }
3135 
3136 
3137  ret=1;
3138  if (0)
3139  {
3140 f_err:
3141  ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3142  }
3143 end:
3144  if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3145  {
3146  BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3147  s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3148  s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3149  }
3150  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3151  EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3152  return(ret);
3153  }
3154 
3155 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3156  {
3157  int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3158  X509 *x=NULL;
3159  unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3160  const unsigned char *p,*q;
3161  unsigned char *d;
3162  STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3163 
3164  n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3165  SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
3166  SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
3167  -1,
3168  s->max_cert_list,
3169  &ok);
3170 
3171  if (!ok) return((int)n);
3172 
3173  if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3174  {
3175  if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3176  (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3177  {
3178  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3179  al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3180  goto f_err;
3181  }
3182  /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3183  if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3184  {
3185  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3186  al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3187  goto f_err;
3188  }
3189  s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3190  return(1);
3191  }
3192 
3193  if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3194  {
3195  al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3196  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3197  goto f_err;
3198  }
3199  p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3200 
3201  if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3202  {
3203  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3204  goto err;
3205  }
3206 
3207  n2l3(p,llen);
3208  if (llen+3 != n)
3209  {
3210  al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3211  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3212  goto f_err;
3213  }
3214  for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3215  {
3216  n2l3(p,l);
3217  if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3218  {
3219  al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3220  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3221  goto f_err;
3222  }
3223 
3224  q=p;
3225  x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3226  if (x == NULL)
3227  {
3228  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3229  goto err;
3230  }
3231  if (p != (q+l))
3232  {
3233  al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3234  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3235  goto f_err;
3236  }
3237  if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3238  {
3239  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3240  goto err;
3241  }
3242  x=NULL;
3243  nc+=l+3;
3244  }
3245 
3246  if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3247  {
3248  /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3249  if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3250  {
3251  al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3252  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3253  goto f_err;
3254  }
3255  /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3256  else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3257  (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3258  {
3259  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3260  al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3261  goto f_err;
3262  }
3263  /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3264  if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3265  {
3266  al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3267  goto f_err;
3268  }
3269  }
3270  else
3271  {
3272  i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3273  if (i <= 0)
3274  {
3275  al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3276  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3277  goto f_err;
3278  }
3279  }
3280 
3281  if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3282  X509_free(s->session->peer);
3283  s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3284  s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3285 
3286  /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3287  * when we arrive here. */
3288  if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3289  {
3290  s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3291  if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3292  {
3293  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3294  goto err;
3295  }
3296  }
3297  if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3298  sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3299  s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3300  /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3301  * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3302 
3303  sk=NULL;
3304 
3305  ret=1;
3306  if (0)
3307  {
3308 f_err:
3309  ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3310  }
3311 err:
3312  if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3313  if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3314  return(ret);
3315  }
3316 
3317 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3318  {
3319  unsigned long l;
3320  X509 *x;
3321 
3322  if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3323  {
3324  x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3325  if (x == NULL)
3326  {
3327  /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3328  if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3329  (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3330  {
3331  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3332  return(0);
3333  }
3334  }
3335 
3336  l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
3337  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3338  s->init_num=(int)l;
3339  s->init_off=0;
3340  }
3341 
3342  /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3343  return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3344  }
3345 
3346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3347 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3348 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3349  {
3350  if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3351  {
3352  unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3353  const unsigned char *const_p;
3354  int len, slen_full, slen;
3355  SSL_SESSION *sess;
3356  unsigned int hlen;
3357  EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3358  HMAC_CTX hctx;
3359  SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3360  unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3361  unsigned char key_name[16];
3362 
3363  /* get session encoding length */
3364  slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3365  /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3366  * too long
3367  */
3368  if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3369  return -1;
3370  senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3371  if (!senc)
3372  return -1;
3373  p = senc;
3374  i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3375 
3376  /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3377  const_p = senc;
3378  sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3379  if (sess == NULL)
3380  {
3381  OPENSSL_free(senc);
3382  return -1;
3383  }
3384  sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3385 
3386  slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3387  if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3388  {
3389  OPENSSL_free(senc);
3390  return -1;
3391  }
3392  p = senc;
3393  i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3394  SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3395 
3396  /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3397  * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3398  * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3399  * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3400  * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3401  * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3402  */
3403  if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3404  26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3405  EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3406  return -1;
3407 
3408  p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3409  /* do the header */
3410  *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3411  /* Skip message length for now */
3412  p += 3;
3413  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3414  HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3415  /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3416  * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3417  * from parent ctx.
3418  */
3419  if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3420  {
3421  if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3422  &hctx, 1) < 0)
3423  {
3424  OPENSSL_free(senc);
3425  return -1;
3426  }
3427  }
3428  else
3429  {
3430  RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3431  EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3432  tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3433  HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3434  tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3435  memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3436  }
3437 
3438  /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3439  * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3440  * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3441  * as their sessions. */
3442  l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3443 
3444  /* Skip ticket length for now */
3445  p += 2;
3446  /* Output key name */
3447  macstart = p;
3448  memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3449  p += 16;
3450  /* output IV */
3451  memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3452  p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3453  /* Encrypt session data */
3454  EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3455  p += len;
3456  EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3457  p += len;
3458  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3459 
3460  HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3461  HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3462  HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3463 
3464  p += hlen;
3465  /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3466  /* Total length */
3467  len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3468  p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3469  l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3470  p += 4;
3471  s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3472 
3473  /* number of bytes to write */
3474  s->init_num= len;
3475  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3476  s->init_off=0;
3477  OPENSSL_free(senc);
3478  }
3479 
3480  /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3481  return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3482  }
3483 
3484 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3485  {
3486  if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3487  {
3488  unsigned char *p;
3489  /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3490  * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3491  * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3492  * + (ocsp response)
3493  */
3494  if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3495  return -1;
3496 
3497  p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3498 
3499  /* do the header */
3500  *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3501  /* message length */
3502  l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3503  /* status type */
3504  *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3505  /* length of OCSP response */
3506  l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3507  /* actual response */
3508  memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3509  /* number of bytes to write */
3510  s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3511  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3512  s->init_off = 0;
3513  }
3514 
3515  /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3516  return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3517  }
3518 
3519 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3520 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3521  * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3522 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3523  {
3524  int ok;
3525  int proto_len, padding_len;
3526  long n;
3527  const unsigned char *p;
3528 
3529  /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3530  * extension in their ClientHello */
3531  if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3532  {
3533  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3534  return -1;
3535  }
3536 
3537  n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3538  SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3539  SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3540  SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
3541  514, /* See the payload format below */
3542  &ok);
3543 
3544  if (!ok)
3545  return((int)n);
3546 
3547  /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3548  * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3549  * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3550  if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3551  {
3552  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3553  return -1;
3554  }
3555 
3556  if (n < 2)
3557  return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3558 
3559  p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3560 
3561  /* The payload looks like:
3562  * uint8 proto_len;
3563  * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3564  * uint8 padding_len;
3565  * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3566  */
3567  proto_len = p[0];
3568  if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3569  return 0;
3570  padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3571  if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3572  return 0;
3573 
3574  s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3575  if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3576  {
3577  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3578  return 0;
3579  }
3580  memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3581  s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3582 
3583  return 1;
3584  }
3585 # endif
3586 #endif
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